APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Frank Crittenden, appeals as of right the Morgan County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This cause comes to us on a common law writ of certiorari to review a fee dispute in a post-conviction proceeding involving an indigent defendant, David McNish. The issue is whether an attorney appointed to review the records in a post-conviction proceeding may exceed the maximum allowable rates for attorneys representing indigent defendants. We hold that: (1) Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13 (1996) required an attorney performing services as an "expert" to obtain prior approval for an hourly rate in excess of the hourly rate provided for attorneys in Rule 13; and (2) the trial court should have explicitly set forth the approved "expert" hourly rate in its order if such rate was intended to exceed the normal hourly rate provided for attorneys in Rule 13.

The defendant, Thomas Dee Huskey, has been charged on four counts of murder, eleven counts of rape, fourteen counts of kidnapping and three counts of robbery. The State filed notice of intention to seek the death penalty. In November of 1992, the petitioner, Herbert S. Moncier, and a second attorney were appointed pursuant to Tenn. R. Evid. 13 to represent Huskey. Tennessee Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 13 § 1 permits appointment of two attorneys for one defendant in capital cases. The petitioner sought additional reimbursement in the trial court for two additional attorneys, for paralegals and for various other expenses. The trial judge entered an order granting reimbursement for two additional attorneys not to exceed $ 10,000.00 and for paralegals at $ 15 per hour not to exceed $ 5,000.00. The order was entered nunc pro tunc to the date of the petitioner's appointment.

On January 6, 1997, the trial court issued a community corrections violation warrant for failure to pay court costs, fines, supervision fees, and maintain employment. On May 5, 1997, a second revocation warrant was issued, this time for ag gravated robbery. On June 2, 1997, the trial court revoked Appellant’s community corrections placement and imposed his original sentence of incarceration.

We granted this appeal to determine whether we should retain "the Distretti Rule1" adopted by this Court sixty-seven years ago. The rule provides that before a death will be considered accidental under the terms of an insurance contract, the means, as well as the result, must be involuntary, unexpected, and unusual.

The plaintiff, Adolph C. Lavin and wife, Jean Lavin, surviving parents of Troy James Lavin, brought this action against Ross and Susan Jordon and their son, Sean Jordon, for the wrongful death of Troy Lavin, who was shot and killed by Sean Jordon. The Trial Judge entered an interlocutory partial judgment on the pleadings limiting the recovery from the parents of Sean Jordon to $10,000.00 pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 37-10-101, 102 and 103 which read as follows:

In a documentary on how to complicate a simple divorce, this case would serve as a highlight film. After the trial court finally entered a final judgment, the parties on appeal argue about the trial judge’s refusal to recuse herself, a pre-nuptial agreement, the division of marital property, the award of attorney’s fees, and certain injunctions involving the custody and visitation with the parties’ minor child. We modify the judgment to give Dr. Oakley a $2,000 credit for her separate property awarded to Mr. Wilson and to make the judgment for attorney’s fees run to Mr. Wilson instead of his lawyer. In all other respects we affirm the judgment below.

This case comes to us on appeal from an order dismissing Appellant Dean’s complaint against Appellees, filed apparently under the auspices of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 et seq., alleging violation of civil rights under the color of state authority. The trial court dismissed Mr. Dean’s complaint for failure to specify the capacity of the defendants being sued. For the reasons and under the authorities recited below, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Mr. Dean’s claim with prejudice.

The appellants and appellees have both filed a Petition to Rehear, which we have considered and found to be without merit. It is, therefore, ordered that the petitions be denied.

In this case James Harrison Jenkins appeals the action of the trial court in dismissing his petition to modify a final decree of divorce.

The appellant in this action is Edith Stromatt, a former employee of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville, Tennessee. When Ms. Stromatt sought disability with the Metropolitan Employee Benefit Board ("the Benefit Board"), she was granted a medical disability pension; however, she was denied the inline- of-duty pension (IOD) that she desired. Ms. Stromatt brought suit in chancery court claiming that the Benefit Board erred in its failure to grant her an IOD pension. She also claims that the Benefit Board denied her the constitutional right to be heard prior to its decision. The trial court agreed with the conclusions of the Benefit Board and dismissed Ms. Stromatt's appeal.

The Juvenile Court of Pickett County found a juvenile to be delinquent for selling marijuana to a classmate. He appealed to the Circuit Court, which likewise found him to be delinquent, and placed him on probation with the Department of Childrens’ Services. We reverse the Circuit Court.

The plaintiff, Adolph C. Lavin and wife, Jean Lavin, surviving parents of Troy James Lavin, brought this action against Ross and Susan Jordon and their son, Sean Jordon, for the wrongful death of Troy Lavin, who was shot and killed by Sean Jordon. The Trial Judge entered an interlocutory partial judgment on the pleadings limiting the recovery from the parents of Sean Jordon to $10,000.00 pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 37-10-101, 102 and 103 which read as follows: