APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, John Claude Wells, III, (defendant), was convicted of nine (9) counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, by a jury of his peers. The trial court, finding the defendant to be a standard offender, imposed a Range I sentence consisting of confinement for ten (10) years in the Department of Correction in each of the nine counts. The sentences must be served consecutively. The effective sentence imposed was confinement for ninety (90) years in the Department of Correction.

We granted the application of Dae-Young Jeong (Husband) for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9, T.R.A.P., to consider whether the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction to grant his wife, the plaintiff Aeyon Cho (Wife), an absolute divorce.

The issue on this interlocutory appeal granted pursuant to T. R. A. P. Rule 9, is whether the lease between the parties is too broad to be enforceable, as was held by the Trial Court.

Crystal M. Trueitt and Carmen Y. Silvels, individually and as mother and next friend of Christopher M. Silvels, a minor,2 appeal jugements rendered in heir favor in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County in the amount of $1,033.36, $1,004.60, and $98.50, respectively.

The controversy presently on appeal attacks a judgment entered in a post-divorce petition for contempt, wherein Linda J. Meador seeks to recover property she contends was awarded he i the divorce decree and to find her fomer husband, Corbin Dale Meador in contempt of court for refusing to deliver the property to her.

By this appeal Casey Lynn Burgess insists that the Trial Court was in error in dismissing his petition for change of custody of his two children, custody of whom by the divorce decree was awarded to Ms. Welch.

This is a divorce action. The defendant (wife) assertson this appeal, among other things, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance of the trial. The record reflects that there was a great deal of confusion as to the way and manner the case was set for trial because of the resignation of the former Circuit Judge. The wife's counsel claims to have had no notice of the trial date until the day the case was set for trial. On that date, he applied to the court for a continuance. The court continued the case until the following morning at 7:00 a.m. Prior to the trial, the court allowed the wife's attorney to make a motion for a continuance on the record, with a written motion, to be filed as exhibit No.1. Counsel's affidavit supporting the motion for a continuance was allowed to be filed as exhibit 2.

The Appellant, Eldreid Reid, appeals as of right his conviction and sentence for one count of rape. He argues on appeal:

 (1) The trial court erred when it permitted the State to introduce evidence that Dorey Horton’s daughter had charged her with assault.
(2) The trial court erred in refusing to permit him to elicit certain testimony from Dorey Horton and in not allowing him to make an offer of proof regarding that testimony.
(3) The trial court erred when it prohibited him from introducing testimony that the first grand jury which considered the case returned a no true bill.
(4) His sentence is excessive.

We have reviewed the record presented in this appeal and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the Appellant’s conviction and sentence.

The appellant, Michael Wayne Robey, was indicted on two counts of aggravated burglary and two counts of theft. As part of a plea agreement, the two theft charges were dismissed; and he pled guilty to two counts of aggravated burglary. The appellant was classified as a Range II, multiple offender and the state recommended concurrent sentences of seven years at 35%.

This case originated as an action to collect monies due under the terms of a promissory note executed by the defendant to the plaintiff First Tennessee Bank, National Association. An answer was filed by the defendant admitting the execution of the note and that there was an outstanding balance thereon. He also filed a counterclaim in which he sought a setoff and damages for forged checks drawn on his account and paid by the bank. The trial court on motion of the plaintiff, entered a summary judgment against the defendant on the original complaint and dismissed the counterclaim. A judgment in the amount of $34,399.24 was entered against the defendant. This appeal resulted. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case originated as an action to enforce a lien for work and materials pursuant to  T. C. A. § 66- 11- 126. The plaintiff alleged that he had furnished equipment, labor, and materials which were used for improvements on the property which the defendant, Cole occupied as lessee and the defendant, Ogle, was an owner. The defendant, Ogle, filed an answer, generally stated that he owned an interest in the subject property, but was without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations set forth in the complaint.

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This action for damages for defamation and outrageous conduct was dismissed on motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff presents the propriety of the dismissal for appellate review, which is de novo on the record with no presumption of correctness. Johnson v. EMPE, Inc., 837 S.W.2d 62, 68 (Tenn. App. 1992).

Plaintiff, incarcerated in prison, brought this action against this attorney for alleged malpractice in representing him in the charges brought against him for criminal conduct.

This is a divorce case that comes to us in an unusual posture. The Husband filed his original complaint on April 3, 1996.  No answer was filed by the Wife.  A marital dissolution agreement was filed on June 12, 1996. The marital dissolution agreement provided for the division of  the parties' property and further contained the following provision:

The parties agree that they are equally responsible for the breakdown of  the marriage and respectfully request the court to declare them divorced rather than awarding a divorce to either party alone.

Plaintiff Mabel Donnelly (Donnelly) appealed the trial court’s denial of her motion to reconsider a grant of summary judgment to the defendants Dr.  Robert E. Walter (Dr. Walter) and Hermitage Nursing Home (Hermitage).  She presents for our review the question of whether the denial of her  motion to reconsider was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. For their part, the defendants contend that Donnelly’s appeal should be dismissed because of her failure to serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the clerk of this court. We affirm.

The appellant, Michael Frazier, appeals from the sentencing judgment of the Criminal Court of Knox County. He was tried for attempt to commit murder in the first degree and was convicted of attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony. The appellant received a sentence of four years as a standard (Range I) offender. On appeal the following issues are raised: (1) sentencing at the maximum time within the range and (2) the denial of probation.

In this custody dispute, the Trial Judge granted custody of the parties' child to the father, and the mother has appealed.

We are primarily called upon in this appeal to decide whether the Tennessee Peer Review Law of 1967 ( T. C. A. § 63-6-219) ( t he La w), grants immunity to hospitals for actions taken against physicians. 1. Parkwest Hospital was purchased by Fort Sanders Alliance in 1990 and became known as Fort Sanders Parkwest Medical Center. We hereafter refer to the hospital as "Parkwest". 2.  upon recommendations of peer review boards or committees.  For reasons hereinafter stated, we believe that the law was intended to, and does, grant hospitals such immunity. We affimr the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting joint custody of the parties' minor children to the parties, with the husband having primary residential custody. For reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a declaratory action wherein the parties seek to have a portion of the will of Carl Parrot t, deceased, construed by the court. Carl Parrott died testate on February 20, 1990. His Last Will and Testament was executed on January 3, 1983, and named his attorney, Jerry K. Galyon, and his daughter, Wanda Parrott Patterson, co- executors.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant contends the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the battering of a school teacher in a school corridor by a student arose out of and in the course of the teacher's employment. The appellee insists the appeal is frivolous. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed, but declines to award damages for a frivolous appeal.

Following the trial court’s order granting the parties an absolute divorce, distributing the parties’ property, awarding custody of the parties’ four minor children to Iva Dell Brown McAlexander (the Mother), and ordering Kenneth Jackson McAlexander (the Father) to pay child support to the Mother pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines, Father appealed. The sole issue presented by the Father is whether the trial court erred in granting custody of the parties’ four children to the Mother. We affirm.

Defendant Memphis Housing Authority(MHA) appeals several orders entered by the trial court in favor of two of MHA’s former employees, Plaintiffs/Appellees Jerry D. Williams and Mable Monday (collectively, the Employees). In separate actions filed below, the Employees sued MHA for breach of employment contract. In both cases, the trial court entered orders granting the Employees’ motions for summary judgment based on the court’s conclusion that MHA’s Manual of Operations constituted part of the employment contract between the parties and, further, that MHA breached this contract by terminating the Employees without just cause. Amending the pleadings to conform to the proof in the records, the trial court’s foregoing orders also granted summary judgment to the Employees on their claims that, in terminating the Employees, MHA violated their rights to substantive and procedural due process.1 After conducting a subsequent hearing on the issue of remedies, the trial court entered final orders granting the Employees back pay and reinstatement to their former positions with MHA.2 Upon MHA’s motion, this court consolidated MHA’s appeals of the trial court’s judgments in favor of Williams and Monday because the appeals involve common questions of law and fact.3