APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The only issue raised in this paternity action is whether there is any material evidence to support the jury's verdict that the appellant was the father of the child. We affirm.

The plaintiff, A. J. Hall, Inc., has appealed from the summary dismissal of a part of its suit against the defendant, Federated Mutual Insurance Company. The Trial Court expressly directed the entry of final partial judgment as permitted by T.R.C.P. Rule 54.02.

This appeal involves a boundary line dispute between two neighbors. The Appellants, William and Rebecca Pevear, and the Appellees, Evans and Irene Hunt, own real estate which is separated by an alley which is owned by the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County.
 

The Travelers Insurance Company ("Travelers") filed an interpleader in the Chancery Court for Davidson County. It alleged that both defendant/appellee, Maudine Y. Lancaster Webb ("Ms. Webb"), and defendant/appellant, Vicky Austin Lancaster ("Mrs. Lancaster"), claimed the proceeds of an insurance policy which covered the life of decedent, Charles S. Lancaster.

This case presents for review the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground the suit is barred by the three year statute of limitations. This Court finds the essential cause of action alleged is breach of contract rather than injury to property and, therefore, the applicable limitation period is six years rather than three years.

Charles N. Delatte ("plaintiff") filed suit in the Circuit Court of Davidson County against South Mark Realty Partners, Ltd. ("defendant") seeking damages for injuries sustained by him when a metal hand railing on a stairway in the common area of defendant's apartment complex collapsed, causing him to fall.  The trial court granted defendant's motions for  summary judgment. The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court was in error in so doing. For the reasons herein set forth, we find no error and affirm.

Both the trial court and the majority of this panel have decided that Tom and Karen Moore are not entitled to a jury trial on their medical malpractice claim against Dr. Lloyd A. Walwyn because of shortcomings in the affidavits they filed in opposition to Dr. Walwyn’s motion for summary judgment. While I do not relish defending sloppy lawyering, I am convinced that my colleagues have scrutinized the Moores’ counter-affidavits using standards stricter than those required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.05 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115 (1980). I would vacate the summary judgment because the counter-affidavits demonstrate the existence of genuine and material factual issues that only a jury should resolve.
 

The captioned respondent has appealed from an order entered by the Trial Court regulating visitation of the two children of respondent with the captioned petitioners, parents of respondent's deceased husband. Respondent-mother has remarried, and her husband, David McClintock, has adopted the children. However, he is not a party to this proceeding.

This case presents what is purportedly an appeal under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b). The issue of law involves a juvenile's plea of guilty to delinquency in the Circuit Court of Dickson County.