APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a termination of parental rights case involving the parental rights of two fathers to their respective children who were born to the same mother. On March 21, 2017, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and the children’s guardian ad litem jointly filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the children’s mother and the two fathers. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated the parents’ parental rights to the children on multiple statutory grounds and upon a determination that termination of their parental rights was in the best interest of the children. Because we are unable to ascertain whether the trial court’s judgment is an independent judgment of the trial court, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for sufficient findings of facts and conclusions of law in compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1- 113(k) (2017).

Appellant, surviving child of Decedent, brought suit against Appellee, Decedent’s granddaughter, for alleged violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act. Appellant filed the lawsuit in her individual capacity, and the trial court dismissed the case, finding that Appellant lacked standing. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Pro se Petitioner, Victor Clark, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Wayne County Circuit Court. The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the Petitioner’s judgment of conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, see T.C.A. § 39-17-1324(b), is void because he was acquitted of the predicate dangerous felony of attempted second degree murder as charged in the indictment. After review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This appeal involves a post-mediation agreement reached between a plaintiff and the defendants following a car collision in Memphis, Tennessee. After the agreement was executed, the plaintiff refused to perform under the contract. The trial court determined that the agreement was an enforceable contract and ordered compliance with its terms. The plaintiff continued to refuse to perform, and the defendants filed a motion to hold the plaintiff in civil contempt. The plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion requesting the trial court to require the defendants to interplead the settlement funds despite the plaintiff’s nonperformance. The trial court denied the motion for civil contempt, granted the motion for interpleader of the settlement funds, and dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal, we conclude that the plaintiff lost the ability to appeal the validity of the post-mediation agreement by failing to file a timely appeal. We further conclude that the trial court erred in considering the motion to interplead the settlement funds filed by the plaintiff’s attorney but affirm the trial court’s final order in all other respects. We, therefore, vacate in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, Stephen B. Wlodarz, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus from his 2001 convictions for first degree premeditated murder, attempted first degree premeditated murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of manufacturing a Schedule VI controlled substance. Petitioner entered “best interest” pleas under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), and was sentenced to a total effective sentence of life imprisonment “without parole.” Following our review, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Therefore, we affirm the summary dismissal of his petition.

On July 19, 2017, the Defendant, Jack Austin, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to eight years and six months at 85% in the Department of Correction. The Defendant argues on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. He additionally argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence by misapplying an enhancement factor. After thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This interlocutory appeal involves a complaint for damages under the Public Employee Political Freedom Act. The chancery court transferred the case to circuit court after determining that only unliquidated damages were “available” under the statute. We conclude that the complaint failed to allege any liquidated damages. As such, the chancery court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate this case. The trial court’s decision to transfer this case to circuit court is therefore affirmed.

The Defendant, John Palladin Gibson, was convicted of two counts of driving under the influence (DUI), Class A misdemeanors; two counts of fourth-offense DUI, Class E felonies; and one count of second or subsequent offense driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 55-10-401 (2013) (amended 2015) (DUI), 55-10-402(a)(4) (2013) (amended 2014, 2015, 2016) (fourthoffense DUI), 55-50-504 (2013) (amended 2016) (driving while privilege cancelled, suspended, or revoked). The trial court merged the DUI convictions and sentenced the Defendant, a career offender, to six years for DUI and eleven months, twenty-nine days for driving on a revoked license. The sentences were imposed concurrently. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in (1) admitting blood tests results without sufficient proof of the chain of custody and (2) denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim related to his trial counsel’s alleged failure to review evidence with him, causing him to reject a plea offer that he would have accepted if he had been aware of the evidence. We reverse the DUI convictions and remand for a new trial, and we affirm the driving on a revoked license conviction.

This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to support, abandonment based upon his conduct prior to incarceration, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of the child. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm.

I agree with the majority’s conclusion to affirm Defendant’s conviction for driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license. Additionally, I agree with the majority’s conclusion on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. However, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion to reverse both DUI convictions. I am of the opinion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the blood-sample evidence because there was sufficient authentication to establish a chain of custody. Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the trial court regarding both DUI convictions. Further, even if the trial court erred in admitting the blood-sample evidence, it was harmless error with regard to the DUI by impairment conviction. A rational jury could have grounded its verdict on both Deputy Sulewski’s testimony and the dashboard video showing Defendant’s speech and performance on three field-sobriety tests. Therefore, I would affirm the conviction for DUI by impairment on that basis as well.

This is a personal injury lawsuit. Plaintiff, while standing on a public street outside of his apartment, owned by Defendants, was approached from behind by an assailant. The assailant shot Plaintiff in each leg with an assault rifle and proceeded to rob him. Plaintiff sued Defendants for negligence, alleging that Defendants knew or should have known of the foreseeable presence of dangerous persons and that their failure to maintain the property in a safe condition was the direct cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff presented no proof that Defendants had notice of the assailant’s presence or an opportunity to prevent the shooting. We affirm, although on different grounds.

Defendant, Charles Phillip Maxwell, was convicted of driving on a suspended license (second offense) following a bench trial. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served at sixty percent release eligibility and a fine of $2,500.00. On appeal, Defendant raises twenty-seven issues. A number of these issues we have deemed are waived. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This action involves the applicability of a forum selection clause contained within a contract for the installation of two network telephone systems. On April 8, 2015, the seller corporation sent to the buyer corporation a twenty-four-page, itemized quote for equipment and licensing required for the network telephone systems, which the buyer corporation’s president signed and returned to the seller. The quote, consisting of a purchase order with specified terms and conditions on each page, contained provisions for “Shipping Terms” and “RETURNS.” Under the heading for returns, the purchase order stated that additional terms and conditions applied and were available on the seller’s website. Following a dispute, the buyer filed a complaint in the Rhea County Circuit Court (“trial court”) against the seller, alleging breach of contract, misrepresentation, negligence, and unjust enrichment. The seller subsequently filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue, citing a forum selection clause contained in the “General Terms and Conditions of Sale” from the seller’s website, which specified King County, Washington, as the sole venue for litigating the terms of the contract. In an Order entered September 27, 2017, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the forum selection clause was valid and enforceable. The buyer has appealed. Determining that the additional terms and conditions from the seller’s website were only applicable to returns and not to the contract as a whole, we reverse the trial court’s grant of the seller’s motion to dismiss.

This appeal involves the forfeiture of the retirement benefits of a former Tennessee trial judge after he was convicted in federal court of numerous felonies arising out of his official capacity as a trial judge and constituting malfeasance in office. The former trial judge appealed the termination of his benefits and participated in a contested case proceeding before an administrative law judge, who ultimately determined that the retirement benefits were properly terminated based on the felony convictions and that the statute requiring such forfeiture was not unconstitutional as applied to the former trial judge. The chancery court agreed with these conclusions. We likewise conclude that the application of the forfeiture statute did not unconstitutionally impair the pension contract of the former trial judge, nor did it unilaterally impose an impermissible retrospective law or constitute an excessive fine. We further conclude that the retirement benefits were suspended as of the appropriate date, despite the former trial judge’s insistence to the contrary. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the chancery court and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Ray W. Mettetal, Jr., filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to establish that the will of his mother, the deceased Mattie L. Mettetal, directs that the real property devised to him in the will should be administered as part of the estate. Petitioner asked the trial court to declare that the will required the administrator to pay the $40,057.35 in costs and improvements expended by petitioner on the real property out of the residuary of the estate. The court denied petitioner’s request. It held that the real property vested immediately in petitioner at the deceased’s death, and therefore it was not part of the probate estate for administration purposes. We affirm that decision. We reverse the trial court’s order to the extent it directs that attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses accrued in a prior appeal to this Court be deducted from petitioner’s distributive share of the estate.

Petitioner, Mohammed Bassim Al-Khafajy, aka Mohammed Bassim Al-Khafiy, was indicted on multiple counts of drug and weapons charges after a police surveillance operation. He eventually pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to sell or deliver more than one half an ounce of marijuana and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony in exchange for a two-year sentence on the drug conviction and a mandatorily consecutive three-year sentence to be served at 100 percent on the firearm conviction. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel and the unknowing and involuntary nature of his plea. The post-conviction court denied relief and Petitioner appealed. After a review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Shawn Simmons, appeals the Lincoln County Circuit Court’s denial of his request for a delayed appeal. Having construed the Petitioner’s pleading as a motion to reopen his first post-conviction petition, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements governing an appeal from the denial of a motion to reopen.

Appellant/Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii); and (2) severe child abuse, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-113(g)(9). Mother also appeals the trial court finding that termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because Appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, does not defend the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, we reverse the trial court’s termination of Appellant’s parental rights on that ground. We affirm the termination of Appellant’s parental rights on the sole ground of severe child abuse and on the trial court’s finding that termination of her rights is in the child’s best interest.

The petitioner, Jerome Perkins, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The case involves the defendant’s violation of a city ordinance. The city cited the defendant for parking his commercial semi-truck on his private driveway and on city streets, which the city claimed was cracking the sidewalk and bringing mud into the street. The municipal court found the defendant in violation of the ordinance, and the defendant appealed the municipal court’s decision to the circuit court. The defendant raised several state and federal constitutional issues regarding the ordinance, but the circuit court found his arguments to be without merit and affirmed the municipal court’s decision. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the circuit court. 

This is a residential foreclosure case. Homeowners appeal the trial court’s dismissal of their claims regarding the foreclosure of their home under Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon our review, we conclude that the Appellants’ claims should not have been dismissed on a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

A Roane County grand jury indicted the defendant, Shawn Nelson Smoot, with the first degree murder of the victim, Brooke Morris, and later convicted him of the same, for which he received an enhanced sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) the trial court erred when allowing the introduction of evidence seized during the warrantless search of his home under the theory of inevitable discovery; (2) the trial court erred when allowing expert ballistics and firearms identification testimony; (3) the trial court erred when allowing the introduction of evidence related to the victim’s order of protection against the defendant; (4) the trial court erred when denying the defendant’s motion to rehear all pretrial motions; (5) the trial court erred when allowing the victim’s landlord to render hearsay testimony regarding an incident between the victim and the defendant; (6) the trial court erred when allowing several witnesses to offer improper character evidence under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (7) the trial court erred when denying the defendant’s request for a trial continuance so he could obtain a mitigation expert; (8) the trial court erred when allowing the State to amend the indictment to include an additional witness twelve days before trial; (9) the trial court erred when denying two motions for mistrial; (10) the trial court erred when admitting the autopsy report as evidence; (11) the trial court erred when admitting the prior consistent statement of the defendant’s roommate into evidence; (12) the trial court erred when excluding the victim’s text messages to her friends from evidence; (13) the trial court erred when instructing the jury on flight; (14) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct when making improper comments to the jury regarding evidence; (15) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct when commenting during closing arguments on the defendant’s failure to testify; (16) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict; (17) the State made an improper “golden rule” argument during the sentencing phase of trial; (18) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole; and (19) the cumulative effect of these errors warrant a reversal of the verdict. Based on the arguments of the parties, our review of the record, and the pertinent law, we conclude the trial court erred when admitting the evidence seized during the search of the defendant’s residence, when admitting certain hearsay statements contained in the order of protection documents, and when admitting the prior consistent statement of the defendant’s roommate. These errors were harmless, and their cumulative effect did not change the outcome of either phase of trial. Discerning no further errors, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

The petitioner, Jason Lyles, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Steve Anderson, appeals from the Hamblen County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 1985 convictions for receiving and concealing stolen property, possession of engines and transmissions with altered numbers, arson of an automobile, and escape and his forty-two-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred by dismissing his petition and by finding him in contempt of court, which resulted in a ten-day sentence in confinement. Although the habeas corpus court erred by dismissing the petition pursuant to the mootness doctrine, we conclude that the petition fails to state a colorable claim for habeas corpus relief. Furthermore, we reverse the judgment of the habeas court relative to the contempt determination and dismiss the charge.

I agree with the majority opinion affirming the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of the Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition on the basis that the petition fails to state a colorable claim. However, I disagree that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s finding of direct criminal contempt.