APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant-Appellant, Jeffrey Mansir, was convicted by a Blount County jury of kidnapping, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-303, and assault, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-101.1 He was sentenced as a Range II multiple offender to ten years’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively to a Knox County conviction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction for kidnapping; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s request for a mistrial following an improper comment by the victim; and (3) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant as a Range II offender based on a prior out of state felony conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Trevon Scott Barcus, appeals as of right from the Scott County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He claims entitlement to habeas corpus relief, alleging that (1) his separate federal and state convictions for failing to register as a sex offender violate double jeopardy principles; (2) he entered an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea because the trial court failed to inform him that he could not transfer the supervision of his probation to another state; and (3) that this “categorical” prohibition on travel constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and violates principles of substantive due process. Following our review, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for relief and, therefore, affirm the summary dismissal of his petition.

Santos M. Martinez-Aleman, Petitioner, appeals from the denial of habeas corpus relief from his guilty plea to two counts of sexual battery and resulting twelve-year sentence. After a review, we affirm the denial of habeas corpus relief.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children. The juvenile court determined that four statutory grounds supported terminating her parental rights: abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; failure to substantially comply with the permanency plan; persistence of conditions; and her failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of her children. The court also determined that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of her children. Upon our review, we conclude there was clear and convincing evidence supporting both the grounds for termination and the best interest determination. So we affirm.

The Petitioner, Paul Wright, pleaded guilty to six counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and seven counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-five years. The Petitioner timely filed a postconviction petition, alleging that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, concluding that the Petitioner had not proven Counsel was deficient or shown prejudice. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Ryan D. Buford, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Shawn Gibson Delosh, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

In this post-divorce case, Doris Anne Baumgaertner (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s decision to deny her request to relocate the parties’ minor son (“Child”) to Germany. She also appeals the decision to change the primary residential parent designation from her to David Timothy Dungey (“Father”). We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

In a letter sent to high-ranking school officials, parents claimed that a special education teacher had denied their child an appropriate education based on the child’s needs and improperly used physical restraints on the child. The parents also claimed that the teacher had ignored them at a school event and did not communicate with them for a month afterward. The teacher sued the parents for defamation. The trial court granted summary judgment to the parents, reasoning primarily that the parents had not published the letter. The court also reasoned that the statements in the letter were not defamatory and that the parents did not act with actual malice. We conclude that some of the statements in the letter were not defamatory but others were capable of being understood as defamatory. For those statements capable of conveying a defamatory meaning, the record lacked evidence of actual malice. So we affirm the grant of summary judgment. 

This case concerns the decision of the Rutherford County Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”) to deny a property owner’s application for a special exception to operate a major home-based business on his residential property. The property owner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court, and the court upheld the BZA’s decision. Discerning no error, we affirm the Chancery Court’s decision. 

Two children and two individuals who are neither biological nor adopted children of an intestate decedent contend that they are entitled to the decedent’s life insurance proceeds based on an alleged breach of contract between them and the decedent’s ex-girlfriend, who was the life insurance policy’s named beneficiary. The trial court found that the alleged contract failed for lack of consideration. We affirm the trial court’s decision. 

In a previous appeal, we affirmed a trial court’s decision to hold a party in contempt, but we vacated the award of compensatory damages. Keller v. Estate of McRedmond, No. M2013-02582-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 2447041, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2018). We remanded the case to the trial court for a calculation of the damages solely attributable to the contemptuous conduct. Id. On remand, the trial court entered an amended judgment. In this appeal, among other things, the contemnor argues that the amount of damages awarded lacks a sufficient evidentiary basis. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the amount of damages awarded, we affirm.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Isaiah Williams, of attempted second degree murder and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of seventeen years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented is insufficient to establish his identity as the shooter. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The petitioner, Coty Shane Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his
guilty-pleaded conviction of second degree murder, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, Sebastian A. Stevens, of three counts of aggravated assault and one count of aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of eight years to be served consecutively to a prior sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. He also contends that the trial court erred when it excluded the victim’s prior conviction and when it allowed the State to introduce evidence of the Defendant’s prior incarceration. The Defendant lastly contends that the trial court erred when it ordered that his effective sentence of eight years in this case be served consecutively to his sentence for a previous conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Ricky Dale Breeden, was convicted by a Union County Criminal Court jury of three counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522 (2018) (subsequently amended) (rape of a child), 39-13-504 (2018) (aggravated sexual battery). He was sentenced to an effective ninety-five years for the convictions. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his rape of a child convictions, (2) the State failed to make a proper election of offenses, (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for expert funds, (4) the court erred by ordering consecutive service. Although we affirm the Defendant’s rape of a child convictions, we reverse the Defendant’s convictions for aggravated sexual battery and remand the case for a new trial.

This is the second appeal of this action concerning the construction of the last will and testament of the decedent. In the first appeal, we reversed the trial court’s finding that the property at issue vested in her designated heir at the time of the decedent’s passing. Upon remand, the trial court held that the property vested when the personal representative executed warranty deeds for the property at issue, despite the fact that the deeds were never recorded. We now uphold the trial court’s ruling and remand for further proceedings necessary for the distribution of the estate.

The Defendant, Charlie Evans, was convicted after a jury trial of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-305. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he caused serious bodily injury to the victim. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, a psychiatrist, was sanctioned by the Board of Medical Examiners for violation of the Tennessee Medical Practice Act. The Chancery Court for Davidson County affirmed the Board’s action, and Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Kadarick Lucas, pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery, and he received an eight-year effective sentence. The Petitioner then filed a petition for postconviction relief, contending that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that he did not plead guilty freely and voluntarily. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Divorcing parents of a minor child agreed to all terms of the divorce other than the permanent parenting plan. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court designated the father as the primary residential parent. The mother appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal arises from a divorce action between Judith Galilea Abner (“Wife”) and Steven Dale Abner (“Husband”). As part of the divorce, the Trial Court entered an order classifying certain property inherited by Husband during the divorce as his separate property after finding that this property had not been comingled or transmuted into marital property. Husband also was awarded as his separate property the value of a log cabin at the time of marriage. The parties had resided in the log cabin throughout the marriage and made substantial improvements to the log cabin during the marriage to which Wife had substantially contributed. The Trial Court, therefore, classified the appreciation of value of the log cabin as marital property, and Wife was awarded one-half of the increase in value of the property. The Trial Court classified as marital property an account in Wife’s sole name, upon its finding that the money in the account had been comingled such that the money could no longer be traced back to the original deposit. Additionally, the Trial Court granted an award of attorney’s fees to Husband for four of the five days of trial due to Wife changing her testimony and the “immense amount of time spent on these issues.” Wife timely appealed to this Court. We affirm the Trial Court’s findings concerning the classification of the parties’ property. However, we reverse the Trial Court’s award of attorney’s fees to Husband.

In 2010, the Petitioner, Darrell Carpenter, was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to serve twenty years in prison. The Petitioner was granted post-conviction relief in the form of a delayed appeal. After his conviction was affirmed, the Petitioner again sought post-conviction relief, asserting that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel and that the State withheld or destroyed exculpatory evidence. The postconviction court held a hearing and denied the post-conviction claims, and the Petitioner appeals, listing in his reply brief twenty-five grounds for relief. The thrust of the Petitioner’s claims is that a 911 chronology report allegedly contradicts the proof at trial, that trial counsel was deficient in not challenging the proof on this basis, and that the State failed in its duty to preserve or produce related evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner has not demonstrated that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that his rights were otherwise violated, and we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

This suit was brought under the Tennessee Human Rights Act by two African-American employees against their employer and their union to recover for alleged discrimination that created a hostile work environment. At issue in this appeal is the grant of summary judgment to the union on the basis that it did not cause or attempt to cause the employer to discriminate. Upon our de novo review, we conclude that the evidence presented at the summary judgment stage negated an essential element of the Plaintiffs’ claim and thus summary judgment was warranted. Judgment affirmed.

The Petitioner, Travis L. Lindsey, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his convictions for the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, and his effective twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to fully advise him of the deadline by which he could enter into a plea agreement with the State in order to avoid a trial. We conclude that the Petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to relief, and we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.