APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The day before a hearing on a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution was held, Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. Plaintiff did not appear at the hearing the following day. As such, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the case with prejudice. We reverse and remand for the entry of an order of dismissal without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

Siblings appeal the trial court’s refusal to set aside a deed conveying real property from their decedent father to their brother. The siblings also appeal the trial court’s denial of their post-trial motion to consider purported newly discovered evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner commenced this action in the Knox County Circuit Court (“trial court”), naming as respondents his mother, his brother, and a purported family trust. He alleged, inter alia, that his mother and brother had “brought about” the wrongful death of his father and had mishandled trust funds. Additionally, the petitioner requested “financial separation” from familial assets, a money judgment, and injunctive relief to freeze familial assets. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order dismissing this action with prejudice upon finding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because all parties involved in the matter resided in Campbell County and all acts forming the basis for the petitioner’s claims had occurred in Campbell County. The petitioner has appealed. We determine that although the trial court correctly found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the court erred by dismissing this action with prejudice. We further determine that, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 16-1-116 (2009), this matter should be transferred to the court wherein jurisdiction lies. We therefore vacate the portion of the trial court’s judgment dismissing the case with prejudice and remand for entry of an order transferring this action to the Campbell County Circuit Court.

An employee filed workers' compensation claims against her employer for alleged workrelated back and leg injuries. The Court of Workers' Compensation Claims (the trial court) ruled against the employee, finding that the employee failed to show that her alleged injuries were work-related. The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board affirmed the trial court's decision. The employee appealed. This appeal was referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. After careful consideration, we affirm the judgment of the Appeals Board and adopt its opinion as set forth in the attached Appendix.

The Defendant, Keith Lamont Brown, appeals his conviction for the delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine for which he received a sentence of twenty-five years as a persistent offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In a case involving a long-term marriage, the trial court found that the husband performed most of the household duties and the wife earned most of the income. Moreover, the husband’s earning capacity was substantially less than that of the wife at the time of the divorce. The trial court denied the husband’s request for alimony, and the husband appealed. We conclude that the trial court erred in failing to award the husband alimony and reverse and remand that part of the trial court’s decision.

An employee filed workers’ compensation claims against her employer for alleged work-related back and leg injuries. The Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims (the trial court) ruled against the employee, finding that the employee failed to show that her alleged injuries were work-related. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board affirmed the trial court’s decision. The employee appealed. This appeal was referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. After careful consideration, we affirm the judgment of the Appeals Board and adopt its opinion as set forth in the attached Appendix.

In this divorce action, Wife appeals the trial court’s action in classifying as Husband’s separate property the appreciation in value of shares of stock, arguing that the appreciation in value was marital property. Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the evidence does not show that Wife substantially contributed to the preservation and appreciation in value of the stock; accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 2017, the Petitioner, Sara Elizabeth Arnold, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault in exchange for an agreed eight-year sentence and the dismissal of an attempted first degree murder charge she also faced. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that her guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because she was mentally incompetent and her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have her mental condition evaluated. The post-conviction court denied the petition, finding that she had undergone two mental evaluations that concluded she was competent prior to entering her plea. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the mental evaluations conducted on her were not proper assessments of her mental state and asks this court to obtain a copy of her institutional record. After review, we reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment.

In 2013, a Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, John Steven Hernandez, of first degree premeditated murder for a killing that occurred in 1993, for which the trial court imposed a sentence of life in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it: (1) did not dismiss the charge against him based on pre-indictment delay; (2) did not dismiss the charge against him based on post-indictment delay; (3) denied his motion to suppress evidence; (4) made several erroneous evidentiary rulings; and that (5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and that (6) the Defendant is entitled to a new trial based upon the cumulative effect of the errors. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Ronnie Joe Edwards, Jr., appeals the order of the trial court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original five-year sentence in confinement. Upon review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defendant violated the terms of his probation and the imposed sentence is proper. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Christopher Danta Logan, appeals the Tipton County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for
post-conviction relief. The Petitioner argues that he timely filed his petition alleging he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The State agrees that the Petitioner timely filed his petition. After a review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the
post-conviction court committed reversible error; therefore, we reverse the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the petition and remand for a hearing regarding the timeliness of the Petitioner’s post-conviction petition.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the Petitioner is not entitled to relief based upon his claim of bias by the post-conviction judge. Rather, I conclude that the post-conviction judge’s comments at the conclusion of the hearing were so egregious that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned and, thus, warranted recusal. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10, R.J.C. 2.11(A) (“A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned….”). Because the judge presided over the proceedings when disqualified from doing so, I would reverse the post-conviction court’s order denying the Petitioner post-conviction relief and remand for a new hearing with a different judge.

A Williamson County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Thomas Bethel Hendrix, of two counts of aggravated child abuse and one count of child abuse, and the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty-five years in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by admitting certain statements he made to law enforcement and that the trial court erred by failing to merge his convictions into a single conviction of aggravated child abuse. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but conclude that the Appellant’s convictions must be merged. Accordingly, the case is remanded to the trial court for merger of the convictions into a single conviction of aggravated child abuse. We note that merger of the convictions does not affect the Appellant’s twenty-five-year sentence because the trial court ordered that he serve the sentences concurrently.

This is another appeal arising from the divorce of Corey Daniel Hopwood (“Father”) and Andrea Renea Hopwood (“Mother”). In a previous opinion, we remanded for a new determination concerning the duration and amount of an award to Mother of rehabilitative alimony and the calculation of an award to Mother of attorney’s fees attributable only to child custody and child support issues. The Chancery Court for Williamson County (“the Remand Court”) addressed these two issues on remand. Father appeals to this Court, arguing in large part that he simply cannot afford to pay what the Remand Court ordered him to pay. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm the Remand Court’s rulings with respect to rehabilitative alimony and attorney’s fees attributable to child support and child custody. However, we modify the Remand Court’s judgment to reduce the amount of life insurance Father is required to carry to secure his alimony obligation in light of the reduction of his alimony obligation. We further modify the Remand Court’s judgment to eliminate $750 in attorney’s fees assessed against Father for filing an improperly-styled motion when he was acting pro se. The judgment of the Remand Court is affirmed as modified.

In 1997, an employee sustained a workers’ compensation injury. In 1999, the chancery court approved a settlement of the claim, which in part required the employer to pay for reasonable and necessary future medical treatment. In 2016, the employer declined to provide certain treatment based on the results of a utilization review under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-124. The chancery court granted the employee’s motion to compel the medical treatment and held in abeyance her request for attorney fees under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(b)(2). The employee filed a second motion to compel because of a dispute about whether the first order to compel required the employer to provide the employee with a particular medication. The chancery court granted the second motion to compel and awarded the employee attorney fees, but in a lesser amount than the employee had requested. Both parties appealed. The employee contends that the chancery court erred in awarding attorney fees by failing to make findings based on the factors in Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a) (RPC 1.5(a)). The employer contends the chancery court erred by granting the second motion to compel treatment. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We vacate the chancery court’s award of attorney fees and remand for a determination of attorney fees in accordance with the factors set forth in RPC 1.5(a). We affirm the chancery court’s judgment granting the second motion to compel.

A Hardin County jury convicted the defendant of two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm (counts 1 and 2), possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver (count 3), possession of unlawful drug paraphernalia (count 4), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (count 5). On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions in counts 3 and 5 and asserts the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the inference of casual exchange pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-419. Upon our review of the record, we conclude sufficient evidence exists to support the defendant’s convictions and the defendant failed to preserve the jury instruction issue for appeal. In reviewing the sentencing determinations of the trial court, however, we note several errors in the completion of the judgment forms for counts 1, 2, 3, and 4. Specifically, there are clerical errors in the felony classifications as marked in counts 1, 2, and 3 (in count 1, the trial court incorrectly classified the conviction as a Class C felony rather than a Class B felony; in count 2, the trial court incorrectly classified the conviction as a Class E felony rather than a Class C felony; and in count 3, the trial court incorrectly classified the conviction as a Class C felony rather than a Class B felony). Additionally, in merging the defendant’s convictions in counts 1 and 2, the trial court failed to impose a sentence for the merged conviction of count 2. Finally, in count 4, the trial court incorrectly sentenced the defendant for a misdemeanor conviction rather than the felony for which he was found guilty, warranting a new sentencing hearing on the same. Consequently, we remand the case to the trial court for sentencing as to counts 2 and 4 and the entry of corrected and completed judgment forms as to counts 1, 2, 3, and 4.

The petitioner, Dexter Sappington, Jr., appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel prior to and during his guilty plea hearing. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Brice Cook, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Reginald Tyrone Donnell, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief from his two convictions of second degree murder, contending that the indictment charging him was void and that a fatal variance existed between the indictment and the proof adduced at trial. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition for failure to comply with the procedural requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-107, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

This is a divorce case. Wife filed for divorce in February 2017 after twelve years of marriage. Following a three-day trial, the trial court ordered Husband to pay $1000 in transitional alimony to Wife for six months and $500 per month for the following six months. The trial court also entered a permanent parenting plan for the parties’ two minor children naming Husband primary residential parent. Husband received 233 days of parenting time, and Wife received 132 days. Wife appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case involves an alleged contract for the sale of real property. The proposed buyers, who were originally lessees of the property, brought suit to enforce the alleged agreement, seeking specific performance and damages. After a trial, the Maury County Chancery Court held that a contract for the sale of the property did exist and that specific performance of the contract should be awarded. Certain monetary damages were also awarded to the former lessees. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we affirm in part and reverse in part. Although we affirm the chancery court’s decision that a valid contract exists and that the contract is properly subject to specific performance, we reverse the award of damages that is challenged on appeal for the reasons stated herein.

The appellees have moved the court to dismiss this appeal as premature. Because multiple motions remain pending in the trial court, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Carlos Eugene Moore (“Attorney”) entered into a written contingent fee agreement to represent a client in a personal injury matter. The agreement, which was signed by the client, provided that if the client refused to accept any settlement offer which Attorney advised her was reasonable and should be taken, the client was responsible for the contingency fee “on the basis of that offer” unless Attorney waived the provision. When Attorney received an offer to settle the matter, he advised the client to accept the offer. She refused. Attorney filed a motion to withdraw which was granted. Attorney also sought to place a lien against the client’s eventual recovery for his fees and expenses “presently owe[d].” After the client filed a complaint with the Board of Professional Responsibility (“BPR”), the BPR filed a petition for discipline. A hearing panel was appointed and, after an evidentiary hearing, the panel concluded that (1) Attorney had “made an agreement for and has sought to collect an unreasonable fee,” violating Rule of Professional Conduct (“RPC” or “Rule”) 1.5(a) and 1.5(c); and (2) Attorney had “violated Rule 1.8(i) because [the client] became obligated when [Attorney] advised [her] that the settlement offer . . . was ‘reasonable and should be taken.’” The hearing panel imposed a sanction of public censure. Attorney sought review in chancery court, and the chancery court affirmed the hearing panel’s decision. Attorney then sought review in this Court, arguing that the hearing panel’s findings that he had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct were arbitrary and capricious and not supported by substantial and material evidence. Attorney further contends that the sanction imposed was arbitrary and capricious and not supported by substantial and material evidence. We hold that the record supports both the findings of violations and the imposition of a public censure. Accordingly, we affirm the chancery court’s ruling upholding the hearing panel’s decision.   

This is a termination of parental rights case involving the parental rights of the mother, Tora W. (“Mother”), to her minor child, Kaden W. (“the Child”), who was eleven years old at the time of trial. On January 19, 2017, the Anderson County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) found that the Child was dependent and neglected and entered an order removing the Child from Mother’s custody and placing the Child into the temporary legal custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The Child was immediately placed in foster care, where he remained at the time of trial. On December 20, 2017, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother.1 Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Child upon determining by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Mother had abandoned the Child by failing to provide a suitable home for him, (2) Mother had not substantially complied with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plans, and (3) the conditions leading to the Child’s removal from Mother’s custody persisted. The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.