APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following adverse disciplinary proceedings against him while in prison, Appellant filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari in Chancery Court. The Chancery Court later dismissed the case upon determining that the petition for certiorari was not timely filed. Because Appellant was released from prison during the pendency of this appeal, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case for the entry of an order dismissing the petition due to mootness.

Homeowners filed a declaratory judgment action related to the operation of a group home in their neighborhood. Among other things, homeowners claimed that the use of the property for a group home violated the local zoning ordinance. On motions for summary judgment, the court concluded that the operation of the group home did not violate the zoning ordinance because the group home’s residents constituted a “family” as defined in the ordinance. The court further concluded that the use was protected under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (Supp. 2017). We affirm the grant of summary judgment.

A final forfeiture was entered against the appellant, Gary’s Bonding Company, in the Marion County Circuit Court ordering the complete forfeiture of the bail bond in the case of the criminal defendant, Johnny Cook. On appeal, the appellant contends the trial court erred in ordering a final forfeiture. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed in this matter, we are without jurisdiction to determine whether the trial court erred. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

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Having pursued relief under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, Jacob Davis filed a petition for a declaratory order with the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC” or “the Department”) to challenge the Department’s interpretation of the statutes regarding release after a sentence of life, and the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(i). Upon receiving an unsatisfactory response, Davis then filed a declaratory judgment action in the Davidson County Chancery Court against the TDOC and the Tennessee Attorney General (collectively, “the State”) about the calculation of his sentence, including his eligibility for release and the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501. The chancery court ruled against him and he appealed. The Court of Appeals finds, based on rules of statutory interpretation, Vaughn v. State, 202 S.W.3d 106 (Tenn. 2006), and a number of cases from the Court of Criminal Appeals, that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(i) establishes the legal release date for someone sentenced to life. The court also finds that the statute is constitutional. The chancery court is affirmed.

This appeal arose from a divorce action filed by the wife. Prior to the onset of the litigation, the parties had been married for eighteen years with one minor child born during the marriage. On November 2, 2017, the trial court granted the divorce; divided the marital property according to the wife’s proposed property distribution; awarded to the wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $1,100 per month; awarded to the wife half of her attorney’s fees as alimony in solido; and adopted the husband’s proposed permanent parenting plan. Although the husband’s permanent parenting plan contained a child support calculation based on monthly income estimates, the court ordered the child support payments to be calculated using the average of the parties’ respective incomes from the previous three years. The husband has appealed. Because it is unclear whether the trial court classified the real property upon which the marital home is located as marital property or the wife’s separate property prior to awarding her its value and because we determine that the order appealed from contains an internal inconsistency with respect to the amount of child support awarded, we vacate the trial court’s distribution of marital property and its awards of alimony and child support. We remand for the trial court to clarify its property classification and resolve the inconsistency concerning child support prior to rendering judgment regarding an award of alimony. The trial court’s judgment granting the divorce is otherwise affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Tracy Douglass, of first degree premeditated murder, for which he received a life sentence. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it failed to declare a mistrial following the State’s improper statements during closing argument. He also asserts that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This case involves a claim of unjust enrichment following the execution and partial performance of a contract for the sale of a laundry and dry cleaning business. On December 21, 2012, the parties executed a contract, selling the business in exchange for $100,000.00. The buyers tendered $50,000.00 at the time of the contract’s execution and simultaneously tendered a promissory note to the seller for the remaining $50,000.00 with a pre-arranged payment plan. The contract contained a provision stating that it was conditioned on the buyers’ ability to obtain a satisfactory commercial lease from the owner of the building where the business was located. The buyers took possession of the business and began making payments pursuant to the promissory note. However, the buyers were unable to enter into a written or long-term lease with the building owner. The buyers ceased making payments on the promissory note after nine months. In November 2013, the buyers began contacting the seller, requesting a return of the down payment and money paid on the promissory note in exchange for the business. In June 2014, the buyers filed a complaint seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the contract of sale was void due to an unsatisfied condition. The seller filed an answer and countercomplaint requesting enforcement of the contract and promissory note, including the enforcement of a vendor’s lien held on the business equipment. On December 19, 2017, the trial court entered an order dismissing the buyers’ complaint and granting the seller’s requested relief pursuant to the contract and promissory note. The buyers have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This is a parental termination case. The trial court terminated the parental rights of a mother based on the statutory grounds of severe child abuse, substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of the child. The mother appeals. We reverse in part, with respect to one ground for termination, but otherwise affirm the trial court’s order terminating parental rights and remand for further proceedings.

This case involves a contentious divorce between parties who share one minor child. After a two-day bench trial, the trial court granted the wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. The husband appealed raising numerous issues related to property classification, valuation, and division. He also challenges the alimony awards and child support determination. After our review of the record, we determine that the trial court erroneously set the husband’s income for the purpose of child support, and we therefore remand the case for a new determination of the husband’s income and calculation of his child support obligation. We affirm the trial court’s decision in all other respects.

Defendant, Sedrick Darion Mitchell, was convicted of the sale and delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school and simple possession of cocaine. Defendant was sentenced as a career offender to an effective 60-year sentence of imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; that his simple possession conviction should be reversed because he was questioned without an attorney present; and he challenges the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-420(h), (i), and (j). Following our review, we affirm Defendant’s convictions.

This appeal concerns punitive damages. Skyco Staffing Services, Inc. (“Skyco”) provided Derrick Gilbert (“Gilbert”) to Dealers Warehouse Corporation (“Dealers”) for temporary work. On February 14, 2014, Gilbert was driving a Dealers truck when he collided with a truck driven by Charles Edward Poole (“Poole”). Poole1 sued Gilbert, Dealers, and later Skyco for damages in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”).2 Dealers filed a third-party claim against one-time Skyco affiliate People 2.0 Global, LLC (“People 2.0”), as well. Skyco and People 2.0 filed motions for summary judgment, which were granted. The jury returned a verdict for Poole against Dealers and Gilbert for compensatory damages of $431,508.71. In a second phase, the Trial Court directed a verdict in favor of Dealers regarding punitive damages. Finally, the jury returned a verdict for Poole against Gilbert in the amount of $250,000 in punitive damages. Poole appeals, arguing he is entitled to joint and several judgment against Dealers for the punitive damages assessed against Gilbert. Dealers, for its part, argues both that the Trial Court was correct and that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether it exercised supervision of Gilbert. We hold, inter alia, that Dealers is not jointly and severally liable for punitive damages assessed separately against Gilbert. We hold further that Dealers’ exclusive supervisory responsibility for Gilbert was laid out in unambiguous contractual terms. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Ex-husband appeals the entry in a Tennessee Chancery Court of an order authenticating a judgment entered against him in his California divorce proceeding; the judgment also imposed a constructive trust on real property he purchased in Tennessee in violation of orders of the California court. We discern no error in the judgment of the Chancery Court and accordingly, affirm.

A landowner filed a declaratory judgment action alleging that the Bedford County Board of Commissioners’ denial of his request to rezone his property was arbitrary and capricious, violated his due process rights under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, constituted a regulatory taking, and that the Commission violated the Tennessee Open Meetings Act when it met with its counsel prior to taking the vote. The landowner requested compensatory damages for the manner in which his application to rezone his property was handled and compensation for the taking of his property. After a bench trial, the trial court held that the Commission’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and violated the landowner’s due process rights; the court ordered the property rezoned from residential to commercial and awarded the landowner damages. The court held that there had been no regulatory taking and no violation of the Open Meetings Act. Both parties appeal. Upon review, we have determined that the court erred in holding that the Commission’s decision to deny the application for rezoning was arbitrary and capricious and in ordering the property rezoned; in holding that the landowner’s due process rights were violated and in awarding damages and attorney fees to the landowner; we affirm the decision in all other respects.  

This is a divorce case. Husband/Appellant appeals the trial court’s decision regarding: (1) the parenting plan for the minor children; (2) the enforcement of the parties’ prenuptial agreement in its denial of Husband’s request for alimony and a portion of Wife’s retirement accounts; and (3) the designation and division of property. Under the doctrine of lex loci contractus, we vacate the trial court’s order enforcing the waiver of spousal support provision of the parties’ prenuptial agreement. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed, and the case is remanded for determination of whether alimony is warranted in this case and, if so, the amount thereof.  

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to one child. The juvenile court found three statutory grounds for termination: (1) abandonment for failure to visit by an incarcerated parent; (2) abandonment by wanton disregard for the welfare of a child by an incarcerated parent; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility for the child. The court also found that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights.

Husband appeals the trial court’s award of alimony to Wife, as well as the trial court’s division of the parties’ 2017 tax refund. The trial court determined that Wife’s need was in the range of $17,500.00 per month and awarded Wife $15,000.00 per month in alimony in futuro, as well as $3,500.00 per month in rehabilitative alimony. We affirm the trial court’s finding that Wife’s need is in the range of $17,500.00 per month. We also affirm the trial court’s award of $15,000.00 per month in alimony in futuro. We vacate, however, the award of rehabilitative alimony and the division of the parties’ 2017 tax refund and remand for reconsideration in accordance with this opinion.

The petitioner, Gregory Duff, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the defendant, German Calles, of one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter, four counts of aggravated assault while acting in concert with others, two counts of attempted especially aggravated robbery, one count of especially aggravated burglary, two counts of employment of a weapon during the commission of a dangerous felony, two counts of conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery, and one count of conspiracy to commit especially aggravated burglary, for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-six years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred when setting the length of his sentences and ordering partial consecutive sentences. Following our review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a parental termination case. The juvenile court declined to terminate father’s parental rights, but it found that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate mother’s on the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, persistence of conditions, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and abandonment by willful failure to support. The juvenile court further found that termination was in the best interests of the children. We reverse as to the former two grounds, but affirm as to the latter two and further find that termination of mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children.

The Petitioner, Richard Dickerson, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel coerced him into testifying and failed to discover a mistake in his presentence report. After thorough review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This is a parental termination case. The juvenile court declined to terminate father’s parental rights, but it found that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate mother’s on the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, persistence of conditions, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and abandonment by willful failure to support. The juvenile court further found that termination was in the best interests of the children. We reverse as to the former two grounds, but affirm as to the latter two and further find that termination of mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children.

In this divorce action, the wife was shown to be economically disadvantaged compared to the husband, and the trial court awarded to the wife a slightly greater share of the marital estate in addition to rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $4,000.00 per month for a period of four years. The husband has appealed. Although we conclude that the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed, we also modify that judgment to include an indemnification clause in the husband’s favor regarding the mortgage on the marital residence. We further grant the wife’s request for an award of attorney’s fees incurred in defending this appeal.

Defendant, Amanda Beth Marcy, appeals from the denial of her “Motion to Amend Revocation Order” in which she argued that the trial court failed to award her credit for time served on Community Corrections when her probation was revoked. For a multitude of reasons, we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Linda Anne Dunavant, was convicted of aggravated assault and filing a false police report and sentenced, respectively, to terms of three years and two years, to be served concurrently. On appeal, she argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction for aggravated assault, and that the court erred in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

An employee filed suit for workers’ compensation benefits for injuries sustained in a work-related motor vehicle collision. The trial court later dismissed the case with full prejudice based on a settlement approved by the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development (the “Department”). Over seven years later, the employee filed a motion in another workers’ compensation case to compel medical benefits for her injuries related to the collision. The trial court granted the employee’s motion to compel, referencing in its order this case number (#15,665) and the case number in which the motion was filed (#13,393). In a separate order, the trial court awarded the employee her attorney fees and costs. We vacate the trial court’s orders, finding that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to compel medical benefits for the employee’s physical injuries.