APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

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Rodney Smith vs. State

01C01-9707-CC-00252

Originating Judge:L. Terry Lafferty
Lawrence County Court of Criminal Appeals 06/25/98
State vs. Katz

03C01-9704-CC-00150

Originating Judge:James B. Scott, Jr.
Anderson County Court of Criminal Appeals 06/25/98
State vs. David McCormick

01C01-9707-CR-00295

Originating Judge:L. Terry Lafferty
Davidson County Court of Criminal Appeals 06/25/98
Hankins vs. Seaton

03A01-9710-CV-00468
Court of Appeals 06/25/98
State vs. Gann

03C01-9707-CR-00274

Originating Judge:E. Eugene Eblen
Court of Criminal Appeals 06/25/98
Atkins vs. Grooms

03A01-9708-JV-00337
Court of Appeals 06/25/98
Eblen vs. Johnson

03A01-9709-CH-00423
Court of Appeals 06/25/98
Purkey vs. Purkey

03A01-9707-CV-00317
Court of Appeals 06/25/98
Canonie vs. Tennessee

03A01-9710-CH-00481
Court of Appeals 06/25/98
3A01-9801-CH-00034

3A01-9801-CH-00034
Court of Appeals 06/25/98
State vs. Lester

03C01-9702-CR-00069
Hamilton County Court of Criminal Appeals 06/25/98
3A01-9801-CV-00033

3A01-9801-CV-00033
Sevier County Court of Appeals 06/25/98
Roach vs. Renfro

03A01-9711-CH-00517
Court of Appeals 06/25/98
Charlotte Hull v. Emro Marketing Company

01S01-9709-CH-00201
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the plaintiff suffered an injury by accident on February 23, 1995 and was entitled to an award of 22 percent permanent partial impairment to the body as a whole ( $14,8. for permanent partial disability and $96. for temporary total disability payable in a lump sum), medical expenses incurred after March 9, 1995, and future medical treatment caused by the injury. The trial court ruled that Emro Marketing Company ("Emro") was liable for the award because it was the employer at the time of the most recent injury that bore a causal relation to the plaintiff's incapacity. Emro raises the following issues: 1. Whether the Chancellor erred in finding the subsequent employer liable under the last injurious injury rule when the subsequent injury was not suffered in the scope of the employee's employment with the subsequent employer. 2. Whether the Chancellor erred in applying the last injurious injury rule when the employee's initial injury was the strongest causal link to the disability of the employee, who had not fully recovered from her initial injury? The plaintiff contends the trial court properly found Emro liable, but says if it is not then Kwik Sak, Inc. ("Kwik Sak") and Reliance Insurance Company ("Reliance") are liable. Kwik Sak and Reliance say that Emro is liable as found, but if it is not then the plaintiff has not appealed from the action of the trial judge dismissing them as defendants. We find the trial judge erred in applying the repetitive injury rule and/or the last injurious injury rule in this case and find Kwik Sak and Reliance were the insurers at the time of the plaintiff's injury. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Don R. Ash,
Rutherford County Workers Compensation Panel 06/24/98
Special Judge Hamilton v. Gayden, Jr.

01S01-9706-CV-00188
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). In this case, the plaintiff brought suit against Epsco, Inc. ("Epsco") and later Hughes Parker Industries, Inc. ("Hughes Parker")1, alleging that he was entitled to workers' compensation benefits as a result of developing carpal tunnel syndrome in the course of his employment. The trial court dismissed the suit against Hughes Parker and found that Epsco was not prejudiced by the plaintiff giving notice of his injury on April 3, 1996. The trial court awarded the plaintiff 4 percent permanent partial disability to both arms and seven weeks of temporary total disability. Epsco appeals and presents the following issues: 1. The plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the plaintiff's failure to give timely notice. 2. The plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 3. The permanent partial impairment award is excessive. 4. There is no basis for an award of temporary total disability. We affirm the judgment of the trial court that the plaintiff timely notified and filed suit against Epsco, we modify the judgment of the trial court to find that the plaintiff can recover 2 percent permanent partial disability to each upper extremity, and we reverse the judgment of the trial court that the plaintiff is entitled to temporary total disability benefits. 1 There is no issue raised concerning the dismissal of Hughes Parker in this case. 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Jim T. Hamilton,
Lawrence County Workers Compensation Panel 06/24/98
Charles D. Price vs. State

01C01-9702-CR-00042
Davidson County Court of Criminal Appeals 06/24/98
Kevin Curtis v. Grundy Co. Sheriff's Dept., et al .

01S01-9607-CH-00131
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Originating Judge:Hon.
Grundy County Workers Compensation Panel 06/24/98
State vs. Larry Catron

02C01-9710-CC-00376

Originating Judge:Joseph H. Walker, III
Lauderdale County Court of Criminal Appeals 06/23/98
Stone vs. Stone

M1997-00218-COA-R3-CV
This appeal involves a former spouse's efforts to extricate himself from the spousal support obligations contained in a marital dissolution agreement. Approximately one year after the entry of the divorce decree approving the agreement, the former husband requested the Chancery Court for Putnam County to set the agreement aside because he did not have independent legal advice and his judgment was impaired by antidepressant medication when he signed the agreement. The trial court modified portions of the decree but did not relieve the former husband of his spousal support obligation. Thereafter, the former husband filed a second motion seeking to terminate or reduce his spousal support obligations because of his former wife's improved financial circumstances. The trial court again declined to relieve the former husband of his obligation to pay spousal support. On this appeal, the former husband renews his argument that he should no longer be required pay spousal support because of his former wife's improved financial circumstance and his own weakened financial condition. We affirm the trial court's decision that the former husband has failed to prove the existence of a substantial, material change in circumstances that would warrant modifying his spousal support obligation.
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Originating Judge:Vernon Neal
Putnam County Court of Appeals 06/23/98
Evans vs. Steelman

01S01-9701-JV-00019
Supreme Court 06/22/98
Alexander, et. al. vs. Inman

01S01-9705-CH-00103
Davidson County Supreme Court 06/22/98
Evans vs. Steelman

01S01-9701-JV-00019
Supreme Court 06/22/98
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Ins. Co. vs. Joseph Farmer & Debra Farmer

03S01-9707-CH-00081
Supreme Court 06/22/98
State of Tennessee vs. Johnny M. Henning

02S01-9707-CC-00065
Supreme Court 06/22/98
Albert Gregurek v. Swope Motors

M2002-02854-COA-R3-CV
This case involves an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction and/or Motion for Summary Judgment. We reverse.

Originating Judge:J. Curtis Smith
Marion County Court of Appeals 06/22/98