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| Janet Wynn v. Tecumseh Products Co.
02S01-9709-CV-00081
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial court awarded the plaintiff a 3 percent permanent partial disability to her right leg, a 4 percent permanent partial disability to each of her arms, and medical expenses in the amount of $77.. The trial court noted that the plaintiff is very bright and capable of expressing herself. The defendant raises the following issues on appeal: "1. Does the evidence preponderate against the Trial Court's finding that Plaintiff sustained a thirty (3%) percent permanent partial disability to her right leg. 2. Does the evidence preponderate against the Trial Court's finding that Plaintiff's condition to each of Plaintiff's arms was caused by the work activities performed at Tecumseh Products Company. 3. Does the evidence preponderate against the Trial Court's finding that Plaintiff sustained a forty (4%) percent permanent partial disability to each of her arms. 4. Did the Trial Court err in finding that Tecumseh should pay Dr. James Spruill's medical charges in the amount of $77.." We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Creed Mcginley, |
Henry County | Workers Compensation Panel | 03/02/98 | |
| Beverly Riddle v. Murray Outdoor Products
02S01-9706-CH-00058
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial judge awarded the plaintiff 58 percent permanent partial disability to each arm as a result of carpal tunnel syndrome. The defendant raises the following issues on appeal: I. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiff had properly satisfied notice and statute of limitations requirements for her alleged left upper extremity injury. II. Whether the trial court erred in awarding the plaintiff 58 percent impairment to each arm. We affirm the judgment.
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Joe C. Morris, |
Madison County | Workers Compensation Panel | 03/02/98 | |
| Lucy B. Anderson v. Lenzing U.S.A
03S01-9704-CV-00036
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appeal has been perfected by Lucy Anderson, widow and administratrix of the Estate of Billy Joe Anderson, deceased, from a ruling by the trial court that her claim for death benefits was not compensable as she failed to establish her husband's death was caused by his work activities. At the time of his death, Mr. Anderson was 54 years of age, was six foot four inches tall and weighed between 26-28 pounds. He had been employed as a cutter operator with defendant, Lenzing U.S.A., for about six years but had worked a total of 21 years for the company. Plaintiff testified her husband was in good health, took no medication and never complained of chest pains. She said he smoked cigars sometimes but did not appear to inhale the smoke. She also stated he had no complaints before reporting to work on March 11, 1993. He was working the "C" shift which started at 12 midnight and ended at 7: a.m. Arvine Taylor, decedent's shift supervisor, testified and described the duties of a cutter operator. The employer is engaged in the business of producing rayon fiber. As the material moves through the production line, it is called a "tow." A cutter operator is responsible for keeping the tow moving down the production line. If knots appear in the tow, the operator uses a knife and cuts the knot out. If the tow stops for any reason, the operator reels it back up on the machine and continues the process. Also, if co-workers spot a knot along the production line, a horn is sounded to alert the cutter operator. It appears a cutter operator has the responsibility of watching over several machines involved in this process. On the night in question, the deceased was looking after four units on the production line. The evidence indicates that among the four machines, there were 42 breaks during the shift. Records showed there was a break on unit #2 at 5:25 a.m. and at 6:3 a.m., unit #4 and unit #1 were down. Supervisor Taylor told the court the records indicated it was an average night on the production line. He said it would normally take ten to fifteen seconds to remove a small knot and that there was very little physical exertion in cutting out a knot or resuming a tow if it was down. 2
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Ben K. Wexler, |
Anderson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 03/02/98 | |
| Beryl Jack v. State
01S01-9706-BC-00136
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee contends the evidence preponderates against the commissioner's finding that her claim is barred because of a false statement contained in her employment application. The panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The claimant has been a certified nursing technician since 1973. She began working for Bethany Health Care, a nursing home, in May of 199 and soon thereafter injured her back while lifting a patient. As a result of that injury, she received two laminectomies at L5-S1. Following those surgeries, she had difficulty standing, bending and sitting for long periods of time. The operating surgeon imposed lifting and bending restrictions. She was awarded permanent partial disability benefits and applied for social security disability benefits. She was terminated from Bethany because that employer did not have work for her within her limitations. On October 1, 1991, she made written application for employment at Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute. On that application, she was asked, "Do you have a limiting disability or handicap?" She responded, "No." In response to a question as to her reason for leaving Bethany, she wrote, "Illness in the family." On another document, she denied having any "history of physical defects." On the strength of that application, she was approved for employment by the state. We find in the record no evidence that the employer had any knowledge of her pre-existing disability. It is equally clear in the record that she could not have been employed as she was if the above questions had been accurately answered. The commissioner denied compensation benefits because of the false application. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6- 225(e)(2). Where the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses, especially if issues of credibility and weight to be given oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded those circumstances on review. Kellerman v. Food Lion, Inc., 929 S.W.2d 333 (Tenn. 1996). A false statement in an employee'sapplication for employment will bar recovery of workers' compensation benefits if all three of the following elements exist: first, the employee must have knowingly and willfully made a false representation as to his physical condition; second, the employer must have relied upon the false representation and such reliance must have been a substantial factor in the hiring; and third, there must have been a causal connection between the false representation and the injury. Federal Copper and Aluminum Company v. Dickey, 493 S.W.2d 463 (Tenn. 1973). The causal 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. William Robert Baker, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 03/02/98 | |
| Joey Sweat v. Superior Industries, Inc.
03S01-9701-CH-00006
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. I This is a psoriatic arthritis1 case, an on-going debilitating condition, which pre-existed the plaintiff's employment. He alleges that he was asymptomatic prior to his employment by the defendant and that the nature of his job triggered his symptoms and worsened the underlying disease. The defendant says that only the symptoms, i.e., pain and swelling, were exacerbated by employment (as any physical activity would do) but that the disease per se was not worsened. Dr. David Lurie testified by deposition. The precise issue of whether the plaintiff's employment caused a progression of the disease or whether it merely aggravated the symptoms was not sufficiently articulated by Dr. Lurie in the opinion of the trial judge, and he requested that Dr. Lurie elucidate the point either by a supplemental deposition or by letter. Counsel agreed to the latter. He was asked: In your opinion, based on a reasonable medical probability, did Sweat's activities . . . advance and result in an actual progression of his underlying psoriatic arthritis? To which Dr. Lurie responded: "In my opinion, based on reasonable medical probability Sweat's work . . . advanced and resulted in actual progression of his underlying psoriatic arthritis." He testified that the allocation of the progression of the disease from physical activity as contrasted to spontaneous progression was not quantifiable, but that the "repetitive, strenuous, weight-bearing activities resulted in some permanent joint injury." 1A connective tissue arthritis, not curable, and highly debilitating. 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Thomas J. Seeley, Jr., |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 03/02/98 | |
| Slate vs. State
03A01-9708-CV-00369
|
Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | ||
| State vs. Trampas Sweeney
01C01-9702-CC-00053
Originating Judge:William M. Barker |
Williamson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 02/27/98 | |
| Kizer vs. Kizer
01A01-9707-GS-00304
Originating Judge:Barry R. Brown |
Sumner County | Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | |
| Bellamy vs. State
03A01-9701-BC-00035
|
Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | ||
| Brown vs. Davidson
01A01-9702-CV-00049
|
Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | ||
| Allstate vs. Auto
03A01-9706-CH-00225
|
Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | ||
| 03A01-9709-CV-00444
03A01-9709-CV-00444
|
Knox County | Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | |
| Reid vs. Sundquist
01A01-9709-CH-00494
Originating Judge:Carol L. Mccoy |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | |
| Copas vs. Copas
03A01-9708-CV-00375
|
Sevier County | Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | |
| Witt vs. Tennessee
03A01-9709-CH-00400
|
Bradley County | Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | |
| State vs. Garrison
03C01-9702-CC-00047
Originating Judge:Thomas W. Graham |
Bledsoe County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 02/27/98 | |
| Lampley vs. Lampley
01A01-9708-CH-00423
|
Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | ||
| Hooker vs. Thompson
01A01-9709-CH-00533
Originating Judge:Carol L. Mccoy |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | |
| Molin, M.D., et . ux. vs. Perryman Construction Co.
01A01-9705-CV-00232
Originating Judge:Barbara N. Haynes |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | |
| Webb vs. Mortgage Systems Corp.
01A01-9512-CH-00566
Originating Judge:Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr. |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | |
| Walker vs. Exchange
03A01-9709-CV-00402
|
Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | ||
| State vs. Manning
03C01-9501-CR-00012
Originating Judge:R. Steven Bebb |
Bradley County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 02/27/98 | |
| Lampley vs. Lampley
01A01-9708-CH-00423
|
Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | ||
| Pehlman vs. Pehlman
03A01-9708-CV-00339
|
Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 | ||
| 03A01-9708-CV-OO331
03A01-9708-CV-OO331
|
Anderson County | Court of Appeals | 02/27/98 |