APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case arises under the Grandparents’ Visitation Act. The Petitioners/Appellees, Jerrell
McVay and Cynthia Marie McVay (“Grandparents”), filed a petition with the juvenile court for
court-ordered visitation with their paternal grandchild, Lauren Nicole McVay. The Juvenile Court
awarded visitation to the Grandparents, pursuant to the Grandparents’ Visitation Act. The child’s
mother, Respondent/Appellant Sharon Blen (“Mother”), appeals the trial court’s decision. We
reverse.

Custody of the five-year old son of these parties was awarded to his mother, the propriety of which the appellant-father questions. Our review of the findings of the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-225(3)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 584 (Tenn. 1991). We cannot substitute our judgment for that of the trial judge, and we are not positioned to evaluate the credibility of the parties or their witnesses. Walls v. Magnolia Truck Lines, 622 S.W.2d 526 (Tenn. 1981).

Darryl Jones (hereafter “Plaintiff”) filed suit in the Circuit Court of Shelby County against Dana A. Watson and Sheree Watson (hereafter “Defendants”) to recover damages for the wrongful death of his wife, Goldie Jones, as a result of a motor vehicle accident. Defendants were insured by Allstate Insurance Company ( hereafter “Allstate”). Allstate ultimately entered into a settlement agreement with plaintiff and pursuant thereto issued not one but two consecutive settlement checks to plaintiff. Because the son of the deceased wife incorrectly filed a wrongful death action on his own behalf, plaintiff was prevented from consummating the settlem ent agreement with
Allstate. Some three years after plaintiff’s suit had been filed, defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to comply with Rules 3 and 4 T.R.C.P. in that defendants had not been served with process, nor had an alias summons been issued, nor had the action been  recommenced within one year of the date of the issuance of the original process, thus plaintiff’s claim was barred by the one year statute of limitations. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The sole issue presented by plaintiff on appeal is whether the trial court erred in so doing. We find that it did and reverse.