APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A tenant evicted from her home filed a de novo appeal in circuit court from a general sessions judgment for back rent and dismissal of her counterclaim. The circuit court refused to hear any evidence from the pro se tenant as to her counterclaim based on a local court rule requiring litigants to submit a witness list and exhibits ten days prior to trial. Because of the absence of a transcript and the discretion of trial courts to apply local rules, this court must affirm.

Brian Bowling (“Employee”) was employed as a laborer for Potter South East (“Employer”). During his employment with Employer, he was constantly exposed to loud noise from jackhammers, sledgehammers, power drivers and heavy equipment. Employee initially developed hearing loss in 2010 or 2011. Employer filed a motion for summary judgment raising the one-year statute of limitations. The motion was supported by the evaluating physician’s C-32 report. The trial court granted Employer’s motion and entered an order dismissing Employee’s claim. Employee has appealed from that order. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following the denial of a suppression motion, the defendant, Ferderic Lamont Byrd, pled guilty to attempted possession of less than 15 grams of a Schedule I controlled substance with intent to sell. As a condition of his plea agreement, the defendant reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A), challenging the evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless traffic stop of the vehicle he was driving. Upon our review, we find no error in the denial of the motion and affirm the judgement of the trial court.

The Petitioner, James Jaylen Simmons, pleaded guilty to second degree murder with an agreed sentence of forty years. The Petitioner timely filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that his attorney was ineffective, rendering his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The pro se Petitioner, Charles Blackstock, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order summarily denying his petition for a writ of error coram nobis or, alternatively, petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jonathan Montgomery, was convicted by a Rutherford County jury of initiating a false report in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-502, a Class D felony. As a Range I standard offender, the Defendant received a sentence of three years imprisonment to be served at thirty (30) percent release eligibility. In this appeal as of right, the sole issues presented for our review are (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction, and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Defendant’s request for an alternative sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal was filed by the plaintiffs pursuant to the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-1-1801 to challenge assessments rendered against them by the Commissioner of Revenue for the State of Tennessee. The dispute involves the plaintiffs’ challenge to Tennessee’s assessments of excise tax for the period 2010 through 2012. After cross motions for summary judgment were filed, the trial court found in favor of the Commissioner. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

This case concerns alleged hazing against a student perpetrated by a college fraternity. When suit was brought by the hazed student against the college, the college sought summary judgment regarding the claims asserted against it. Summary judgment was thereafter granted to the college, and the student appealed to this Court. For the reasons that follow, we reverse in part and affirm in part.

This wrongful-death action arises out of the death of a Lemay Concrete employee who was struck and killed by a third party’s cement-mixer truck while acting in the course and scope of his employment. The issues in this appeal are post-settlement disputes concerning an attorney’s fee lien filed by the plaintiffs’ first attorney, a subrogation lien filed by the employer’s workers’ compensation carrier, and the assessment of postsettlement discretionary costs against the carrier. The employee’s family instituted this action after agreeing to pay their first attorney 33% of the gross recovery or “a reasonable attorney’s fee” if they discharged him before recovering. While the action was pending, the insurance carrier paid workers’ compensation benefits to the family and, after declining a settlement offer of $400,000, the plaintiffs discharged their attorney. The plaintiffs then retained substitute counsel. Months later, the wrongful-death claim was settled for $1,350,000. The plaintiffs then sought to void their first attorney’s fee agreement and requested the trial court deduct a portion of their substitute counsel’s fees from the carrier’s subrogation lien. The trial court referred all issues to a special master. The special master found the fee agreement was valid and recommended a fee of $133,333—or 33% of $400,000, the amount of the last “firm offer” secured during the first attorney’s representation. The special master’s report contained no findings and identified no factors relied upon in determining that $133,333 was a “reasonable fee,” other than finding the amount would be one-third of the last “firm offer” obtained by the first attorney. The special master also found the carrier’s own counsel protected its subrogation lien and, thus, recommended that the carrier not be liable for any portion of the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees. The trial court adopted verbatim the special master’s findings and recommendations. Additionally, the court assessed post-settlement discretionary costs against the carrier in lieu of a deduction for plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees. This appeal followed. We have determined that the fee awarded to the plaintiffs’ first attorney was not based on the relevant legal principles or applicable facts because the trial court’s ruling was based entirely on the special master’s recommendation—which addressed only one of the guidelines in Tennessee Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a) for determining what a reasonable fee is. Therefore, we vacate the fee awarded to the plaintiffs’ first attorney and remand this issue to the trial court to award “a reasonable fee” that is based on the relevant facts and factors. We also reverse the trial court’s ruling that the workers’ compensation carrier was not liable for any portion of the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and remand this issue for apportionment of the fees incurred by the plaintiffs’ attorneys. Accordingly, we also reverse the assessment of discretionary costs against the workers’ compensation carrier and remand this issue for reconsideration.

This is an appeal of the trial court’s decision to summarily dismiss a claim of vicarious liability against the owner of the vehicle that was involved in a fatal vehicular accident. The driver of the vehicle was the son and employee of the vehicle owner, and it is alleged that the driver was acting in the course and scope of his employment with the vehicle owner at the time of the collision. The owner of the vehicle filed for summary judgment, and the trial court found the affidavits and deposition testimony of the owner and his son refuted the prima facie evidence of vicarious liability created by Tenn. Code. Ann. §§ 50-10-311 and -312 that the son was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the collision. The plaintiff appeals contending that summary judgment was not proper because the owner and his son were interested witnesses and their credibility was at issue. We agree. It is undisputed that the son’s employment necessitated his travel on the road where the collision occurred, and whether the son had deviated from the defendant’s business prior to the collision is a material fact that is in dispute. For this reason, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal concerns a post-divorce motion to show cause filed by wife against husband for unpaid child support, extracurricular expenses and medical expenses for the children and a failure to divide certain financial accounts of the parties. Additionally, husband sought credit for premiums he had paid post-divorce toward a life insurance policy awarded to wife as part of the division of marital property. Given the nature of the relief being sought, the parties entered into an agreed order referring the matter to a special master. A hearing was held before the special master who subsequently filed his findings and recommendations with the trial court. Husband filed objections in the trial court to the special master’s findings. Following a hearing on husband’s objections, the trial court approved the special master’s findings and recommendations in their entirety and adopted them as the judgment of the court. The husband appeals. We affirm.

Petitioner, Jermaine Davis, claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied his petition for post-conviction relief, finding that Petitioner failed to prove deficient performance and prejudice. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns the responsibilities of the parties, pursuant to the terms of their marital dissolution agreement, following their divorce. Appellant’s ex-wife filed a petition for contempt, contending that Appellant had failed to refinance a debt allegedly owed on a condominium he was awarded in the divorce. Although the trial court did not find Appellant to be in contempt, it did order Appellant to refinance the loan in question and remove his ex-wife’s name from it. We reverse.

A private university dismissed a graduate student for poor academic performance. The student sued the university for breach of contract, claiming the university failed to follow its own procedures in considering his grade appeal and other post-dismissal requests. The university moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Because the complaint adequately alleges a claim for breach of contract, we reverse.

The Defendant, Daniel L. Ginther, appeals as of right from the Williamson County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of the remainder of his eight-year sentence for passing worthless checks in the amount of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement in spite of the Defendant’s “serious medical issues.” Following our review, we affirm.

Pro se appellants appeal from the trial court’s judgment in favor of their former landlord. We affirm the trial court.

The Petitioner, Rodolfo Guerra-Rosales, pleaded guilty in General Sessions Court to misdemeanor drug possession, and the court imposed a probation sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. The Petitioner timely filed a post-conviction petition in circuit court, alleging that his guilty plea in general sessions court was involuntary based upon the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, concluding that the claim was not cognizable and that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts, and the State concedes, that the post-conviction court had jurisdiction to consider the petition and that his petition stated a colorable claim. After review, we reverse the post-conviction court’s dismissal and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the Petitioner’s claim.

Petitioner, Jonquarius Cunningham, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 2015, Petitioner was convicted of one count of attempted second degree murder, one count of reckless endangerment, two counts of employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-three years’ incarceration. This court affirmed the judgments of conviction on direct appeal. State v. Jonquarius Cunningham, No. W2016-00065-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 3616667, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 23, 2017), no perm. app. filed. Thereafter, Petitioner instituted a collateral proceeding seeking post-conviction relief. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to introduce at trial the deposition transcript of one of the victims. He further contends that his judgment of conviction in count five is void based on inconsistent verdicts. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Luis Jorge Diaz, was convicted of six counts of aggravated sexual battery and subsequently sentenced to twenty years in confinement. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-504. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, the Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, alleging, among other things, that trial counsel was ineffective because of his failure to communicate multiple plea offers from the State to the Petitioner. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner filed a timely appeal. Following our review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Carlos Williamson, pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and evading arrest and agreed to allow the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of his sentence. The trial court subsequently ordered the Defendant to serve concurrent twelve-year, three-year, and four-year sentences, respectively, in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it applied two enhancement factors to his sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

In 2009, a Blount County jury convicted the Petitioner, Anthony Todd Ghormley, of two counts of attempted first degree murder, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of especially aggravated burglary, and three counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of 105 years. See State v. Anthony Todd Ghormley, No. E2010-00634-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 171940, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Jan. 20, 2012), no perm. app. filed. On March 13, 2019, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his indictment was void because it failed to include the requisite level of mens rea for the charged offenses and that the affidavit of complaint had been improperly amended. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains his claims and argues that the trial court improperly dismissed his petition. After review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

This is a healthcare liability action resulting from injuries sustained by a guidewire left in the plaintiff’s neck following a procedure. The defendants moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with notice requirements in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). The trial court dismissed the action without prejudice, and the plaintiff appealed. We affirm.

We granted this interlocutory appeal to review the trial court’s suppression of an incriminating statement the Defendant, Joseph Woodruff, made to police. The Defendant was arrested in May 2015 related to an aggravated robbery and an attorney was appointed to represent him. The Defendant later asked to speak with police and, following a waiver of his Miranda rights and without his attorney present, confessed to the robbery. Following his indictment, the Defendant sought to suppress his statement to police and, after a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress. The State filed a motion for an interlocutory appeal challenging the suppression of the statement, which the trial court granted, and this court granted the State’s application for a Rule 9 appeal. After review, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.

In this appeal from a final decree of divorce, the husband contends the trial court abused its discretion in awarding spousal support. He challenges the type, amount, and duration of the alimony awarded. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

The Defendant, Calvin Cole, appeals the denial of his Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court summarily denying the petition.