APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

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State of Tennessee v. George Lorenzo Cartwright

01C01-9608-CR-00338

The appellant, George Lorenzo Cartwright (defendant), appeals as of right from a judgment of the trial court revoking his community corrections sentence and reinstating the sentence previously imposed by the court. The trial court found the defendant had violated the terms of his house arrest, he admitted he had ingested marijuana, and he had been arrested for the possession of cocaine.

Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Joe B. Jones
Originating Judge:Judge Jane W. Wheatcraft
Sumner County Court of Criminal Appeals 09/02/97
In re: Estate of Carleton Elliott Walton, Deceased, Jeffrey O. Walton, Administrator v. Leslie Young

01S01-9612-PB-00252

This case presents for review with the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the trial court's denial of a claim of paternity. For the reasons set forth, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded. 

Authoring Judge: Justice Lyle Reid
Originating Judge:Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Davidson County Supreme Court 09/02/97
William J. Snyder v. Ltg. Lufttechnische Gmb; and HSM Pressen-GmbH

01S01-9607-FD-00143

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee,1 this Court has accepted two questions certified to us by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. The questions are as follows: 1. Whether products liability defendants in a suit for personal injuries based on allegations of negligence and strict liability in tort may introduce evidence at trial that the plaintiff’s employer’s alteration, change, improper maintenance, or abnormal use of the defendants’ product proximately caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries. 2. If “no,” of what effect is Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 28-108? 3 As explained below, the answer to the first certified question is that products liability defendants in a suit for personal injuries based on allegations of negligence and strict liability in tort may introduce relevant evidence at trial that the plaintiff’s employer’s alteration, change, improper maintenance, or abnormal use of the defendants’ product was the cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injuries. The jury may consider all evidence relevant to the actions of the employer with respect to the defendants’ product in assessing whether the plaintiff has met his burden of establishing the elements necessary to recover against the defendants. However, in making that determination, the jury may not assess fault against the employer. Our answer to the first question makes it unnecessary to reach the second one.

Authoring Judge: Justice Frank W. Drowota, III
Originating Judge:Magistrate Denis H. Inman
Knox County Supreme Court 09/02/97
Mary Blake v. Plus Mark, Inc. and Sue Ann Head, Director of the Division of Worker's Compensation, Tennessee Department of Labor

03S01-9512-CH-00137

This is an appeal from the decision of the Chancery Court in a worker's compensation case, in which the trial court granted the employee's motion for non-suit and then entered a judgment of no liability for the employer on its counterclaim. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded.

Authoring Judge: Justice Lyle Reid
Originating Judge:Chancellor Dennis H. Inman
Supreme Court 09/02/97
Gertrude Jackson and Josephine J. Johnson v. Helen Patton, Executrix of the Estate if Jennie Mai Jackson, Deceased

01S01-9609-CH-00177

This will contest case presents for review the decision of the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred in sustaining the most recently executed instrument as the testatrix's last will and testament. For the reasons stated herein, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated.

Authoring Judge: Justice Lyle Reid
Originating Judge:Chancellor Henry Denmark Bell
Supreme Court 09/02/97
James R. Fruge and Jane Fruge v. John and Jane Doe

02S01-9601-CV-00005

This case presents for review the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's award of summary judgment denying the plaintiff's claims under the uninsured motorist statute. That decision is reversed, and the case is remanded. 

Authoring Judge: Justice Lyle Reid
Originating Judge:Judge George H. Brown, Jr.
Supreme Court 09/02/97
Pack vs. State

03C01-9611-CR-00440

Originating Judge:Douglas A. Meyer
Hamilton County Court of Criminal Appeals 08/29/97
01A01-9611-CH-00530

01A01-9611-CH-00530

Originating Judge:Robert S. Brandt
Davidson County Court of Appeals 08/29/97
Charles C. Jones v. Tridon, Inc., et al.

01S01-9703-CV-00057
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the defendants-appellants contend (1) the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding of an injury by accident, (2) the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the claimant's injury was one arising out of the employment, (3) the trial court exceeded its authority under an agreed order, and (4) the evidence preponderates against the trial court's award of medical and temporary total disability benefits. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the award of medical and temporary total disability benefits should be reversed and the judgment otherwise affirmed. The claimant, Jones, was an employee of the employer, Tridon, on January 3, 1993, when he suffered a compensable back injury and was provided some medical benefits by the employer's insurer, Royal. He continued to work and, in January of 1994, requested additional benefits, claiming a new injury. He was given a list of approved physicians but chose, without further consulting the employer or its insurer, to see a chiropractor who was not on the list. The trial court found that a compensable injury occurred on January 21, 1994 and awarded the medical expenses for treatment by Dr. McCombs, 36 weeks of temporary total disability benefits and permanent partial disability benefits based on 15% to the body as a whole. No issue has been raised with respect to the extent of permanent partial disability. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6- 225(e)(2). This panel is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Robert Corlew,
Rutherford County Workers Compensation Panel 08/29/97
Kay Perryman v. Cosmolab, Inc.

01S01-9703-CH-00069
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court inaccordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer contends the evidence preponderates against the trial court's award of permanent partial disability benefits and temporary total disability benefits. The employee concedes the award of temporary total disability benefits is excessive, but contends the trial court used an incorrect compensation rate. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the award of permanent partial disability benefits should be affirmed and the award of temporary total disability benefits modified. The case is remanded for additional proof as to the correct compensation rate. The employee or claimant, Perryman, is forty years old with a high school education. She has worked for the employer for twenty years. In 1994, she injured her elbow at work. As part of her treatment, she was required to take medication which contained blue and yellow dyes, which were also used in the employer's manufacturing process. She had an allergic reaction to the dyes after taking the medication. As a consequence, she is no longer able to work for the employer. She returned to gainful employment on October 31, 1994, thirteen weeks after the beginning of her inability to work because of the injury and treatment. The proof of permanency consisted of the following from the testimony of Dr. Samuel Rowe Marney, Jr., a board certified specialist in Allergy and Immunology: Q. Dr. Marney, Ms. Perryman now has these allergies. Do you have an opinion based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty as to whether she will have those in the future? A. Based on the usual course of allergies, she's almost certain to carry these allergies the rest of her life. The trial judge awarded permanent partial disability benefits based on forty percent to the body as a whole and temporary total disability benefits for sixty-five weeks. The compensation rate was fixed at $216.22. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Lee Russell,
Perry County Workers Compensation Panel 08/29/97
State v. Worley

03C01-9608-CR-00322
Sullivan County Court of Criminal Appeals 08/29/97
01A01-9702-CV-00069

01A01-9702-CV-00069

Originating Judge:Walter C. Kurtz
Davidson County Court of Appeals 08/29/97
Walter A. Dickman v. Meadows Homes, Inc.

01S01-9703-CC-00061
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer, Meadows Homes, Inc., contends the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the claimant was a covered employee and in favor of a finding that he was an independent contractor. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the claimant was an independent contractor. On June 13, 1994, the claimant, Walter Dickman, and Meadows Homes, Inc., entered into the following: CONTRACTOR AGREEMENT I/We Walter Dickman do state that I/We are general contractors who are duly licensed to perform the services for which we are offering to Meadows Homes. Our services are being offered to the general public. As a contractor, I/We provide our own commercial automobile, workmen compensation and liability insurance,and hereby release Meadows Homes from any and all liabilities concerning our contract and any employees and their properties. As a contractor I/We agree to provide all necessary tools, equipment and transportation necessary to complete any services required. As a general contractor I/We affirm that we are responsible to report and pay any local, state or federal taxes which may be due on income from services rendered. The paper writing was dated and signed by the claimant and a representative of Meadows Homes, Inc. Thereafter, Dickman bid on and was awarded work at property owned by Meadows Homes in Jackson County. Then, beginning on June 27, 1994, the parties agreed that he would be compensated on an hourly rather than a per job basis. He would perform the work, then bill Meadows for his time. 2
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. J. O. Bond,
Workers Compensation Panel 08/29/97
IN RE: Ross

03A01-9703-CH-00099
Court of Appeals 08/29/97
01A01-9612-CH-00540

01A01-9612-CH-00540

Originating Judge:Robert E. Burch
Humphreys County Court of Appeals 08/29/97
State vs. Colson

03C01-9612-CR-00465

Originating Judge:Leon C. Burns, Jr.
Court of Criminal Appeals 08/29/97
01A01-9610-CV-00491

01A01-9610-CV-00491

Originating Judge:Don R. Ash
Rutherford County Court of Appeals 08/29/97
01A01-9702-CV-00069

01A01-9702-CV-00069
Court of Appeals 08/29/97
01A01-9610-JV-00469

01A01-9610-JV-00469

Originating Judge:Andrew J. Shookhoff
Davidson County Court of Appeals 08/29/97
Goad v. Cna

03S01-9606-CV-00064
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer insists the award of permanent partial disability benefits is excessive; and the claimant or employee insists the award of permanent partial disability benefits is inadequate, the trial court erred in finding part of the claimant's claim to be time barred, the appeal should be dismissed for failure to file part of the transcript, and the appeal is frivolous. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the trial court's judgment that the claim for disability benefits resulting from a 1989 injury is time barred should be affirmed, and that the award of permanent disability benefits from a 1992 injury should be reversed and dismissed. This claim involves two separate injuries to the claimant, both arising out of and in the course of his employment by the same employer. The first injury occurred in November of 1989, when the claimant strained his lower back while lifting a fuel cell. The treating physician diagnosed lumbar disc injury with mechanical nerve compression. He was unable to work for three months. Although the doctor assigned a permanent whole person impairment rating of five percent, the claimant returned to work and received no permanent disability benefits. On April 8, 1992, the claimant injured his neck and low back in a fork lift collision, but was unable to work for only a few days. On June 29, 1992, he saw Dr. Robert J. Wilson, who found no objective evidence of injury, but assigned an impairment rating of three percent, from subjective complaints of pain. On January 5, 1993 and June 25, 1993, he saw Dr. William E. Kennedy, who diagnosed chronic low back and cervical syndrome superimposed on pre-existing degenerative disc disease. Dr. Kennedy assigned a permanent impairment rating of eight percent and restricted the claimant from activities requiring bending, stooping, squatting, heavy lifting, working over 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Ben K. Wexler,
Knox County Workers Compensation Panel 08/28/97
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
Monroe County Court of Appeals 08/28/97
Jenkins v. Goddard

03A01-9704-CH-00139
Court of Appeals 08/28/97
State vs. Larry Dawson

02C01-9704-CC-00156
Lauderdale County Court of Criminal Appeals 08/28/97
Joan Marie Griffin v. National Medical Hospital of Tullahoma

01S01-9606-CH-00130
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff is 29 years old, married, and has a young child. She is learning- disabled on account of a stroke when she was only four months old; she was born with congenital heart disease, and developed a pronounced scoliosis at age 12 which required the surgical implantation of rods in her back. Notwithstanding, she has held several jobs: attendant at a day care center, counter clerk at a fast- food eatery, sales clerk and cashier at a J. C. Penney store. She was employed by the defendant in August, 1992 in furtherance of its special employment program called Overcoming Challenges which was established to employ afflicted persons. Her initial job with the defendant was working in the cafeteria making sandwiches and serving food. Some of this work was difficult for her, and ambition lagged; the defendant constantly provided encouragement, and at the time of her alleged injury she had been assigned duties as a cashier. She was often absent from work owing to illness or to the pre-emptive care of her young child. She commonly experienced pain and fatigue as a result of standing or sitting for extended periods, or whenever she lifted objects. Her previous jobs at the day care center, fast food restaurant and the J. C. Penney Store also caused pain and fatigue. The injury from which this complaint arises occurred March 3, 1994 when the plaintiff attempted to lift a milk crate. She was initially treated by Dr. Ramprasad who prescribed physical therapy; thereafter, she was referred to Dr. Paul McCombs, a neurological surgeon. He saw the plaintiff on two occasions, April 25 and May 16, 1994, and on the second visit released her to return to work with the recommendation that she avoid prolonged repetitive twisting, bending and stooping, and that she avoid lifting in excess of 2 pounds at any one time or ten pounds repetitively. The plaintiff returned to Dr. McCombs on June 6, 1994 stating that she had a reoccurrence of pain while lifting her daughter. She returned again on July 25, 1994, 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. John W. Rollins,
Coffee County Workers Compensation Panel 08/28/97
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
Court of Appeals 08/28/97