Allen D. Curtis, and Carolyn June Rice, v. William M. Rice, and Rice & Papuchis Construction Company, Inc.
01A01-9605-CH-00211
This is an appeal by plaintiffs/appellants, Allen D. Curtis and his wife, Carolyn June Curtis, from a decision of the chancery court which dissolved the partnership formed between Curtis and defendant/appellee, William M. Rice, and which distributed the partnership's assets.1 The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows. Originating Judge:Tom E. Gray |
Sumner County | Court of Appeals | 12/04/96 | |
Cynthia Albright v. Joseph L. Mercer, III
01A01-9607-CH-00333
This is an appeal by defendant/appellant, Joseph L. Mercer, III, from a decision of the Chancery Court for Williamson County awarding plaintiff/appellee, Cynthia Albright, attorney's fees of $1,000.00.
Authoring Judge: Judge Samuel L. Lewis
Originating Judge:Judge Henry Denmark Bell |
Williamson County | Court of Appeals | 12/04/96 | |
Sandra L. Garfinkel, v. Charles Leonard Garfinkel
02A01-9511-CH-00265
This is a divorce case in which the trial court awarded custody of the parties’ minor children
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard
Originating Judge:Chancellor John Walton West |
Henry County | Court of Appeals | 12/03/96 | |
Rainbo Baking Company of Louisville, a Delaware Corporation, v. Release Coatings of Tennessee, Inc.
02A01-9510-CH-00223
Rainbo Baking Company of Louisville (“Rainbo”) filed suit in the Chancery Court of Shelby County against Release Coatings of Tennessee, Inc. (“Release”) seeking compensatory damages from Release for damages allegedly sustained by Rainbo as a result of the improper straightening of a large quantity of baking pans used by it in its bakery business. The suit contained a count in negligence and a count in breach of contract. Release filed a counter-claim seeking to recover from Rainbo the balance due it for work performed. Following a bench trial, the court issued an opinion from the bench. In this opinion the court found that upon the evidence presented, Release was liable to Rainbo. However, the court specifically stated that it did not find that Rainbo had carried its burden of proof as to damages. The court ordered a reference to the Master to give Rainbo an opportunity to present additional proof as to damages, with Release being given an opportunity to present countervailing proof if desired. Following the Master’s hearing, a report was submitted to the chancellor in which the value of Rainbo’s pans was stated. The Master’s report was affirmed and judgment entered thereon in favor of Rainbo. The chancellor dismissed the counterclaim of Release against Rainbo. Release has raised three issues on appeal: did the 2 chancellor err in: (1) awarding a judgment against Release when Rainbo failed to prove its case; (2) the manner of determining the amount of damages sustained by Rainbo; and (3) failing to find for Release on its counter-claim. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we modify and affirm the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Hewitt P. Tomlin
Originating Judge:Chancellor D. J. D'Allisandratos |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 12/03/96 | |
William Wesley Goad v. State of Tennessee
01S01-9509-CR-00169
The primary issue in this appeal is whether the petitioner, William Wesley Goad, was afforded his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital trial.
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson
Originating Judge:Judge Fred A. Kelly, III |
Sumner County | Supreme Court | 12/02/96 | |
Janice Holder v.Tennessee Judicial Selection Commission and George T. Lewis, III, Esq. in his official capacity as Chairperson of the Tennessee Judicial Selection Commission
01S01-9610-CH-00211
The petition to rehear is denied. ENTER this the 2nd day of December, 1996.
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
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Davidson County | Supreme Court | 12/02/96 | |
State of Tennessee v. John Michael Denton and William Douglas Brown v. State of Tennessee
01S01-9509-CC-00152
We granted review and consolidated these cases in order to consider the circumstances under which imposition of two convictions resulting from a "single" criminal act may violate the double jeopardy and du process clause of the state and federal constitutions in light of State v. Anthony, 817S.W. 2d299 (Tenn. 1991).
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Originating Judge:Judge Henry D. Bell |
Davidson County | Supreme Court | 12/02/96 | |
Debbie VanCleave, v. Matthew Markowski and Diane Markowski
02A01-9602-CV-00035
This matter appears appropriate for consideration pursuant to Rule 10(b) of the Rules of the
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard
Originating Judge:Judge Whit A. Lafon |
Madison County | Court of Appeals | 12/02/96 | |
01A01-9606-CH-00254
01A01-9606-CH-00254
Originating Judge:Robert S. Brandt |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 11/27/96 | |
01A01-9606-CH-00285
01A01-9606-CH-00285
Originating Judge:Allen W. Wallace |
Cheatham County | Court of Appeals | 11/27/96 | |
01A01-9608-CH-00363
01A01-9608-CH-00363
|
Court of Appeals | 11/27/96 | ||
01A01-9605-CH-00204
01A01-9605-CH-00204
Originating Judge:Ellen Hobbs Lyle |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 11/27/96 | |
01C01-9510-CR-00344
01C01-9510-CR-00344
Originating Judge:J. Randall Wyatt, Jr. |
Davidson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 11/27/96 | |
01A01-9608-CH-00365
01A01-9608-CH-00365
|
Court of Appeals | 11/27/96 | ||
01C01-9506-CC-00178
01C01-9506-CC-00178
Originating Judge:W. Charles Lee |
Bedford County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 11/27/96 | |
01C01-9511-CC-00357
01C01-9511-CC-00357
Originating Judge:J. O. Bond |
Macon County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 11/27/96 | |
01C01-9510-CR-00328
01C01-9510-CR-00328
Originating Judge:Jane W. Wheatcraft |
Sumner County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 11/27/96 | |
Conviction. Our Supreme Court, In State v. Kimbrough, 924 S.W.2D 888 (Tenn.
01C01-9506-CC-00178
Originating Judge:W. Charles Lee |
Bedford County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 11/27/96 | |
03C01-9604-CC-00153
03C01-9604-CC-00153
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Blount County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 11/27/96 | |
01A01-9603-CH-00128
01A01-9603-CH-00128
Originating Judge:William B. Cain |
Maury County | Court of Appeals | 11/27/96 | |
01C01-9506-CC-00178lerk
01C01-9506-CC-00178lerk
Originating Judge:W. Charles Lee |
Bedford County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 11/27/96 | |
01A01-9606-CV-00270
01A01-9606-CV-00270
Originating Judge:Thomas Goodall |
Sumner County | Court of Appeals | 11/27/96 | |
03C01-9601-CR-00001
03C01-9601-CR-00001
Originating Judge:Stephen M. Bevil |
Hamilton County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 11/27/96 | |
Mary A. Marshall v. Bc/Bs of Memphis, et al
02S01-9606-CV-00058
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court inaccordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee contends it was error to summarily dismiss her claim as being barred by Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-23, a statute of limitation. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for trial of all issues raised by the pleadings. The action was commenced by the filing of a complaint and summons on February 24, 1995 seeking workers' compensation benefits for injuries and disabilities arising out of and in the course of the claimant's employment with the defendant, Blue Cross / Blue Shield of Memphis. In particular, the employee claims that she has become permanently disabled from the repetitive trauma of operating a key punch machine. By their responsive pleading, the defendants deny the existence of the injury and deny that they received timely notice, but do not assert the affirmative defense that the claim is barred by any statute of limitations. The defendants then took the claimant's discovery deposition and interrogated her concerning, among other things, when she first knew her work was causing pain. Her deposition reveals that her pain began in 1992 and was reported to the employer. The employer, however, chose to treat her claim not as one for workers' compensation benefits, but for group health benefits. On January 18, 1996, the defendants served a pre-trial "Motion to Dismiss" the claimant's claim "pursuant to Rule 41.2 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure" for "failure to file such cause of action within the time prescribed by Section 5-6-23 of the Tennessee Code Annotated." The motion was, according to the trial judge's order of dismissal, "supported by" the claimant's discovery deposition. The trial judge treated the motion as a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 motion for summary judgment, found from the deposition that the claimant "was told in 1992 that she was suffering work related injuries to her wrists, shoulders, neck and back by her physicians (sic) statement to her employer so stating and was told by her employer she did not have a workers' compensation claim," and dismissed the claim as being time-barred. By Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.3, summary judgment will lie if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment is almost never an option in workers' compensation cases; however, when there is no dispute over the evidence establishing thefacts 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Irma Merrill, |
Marshall County | Workers Compensation Panel | 11/27/96 | |
01A01-9510-CV-00456
01A01-9510-CV-00456
Originating Judge:Walter C. Kurtz |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 11/27/96 |