APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Cordarious Franklin, was convicted of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and child abuse. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of forty years for rape of a child, twelve years for aggravated sexual battery, and eleven months, twentynine days for child abuse. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (I) whether the trial court erred by admitting the victim’s forensic interview; (II) whether the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions; (III) whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s request to review the victim’s medical records; (IV) whether the trial court erred by failing to give the jury a Ferguson instruction; (V) whether a juror’s questions amounted to extraneous prejudicial information; (VI) whether Defendant’s sentence was improper; and (VII) whether there was plain error due to an ex parte conversation between the State and the trial court and by the trial court’s exclusion of Defendant’s family from the courtroom during the victim’s testimony. After review, we conclude there is structural constitutional error by the trial court excluding the public from the courtroom and therefore reverse the judgments and remand for a new trial.

The Defendant, Michael Green was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, and two counts of attempted aggravated kidnapping, a Class C felony. T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101(a)(1)-(3) (2018) (criminal attempt); 39-13-304(a) (2018) (aggravated kidnapping). The trial court merged the convictions into a single aggravated kidnapping judgment and sentenced the Defendant, a Range II offender, to fifteen years to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction of aggravated kidnapping or attempted aggravated kidnapping, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the case due to the lack of a preliminary hearing or for a delayed preliminary hearing, (3) the court erred in denying his motion to suppress his pretrial statement, and (4) the court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction pursuant to State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 578 (Tenn. 2012). Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves the Commissioner of Revenue for the State of Tennessee’s audit and subsequent adjustment of sales tax due from Appellant, Check Printers, under the Tennessee Retailers Sales Tax Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-6-101, et seq. The trial court granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment finding that, although Appellant manufactured the disputed products in Tennessee and ultimately exported the products outside the state, under Appellant’s standard contract language, title passed to the customer in Tennessee at the time the product was tendered for shipping. Based on this intervening taxable event, i.e., the “sale,” as that term is defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-6-102(80)(A), the trial court concluded that the products were not excluded from taxation under either the manufactured-for-export exemption, Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-6-313(a), or the sale-for-resale exemption, Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-6-102(75)(a). Because there is a dispute of material fact concerning whether Appellant’s sale of blow-in cards to its customer, AMI, was consummated in Tennessee, we vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment only as to the AMI blow-in cards; the trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed.

The key issue on appeal is the scope of a dragnet clause under Georgia law. Mortgagors refinanced debt secured by their real property with a new lender. Although the new lender sent the original mortgagee the requested payoff amount, the original mortgagee refused to release its deed of trust. The original mortgagee claimed that the real property was also security for other debts by virtue of an unrecorded instrument signed by one of the mortgagors that contained a dragnet clause. The mortgagee sought a declaratory judgment that its unrecorded instrument had priority over the deed of trust recorded by the new lender. The new lender counterclaimed, seeking the statutory penalty for the mortgagee’s failure to release its deed of trust and recovery of attorney’s fees and expenses. The trial court concluded that the unrecorded instrument was unenforceable and not effective as to the new lender due to a lack of actual notice. The court also ordered the original mortgagee to release its deed of trust and awarded the new lender the statutory penalty and attorney’s fees. On appeal by the original mortgagee, we conclude that the unrecorded instrument was enforceable, but under Georgia law, the dragnet clause was limited to the debts of the mortgagor who signed the instrument. Because of the lack of actual notice, the unrecorded instrument was not effective as to the new lender. Despite the new lender being a defendant in the declaratory judgment action, the new lender’s counterclaim for the statutory penalty entitled it to an award of attorney’s fees. We affirm the decision of the trial court as modified.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ second lawsuit against adjacent property owners arising from the discovery of a leaking septic tank on the plaintiffs’ property. In their first lawsuit, the plaintiffs sued their neighbors in chancery court for negligence and trespass after discovering that the leaking septic tank was connected to a mental health facility on their neighbors’ property. While the first action was still pending, the plaintiffs filed this action against their neighbors for continuing nuisance and trespass arising from the leaking septic tank. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on the doctrine of prior suit pending. The plaintiffs opposed the motion and requested additional time to conduct discovery. After the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, the plaintiffs appealed. We conclude that the requested discovery was unnecessary to respond to the defendants’ motion and that all the elements of the defense of prior suit pending were present. So we affirm.

In this appeal, the parties were declared divorced in February 2013 when the trial court approved their marital dissolution agreement and entered a final decree of divorce; at the same time, the parties entered into a separate agreement which was to govern the transfer of the wife’s marital interest in four businesses operated by the husband. In July 2014, the husband filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60.02(5) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure to have the decree set aside. The court granted the motion and vacated the decree, reinstating the marital relationship; the court also rescinded the agreement transferring the wife’s interest in the businesses on the ground of mutual mistake. Following a trial, the court entered a final decree of divorce in 2017. Both parties appeal. Wife asserts that the trial court erred in vacating the 2013 decree, in rescinding the parties’ agreement, and in failing to award her all of the attorney’s fees she incurred at the trial court level. Husband appeals the division of the marital estate in the 2017 decree, and contends that the trial court erred when it failed to order the return of payments he made to wife pursuant to the agreement that was rescinded and alimony payments he made pursuant to the 2013 decree that was vacated. Both parties seek their attorney’s fees on appeal. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects and decline to award fees on appeal.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Mario Walls, of attempted second degree murder, and the trial court imposed a sentence of thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction, contending that the proof did not show he was aware his conduct was reasonably certain to result in the victim’s death. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Steven Douglas Fish, appeals the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. We conclude that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief because Petitioner’s judgment is not void and that Petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief because his petition was filed outside of the statute of limitations period. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This appeal arises from a commercial lease dispute. The trial court summarily ruled that Simmons Bank, which acquired the tenant originally named in the lease in a merger, had the right to exercise a renewal option. The appellant landlord contends this was error because “(1) the plain language of the lease expressly indicated the option could only be exercised by the tenant originally named in the lease and (2) two events of default occurred [as a result of the merger] which precluded the exercise of the option under the plain terms of the lease.” The alleged events of default were that (1) the original tenant failed to “maintain its legal existence,” and (2) the original tenant transferred its interest to Simmons Bank by operation of law. We have determined that regardless of whether the lease was transferred to Simmons Bank by merger pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-21-108(a)(2) “without reversion or impairment,” the parties agreed to restrict any transfer of the right to renew the lease to one entity, First State Bank, “the Tenant originally named” in the lease. Accordingly, and relying on the legal principle that a statute shall not be applied to construe a contract when the parties to the contract express a contrary intention, the agreed-upon renewal restriction in the lease controls. As a consequence, Simmons Bank does not have the right to exercise the renewal option. Therefore, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to Simmons Bank and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of the landlord.  

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her children. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Montgomery County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Matia P. (“Mother”) to her minor children Charlie-Lynn P. and Pharaoh P. (“the Children”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of failure to establish a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and persistent conditions. The Juvenile Court also found that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals, arguing only that termination of her parental rights is not in the Children’s best interest because she has taken certain steps to address her mental health and domestic violence issues. We find and hold that the Juvenile Court did not err in finding that clear and convincing evidence was shown as to all three grounds. We find and hold further that, notwithstanding Mother’s purported improvements, the Juvenile Court did not err in finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court.

John W. McClarty, J., dissenting. The majority holds that the trial court abused its discretion by entering an order that would allow the plaintiffs to discover information that is irrelevant to their breach of contract claim.

The Defendant, Damarcus C. Nelson, appeals as of right from the Dyer County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of the remainder of his four-year sentence for solicitation of aggravated assault. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion because the State failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he violated the law or participated in gang-related activity, and he maintains that the remaining “technical” violations did not warrant incarceration. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Sumner County jury convicted the Defendant, Daversea A. Fitts, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, asserting that the State failed to sufficiently corroborate accomplice testimony presented at trial. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her daughter. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds for termination were proven and that it was in the best interest of the child to terminate parental rights. Mother appeals but only challenges whether the judgment is valid if the guardian ad litem was not present for the termination hearing. After careful review, we conclude that the presence of the guardian ad litem could not be waived by the other parties at the trial on the merits. Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Katelyn Bateman, appeals as of right from the Cheatham County Circuit Court’s order revoking her community corrections sentence and ordering the Defendant to serve the remainder of her sentence in confinement. The Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the sentence served in confinement rather than permitting a furlough to the drug court program. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a divorce. Fiona Eischeid Flodin (“Wife”) filed for divorce from Tan Scott Flodin (“Husband”) in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). Husband, in the latter years of the marriage, was unemployed by his choice. Husband asserted that he contributed by helping Wife with her real estate business. Wife asserted that Husband’s contributions were minimal and that he refused to work despite her urging him to get a job. After a trial, the Trial Court entered an order finding, inter alia, that Husband lived a life of leisure while Wife did the vast majority of the work both for pay and at home. The Trial Court found all the witnesses credible except Husband. The Trial Court proceeded to award Husband around 38% of the marital estate as well as six months of transitional alimony at the rate of $2,000 per month. Husband appealed. Husband argues on appeal that the Trial Court erred in its valuation of certain marital assets, in its division of the marital estate, and in not awarding him more alimony than it did. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s factual findings. The values adopted by the Trial Court as to marital assets were within the range of evidence presented. In addition, the Trial Court appropriately considered the relevant factors in its decisions regarding alimony and the marital estate. We discern no abuse of discretion or other error by the Trial Court. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The Petitioner, David G. Andrews, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 2017 conviction for robbery and his ten-year sentence. He contends that the judgment is void. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This interlocutory appeal involves a discovery dispute. G.G., an eighth-grade student, was expelled from Boyd-Buchanan School after he sent sexually explicit messages to a female student on a social media platform. G.G. and his mother, Jackie Johnson, filed a complaint against Boyd-Buchanan School and other school officials. The trial court dismissed most of plaintiffs’ claims. The only remaining claim is plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim against the school. During discovery, plaintiffs requested the employment files of various school administrators and extensive information relating to the disciplinary records of non-party students. The school filed a motion for a protective order. The court granted the school’s motion in part and denied it in part. The school then requested permission to file an interlocutory appeal. The trial court granted permission to appeal, as did this Court. In this opinion, we clarify the appropriate legal standard for analyzing discovery disputes. We also hold that the trial court abused its discretion by entering an order that would allow plaintiffs to discover information that is irrelevant to their breach of contract claim. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for the entry of an order granting Boyd-Buchanan School’s motion for a protective order in its entirety.

The defendant, Derrick Williamson, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of alternative sentencing for his jury conviction of child abuse. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In 2014, the Petitioner, Paul Brent Baxter, was convicted of aggravated assault and aggravated kidnapping, and the trial court sentenced him to serve thirty-five years. The Defendant appealed his convictions to this court, and we affirmed the judgments. State v. Paul Brent Baxter, No. M2015-00939-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 2928266 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 16, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2016). Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Clarence D. Schreane, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis from his first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery convictions, for which he received an effective sentence of life plus sixty years. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Defendant, Mario Marquette McAdoo, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s revocation of his probation for his convictions for four counts of felony theft, misdemeanor assault, and misdemeanor resisting arrest and its order that he serve the remainder of his effective ten-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at the revocation hearing and that, as a result, he is entitled to a new revocation hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves a prisoner’s appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of his complaint, wherein he raised numerous claims relating back to his seizure, arrest, prosecution, and conviction, all of which occurred from 1998 to 2000. The trial court dismissed all of the prisoner’s claims on numerous grounds, including that they were time-barred by various statutes of limitations and that many of the defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity. Concluding that because certain defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity and that all of the prisoner’s claims are either time-barred or do not comply with the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we affirm.

The petitioner, Jeffrey Mason, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2017
guilty-pleaded conviction of second degree murder, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Early Reynolds, of unlawful possession of a firearm after a prior felony conviction involving use, or attempted use, of force, violence, or a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to serve fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress statements made to the police after he invoked his right to remain silent; (2) the trial court improperly admitted a photograph of the Defendant holding a gun; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court.