APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A husband appeals the trial court’s division of marital assets and denial of attorney’s fees.  Both parties sought a divorce. Prior to trial, the parties stipulated that the husband was entitled to a divorce based on the wife’s admitted adultery. The parties also stipulated to the value of the husband’s premarital interest in his 401(k) retirement account. As to the division of marital assets, the parties stipulated that the husband would receive the marital home, and the wife would receive another piece of real property. The parties stipulated to the values of all remaining assets and debts but not to their division, and the wife waived any claims to alimony. After a four day bench trial, the trial court granted the husband a divorce and approved a permanent parenting plan which designated him as primary residential parent for the parties’ one child. In addition, the trial court classified the parties’ assets and divided the remaining marital estate, awarding fifty-four percent (54%) of the marital estate to the wife and forty-six percent (46%) to the husband, and declined to award either party attorney’s fees. The husband takes issue on appeal with the manner in which the trial court divided the marital estate and with the trial court’s decision to not award him any attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s division of the parties’ marital estate, as well as the trial court’s decision not to award the husband any attorney’s fees. We also decline to award the wife her attorney’s fees on appeal.

Pamela Lyles (“Employee”) was employed by Titlemax of Tennessee, Inc. (“Employer”). On May 19, 2010, an armed robbery occurred, during which the offender brandished a handgun at Employee. Employee immediately began exhibiting symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and was diagnosed with PTSD no later than July 13, 2010. Employee filed a Request for Benefit Review Conference with the Tennessee Department of Labor on September 16, 2011, which resulted in an impasse. Employee brought suit and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Employer, stating that the statute of limitations barred her claim. Employee has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.

Father appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his complaint for modification of the court’s order adopting a permanent parenting plan in a previous custody action. Subsequent to Father’s filing of this appeal, he filed a similar or identical petition for modification in the original custody action, and the trial court is scheduled to hear that petition prior to the adjudication of this appeal. We have, therefore, determined that this appeal is moot.

A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant, Maurice Gray, of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, convicted felon in possession of a firearm, convicted felon in possession of a handgun, and evading arrest. Defendant received a total effective sentence of twenty-nine years. On appeal, Defendant argues the following: (1) the evidence was insufficient for a rational juror to have found Defendant guilty on all charges beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court erred in ordering partially consecutive sentence alignment; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to merge counts three, four, and five. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm Defendant’s judgments of conviction but remand for merger of counts four and five.

This action involves claims relating to the relocation of an approximate ten-foot wide golf cart path located on an easement granted in 1996. The plaintiff owner of the easement sought, inter alia, an injunction and compensatory and punitive damages for the interference with the easement. The case proceeded to a hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment, after which the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant owner of the servient property and the defendant construction company that relocated the path. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

C.K. Smith, Jr. (“Employee”) suffered a compensable shoulder injury and was awarded lifetime medical care pursuant to a settlement agreement with Goodall Buildings, Inc. (“Employer”). Employee suffered from long-term chronic pain because of his injury and was referred to Dr. Jeffrey Hazlewood for pain management. Upon entering the care of Dr. Hazlewood, Employee was already prescribed a high dosage of opioids to manage his pain. Dr. Hazlewood continued this treatment, slowly raising Employee’s prescription. However, Dr. Hazlewood began to have concerns about Employee forming an addiction, and new medical guidelines on pain management indicated that Employee was taking too high a dosage of opioids. Dr. Hazlewood recommended weaning Employee off opioids, or at least lowering his dosage. In response, Employee left the care of Dr. Hazlewood and filed a motion for a new panel of physicians. That motion was heard for the first time almost two years later. The trial court granted Employee’s motion and ordered Employer to provide a new panel of physicians. Employer appealed, arguing Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(j) precludes Employee from receiving a new panel of physicians. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tyson Reed King, was found guilty by a Maury County Circuit Court jury of destroying, tampering with, or fabricating evidence and of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-503 (2014) (destruction, tampering, or fabrication of evidence), 39-17-425 (2014) (unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia). The trial court sentenced the Defendant, a Range II offender, to serve nine years at 35% for destroying, tampering with, or fabricating evidence and to eleven months, twenty-nine days for unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. The sentences were imposed to run concurrently. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I join the majority in affirming the post-conviction court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief. However, I write separately to dissent from the majority’s holding that a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, which a defendant files after sentencing but before the judgment becomes final, does not constitute a “critical stage” of the proceedings and, therefore, does not provide the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.

The Petitioner, Oscar Armando Delgado, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for not fully advising him of the immigration consequences of his plea or providing him with a Spanish language interpreter, thereby rendering his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Kaylecia Woodard, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery and received an effective sentence of fifteen years. The sentence was vacated on appeal and the case was remanded for re-sentencing. On remand, the defendant was sentenced to ten years’ incarceration. On appeal the defendant contends the trial court erred in applying enhancement factor (2) and in improperly weighing the enhancement factor. Upon our review of the record, arguments of the parties, and pertinent authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Brandon Gillenwater, appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s judgment denying him alternative sentencing. Defendant’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw from representation pursuant to Rule 22 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that counsel’s motion is well-taken and, in accordance with Rule 22(F), affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

Defendant, Jamal P. Hicks, was convicted of sexual battery in 2004. As a result of that conviction, Defendant was declared a registered sex offender and required to comply with the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification and Tracking Act of 2004. T.C.A. § 40-39-201. et seq. In 2016, Defendant was convicted by a jury of falsifying a registration form, failing to report a change in circumstance on a registration form, and perjury. As a result, he received an effective sentence of three years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court improperly admitted three exhibits at trial and that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. After a thorough review, we conclude that the trial court improperly admitted several exhibits at trial and, as a result, the evidence is insufficient to support the judgments. Consequently, Defendant’s convictions are reversed and vacated.

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to visit and to support and that termination was in the best interest of the Child. We vacate the order and remand for additional findings of fact. 

The Defendant, Joshua Cool, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, two counts of second degree murder, and criminally negligent homicide. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2014) (first degree murder); 39-13-210 (2014) (second degree murder); 39-13-212 (2014) (criminally negligent homicide). After the appropriate merger, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences of life imprisonment for two first degree premeditated murder convictions and to two years’ confinement for criminally negligent homicide. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his first degree murder convictions, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence recovered during a warrantless search and his subsequent police statement, and (3) the trial court erred by admitting various evidentiary items. We affirm the Defendant’s convictions, but we remand the case to the trial court for the entry of a corrected second degree murder judgment to reflect the offense as a Class A felony.

The Appellant, Dinnie Merel Robertson, was convicted in the Lawrence County Circuit Court in case number 31906 of two counts of felony vandalism, carrying a firearm with the intent to go armed, and misdemeanor reckless endangerment. Subsequently, he pled guilty in the Lawrence County Circuit Court in case number 33049 to two counts of retaliation for past action. The Appellant received an effective four-year sentence in case number 31906 and an effective two-year sentence in case number 33049 to be served consecutively as ten months in confinement followed by supervised probation. The Appellant then was convicted in the Lawrence County Circuit Court in case number 33414 of selling one-half gram or more of methamphetamine and selling Clonazepam and received an effective ten-year sentence to be served in confinement and consecutively to the effective six-year sentence. The trial court also revoked the Appellant’s probation in case numbers 31906 and 33049 and ordered that he serve his sentences in those cases in confinement. In this consolidated appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions in case number 33414, that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve his effective ten-year sentence in that case consecutively to his prior sentences, and that the trial court erred by denying his request for probation. He also contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation in case numbers 31906 and 33049 and ordering that he serve those sentences in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the case for correction of the judgments.

The Petitioner, Thiermo Mamadou Diallo, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, seeking relief from his conviction of statutory rape, which was the result of a guilty plea, based upon the victim’s recantation of her allegations against him. The Petitioner acknowledged that the petition was untimely but alleged that due process justified tolling the statute of limitations. After a brief hearing on the issue, the coram nobis court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner challenges this ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Following a trial, a Shelby County jury found Defendant, Willie Mitchell, guilty of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced Defendant, as a career offender, to a total effective sentence of forty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant challenges both the sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to his conviction for aggravated robbery and the sentence imposed by the trial court. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of conviction.

The Petitioner, Derrick Chambers, appeals from the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, wherein he challenged the validity of his guilty plea to attempted first degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel because trial counsel (1) “failed to adequately investigate, or prepare for trial, develop defenses, speak to witnesses, file motions, or meet with the [Petitioner] to prepare for trial”; (2) “failed to object to raise a statutory claim with respect to charging him with attempted murder by using a firearm and employing a firearm in the commission of the same offense”; and (3) coerced him into pleading guilty by providing incorrect advice. The Petitioner further contends that, but for trial “counsel’s ineffective representation,” he “would have received a greatly reduced sentence.” After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The petitioner, Larry Wade, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel upon the entry of his guilty plea and during the subsequent hearing on the motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition and further conclude the petitioner does not have a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel during a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea after sentence has been imposed.

The petitioner, Richard Bryant Long, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal arises out of a petition to construe a will. The petitioner has appealed from an order requiring him to obtain an attorney within thirty days or else the matter would be dismissed. Because the order does not dismiss the petition or otherwise dispose of all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

This appeal arises from a personal injury lawsuit. Thomas Sutherland (“Plaintiff”) sued MP & T Hotels, LLC (“the Hotel”) in the Circuit Court for Wilson County (“the Trial Court”) for personal injuries after encountering noxious fumes in his hotel room. The Hotel raised the affirmative defense of comparative fault against Charles Stewart d/b/a Stewart and Son Termite and Pest Control (“Stewart”), who days before Plaintiff’s stay had sprayed insecticides in several of the Hotel’s rooms in keeping with a contract with the Hotel. Plaintiff thereafter sued Stewart as well. Plaintiff died during this case, and his son (“Substitute Plaintiff”) was substituted.1 For having to defend himself in this action, Stewart contends he is entitled to attorney’s fees and expenses from the Hotel under a theory of implied indemnity. The Trial Court denied the parties’ competing motions for summary judgment. Stewart appeals. Because the order appealed from is not a final judgment, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, and this appeal must be dismissed. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal.

Plaintiff in this action, which recovered a judgment against the Tennessee Defendants in a New York court, sought to enroll and enforce the judgment in accordance with the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 26-6-101 to -108, in Davidson County Circuit Court. Defendants moved to dismiss the proceeding and to deny the New York judgment full faith and credit on the ground, inter alia, that it was void under Tennessee law. The court denied the motion, held that the judgment was entitled to full faith and credit, and enrolled the judgment. Defendants appeal; we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.

This is a premises liability case. Appellants sued Appellee, building owner, for negligence alleging that his injuries from a fall were due to an unsafe ladder on which he was standing to access Appellee’s HVAC units. Appellee denied all allegations and asserted comparative fault by one of the Appellants, Christopher Creech. After various pre-trial motions, the case proceeded to trial. At the close of trial, the trial court denied both motions for directed verdict. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellee. Appellants appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

This appeal arises from the dismissal of a complaint filed against the Shelby County Retirement Board and a labor union for breach of contract for an administrative decision by the Shelby County Retirement Board, which denied the plaintiff’s request for a pension benefit as a former employee of the Shelby County Health Department. The retirement board and the union filed separate motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6). The chancery court granted both motions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, determining that the plaintiff’s complaint was a petition for writ of certiorari, which the plaintiff did not file within the sixty-day statute of limitation. We affirm.