APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves a trip and fall premises liability case filed against a supermarket by one of its customers. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant because the plaintiff’s evidence did not tend to show the defendant had either actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition that would give rise to a duty to either warn the plaintiff of the condition or remove the condition. For the following reasons, we agree that the defendant lacked actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition in its store, and affirm the trial court’s award of summary judgment.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether an amended pleading that seeks to vacate an arbitration award that was delivered to the parties more than 90 days earlier relates back to the date of the original pleading pursuant to Rule 15.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure when the original pleading only sought to modify the arbitration award. A dispute arose when an employer terminated the employment contract of its chief financial officer. The parties submitted the dispute to arbitration pursuant to the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act (“the Act”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-301 to -320. After the arbitrator issued a monetary award in favor of the corporation, the employer filed a petition to confirm the award in chancery court. Within 90 days of the delivery of a copy of the award to the employee, which is the limitation period set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-314(a) of the Act, the employee timely filed an answer to the petition in which he sought modification of the award with respect to prejudgment interest only. Otherwise, the employee admitted all material allegations in the petition. Significantly, the employee did not seek to vacate the award. After waiving any claim to prejudgment interest, the employer filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings to confirm the arbitration award in all other respects. Before the hearing on the motion, but more than 90 days after a copy of the award was delivered to the employee, the employee filed a Rule 15 motion to amend his answer to assert a counterclaim to vacate the award on grounds not previously raised. The trial court denied the employee’s Rule 15 motion to amend the answer as futile on the ground that it was not a timely application to vacate the final award and awarded the employer judgment on the pleadings. The employee appeals, contending the court erred because an amended pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading pursuant to Rule 15.03. We have determined that strict adherence to the 90-day limitation furthers the primary objectives of the Act, which is to bring the arbitration process to a speedy and final resolution. Furthermore, the limitations provided by Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-5-312 and -313(b) are more specific than the general relation-back provision of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to amend the answer as futile on the ground that the employee did not file a timely application to vacate the final award, and we affirm the entry of judgment on the pleadings in favor of the employer.

The Knox County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Trendell Brady, on four counts rape of a child.  Following a trial, the jury acquitted Defendant of counts one and two and convicted Defendant as charged in counts three and four.  The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I standard offender to forty years on each count and ran the sentences consecutively.  Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, and, after a hearing, the trial court amended the judgments of conviction to reflect twenty-five-year sentences on each count, running consecutively.  On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and that the trial court improperly sentenced Defendant to consecutive twenty-five-year sentences.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Appellant, William J. Wagner, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to driving under the influence (DUI), third offense, and reserved a certified question of law concerning whether the State had jurisdiction to prosecute him for the offense because the offense was committed on federal property. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the certified question is not dispositive of the case. Therefore, this court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal, and the appeal is dismissed.

The Petitioner, Jonathan Alajemba, filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of facilitation of conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery, attempted especially aggravated robbery, attempted voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, reckless aggravated assault, and aggravated burglary. The Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective by persuading the Petitioner not to testify and failing to present proof of an insanity defense. He further alleged that newly discovered evidence in the form of recanted testimony established he did not intend to commit robbery. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Jorrel Brown, appeals the Franklin County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his three convictions of passing a forged check, Class E felonies, and resulting effective three-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and, therefore, that his guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Joshua Ryan Steele, was convicted of domestic assault and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served on probation. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal made at the close of the State’s proof and the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Gary Strange, was convicted of three counts of rape of a child and one count of incest following a jury trial. The trial court sentenced Defendant to thirty years for each count of rape of a child and eight years for incest. The trial court ordered two of the thirty-year sentences to run consecutively with each other and concurrently to the remaining sentences for an effective sixty-year sentence as a Range II offender. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred by admitting the victim’s forensic interview; (2) the trial court erred by failing to require the State to make an election of offenses; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (4) there was a fatal variance between the indictment and the evidence; and (5) his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the briefs and the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Four family members sued their former employer and eight individual defendants after their employment was terminated amid allegations of malfeasance. The complaint alleged nine causes of action. The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against the former employer and six of the eight individual defendants on summary judgment. The plaintiffs and the remaining two defendants then became embroiled in an extended discovery battle. The battle ended with the trial court dismissing the remaining claims with prejudice based on the plaintiffs’ failure to cooperate in discovery. We conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the contract claims because the contract at issue was not ultra vires. Because we reverse that portion of the trial court’s decision, we also reverse the award of attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-113(a). We affirm the trial court in all other respects.

In this termination of parental rights case, both parents appeal the trial court’s termination of their parental rights to their son upon numerous statutory grounds and upon its finding that termination was in the child’s best interest.  Upon our review, we conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence supporting the trial court’s determinations with respect to certain grounds though not others and that termination was in the best interest of the child.  Accordingly, we reverse portions of the court’s order finding that certain grounds for termination were established, affirm the remainder of the grounds and the best interest determination, and affirm the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.

In this divorce proceeding, the Father appeals the designation of Mother as the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment.

A father filed a petition to modify a parenting plan in which he sought to change the primary residential parent or modify the residential schedule. The trial court denied his petition, and he appealed. We hold that the father failed to establish a material change of circumstances to justify any change to the parties’ parenting plan and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

A father appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate his parental rights based on the grounds of (1) abandonment by willful failure to support, (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child.  He further challenges the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of the child.  We affirm the trial court’s termination of the father’s parental rights but vacate the court’s judgment regarding two of the grounds for termination.

Defendant, Barenton Barnett, was indicted by the Polk County Grand Jury for theft of property valued at $60,000 or more, a Class B felony. Defendant pleaded no contest to vandalism of more than $2,500, a Class D felony, in exchange for a sentence of three years to be suspended on probation, and Defendant was ordered to pay $8,207 in restitution. Defendant sought to withdraw his plea. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion. Defendant appeals. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The owners of the dominant estate sued the owners of the servient estate of an easement to Tanner’s Bar, a piece of land near a river.  The trial court ruled that the easement was an easement appurtenant for ingress and egress only and did not entitle the dominant estate owners to engage in recreational activities at Tanner’s Bar.  The trial court further ruled that a member of the dominant estate family had to accompany all invitees to the easement.  Having concluded that the intent of the easement was for the dominant estate owners to have the right to enjoy the river at Tanner’s Bar, we reverse the decision of the trial court prohibiting recreational use.  We have further determined that the trial court erred in requiring that a dominant estate family member be present with invitees. 

Anthony Wallace (“Defendant”), pro se, appeals the summary dismissal of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion to correct what he claims were errors in his judgments of conviction. Defendant filed an untimely notice of appeal. Because we can find no errors in the judgments of conviction, the interest of justice does not warrant waiver of timely filing. The appeal is dismissed.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, John D. Hudson, of evading arrest (motor vehicle flight) (count one), criminal impersonation (count two), driving with a revoked license (count three), a first offense seat-belt infraction (count four), and failure to obey a traffic control device (count five). Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II multiple offender to four years for evading arrest, six months for criminal impersonation, six months for driving on a revoked license, thirty days for the seat belt infraction, and thirty days for the failure to obey a traffic control device. The trial court ordered counts one, two, and three to be served consecutively, and a concurrent term of thirty days for the remaining counts, for an effective sentence of five years imprisonment. The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing partial consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm.

William Langston, Petitioner, was initially indicted for voluntary manslaughter. The State obtained a superseding indictment charging Petitioner with first degree murder. Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder. This court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied further review. State v. William Langston, No. W2015-02359-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1968827, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2017), perm app denied (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017). Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of his first retained counsel (“trial counsel”). Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel failed to convey to him a four-year settlement offer before the State obtained the superseding indictment. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

During a botched robbery, sixteen-year-old Tyshon Booker, the Defendant-Appellant, shot and killed the victim, G’Metrick Caldwell. Following extensive hearings in juvenile court, the Defendant was transferred to criminal court to be tried as an adult.  At trial, the Defendant admitted that he shot the victim several times in the back while seated in the backseat of the victim’s car; however, he claimed self-defense. A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant of two counts of first-degree felony murder and two counts of especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the process of transferring a juvenile to criminal court after a finding of three statutory factors by the juvenile court judge violates the Defendant’s rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); (2) whether the State’s suppression of alleged eyewitness identifications prior to the juvenile transfer hearing constitutes a Brady violation, requiring remand for a new juvenile transfer hearing; (3) whether the juvenile court erred in transferring the Defendant to criminal court given defense expert testimony that the Defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and was amenable to treatment; (4) whether the trial court erred in finding that the Defendant was engaged in unlawful activity at the time of the offense and in instructing the jury that the Defendant had a duty to retreat before engaging in self-defense; (5) whether an improper argument by the State in closing arguments constitutes prosecutorial misconduct requiring a new trial; (6) whether evidence of juror misconduct warrants a new trial and whether the trial court erred in refusing to subpoena an additional juror; and  (7) whether a sentence of life imprisonment for a Tennessee juvenile violates the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Shonique Nechelle Smith, Defendant, appeals from the trial court’s judgment revoking community corrections and requiring her to serve the balance of her sentence in incarceration. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal is from the Claims Commission’s order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 9-8-402, 29-26-121, and 29-26- 122. We must affirm.

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Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, which the trial court granted on the grounds of persistent conditions, severe child abuse, and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to parent. Mother also appeals the trial court’s finding that the termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Finding no error, we affirm.

Stephen Damian Ledet, Defendant, was convicted by a jury of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance for resale and tampering with evidence. On appeal, Defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions. After review of the record and briefs, we affirm the convictions.

The Petitioner, Jason Matthew Wyatt, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s order summarily denying relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 and summarily dismissing post-conviction relief. The Petitioner argues the trial court erred in (1) holding that the Criminal Savings Statute in Code section 39-11-112 did not apply to the amendments to the theft grading statute in Code section 39-14-105 and (2) dismissing his Rule 36.1 motion/post-conviction petition without appointing counsel. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Benjamin Scott Brewer, Defendant, was convicted after a jury trial of six counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication, four counts of reckless aggravated assault, driving under the influence, violation of motor carrier regulations, and speeding. As a result, Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of 55 years in incarceration. Defendant appeals his convictions and sentences, arguing on appeal that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); that the trial court improperly certified a witness as a drug recognition expert; that the evidence was insufficient to show intoxication; and that the trial court improperly sentenced Defendant to consecutive sentences. Following our review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.