APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This civil action was filed by Michelle Ball ("Ms Ball") against Hamilton County Emergency Medical Services ("HCEMS") and others, seeking damages for the wrongful death of Ms. Ball's 16-month-old daughter, Miranda K. Ball ("Miranda"). The suit against HCEMS brought into play the provision of the Govermental Tort Liability Act. Following a bench trial, the court dismissed the complaint as to HCEMS, finding that HCEMS did not have a duty to transport Miranda to the hospital in the face of her mother's decision at the child's condition was not such as to require a trip to the hospital. The court further fond that HCEMS' emergency medical technicians ("the EMTS") did not violate their standard of care by failing to advise Ms. Ball that croup could be life-threatening under certain circumstances. Ms. Ball appealed, raising issues that present the following questions for our determination:

Vanderbilt University Medical Center (“Vanderbilt”) filed suit in the Chancery Court of Davidson County against Macon County (“County”) seeking a judgment against County in the amount of $20,671.95 for medical services rendered by Vanderbilt in Nashville to an inmate who had been in the  custody of County and who had been brought to Vanderbilt for treatment. Both Vanderbilt and County filed motions for summary judgment,  supported by affidavit or affidavits. Following a hearing, the chancellor denied County’s summary judgment motion and granted summary  judgment in favor of Vanderbilt. On appeal, County has raised two issues which are as follows:

1. Did the trial court err in ruling that venue was proper in Davidson County; 2. In granting Vanderbilt’s motion for summary judgment.

This appeal involves a dispute between partners. Plaintiffs-Appellants, Robert D. Fulcher III, Eleanor Fulcher, and Allen-Fulcher Partnership, appeal the trial court’s ruling in favor of Appellees, R. Chancellor Allen, H. Stanley Allen, and Harwell-Allen Partnership.

A white college professor denied tenure sued his university employer for breach of contract and racial discrimination. The Chancery Court of Davidson County dismissed both claims. We reverse the judgment dismissing the contract claim and affirm the ruling on the discrimination claim.

The Petition er, A. D . Barke r, appe als the order o f the Se vier County Circuit Court dismissing his petition fo r post-conviction relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted the appeal in this child custody case to determine whether the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony regarding the effects of an interracial relationship on the child and in later excluding the trial court’s comments from the statement of evidence.

Although I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the grant of custody to the father, I write separately to condemn the appearance of impropriety this case exudes. As the United
States Supreme Court stated in Offutt v. U.S., 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S. Ct. 11, 13, 99 L. Ed. 11, 16 (1954), “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” The trial court’s actions in this case do not satisfy that appearance.

On October 15, 1997, the defendant was convicted of delivering cocaine and he was sentenced to serve four years in the penitentiary.  The defendant was tried along with a co-defendant Reggie Barton. In the course of the trial, statements made by Barton implicated the defendant.  The defendant raises the following issues:  1. Whether the defendant’s Motion To Sever the trial should have been granted?  2. Whether the co-defendant’s statement to the confidential informant should have been excluded or redacted?  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I disagree with the majority's holding in this case that the district attorney
general abused his discretion in denying pretrial diversion. The defendant has
committed an extremely serious offense in this case. She has admitted to
embezzling approximately $27,400.00 from her employer. Her crime was not an
isolated incident but a complicated, calculated, and deliberate criminal scheme
that occurred repeatedly over a course of two years until she was ultimately
caught.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court properly ruled that the prosecution abused its discretion by failing to consider all of the relevant factors in denying the defendant’s application for pretrial diversion, and whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing.1 The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed that the prosecutor’s written letter denying diversion did not discuss all of the relevant factors, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing to allow the prosecutor to testify as to the factors that were considered in denying pretrial diversion.