APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Jerimyah Sherrell Shutt, pleaded guilty to especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. The post-conviction court appointed counsel and, after a hearing, denied relief. After review, we affirm the postconviction court’s judgment.

A metropolitan board of education adopted a policy preventing the provision of student information to the State of Tennessee in its role as the administrator of an achievement school district pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-13-132. The State filed a petition for writ of mandamus and declaratory judgment, and the chancery court granted the writ of mandamus. The board of education appeals. We affirm the decision of the chancery court.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Richard Shane Frazier, of aggravated assault and violating an Order of Protection. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of fifteen years to be served consecutively to previous sentences for other convictions. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated assault. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Washington County jury convicted the Defendant, Aaron Charles Garland, of first degree felony murder and robbery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress his statements to police and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for first degree felony murder. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Defendant, James Hall, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to modify his sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35. Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to consider Defendant’s rehabilitation efforts. After a review of the record, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. However, the judgment for case 2015-C-1974 contains an error that warrants remand for correction.

Following a trial, a Washington County jury found Defendant, Barbara Mae Potter, guilty of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, and one count of tampering with evidence. At sentencing, the trial court merged Defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree murder into the two convictions for first degree premeditated murder and imposed concurrent life sentences for those offenses. The trial court imposed a three-year sentence for tampering with evidence and ordered the sentence to run concurrently with Defendant’s life sentences. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in changing the venue of the trial to Washington County; (2) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion for the lead prosecutor to withdraw from the case; (3) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s “motion to
 pre-emptively strike witness”; (4) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions; (5) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to sever; and (6) issues raised in Defendant’s petition for writ of error coram nobis entitle her to a new trial. Following a thorough review, we reinstate Defendant’s conspiracy to commit first degree murder conviction, affirm the convictions, and remand for sentencing on conspiracy to commit first degree premeditated murder.

The petitioner, Steven Anderson, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition challenged his 1994 convictions of aggravated robbery, especially aggravated robbery, and second degree murder. Because the petitioner has stated entitlement to habeas corpus relief in the form of the application of pretrial jail credit, we reverse and vacate the order of the habeas corpus court summarily dismissing the petition. The cause is remanded to the habeas corpus court so that that court may transfer the case to the trial court for the entry of an amended judgment reflecting the appropriate award of pretrial jail credit.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to set aside a final judgment obligating him to pay child support. The record shows that Appellant voluntarily executed a document placing his name on the child’s birth certificate and thereafter entered into a marital dissolution agreement and parenting plan obligating him to pay child support with full knowledge that he was not the biological parent of the child. Because Appellant has failed to present sufficient evidence of a ground for relief under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we affirm the decision of the trial court to deny Appellant’s request to set aside the judgment. We reverse, however, the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees based on the parties’ marital dissolution agreement.

I respectfully disagree with the conclusions and opinions of the majority. Therefore, I must dissent from the majority’s opinion.

The mortgagors sought to rescind the foreclosure sale of their property, claiming that the sale was invalid because it had been conducted improperly. A jury found the sale process was properly followed and the verdict was approved by the trial court. The mortgagors appeal. We affirm

In this estate proceeding, the appellants, three of the five adult children of the decedent, appeal the probate court’s interpretation of the decedent’s last will and testament as demonstrating the decedent’s intent to have her real property administered as part of her estate by her personal representative. Having determined that the probate court’s order was premature due to ongoing proceedings in the decedent’s conservatorship case, we vacate the probate court’s order interpreting the last will and testament. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce in which it determined that Appellant/Wife was not entitled to an award of alimony in futuro, but awarded Wife alimony in solido and transitional alimony. The trial court further determined that the parties’ marital residence was Wife’s separate property. On appeal, Wife argues that the trial court erred in denying her alimony in futuro, while Appellee/Husband appeals the classification of the parties’ home as Wife’s separate property. With respect to the trial court’s decision that alimony in futuro is inappropriate in this case, we affirm. However, because we conclude that the trial court erred in classifying the parties’ home as Wife’s separate property, we reverse in part and remand for further proceedings

The pro se petitioner, Victor Eugene McConnell, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Davidson County Criminal Court, arguing the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the petition. The petitioner asserts the State breached the plea agreement in this case, entitling the petitioner to habeas corpus relief. After our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Defendant, Elvis Louis Marsh, was convicted of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine, delivery of less than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine, conspiracy to sell or deliver less than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine, possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He received an effective sentence of thirty years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support his convictions. Upon reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The defendant, Eric Henry, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his two-year sentence for reckless endangerment in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Following the denial of a suppression motion, the defendant, Whelchel Randall Hogan, entered a guilty plea in Dickson County Circuit Court to possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine and reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law relating to the initial seizure of the defendant and the validity of the search warrant issued in this case. The defendant asserts the police did not have reasonable suspicion for the initial seizure of the defendant and the search warrant issued in this case lacked probable cause. Upon our review of the record, arguments of the parties, and pertinent authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1994, the petitioner, Hugh A. Niceley, was convicted of eight counts of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated sexual battery, occurring over the course of several years from 1988 until 1992. For his crimes, the petitioner received an effective sentence of fifty-three years, to be served at 30 percent. In 1999, the trial court entered a new judgment as to Count 9, requiring the sentence be served at 100 percent, as required by the applicable statute. As a result, the petitioner asserts the 1999 judgment created an illegal sentence, arguing his sentence in Count 9 should be served at 30 percent, as originally ordered. The trial court disagreed, as do we. Accordingly, the order of the trial court requiring service of Count 9 at 100 percent is affirmed.

While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the officer’s actions were a proper exercise of the community caretaking function, I disagree with the majority’s holding that the Defendant was not seized when the officer approached the Defendant with activated blue lights. Without a seizure, there would be no need for the officer’s actions to be deemed the exercise of the community caretaking function.

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $9,000 per month. In addition, the trial court awarded Wife her attorney’s fees as alimony in solido in the amount of $121,873.81. We vacate the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro and, for the reasons stated herein, remand the issue of Wife’s alimony for reconsideration. Additionally, we vacate the trial court’s award of Wife’s attorney’s fees and remand for the trial court to reconsider whether or not to award Wife her attorney’s fees and, if so, to award a reasonable attorney’s fee and state the basis for its decision. We also vacate the trial court’s order denying Wife’s motion for discretionary costs, and remand the issue to the trial court for a reconsideration of Wife’s motion on its merits.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal pursued pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Because Appellant admits that no order has been entered by the trial court with respect to her motion to recuse, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.   

The petitioner, Christopher L. Shaw, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition challenged his 2012 Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of possession of 26 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free zone, possession of drug paraphernalia, and felony evading arrest. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of relief.

Judgment creditor appeals the trial court’s decision to set aside a conditional judgment, to dismiss her claims of bad faith, civil contempt, and conversion against the garnishee, and to deny certain requests for discovery and sanctions. We affirm the trial court’s decision to set aside the conditional judgment, as well as the dismissal of the judgment creditor’s conversion claim. We reverse, however, the trial court’s dismissal of the judgment creditor’s claims of bad faith and civil contempt. We also vacate the trial court’s decisions with regard to sanctions and discovery, except to the extent that the trial court allowed withdrawal of certain requests for admission, which is affirmed.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Antoine Dewayne Clark, of aggravated arson, and he was sentenced to serve thirty years in prison. On appeal, he alleges that the trial court erred in limiting defense counsel’s questions during voir dire; in allowing testimony regarding the injuries suffered by the victims; in denying a mistrial based on the introduction of evidence that the Defendant was wearing an ankle monitor; and in permitting hearsay testimony. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether an employer, who did not use an automated external defibrillator (AED) to assist an employee who suffered a non-work related medical emergency, can be liable for workers’ compensation benefits. An employee collapsed at work because of a medical condition unrelated to her employment. The employer knew of the employee’s need for immediate medical assistance. The employer had acquired an AED but did not use it to assist the employee while awaiting the arrival of emergency medical responders. Medical responders assisted the employee, but she suffered a brain injury because of oxygen deprivation. We hold that an injury that is caused by an employer’s failure to provide reasonable medical assistance arises out of and in the course of employment when an employee becomes helpless at work because of illness or other cause unrelated to her employment, the employee needs medical assistance to prevent further injury, the employer knows of the employee’s helplessness, and the employer can provide reasonable medical assistance but does not do so. Here, the employee’s claim did not arise out of her employment because her employer provided reasonable medical assistance and had no statutory or common law duty to use its AED to assist the employee. Therefore, the employer is not liable for workers’ compensation benefits. We reverse the trial court’s denial of the employer’s motion to dismiss and remand to the trial court for an order of dismissal.

This action arises from an agreed-upon adoption that the birth mother revoked within 30 days of the child’s birth. The defendants include three adoption agencies, three social workers, two attorneys, a hospital, and the prospective adoptive parents. Generally stated, the complaint alleges that the defendants acted in concert to abduct the mother’s child by inducing the mother to surrender her parental rights, consent to the adoption, and waive her right of revocation. The articulated claims include conspiracy to commit fraud and tortious civil kidnapping, negligence, professional negligence, healthcare liability, and conversion of her child. All defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02 for some or all of the following reasons: (1) the adoption documents were valid under Tennessee law and not fraudulent; (2) Tennessee does not recognize the torts of civil kidnapping and conversion of a child; (3) the claims are time-barred; (4) the mother’s first certificate of good faith was non-compliant because it did not disclose a prior violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-122; (5) the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act barred the mother’s intentional tort claims against the hospital; and (6) the mother released some of the defendants from liability by signing a release agreement. Additionally, the healthcare providers contended the complaint should be dismissed because the mother failed to comply with the pre-suit notice requirement of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act. The trial court granted the motions on various grounds and dismissed the complaint with prejudice for all defendants. Having determined that Tennessee does not recognize a tort of conversion of a child or tortious civil kidnapping and that conspiracy to commit fraud is not a standalone claim, we affirm the dismissal of these claims. We also affirm the dismissal of all remaining claims as time-barred. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.