APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Jack Louis Janes, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea or, in the alternative, petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s award of attorney fees. The ex-husband appeals. Upon a thorough review of the record, we discern no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Donald Hollon Runions, was convicted of two counts of violation of the Child Protection Act, Class A felonies; four counts of rape of a child, Class A felonies; and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, Class B felonies, and he was sentenced to an effective term of fifty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the Child Protection Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-518,is unconstitutional; and (3) case law applied in his case to allow certain credibility evidence should be overturned. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Michael E. Stewart, filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in the Polk County Criminal Court, claiming that newly discovered evidence revealed the investigating officer in his case participated in the bystander jury selection process used at his trial and that the statute of limitations should be tolled. After an evidentiary hearing, the coram nobis court denied the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that our supreme court’s rules prevented him from receiving a fair coram nobis hearing by depriving him of an investigator; that the coram nobis court erred by inquiring into the Petitioner’s relationship with his “main” witness at the hearing; and that the coram nobis court should have granted his petition. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Petitioner, Dedrick Wiggins, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his convictions for two counts of second degree murder and three counts of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition as filed outside the one-year statute of limitations. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Ercil K. Gates-Rayford, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

After a planning commission approved a subdivision request, neighboring property owners filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari. The trial court granted the writ and, upon review, vacated the decision and remanded the case for further consideration. Both the planning commission and the owner of the proposed development appealed. Based on our review, we conclude that the planning commission acted illegally when it misapplied the applicable legal standards. So we affirm.  

A Hardin County firefighter and Appellant’s husband died after their vehicles collided. Appellant alleged that the firefighter had negligently caused the accident, and thus filed tort claims against Hardin County under a theory of vicarious liability and Tennessee’s Governmental Tort Liability Act. She filed her claims more than one year after the accident, so the trial court dismissed them as barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations. She appeals, and we affirm.

Following a bench trial, the Chancery Court for Knox County (“trial court”) granted the divorce of Louise Helen Pack Dover (“Wife”) from Norris L. Dover (“Husband”) on the basis of inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court classified several real properties, largely purchased by Husband before the marriage, as Husband’s separate assets and concluded that no transmutation occurred during the marriage. The trial court also classified Husband’s 401(k), which was established before the marriage, as a marital asset and ordered the parties to divide it equally. The trial court then awarded Wife alimony in solido in the amount of $5,000.00 per month for thirty-six months. We conclude that the trial court erred in the classification of the real properties at issue as well as its classification of Husband’s 401(k). Because the division of marital property will change substantially as a result of this opinion, we vacate the trial court’s division of the parties’ marital estate and the alimony award. We therefore reverse in part, affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

A Williamson County jury convicted the Defendant, Robert A. Doll, III, of two counts of suborning aggravated perjury and one count of criminal simulation, and the trial court sentenced him to two years of probation. The Defendant filed a motion for new trial, alleging that the indictment against him was untimely. The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion, and the Defendant now appeals. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred when it failed to dismiss the indictment as time-barred. After review, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

The trial court entered an order permitting the use of sealed court records from a dependency and neglect matter in a subsequent federal civil rights lawsuit challenging the dependency and neglect proceedings. The respondent mother, who is also the plaintiff in the related federal action, has appealed. Inasmuch as the collateral federal lawsuit has now been dismissed, we determine that this appeal is moot and nonjusticiable. We therefore dismiss the mother’s appeal.

Two corporations entered into merger discussions. Later, one corporation sued the other claiming that an agreement to merge had been reached through the exchange of emails. The plaintiff corporation requested specific performance of the alleged merger agreement and damages. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court concluded on the undisputed facts that there was no meeting of the minds and, thus, no agreement to merge. We affirm.

The defendant, Dawn Michlitsch, pled guilty to two counts of possession of .5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia for which she received an effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in enhancing her sentence and in denying any form of alternative sentencing. Upon our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Carroll County jury convicted the Defendant, Elijah Paul Williams, of intentionally or knowingly failing to pay child support, and the trial court sentenced him to six months, ninety days of which the Defendant was to serve in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that he was denied due process of law. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Demetrice A. Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2017
guilty-pleaded convictions of possession of a handgun after having been convicted of a felony and failure to appear, alleging that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary because he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The father of two children appeals the termination of his parental rights, contending the petitioner failed to prove a ground for termination or that termination was in the children’s best interests by clear and convincing evidence. In 2018, the juvenile court placed the children in foster care and declared them dependent and neglected upon the petition of the Department of Children’s Services. The court then ratified a permanency plan that had several requirements for the father, including submitting to and passing random drug screens, resolving pending legal issues, and avoiding new criminal charges. Over the next two years, the father only completed some of the action steps and incurred new criminal charges for which he was incarcerated. In September 2019, the Department filed a petition to terminate the father’s rights on the grounds of abandonment by exhibiting a wanton disregard for the children’s welfare and by failure to visit, failure to comply with the permanency plan, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of and financial responsibility for the children. After the final hearing, the court found that the Department proved all four grounds and that termination was in the children’s best interests. This appeal followed. Following a detailed review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s findings in all respects and affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights.

Petitioner, Michael F. Maraschiello, was convicted of first degree murder, arson, possession of a shotgun with an altered serial number, and theft after a jury trial in 1997. He was sentenced to life plus five years for the convictions. Petitioner appealed and this Court affirmed the conviction. State v. Maraschiello, 88 S.W.3d 586, 590 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). Over 19 years ago, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging various grounds for relief including ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner sought funding for a medical and psychological expert in 2005, and the post-conviction court denied the request. The post-conviction court granted Petitioner permission for an interlocutory appeal. This Court denied the application for permission to appeal. State v. Michael F. Maraschiello, M2007-01968-CCA-R9-CO, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2007) (order). After multiple amended petitions that included dozens of claims, the postconviction court denied relief to Petitioner in 2019. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the evidence weighs against the post-conviction’s court finding that Petitioner was not a credible witness, that he has a constitutional or statutory right to state funded experts and investigators, that the post-conviction court erred by denying Petitioner the ability to prove his claims by refusing to allow Petitioner to call sixty-nine witnesses, that the postconviction court erred when it rejected Petitioner’s claim that he clearly accepted a plea offer, and that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to call or impeach witnesses. After a thorough review of the very lengthy record, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

The present appeal concerns an insurance agent’s alleged negligent failure to procure excess uninsured motorist coverage in accordance with a prospective insured’s instructions. The two insured parties, a married couple, filed suit against their insurance agent and agency after they were denied coverage by the insurance carrier. The trial court found that it was undisputed that the insureds had paid the premium for the policy in effect and applied Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-135(b), which provides: “The payment of premium for an insurance contract, or amendment thereto, by an insured shall create a rebuttable presumption that the coverage provided has been accepted by all insureds under the contract.” The trial court determined that the insureds had failed to rebut the statutory presumption that they had accepted the provided coverage, which did not include excess uninsured motorist coverage. Therefore, the trial court granted the insurance agent’s motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed, concluding that the rebuttable presumption does not apply to actions against an insurance agent. We granted the ensuing application for permission to appeal to address whether section 56-7-135(b) applies to create a rebuttable presumption in actions against an insurance agent for negligent failure to procure an insurance policy as directed. Considering the plain language of the statute, we conclude that it does create such a presumption. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment. 

This appeal arises from a judgment finding the defendant violated a protective order and a subsequent judgment extending the protective order for one year. Specifically, the defendant seeks to set aside these judgments based on inadequate notice. Although the defendant appeared in court for a related hearing and admits that all notices were sent to her at the proper address, she contends on appeal that, because she was a frequent traveler, she was unaware of the two hearings at issue in this appeal until after they occurred. We have determined the defendant waived the notice issue by failing to bring it to the attention of the trial court and by failing to comply with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Additionally, we have determined the appeal was frivolous; therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary expenses and attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 27-1-122. Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to make the appropriate award.

The Defendant, Jordana Jenyane Wright, pled guilty to Class E felony theft of property with an agreed-upon sentence of one year and six months of probation. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for diversion. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court, in its decision to deny diversion, failed to properly account for the Defendant’s lack of a criminal record and improperly weighed irrelevant facts, such as the Defendant’s failure to implicate any potential co-defendants and the criminal history of the Defendant’s fiancé. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Thomas McLaughlin, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition alleged that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at a revocation hearing .Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Defendant, Armin Lars Begtrup, was found guilty after a jury trial of two counts of aggravated perjury. He was sentenced to three and one-half years of supervised probation. The trial court granted judicial diversion. Defendant timely filed a motion for new trial which the trial court denied. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court violated his right to a unanimous verdict and that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review, we dismiss the appeal because we lack jurisdiction to consider the issues.

I agree that the majority opinion is correctly decided based upon the current relevant rules and case law. I write separately because I also agree with the statement in the Defendant’s supplemental brief that The denial of access to the appellate courts where the defendant enters a plea of not guilty, is convicted at trial, and is sentenced under judicial diversion is wrong. That is the Appellant’s rubric. The defendant who maintains his innocence has no appellate recourse to correct trial errors that may have resulted in a wrongful conviction if sentenced under judicial diversion.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff’s uninsured motorist insurance claim filed against his employer following a car accident. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The transferee of real property following a foreclosure sale filed a forcible entry and detainer action against the occupier. After the transferee prevailed in the general sessions court, the occupier appealed to circuit court. The transferee then filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Because the undisputed facts demonstrate that the transferee is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we affirm.