APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This consolidated appeal arises from a product liability action brought by Donald Coffman and his wife, Carolyn Coffman, after Mr. Coffman was diagnosed with mesothelioma. Plaintiffs asserted several claims against multiple defendants for their alleged involvement in Mr. Coffman’s exposure to asbestos at his workplace. The trial court dismissed their claims against some of the original defendants. The court granted summary judgment to the remaining defendants. Specifically, the court found that: (1) plaintiffs’ claims against one defendant were time-barred by the four-year construction statute of repose set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-202 (2017); (2) plaintiffs’ claims against three defendants were time-barred by the ten-year statute of repose set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103 (2012); (3) ten defendants affirmatively negated their alleged duty to warn; and (4) plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence of causation with respect to seven defendants. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend certain summary judgment orders. Plaintiffs filed separate notices of appeal for each final judgment entered by the trial court. These cases were consolidated for the purpose of oral argument before the Court of Appeals. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we vacate all of the final judgments entered by the trial court.

Petitioner, Coy J. Cotham, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective. Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying his pro se motion to relieve post-conviction counsel, or in the alternative, his motion to continue the post-conviction hearing; that his post-conviction counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately present his claims for post-conviction relief; and that the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition for
post-conviction relief. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Michael D. Fykes, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of especially aggravated burglary and aggravated assault, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) and imposing a sentence greater than necessary and that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Because dual convictions of especially aggravated burglary and aggravated assault in this case are prohibited by statute, we modify the conviction of especially aggravated burglary to aggravated burglary and remand to the trial court for resentencing. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Joshua Michael Ward, entered a guilty plea to reckless homicide, a Class D felony, after the all-terrain vehicle (“ATV”) he was driving ran down an embankment, killing his passenger. The trial court denied the Defendant judicial diversion and sentenced him to three years, with ninety days to be served in confinement and the remainder on unsupervised probation. The Defendant appeals the denial of judicial diversion and the denial of full probation. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing, and we affirm the judgment.

Defendant, Michael Ray Howser, pled guilty to aggravated assault, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon with an agreed effective sentence of ten years as a Range II multiple offender with the trial court to determine the manner of service. A sentencing hearing was held, and the trial court ordered Defendant’s ten-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Paul Hayes, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis based on a victim recanting her identification of him as one of the perpetrators of a home invasion that took place over two decades ago. The petition was denied by the trial court both for having been untimely filed and because the new evidence was neither credible nor was likely to have changed the outcome of the trial. On appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court that the petition should be denied on the merits.

Appellants filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County related to the city’s decision to allow a soccer stadium to be built at the fairgrounds. The complaint alleged that the action violated several provisions of the city’s charter intended to protect the fairgrounds for fair uses. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the city on the basis that the additional uses for the fairgrounds did not violate Metropolitan Charter section 11.602. Because the trial court’s order fails to adjudicate Appellants’ claims that the city’s action violated additional charter provisions, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Appellant inmate filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the chancery court seeking redress for various errors involving the sentence he ultimately received following a plea of guilty to two felonies. Because we conclude that Appellant failed to show he had no other equally effective means to redress these alleged errors, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s petition.

Defendant in a debt collection case appeals the entry of judgment against him, contending that the court erred in setting the case for trial with only two days’ notice, in granting a motion in limine on the day of trial, and in its award of attorney’s fees to the Plaintiff. We modify the judgment to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees awarded; in all other respects, we affirm the judgment.  

This appeal arises from a dispute concerning the defendant’s conduct, which impeded the plaintiffs’ use of a state right of way for ingress to and egress from the plaintiffs’ commercial property. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs following its determination that the defendant had created a nuisance and had intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs’ business relationships. The defendant has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking to declare Old Stage Road a public road. Plaintiff sought to use the disputed road to access his property; his property does not abut the road. The plaintiff, asserting that he was also there on behalf of the public, also sought to have the road declared public in order to access defendants’ private property for recreation. Defendants filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment. Defendants argued that absent a ruling related to defendants’ property rights, the plaintiff and those he represents were likely to interpret any ruling favorable to them as a declaration of their right to trespass upon defendants’ private property for recreational purposes, instead of a public road to gain access to some lawful destination. After a trial, the court held that defendants had shown that public use of the area in question had been abandoned. The disputed road was held to be the private property of defendants. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, Tory Blackmon, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; employing a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101(a)(1)-(3) (2018) (criminal attempt), 39-13-202(a) (2014) (subsequently amended) (first degree murder), 39-13-102(a) (2014) (subsequently amended) (aggravated assault), 39-17-1324(b)(2) (2014) (subsequently amended) (armed dangerous felonies). The court imposed a twenty-year sentence for attempted first degree murder, a six-year sentence for the employing a firearm conviction, and a four-year sentence for aggravated assault. The court merged the aggravated assault conviction with the attempted first degree murder conviction, and it ordered the firearm conviction to be served consecutively to the attempted murder conviction as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(e)(1) (2014) (subsequently amended). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred in sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The plaintiffs, some of whom had an interest in property that had been subject to forfeiture proceedings, filed a quo warranto action alleging misconduct by public officials in the administration of the proceedings. The plaintiffs also sought declaratory relief and judicial review “from each final judgment of forfeiture during the period permitted by Tennessee law.” On The defendants’ motion, the trial court dismissed the case on various grounds, including lack of subject matter jurisdiction and lack of standing. In the case of one plaintiff, we conclude that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a petition for judicial review. We further conclude that the plaintiffs either failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted or lacked standing to pursue the claims. So we affirm the dismissal.

Defendant, Ashton Montrell Jones, appeals from the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion (“Rule 36 motion”) to correct a clerical error in a community corrections revocation order. The trial court summarily denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing on the sole basis of “lack of jurisdiction.” Under the particular circumstances of this case, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand to the trial court for proper consideration of the motion.

Defendant, Cedrick Dewayne Whiteside, was found guilty of driving under the influence of an intoxicant, criminal impersonation, driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked, license, and failure to exercise due care. On appeal, he argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient for the trier of fact to find him guilty of driving under the influence of an intoxicant and for failure to exercise due care. In light of the evidence presented, we uphold Defendant’s driving under the influence conviction but reverse and dismiss the jury’s finding of failure to exercise due care.

This appeal arises from a divorce between parties with no minor children. The husband appealed raising numerous issues related to property division. He also challenges the trial court’s denial of his request for alimony. The appellate record contains no transcript or statement of evidence that complies with Rule 24 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Further the husband’s brief is woefully deficient. Because of the husband’s failure to comply with the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Rules of this Court, there is no basis upon which to conclude that the evidence preponderates against the findings of the chancery court and the rulings based thereon. We affirm the judgment of the chancery court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Appellant, Billy Eugene Cook, Jr., appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation for aggravated burglary, contending that the trial court erred by denying a continuance of the revocation hearing and by revoking his probation on his first violation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a bench trial in the Grundy County Circuit Court, the Defendant, Roger F. Johnson, was convicted as charged of indecent exposure, a Class B misdemeanor. He was subsequently sentenced to a six-month sentence, with service of forty-five days in jail prior to serving the remainder of the sentence on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the indictment fails to charge an offense because it does not include the correct mens rea; (2) the indictment is duplicitous; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father to their four children on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and failure to manifest the ability and willingness to assume custody of the children. On appeal, we conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence to support all three grounds as well as the trial court’s best interest determination. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s decision.

This appeal involves a petition for writ of certiorari filed in chancery court by a prisoner after he was denied parole. The chancery court concluded that the petition was timely filed but found that the issues presented were moot and lacked substantive merit. The prisoner appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order of dismissal on other grounds.

Defendants, Corderro Avant and Davario Fields, aka Devario McNeary, appeal from their convictions for one count of first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder resulting in seriously bodily injury, nine counts of attempted first degree murder, and eleven counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony after shots were fired at a house in Memphis. As a result of the resulting convictions, Defendants were sentenced to effective sentences of life plus twenty-one years. In their direct appeal, Defendants challenge: (1) the trial court’s limitation of cross-examination regarding activity at the home prior to the shooting; (2) the trial court’s decision to allow the alleged child victims to sit in the courtroom; (3) the trial court’s decision to allow the State to use cell phone location data obtained without a warrant; (4) the dismissal of a juror after he told the trial court that he recognized a person identified as an unavailable witness; (5) the trial court’s comments to the jury about deliberation; and (6) the sufficiency of the evidence.1 After hearing oral arguments and a full review, we affirm.

Defendant, Christopher Colligan, appeals following the trial court’s revocation of his eight-year community corrections sentence. Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to award sentencing credit for his time served in the community corrections program from June 27, 2014, to March 29, 2017, and from October 4, 2017, to April 27, 2018. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, as modified, and remand for entry of an amended judgment awarding sentencing credits from October 4, 2017, to April 27, 2018.

Defendant, Bobby D. Dewalt, pled guilty to three counts of delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine as a Range II, Multiple Offender in case number 10598 and was sentenced by the trial court to twelve years for each conviction, to be served concurrently. The trial court denied Defendant’s request for an alternative sentence. At the same time, Defendant’s probation was revoked in case number 9783, for which Defendant was on probation at the time of his guilty plea. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. After a review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying an alternative sentence.

The Petitioner, Eddie Medlock, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 (the Act), Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-30-301 to -313 (2018). The postconviction DNA court denied relief on the basis that DNA analysis of evidentiary items requested by the Petitioner had been performed previously and that the Petitioner’s request regarding various forms of scientific analysis of other items was not cognizable under the Act. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the court erred in dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction DNA court.

Defendant, Eddie Readus, appeals the length of his effective sentence following a resentencing hearing that was granted by the trial court in response to Defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 36.1). The State responds that Defendant failed to state a colorable claim for relief in his Rule 36.1 motion, and therefore, the trial court should have dismissed the motion, rather than granting a new sentencing hearing. We agree with the State. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court granting relief pursuant to Rule 36.1, vacate the amended judgment as to the Class C felony conviction, and reinstate the original judgment.