APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is the second appeal in this dispute involving a third party’s attempt to obtain access to a record that was sealed in the trial court pursuant to an agreed order. In the first appeal, this Court explained that judicial records are presumptively open, and the reason for sealing judicial records must be compelling. Because the trial court had not articulated any specific reasons for keeping the record sealed, we remanded for the trial court to reconsider its decision to deny the petitioner access to the record. We said, “If the trial court determines on remand that the record should remain sealed due to a compelling reason, that reason ‘is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered.’” Kocher v. Bearden, 546 S.W.3d 78, 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 6, 2017) (quoting In re NHC-Nashville Fire Litig., 293 S.W.3d 547, 560 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008)). Unfortunately, the trial court did not comply with these instructions on remand. After repeatedly expressing disagreement with this Court’s decision, the trial judge refused to modify the seal on the record, citing only “confidential information pertaining to the minor plaintiff.” Because both the trial court and the appellees have failed to articulate any compelling reason for maintaining the seal to the exclusion of the petitioner, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for reassignment to a different trial judge and the entry of an order allowing the petitioner to access the sealed record.

This appeal involves a post-divorce custody dispute between David Solima (father) and Stephanie Solima (mother) with respect to their only child, A.J.S. Father filed a petition in the trial court seeking a modification of the then-existing permanent parenting plan. Finding that there had been a material change in circumstances, the court entered an order modifying the parenting plan. Father then filed a motion to alter or amend, which the trial court denied. Father now appeals the court’s order denying his motion. We hold that the order appealed from is not a final judgment because the trial court has not fully adjudicated the issue of child support. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remand for further proceedings.

Respondent attorney filed a notice with this Court that he was unable to respond to or defend against a disciplinary complaint because he suffered from a disability by reason of a mental illness. Following a formal hearing, a hearing panel concluded that the respondent attorney was not incapacitated from responding to or defending against the complaint against him. Upon its review, the chancery court reached the same conclusion as the hearing panel. The respondent attorney has now filed a direct appeal to this Court. We agree with the hearing panel and chancery court that the attorney has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he lacked the capacity, by reason of mental illness, to respond to or defend against his disciplinary complaint.  

In this dependency and neglect case, the juvenile court adjudicated father’s (E.L.) six children dependent and neglected and one of the female children (R.L.) a victim of severe abuse perpetrated by father. Father appealed to the circuit court. After a de novo hearing, the circuit court entered an order holding that clear and convincing evidence exists to demonstrate that R.L. was sexually abused by father and as such was a dependent and neglected and severely abused child. The court similarly found clear and convincing evidence that father’s additional children were also dependent and neglected. Father appeals. We affirm. 

Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for restoration of citizenship rights under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-29-105. Appellant contends that the trial court’s decision violates ex post facto protections by imposing a harsher sentence than that available at the time of his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

The Petitioner, Marvin Christopher Long, filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel and his appellate counsel were ineffective. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition upon finding that the Petitioner previously filed for post-conviction relief and that he failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the dismissal of the petition. Upon review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the Petitioner’s claim regarding the effectiveness of appellate counsel. However, we remand to the post-conviction court for entry of an order ruling on the Petitioner’s claims regarding the effectiveness of trial counsel.

The defendant, Darrell Grant Fisher, entered an open plea to four counts of sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court sentenced the defendant to five years on two counts and four years on the remaining two counts with all sentences to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of eighteen years. On appeal, the defendant claims the trial court erred in imposing consecutive terms. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Notice of Appeal in this case was filed with the Appellate Court Clerk on May 7, 2018, more than thirty (30) days after the April 4, 2018 date of entry of the only order in the record from which the appellant could be appealing. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Notice of Appeal in this case was filed with the Appellate Court Clerk on June 7, 2018, more than thirty (30) days after the April 4, 2018 date of entry of the only order in the record from which the appellant could be appealing. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Defendant, John Matthew Cabe, was indicted for tampering with evidence after selling an item, which was the subject of a theft investigation, from his pawnshop. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted tampering with evidence. On appeal, Defendant contends that he was improperly charged with tampering with evidence because the Pawnbrokers Act of 1988 is a specific statute which governs his conduct as a pawnbroker, and he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for attempted tampering with evidence. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable statutes, we conclude that the Pawnbrokers Act of 1988 specifically governs the actions of a pawnbroker in his or her official capacity, thereby precluding prosecution for tampering with evidence. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and vacated.

This case involves the right of redemption after a tax sale. REO Holdings, LLC (REO), purchased a parcel of real property at a delinquent tax sale. After the sale, the original property owners quitclaimed their remaining interest in the property to Basswood Revocable Land Trust (the Trust). The Trust filed a motion to redeem the property, which the trial court granted. REO appeals. We reverse.

Following settlor’s death, settlor’s daughters, the beneficiaries of the settlor’s trust, engaged in mediation, which resulted in a settlement agreement concerning the distribution of the trust’s assets. Before the settlement was approved by the trial court under the Tennessee Uniform Trust Act (“TUTA”), one of the daughters died, and her estate was substituted in the lawsuit. The surviving siblings then joined in an amended complaint seeking a determination concerning whether the terms of the settlement agreement violated a material purpose of the trust so as to be unenforceable under the TUTA. The deceased daughter’s estate argued for enforcement of the settlement agreement such that the estate would receive the deceased daughter’s share of the trust. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the estate, holding that the settlement was enforceable under the TUTA. The trial court awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the estate under the terms of the settlement. We affirm the trial court’s enforcement of the settlement but reverse its award of attorney’s fees and costs to the estate.

Dr. William Diebold seeks review of the post-conviction court’s denial of his motion to quash a judicial subpoena compelling him to testify at a hearing on behalf of the Petitioner, who is seeking post-conviction relief in an underlying criminal case. Dr. Diebold, a practicing physician, contends that he is exempt from subpoena to the hearing but subject to subpoena to a deposition pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-9-101. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we agree with Dr. Diebold that he is statutorily exempt from subpoena to the hearing but subject to subpoena to a deposition. Therefore, the post-conviction court erred by failing to grant Dr. Diebold’s motion to quash. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed, and the motion to quash is granted.

After his vehicle was seized, the owner filed a claim and request for hearing. After the passage of thirty days following the filing of his claim, the owner moved to dismiss the forfeiture, arguing that the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security had failed to timely set his claim for a hearing. The Administrative Law Judge took the motion to dismiss under advisement, but declined to set a hearing on the merits of the forfeiture. The owner sought interlocutory review of the decision not to set a hearing on the merits, which the Commissioner ultimately denied. Shortly before the Commissioner’s decision on the interlocutory appeal, the ALJ granted the owner’s motion to dismiss and ordered the vehicle returned. The ALJ also denied the owner’s request for attorney’s fees. The owner petitioned for judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision and later amended the petition to include a request for declaratory relief. The chancery court dismissed the owner’s petition for judicial review as moot. The court also dismissed the declaratory judgment action for improper joinder of an original action with an administrative appeal. We affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case involving the parental rights of the mother, Lequita S. (“Mother”), to her minor children, Alexis S., Jaxon S., and Jasmine S. (collectively, “the Children”). The Children were born in 2011, 2014, and 2017, respectively, to Mother and Jerry S. (“Father”). In November 2016, the Overton County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) entered an order removing Alexis and Jaxon from the parents’ custody and placing the two children into the temporary legal custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). These children were immediately placed in foster care, where they remained at the time of trial. The trial court subsequently entered an order on February 15, 2017, wherein the trial court found that Alexis and Jaxon were dependent and neglected due to the parents’ drug abuse and unsuitable home. Jasmine was placed into the same foster home as her siblings following her birth in June 2017, and the trial court entered an order on October 4, 2017, finding Jasmine to be dependent and neglected. On October 19, 2017, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Children. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Children upon determining by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Mother had abandoned the Children by failing to provide a suitable home for them, (2) Mother had abandoned the Children by her willful failure to visit them, (3) Mother had demonstrated substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, (4) Mother had committed severe child abuse against Jasmine, (5) Mother had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of or financial responsibility for the Children, and (6) the conditions leading to removal still persisted and a return of custody would in all probability cause the Children to be subjected to further abuse and neglect. The trial court further found clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Children. Mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Tracy Arnold, appeals the Henderson County Circuit Court’s revocation of her probation related to her convictions for attempted aggravated child abuse and neglect. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal arises from a divorce action involving two minor children. Mother filed a complaint for divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences and inappropriate marital conduct. Father filed an answer and counter complaint based on Mother’s inappropriate marital conduct and adultery. As to the minor children, Father wanted to have the children vaccinated, and Mother opposed vaccinations on religious grounds. The trial court awarded the divorce to Father based on Mother’s inappropriate marital conduct and adultery. The court also designated Father as the primary residential parent and gave him sole decision-making authority for non-emergency medical decisions, which included vaccinations. On appeal, Mother contends that the court interfered with her right to exercise a religious exemption from vaccines. Mother also takes issue with the court’s decision to award the divorce to Father based on Mother’s adultery. She argues that because she had sexual relationships with other men after the parties separated, her acts do not constitute adultery. Finding no error, we affirm.

The Appellant, Kenneth S. Gourley, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probationary sentence and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Don Edward Carter, appeals from the McNairy County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of two counts of first degree murder, for which he is serving concurrent life sentences. On appeal, he contends that (1) the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition as untimely without a hearing to determine whether due process required tolling of the statute of limitations, (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, and (3) prosecutorial misconduct in the conviction proceedings deprived him of his rights to due process and a fair trial. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Merrico Jackson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in: (1) denying his request for a continuance; (2) failing to exclude a witness statement written on the back of a photograph array due to a discovery violation; (3) ruling that photographs of text messages and the call log from the Defendant’s phone were properly authenticated; and (4) excluding testimony about alleged witness intimidation by the State. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision in this case. I disagree with the majority’s assertion that “the argument that diagnosis codes cannot be the standard upon which an emergency is determined for purposes of payment does not somehow make common issues predominate regarding the claims for which a $50.00 cap provision is operative.” I would reverse the trial court as I believe that common issue predominates over all individual issues in this case.

On September 21, 2017, the Defendant, Martrice Thomas, was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced her to life imprisonment in the Department of Correction. The Defendant argues on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction. After thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Rutherford County grand jury indicted the defendant, Jewel Moses Bess, with first degree murder for the death of his wife, the victim. Following trial, a jury found the defendant guilty as charged, and the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s evidentiary rulings allowing testimony of the victim’s intent to end their marriage and the defendant’s prior physical abuse of his son. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Breyon Bates, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver, a Class B felony; simple possession of cocaine, a Class A misdemeanor; and resisting arrest and criminal impersonation, both Class B misdemeanors. The trial court merged the simple possession count into the possession with intent to deliver count and sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent terms of 18 years for the felony cocaine conviction and six months for each of the misdemeanor convictions, for an effective term of 18 years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to the sentence for an offense for which the Defendant was on probation at the time he committed the instant offenses. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his felony conviction and argues that the trial court erred by not charging the jury with casual exchange under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-419. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to support and wanton disregard for the child’s welfare; substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume responsibility for the child. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm.