APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Desmon Paul Rhea, of two counts of first degree felony murder, one count of second degree murder, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of aggravated burglary of a habitation. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus thirty-seven years. On appeal, the Defendant raises six groups of issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motions for judgment of acquittal and whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support his convictions for premeditated murder and the burglary-related offenses; (2) whether the trial court violated his constitutional right to present a defense by conditioning the presentation of an insanity defense on the admission of his previously suppressed statements; (3) whether the State’s destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence requireda new trial under State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999); (4) whether the trial court committed multiple evidentiary errors, each independently warranting reversal and cumulatively depriving him of a fair trial; (5) whether prosecutorial misconduct during the State’s closing argument rendered the trial fundamentally unfair; and (6) whether the trial court’s jury instructions were erroneous. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This extraordinary appeal involves whether a non-attorney individual may file a notice of
appeal in the Shelby County General Sessions Court on behalf of a limited liability
corporation. We conclude that the trial court erred in denying a motion to dismiss the appeal
on this basis. We therefore reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this matter for
dismissal.

This matter concerns a plaintiff’s effort to revive a discrimination lawsuit. Having determined that the plaintiff’s principal appellate brief is not compliant with the relevant rules of briefing in this Court, we conclude that his issues purportedly raised on appeal are waived. The appeal is dismissed.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal requires us to determine whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion for recusal, which was brought pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2. Because Appellant’s petition fails to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2.03, the appeal is dismissed.

The appellant filed the instant action seeking a copy of the property management contract between her condominium association and its property management company. The trial court determined that “a contract between a condominium association and its management company would not be included in those records that a condominium association would be required to provide to a unit owner.” The court dismissed the matter with prejudice. The appellant appeals. We affirm the ruling of the trial court.

The petitioner, Roy Robinson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief,
asserting his case should be remanded for a new evidentiary hearing or, alternatively, that
the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel.
Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties,
we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The trial court found that the husband is
a business owner and that his business, known as Choice Pool Care, LLC, constituted a
marital asset. It then awarded the wife “a 20% share of the business.” However, the trial
court did not value the marital asset. The husband appeals, insisting that the trial court
erred in finding the existence of a marital asset and in its equitable division of the asset.
For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s classification of the husband’s
ownership interest in the LLC as marital property, but we vacate the trial court’s ruling
regarding equitable division of the asset and remand for the trial court to value the asset
prior to equitably dividing the marital estate. The trial court’s rulings regarding child
support and alimony are likewise vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of the
further proceedings that are necessary as to the division of the marital estate.

The Defendant, Jereme Walker Amis, was convicted in the Benton County Circuit Court of possession of a firearm after having been convicted ofa felony crime of violence, a Class B felony, possession of a firearm after having been convicted of felony drug offense, a Class C felony, and violating the conditions of his community supervision, a Class E felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the convictions ofpossessing a firearm and sentenced himto an effective sentence of twenty-four years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendantcontends thatthe trial court committed plain errorby refusing to accept his offer to stipulate tohis prior felony convictions,that the trial court abused its discretionby denying his request to bifurcatethe chargeofviolating the conditions of his community supervision, and that his effective sentence is excessive. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A property owner brought suit against the owner of a neighboring property, seeking either an order awarding her land encompassing a driveway or an easement to use the driveway. The trial court referred the issues to a special master, who made detailed findings regarding the boundary between the properties and as to the elements necessary to establish a prescriptive easement and an easement by necessity. Following a hearing on objections to the special master’s report, the trial court accepted the special master’s findings and recommendations. The neighbor appealed, raising issues regarding the court’s weighing of the evidence in finding the boundary line and granting of a prescriptive easement and an easement by necessity. We affirm.

Mortgage companies maintain that the Tennessee Housing Development Agency(“THDA”), which services mortgages through the trade name of Volunteer Mortgage Loan Servicing(“VMLS”), is liable for monetary losses following the use of an improper bank account number. THDA and VMLS contend that they are protected by sovereign immunity and filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion because it found THDA was engaged in commercial activities. THDA and VMLS appealed. We reverse.

Defendant, Bruce Allen Watts, appeals the trial court’s decision revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his effective fourteen-year sentence in confinement. Upon our review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and, therefore, affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se Petitioner, Verchaunt Joshua Williams, has filed an application for permission to appeal the trial court’s order denying his motion to reopen his prior post-conviction petition. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117; Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, Sec. 10(B). For the reasons stated below, the Court hereby denies the Petitioner’s application.

The Defendant, Mawule Tepe, has filed a pro se petition seeking the recusal of
Bradley County General Sessions Court Judge Clayton Collins and Bradley County
Criminal Court Judge Andrew M. Freiberg from presiding over any of the Defendant’s
pending proceedings in those courts. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B § 2.01. We have
determined that an answer from the State is not necessary. Id. §2.05 (“[i]f the appellate
court, based upon its review of the petition and supporting documents, determines that no
answer from the other parties is needed, the court may act summarily on the appeal”).
Following our review, the Defendant’s petition is summarily DISMISSED.

Defendant, Thomas Koontz, appeals the judgment of the Criminal Court for Hamblen County revoking his probation and ordering execution of his original eight‑year,
six‑month sentence. He argues that the trial court (1) imposed an illegal sentence by altering his release eligibility from thirty percent to one hundred percent, and (2) failed to make the requisite findings on the record to justify ordering him to serve the entire sentence in confinement. Following our review of the record, the arguments and briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s finding that Defendant violated his probation and the revocation of probation; however, the trial court failed to articulate sufficient findings regarding the consequences imposed, as required by State v. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d 751 (Tenn. 2022). Because the record is insufficiently developed for meaningful de novo review, we remand for entry of findings on the record consistent with Dagnan.

The Defendant, Scott A. Stiner, was convicted by a Union County Criminal Court jury of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class C felony, and four counts of aggravated sexual battery of a child less than thirteen years of age, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-529(soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor)1(2018)(subsequently amended), 39-13-504 (aggravated sexual battery) (2018)(subsequently amended). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective fifty-four-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1)he did not receive a fair trial because the allegations and acts that constitute the basis of the convictions were different than the allegations in the indictment and the bill of particulars;(2) the court erred by failing to sever the offenses during the trial; (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated sexual battery of a child less than thirteen years of age conviction in Count 6;(4) he did not receive a unanimous verdict for aggravated sexual battery in Count 3; (5) the court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial; (6) the court erred in admitting evidence in contravention of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (7) the court erred in admitting a diagram that was not properly authenticated; (8)the court erred by allowing expert testimony that went beyond the scope of the witness’s expertise; and (9) the court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing on all counts. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I agree with the majority in affirming the trial court’s judgments and legal conclusions, save for one issue. I write separately to express my disagreement with the majority opinion regarding the trial court’s decision to admit evidence of an uncharged sexual assault of a baby pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). I would find that the introduction of this evidence was in error; however, I would further find that the error was harmless in these circumstances and would affirm the convictions despite the error.

Defendant, Louis L. Steele, was convicted by a Hardeman County Jury of one count of indecent exposure in a penal facility, and the trial court imposed a Range II, three-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction, consecutively to his Davidson County sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Ulester A. Cross, pled guilty to three counts of driving while his license was suspended, and one count each of simple possession of marijuanaand introducing contraband into a penal facility. He received an effective sentence of four years as a Range I offender, to be served on probationfollowing service of forty-five days. Following a hearing on a warrant for violation of his probation, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his original sentence incarcerated. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in revoking probationwithout making sufficient findings. Following a review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Hardeman County jury convicted the Defendant, Danterrio Devonta Poplar, of evading arrest in a motor vehicle while creating a risk of death or injury to others. The trial court imposed a three-year sentence, with 75 days of incarceration and the balance to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of law enforcement witnesses during voir dire and rebuttal closing argument and that the trial court should have given a curative instruction following the prosecutor’s statement. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Devan Denton, of several crimes, including three counts of aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of fifteen years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction, and the Petitioner wassubsequentlyhoused in the Turney Center Industrial Complex in Hickman County, Tennessee. However, he was temporarily moved to the Shelby County Jailfor proceedings stemming from his post-conviction petition. While being held in Shelby County, the Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, which the habeas corpus court denied after a hearing. It is from this habeas corpus proceeding that the Petitioner appeals. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Xavier Young, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of postconviction
relief from his guilty plea to one count of carjacking. The Petitioner argues that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was unknowing and
involuntary. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from a complaint originally filed in the Shelby County chancery court
that sought the removal of the trustee of a trust based on alleged breaches of fiduciary
duties, breach of trust, conversion of trust property, and other claims. The chancellor who
was assigned the case determined that he had a conflict of interest requiring him to recuse
himself. The other chancellors in the judicial district were also unable to hear the case, and
the original chancellor signed an order transferring the case to the circuit court. The circuit
court entered an order removing the trustee. The defendants filed this appeal. Finding that
the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we vacate the removal of the trustee and
remand for transfer of the case back to a court of appropriate jurisdiction.

A homeowner brought suit against the owner of the house next door, asserting a claim for breach of a joint driveway agreement and an alternative action for a declaratory judgment that the neighbor had abandoned the easement created by the driveway agreement. The neighbor filed counterclaims for a declaratory judgment, trespass, and an alternative claim for rescission for failure of consideration. After a trial, the trial court entered a final order determining the boundaries of the easement established by the driveway agreement; the court rejected the plaintiff’s claims for breach of the easement and abandonment as well as the defendant’s claim for trespass. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in its rulings regarding the boundaries of the easement, its denial of her claims for breach of the easement and abandonment, and in its award of discretionary costs to the defendant. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After the trial court granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss, Appellant sought relief from the order pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied the Rule 60.02 motion. The trial court then denied Appellant’s request pursuant to Rule 59.04 for relief from the denial of his Rule 60.02 motion. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.

The Petitioner, Bobby V. Summers, acting pro se, appeals from the summary dismissal of
his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner’s handwritten brief is largely
incoherent and difficult to decipher; however, we understand him to present four primary
arguments: (1) that facilitation of first degree murder is not a valid offense; (2) that his
conviction is void because no principal offender was prosecuted or convicted; (3) that the
indictment or charging instrument was defective and therefore void; and (4) that his guilty
plea was involuntary because counsel “tricked,” “duped,” or “coerced” him. The habeas
corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, finding it procedurally defective and raising
no cognizable claim. After careful review, we affirm.