APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves an inmate’s challenge to the denial of his application for parole by the Tennessee Board of Paroles. After serving approximately ten years ofa 35-year sentence for aggravated rape, the inmate filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County asserting that the Tennessee Board of Paroles was illegally and arbitrarily declining to honor his plea bargain agreement. The trial court dismissed the petition on the grounds that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and because it was not timely filed. The inmate has appealed pro se. We concur that the petition was not timely filed and affirm its dismissal in accordance with Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10(b).1

The Defendant, Michael Brent Cook, appeals as of right from the revocation of his probation by the Sumner County Criminal Court. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his proba tion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Martin R. Craddock, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of habeas corpus relief. He is presently in the custody of the Department of Correction serving a Range I sentence of ten years for his conviction of aggravated sexual battery in 1995. He contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment for aggravated sexual battery fails to allege the mens rea for the offense. We affirm the dismissal of the petition.

Michael T. Keen, the Defendant, appeals as of right following his sentencing hearing in the Sum ner County Criminal Court. Defendant was indicted for vehicular homicide and DUI, second offense. In an agreement with the State, Defendant pled guilty to vehicular homicide, a Class B felony, and agreed to an eight (8) year sentence, with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sente nce. Following his sentencing hearing, the trial court orde red Defendant to serve eight (8) years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In his appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant an alterna tive sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff, Robert E. Mayers, acting pro se in this medical malpractice action, appeals the decision of the Circuit Court of Davidson County denying his application for relief under Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 60.02 from a final summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendants.

The defendant, Sheryl L. Pendergrass, appeals a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(I), Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. In the Sumner County Criminal Court, the defendant pleaded guilty to three drug offenses, subject to reservation of the certified question. In her certified question, the defendant contends that law enforcement officers infringed on her rights to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves an exclusion in an automobile liability policy for a person operating the automobile without a reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do so. The Circuit Court of Davidson County dismissed the insurance company’s action for a declaratory judgment. We reverse, and declare that the exclusion precluded coverage by the company.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code3 Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The employer, Modine Manufacturing Company, Inc., has appealed from the action of the trial court in awarding the employee, Jamia B. Gardner, 80% permanent partial disability to each arm.  The trial court dismissed the case against the Second Injury Fund. On appeal the employer contends (1) there was no evidence of a permanent injury to the employee’s left arm, (2) the award of 80% to each arm was excessive and (3) the trial court was in error in dismissing the case against the Second Injury Fund.  The Second Injury Fund also contends the awards of disability are not supported by the evidence but insists the court was correct in holding it was not liable for payment of benefits.

This appeal involves an interstate contract dispute over ten pairs of emu chicks. Two Tennessee residents declined to honor their contract to purchase the chicks after the Arkansas breeders attempted to substitute chicks different from those advertised for sale. The breeders filed a breach of contract suit in Arkansas against the purchasers seeking to recover the unpaid purchase price, and the purchasers filed suit in the Circuit Court for Wilson County seeking to recover their down payment as well as treble damages and attorney’s fees under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After the breeders obtained a judgment in Arkansas against the purchasers, they moved to dismiss the purchasers’ Tennessee lawsuit on the ground that the Arkansas judgment was res judicata to the purchasers’ Tennessee claims. The trial court agreed and dismissed the purchasers’ claims. On this appeal, the purchasers assert that the Arkansas judgment should not have precluded them from pursuing their Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claims in Tennessee. We agree because the Arkansas court did not have the power to award the full measure of relief the purchasers are seeking in the Tennessee proceedings.
 

After a 1996 divorce by the Circuit Court of Davidson County the husband filed an independent damages action in the chancery court, alleging that the wife fraudulently induced him to enter into the divorce settlement. The wife filed a Rule 60.02 motion in the divorce court seeking a declaration that she was not guilty of fraud. The divorce court ruled that the chancery court was bound by the circuit court’s judgment and that the husband must pay $2500 in attorney’s fees to the wife for services in the Rule 60.02 motion. We reverse.

Plaintiff Chase Cavett Services, Inc. (Chase) appeals an order of the chancery court granting a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction filed by Defendant Brandon Apparel Group, Inc. (Brandon). Because we find that the chancery court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Brandon, we reverse the ruling of the chancellor.

We granted this appeal to address whether the State may be liable for discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(2) in a workers' compensation case. We hold that the State may only be taxed for costs expressly permitted by either the Tennessee claims commission statute or the Workers' Compensation Act.

On December 6, 1996, a W illiamson County jury convicted Appellant, Darrell Wentzel, of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of aggravated kidnapping. After a sentencing hearing on January 31, 1997, Appellant was sentenced to twelve years for each count of aggravated robbery, twelve years for aggravated kidnapping, and six years for aggravated burglary, with all sentenc es to be served concurrently. On February 18, 1997, Appellant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial, claiming that the evidence was insufficient for a conviction, that the aggravating kidnapping conviction should be dismissed because it was incidental to the robbery, that several of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings were erroneous, and that the trial court had misapplied enhancement factors to arrive at maximum sentences on all four convictions.  The trial court denied the motion. Appellant challenges both his convictions and his sentence, raising the following issues:

1) whether the trial court comm itted plain error by adm itting the in-court identification of the Appellant by Mary Ethel Veach;

2) whether there was sufficient evidence to corroborate the accomplice testimony of Edward Mitchem;

3) whether Appellant’s convictions for two counts of aggravated robbery constituted dou ble jeopardy;

4) whether the trial court correctly rejected Appellant’s argument that he could not be convicted of aggravated kidnapping because it was only incidental to the robbery;

5) whether the trial court correctly sentenced the Appellant.

After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the Tennessee claims commission has subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ challenge to certain Medicaid reimbursements paid to them by the State. Upon review, we hold that the Tennessee claims commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Because the plaintiffs’ challenge is based upon an assertion that a state Medicaid regulation is invalid under federal law, the Tennessee Department of Health was the agency with subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-223 of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA").

We granted this appeal to address whether the State may be liable for discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(2) in a workers' compensation case. We hold that the State may only be taxed for costs expressly permitted by either the Tennessee claims commission statute or the Workers' Compensation Act.