APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In accordance with the opinion of the Court filed herein, the petition to rehear filed by the appellees is denied at the cost of appellees..

The only issue in this slip-and-fall case is whether there is any material
evidence to support the jury’s finding of no fault on the part of the plaintiff. We affirm
the judgment of the lower court.

The medical malpractice and outrageous conduct claims involved in this appeal stem from the hospitalization of an elderly patient for total hip replacement surgery. The patient,1 her two sisters, and her caretaker sued the hospital and its nursing staff in the Circuit Court for Davidson County alleging that their lack of appropriate care caused the patient to enter a vegetative state and caused severe emotional stress to the patient’s sisters and caretaker. The trial court granted the   hospital’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm the trial court.

This case involves the interpretation of an insurance policy. After being struck by a vehicle driven by defendant Dana R. Mabe (“Mabe”), plaintiff Charles G. Miller (“Miller”) filed this personal injury lawsuit against Mabe and defendant The Glens Falls Insurance Company (“Glens Falls”). The trial court granted Glens Falls’ motion for summary judgment, holding that Miller was not covered by the uninsured motorist provision of the Glens Falls policy because he was not “occupying” the insured vehicle at the time he was injured. Miller appealed the trial court’s decision. We affirm.

This appeal involves an inmate’s attempt to obtain judicial review of the parole board’s decision to deny him parole. The Chancery Court for Davidson County dismissed the inmate’s petition for common-law writ of certiorari because it was not filed within the time required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102 (1980). The inmate asserts on this appeal that he filed his petition within the required time after he received notice of the board’s decision to deny him parole. We affirm the judgment because the inmate’s underlying request that the parole board review its decision was not timely filed.

The appellant has filed a Petition to Rehear which we have considered and decline to grant. It is, therefore, ordered that the Petition to Rehear is overruled at the cost of the appellant.

The Metropolitan Nashville Board of Education and the teachers union are attempting to use this case as a vehicle to resolve whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-7- 105 (Supp. 1996) permits the board to use administrative law judges in Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-512 (1996) hearings concerning the termination of tenured teachers. The court has decided to address this issue on its merits even though the teacher involved in this case is non-tenured and is not entitled to a hearing before the board. I cannot agree that we should decide this question at this time. It would be more appropriate to delay addressing the issue until we are presented with a concrete case or controversy. The doctrine of justiciability prompts the courts to stay their hand in cases that do not involve a genuine and existing controversy requiring the present adjudication of present rights. State ex rel. Lewis v. State, 208 Tenn. 534, 537, 347 S.W.2d 47, 48 (1961); Dockery v. Dockery, 559 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977). In accordance with the doctrine, our courts routinely decline to render advisory opinions, Super Flea Market of Chattanooga v. Olsen, 677 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tenn. 1984); Parks v. Alexander, 608 S.W.2d 881, 892 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980), or to decide abstract legal questions. State ex rel. Lewis v. State, 208 Tenn. at 538, 347 S.W.2d at 48-49.

Appellant, Luther William Johnson, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to set aside a consent order of paternity and support. The minor child in question, Andreyous Luther, was born on January 23, 1991 to the Appellee, Mary Helen Pearson Johnson (Mother). For reasons herein articulated, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand.

We granted a Rule 9 appeal in this case to resolve an impasse between the Circuit Court for Blount County, Equity Division, and the Probate Court for Blount County -- whicy by Private Act is the General Sessions Court -- to determine which Court has jurisdiction to resolve the allegations of the complaint in this case.

This is a suit for damages brought by Plaintiff Brian Wolney (“Wolney”), with his wife Melissa Wolney, against Defendants Wells Fargo Armored Service Corporation (“WFA”) and Lisa M. Emmons (“Emmons”). Wolney sued for personal injuries he sustained in an accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle driven by Emmons, but owned by WFA. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of WFA, finding that Wolney’s tort claim against WFA was barred because Wolney was WFA’s statutory employee. The Wolneys appeal the grant of summary judgment. We affirm.