APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

We granted this appeal to consider whether a circuit court loses continuing, exclusive subject matter jurisdiction if a post-divorce petition seeking modification of a parenting plan adopted in a final divorce decree alleges facts that are tantamount to an unruly child claim, over which juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-103. After we granted this appeal, the General Assembly amended section 37-1-103 to expressly provide that a circuit court retains subject matter jurisdiction in these circumstances until and unless a pleading is filed or relief is sought in juvenile court and the juvenile court’s exclusive original jurisdiction is invoked. Act of April 18, 2019, 2019 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 167. The General Assembly applied this amendment to all cases pending on its April 18, 2019 effective date, including this appeal. Id. § 2. Because no pleading was filed in juvenile court nor was the juvenile court’s exclusive jurisdiction invoked in any other manner in this case, the circuit court retained subject matter jurisdiction of the post-divorce petition. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the circuit court is reinstated.

This appeal arises from a lawsuit concerning the enforcement of restrictive covenants in a subdivision. River Plantation Homeowner’s Association, Inc. (“the Association”), later joined by certain individual property owners (“Plaintiffs” collectively), sued property owners R. Randall Capps and his wife Carolyn Brown Capps (“the Capps”) in the Chancery Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”) seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant requiring homeowners to have a paved driveway. The Capps have a gravel driveway and wish to keep it. The Trial Court found in favor of Plaintiffs and ordered the Capps to install a concrete driveway. The Capps appeal, raising several issues, including one as to whether the Association lacks standing. We hold, inter alia, that the Association, although not specified in the restrictive covenants as a party capable of suing to enforce restrictions, has standing to do so. In light of the unambiguous driveway restriction and the fact that the Association never waived enforcement, we affirm the Trial Court’s judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. However, we modify the Trial Court’s judgment to allow the Capps, if they so choose, to use asphalt instead of concrete, as the Association has no objection to it. In addition, we reverse the Trial Court’s decision to not award Plaintiffs their attorney’s fees incurred in successfully bringing this enforcement action where the restrictive covenants specifically provide for such attorney’s fees. We, therefore, remand for the determination and award to Plaintiffs of reasonable attorney’s fees. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This appeal arose from a divorce action filed by the wife. The husband and the wife appeared before the trial court and presented a settlement agreement for the trial court’s approval. Prior to entry of the court’s order approving the settlement agreement, the husband filed written notice that he no longer consented to the agreement. Following entry of the trial court’s order in June 2018, the husband filed a motion seeking to set aside such order pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. In his motion, the husband argued that the trial court had failed to supply him with a functioning voice amplification system that he had requested for use during the hearing and that he had misunderstood the terms of the parties’ agreement. The trial court denied the husband’s motion without hearing evidence regarding whether the husband had a disability for which accommodation during the proceedings was necessary or making a finding regarding whether he had properly requested the accommodation as asserted in his motion. Upon a thorough review of the record, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for an evidentiary hearing concerning the husband’s motion.

The trial court granted summary judgment to various of the defendants in a personal injury action. The Plaintiff appeals, contending that material facts are in dispute, precluding summary judgment. Finding that disputes of material fact exist, we reverse the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

In this matter, mother relocated with the parties’ minor child from Tennessee to Florida. Father filed an “Amended Petition to Modify Parenting Plan and Objecting (sic) to Maternal Relocation and for Contempt.” Father’s motion for criminal contempt alleges that mother failed to adhere to the permanent parenting plan and blatantly violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(a) when she moved to Florida without the consent of father. On April 25, 2018, after a hearing on the petition, the trial court entered an order modifying the permanent parenting plan. However, there is nothing in the court’s order resolving father’s petition for contempt. Because there is not a final order resolving all of the claims and issues in the proceedings below, we lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal.  

A motorcyclist sustained severe injuries in an accident on a recently paved portion of a state maintained highway. Alleging that his accident was caused by loose gravel on the highway from the recent paving project, the motorcyclist filed separate actions against the state contractor who resurfaced the state highway and the State of Tennessee. The two actions were consolidated in the circuit court for discovery and trial. Both defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that the plaintiff could not prove that the gravel came from the paving project or that the defendants had notice of the gravel before the accident. The state contractor also argued that it was discharged from liability under the State Construction Projects Liability Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 12-4-503 (2011). The trial court initially denied the motions. But after the defendants filed motions to alter or amend based on new evidence, the court reversed its decision and granted the defendants summary judgment on all claims. The plaintiff appealed. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court erred in excluding lay witness opinion testimony and in ruling that expert proof was necessary to determine the source of the gravel. Taking the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, we conclude that the plaintiff demonstrated genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. So we reverse.

The Petitioner, Joseph E. Suggs, acting pro se, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Davidson County Criminal Court, claiming his judgments of conviction for rape of a child are void because they lack the required
file-stamp. After review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Plaintiff Susan Lynn Slagle (Wife) filed this divorce action in May of 2018. Defendant Robert Wayne Slagle (Husband) did not file an answer or other responsive pleading. Wife moved for a default judgment. A hearing was set for August 2, 2018. Husband appeared pro se at the hearing, still having filed nothing with the trial court. The trial court, without hearing any proof, granted Wife a default judgment on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. Shortly thereafter, the trial court entered its final judgment dividing the marital property. Husband filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(1) motion for relief, asking the trial court to set aside the judgment. The trial court denied Husband’s motion. On appeal, we hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-114 (2017) requires a trial court to hear proof of the facts alleged before granting a divorce on any ground other than irreconcilable differences, in the absence of a valid stipulation between the parties. Because the trial court did not in this case, we vacate the judgment and remand for a trial.

Eight owners of real property in the Daniels2 Estates Subdivision in Roane County, filed suit seeking equitable relief and money damages from defendants, Marshall Steven Cole, Jr. and his wife, Sarah Cole, after defendants allegedly blocked and/or otherwise made impassable a disputed drive known as “Kudzu Drive.” In a later-filed separate action, two additional owners of property in the subdivision filed suit seeking equitable relief and money damages from Mr. Cole individually. Collectively, plaintiffs claim Kudzu Drive is part of a “joint private permanent easement” dedicated to the use of all of the tract owners in the subdivision. Defendants, on the other hand, claim that the easement consists of a road known as “Daniel Road,” of which Kudzu Drive is not a part. Kudzu Drive, defendants allege, is an independent drive situated exclusively on their property. After a bench trial, the court held that Daniel Road and Kudzu Drive encompass one subdivision road dedicated to the use of all subdivision residents. It held that all right, title, and interest in the disputed drive is vested in the homeowner’s association by virtue of an after-the-fact quitclaim deed executed to it by the subdivision’s previous owner and developer, Mrs. Melvia Mae “Peggy” Daniel. The court enjoined defendants from preventing the homeowner’s association from improving or opening “Kudzu Drive.” The court ordered defendants to remove two gates, a berm, and any other obstructions preventing ingress and egress along Kudzu Drive. The court awarded “damages to all of the [p]laintiffs for [s]lander of [t]itle.” The court awarded $14,133.79 in attorney’s fees and expenses to each set of plaintiffs in the consolidated matters. The court awarded an additional $750 to plaintiffs in Eric Lovett et al. v. Marshall Steven Cole, Jr. et al. for attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in preparing the final order for the trial court’s signature. Defendants appeal. We reverse the trial court’s judgment in which the court decreed that the property referred to as Kudzu Drive is a part of the joint private permanent easement dedicated to the use of all of the tract owners. We hold, instead, that Kudzu Drive is an independent drive situated exclusively on the defendants’ property. In view of our decision, we also reverse all monetary awards of the trial court.

Eight owners of real property in the Daniels Estates Subdivision in Roane County, filed suit seeking equitable relief and money damages from defendants, Marshall Steven Cole, Jr. and his wife, Sarah Cole, after defendants allegedly blocked and/or otherwise made impassable a disputed drive known as “Kudzu Drive.” In a later-filed separate action, two additional owners of property in the subdivision filed suit seeking equitable relief and money damages from Mr. Cole individually. Collectively, plaintiffs claim Kudzu Drive is part of a “joint private permanent easement” dedicated to the use of all of the tract owners in the subdivision. Defendants, on the other hand, claim that the easement consists of a road known as “Daniel Road,” of which Kudzu Drive is not a part. Kudzu Drive, defendants allege, is an independent drive situated exclusively on their property. After a bench trial, the court held that Daniel Road and Kudzu Drive encompass one subdivision road dedicated to the use of all subdivision residents. It held that all right, title, and interest in the disputed drive is vested in the homeowner’s association by virtue of an 1 These two matters were consolidated at trial and for the purpose of oral argument before us. 2 The last name of the subdivision’s creator is “Daniel.” However, the subdivision’s designation took on the plural “Daniels.” 05/24/2019 -2- after-the-fact quitclaim deed executed to it by the subdivision’s previous owner and developer, Mrs. Melvia Mae “Peggy” Daniel. The court enjoined defendants from preventing the homeowner’s association from improving or opening “Kudzu Drive.” The court ordered defendants to remove two gates, a berm, and any other obstructions preventing ingress and egress along Kudzu Drive. The court awarded “damages to all of the [p]laintiffs for [s]lander of [t]itle.” The court awarded $14,133.79 in attorney’s fees and expenses to each set of plaintiffs in the consolidated matters. The court awarded an additional $750 to plaintiffs in Eric Lovett et al. v. Marshall Steven Cole, Jr. et al. for attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in preparing the final order for the trial court’s signature. Defendants appeal. We reverse the trial court’s judgment in which the court decreed that the property referred to as Kudzu Drive is a part of the joint private permanent easement dedicated to the use of all of the tract owners. We hold, instead, that Kudzu Drive is an independent drive situated exclusively on the defendants’ property. In view of our decision, we also reverse all monetary awards of the trial court.

The Circuit Court for Montgomery County (“the Trial Court”) entered a default judgment in favor of Theophilus Ebulueme (“Plaintiff”) in this breach of contract action. Fred E. Onoh (“Defendant”) filed a motion pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 to vacate the judgment asserting that Defendant was not properly served and never received notice of the suit. The Trial Court denied the Rule 60 motion. Defendant appealed to this Court. We find and hold that Plaintiff did not achieve personal service and that the service by publication that was attempted was improper. As such, Plaintiff failed to properly serve Defendant rendering the default judgment void. We, therefore, vacate the Trial Court’s August 7, 2017 order granting a default judgment and the Trial Court’s order denying Defendant’s Rule 60 motion.

The Defendant, Michael Freeman, appeals his second degree murder conviction, alleging that (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress his police statement because he made an unequivocal request for a lawyer; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and (3) that the trial court erred by issuing a flight instruction to the jury. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the Defendant’s issues do not entitle him to relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

In 2007, a Shelby County jury found the Defendant, Jeremy Garrett, guilty of aggravated robbery, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. In 2018, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, seeking to correct an illegal sentence. The trial court summarily denied Rule 36.1 relief. On review, having determined that the Defendant has failed to state a colorable claim for Rule 36.1 relief, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Cameron Neil Brown, appeals the denial of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this divorce action, the trial court awarded Wife transitional alimony of $2,000 per month for 24 months and $1,000 per month for the next 24 months; the court denied her requests for alimony in futuro and for alimony in solido to cover the cost of future dental care. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.  

Defendant, Christopher Christian Padgett, was convicted for felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of life in prison. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce indirect hearsay evidence regarding an eyewitness’s description of the suspect’s shoes in violation of the rules of evidence and the Confrontation Clause. Additionally, Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce a recording of Defendant’s conversation with his mother taken at the police service center because the statements were taken in violation of Defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the Tennessee and United States Constitutions. After a review, we hold that the trial court committed harmless error by admitting the indirect hearsay description of the suspect and that Defendant is not entitled to plain error relief on the other issues raised. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, but we remand this case for entry of judgment documents in Counts Two and Four.

After losing in general sessions court, Plaintiff attempted to appeal the judgment to the circuit court. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and a counterclaim in the circuit court. Plaintiff’s appeal was thereafter dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it was not perfected in a timely manner. The circuit court then entered a default judgment against the Plaintiff based upon Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the counterclaim. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the circuit court lost subject matter jurisdiction over the counterclaim upon the dismissal of the appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Appellee Germantown Planning Commission voted to change the zoning designation of property held by Appellant trust. In response, Appellant filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari seeking review of the Planning Commission’s decision. Appellees moved for dismissal of Appellant’s petition for writ of certiorari under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(1). Following a hearing on Appellant’s request for temporary injunction to halt Appellee City of Germantown from taking any action on the Planning Commission’s recommendation for rezoning, the trial court granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the Planning Commission’s recommendation did not constitute a final judgment for purposes of review under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 27-9-101. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court’s adjudication of the motion to dismiss was premature because Appellant had no opportunity to respond to the motion. Appellant also contends that the grant of the motion to dismiss was error because, under Tennessee Code Annotated sections 13-7-203(b) and 13-7-204, the Planning Commission’s decision was a final approval of the rezoning as opposed to a mere recommendation. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal from a final order in the parties’ divorce proceeding entered on April 18, 2017. The Notice of Appeal, filed with the Appellate Court Clerk on April 16, 2019, was accompanied by a motion seeking leave to file it late, presumably pursuant to certain provisions in Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, and because there is no authority in Rule 4(a) for a waiver of the timely filing of a Notice of Appeal in a civil case, we do not have jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

After the administrator of an estate obtained a judgment vesting title to real property in the estate, the administrator filed a detainer summons against the decedent’s daughter in general sessions court seeking possession of the property. The general sessions court determined that the estate was entitled to possession of the property, and the decedent’s daughter appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court granted possession of the property to the estate and ordered the decedent’s daughter to vacate the premises within thirty days. The decedent’s daughter appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendants have appealed from the trial court’s rulings granting the plaintiffs a partial summary judgment and directing the entry of a final judgment under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. Because the order appealed was not properly entered under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58 and because the order is not appropriate for certification as final under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02, we dismiss the appeal

The State appeals the Monroe County Criminal Court’s dismissal of the charge of vehicular assault by intoxication against the defendant, Paul Thomas Welch, Jr. Because the trial court erred by dismissing the charge, we vacate the trial court’s order, reinstate the indictment charging the defendant with vehicular assault by intoxication, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.

Kenneth M. Wright was employed by National Strategic Protective Services, LLC, as a security officer at the Department of Energy, Oak Ridge facility. While participating in a training exercise, he injured his neck, which required surgery. The trial court found Mr. Wright was entitled to increased permanent partial disability benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(B) and then awarded extraordinary benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-242(a)(2). The employer has appealed the award of extraordinary benefits. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s order that: (1) designated Father/Appellee as primary residential parent; (2) awarded him sole decision-making authority; and (3) set visitation. Mother/Appellant appeals: (1) the designation of Father as primary residential parent; (2) the award of sole decision-making authority to Father; and (3) her number of parenting days with the child. Because the trial court failed to make any findings regarding decision-making authority, we vacate the trial court’s award of sole decision-making authority to Father and remand for findings of facts and conclusions of law related to same. We also conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to maximize Mother’s parenting time with the child. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s visitation award and remand for a more equal award of parenting time. Finally, we reverse the trial court’s order concerning child support and remand for a recalculation of support consistent with the new parenting schedule entered on remand. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed.

We granted permission to appeal in this case in order to determine whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1007, which provides that “[n]o process, except as otherwise provided, shall be issued for the violation of [the statutes proscribing the offenses of sexual exploitation of a minor] unless it is issued upon the application of the district attorney general of the district,” applies to search warrants sought and obtained prior to the commencement of a prosecution for sexual exploitation of a minor. In this case, a police officer applied for and obtained the search warrant by which pornographic images of minors were recovered from the Defendant’s computer. The Defendant sought to suppress the evidence on the basis that the search warrant was not applied for by the district attorney general. The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress, and the Defendant subsequently pled guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a minor, reserving as a certified question the efficacy of the search warrant. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling and the Defendant’s conviction. We hold that Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1007 does not require search warrants to be applied for by the office of the district attorney general. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment below.