APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Marcus Levon Somerville, appeals from his convictions for two counts of aggravated assault, contending that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his requests for judicial diversion and alternative sentencing. Additionally, he notes that the record is devoid of any proof that he affirmatively entered a guilty plea. After review, we agree that the Defendant never pled guilty to these offenses, rendering his convictions void as a matter of law. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are reversed, the Defendant’s convictions are vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Patrick Plunk, appeals from the order of the trial court revoking his probation. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to properly apply the two-step process required for probation revocation. In addition, the Defendant contends the record contains no reliable evidence to support revocation and no findings regarding the appropriate consequence, rendering the record insufficiently developed for appellate review. The State responds that the record contains substantial evidence supporting the revocation. After review, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of the Defendant’s probation but remand for the trial court to make findings concerning the consequence imposed for the revocation.

Petitioner, Rhonda Kay Davis, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that trial counsel provided effective assistance of counsel and that her plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

On December 13, 2022, David Johnson was struck by a vehicle driven by Dylan Clark. Dylan Clark’s automobile insurance carrier was Appellee, Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company. Appellee negotiated a settlement and paid $50,000.00 on Mr. Clark’s behalf for his role in the accident. The $50,000.00 check was made payable to both Appellant Beverly Johnson and Medicare. On May 1, 2024, Appellants filed suit. Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, and the trial court granted the motion. Appellants appeal the dismissal of their lawsuit. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Joshua Neil Blair, appeals the thirty-five-year sentence imposed for his Campbell County Criminal Court Jury convictions of felony evading arrest, vandalism, aggravated assault, and attempted second degree murder, claiming that the trial court erred by imposing partially consecutive sentences. Because the record supports the sentencing decision of the trial court, we affirm.

The Defendant, Michael Taylor, entered a guilty plea to arson pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), for which he received an agreed upon four-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of one year in confinement followed by three years’ supervised probation. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying full probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Antonio Dodson, of three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated rape, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, this court affirmed the trial court’s judgments against the Petitioner. State v. Sherrod and Dodson, W2015-02022- CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1907723 at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 9, 2017) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner appeals, maintaining that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his due process rights were violated. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Billy Joe Anderson, pleaded guilty in the Washington County Criminal
Court in case number 48319 to second degree murder, a Class A felony, and in case number
48913 to attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210 (2018)
(second degree murder); 39-13-202 (Supp. 2024) (first degree murder); 39-12-101 (2018)
(criminal attempt). On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred by determining
that he was a Range II multiple offender based on his 2010 Florida conviction. We affirm
the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury found the Defendant, Baeho Shin, guilty of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated sexual battery, and domestic assault, among other offenses. Thereafter, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-two years’incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court violated his constitutional right to confrontation. More specifically, he argues that the court prohibited him from cross-examining the victim about her potential interest in obtaining a U visa, which is a non-immigrant visa available to certain victims of crime. Although the trial court later allowed the Defendant to recall the victim and question her on the topic, he argues that the delayed timing of the examination rendered the remedy inadequate and prejudicial. Upon our review, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in controlling the scope and timing of the cross-examination and that any possible error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 2017, a Washington County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jamarcus Jackson, of misdemeanor assault, misdemeanor reckless endangerment, and second degree murder as a lesser-included offense of first degree murder. The trial court imposed a forty-year sentence. The Petitioner appealed and this court affirmed the judgments. State v. Jackson, No. E2017-01182-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 3409927, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2018), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 15, 2018). Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following a hearing. We affirmed that decision on appeal. Jackson v. State, No. E2021-00642-CCA-R3-PC, 2022 WL 984341 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 23, 2022), no perm. app. filed. In 2024, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely and without merit. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his petition is entitled to a tolling of the statute of limitations because of the unavailability of the newly discovered evidence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A property owner sued his neighbors, claiming that he acquired title to a part of their land by adverse possession or, in the alternative, that he held a prescriptive easement. He asserted additional causes of action against one of the neighbors, including private nuisance, trespass to land, and forcible entry and detainer. The neighbors sought dismissal of the action via Tennessee Rule of Procedure 12.02(6) motions. The trial court dismissed the claims for adverse possession and prescriptive easement based on Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-2-110(a). It dismissed all other claims except for private nuisance based on deficiencies in the complaint. We vacate the dismissal of the prescriptive easement claim because facts warranting application of the statutory bar do not clearly appear on the face of the complaint. Because the appellant waived review of all other issues, we otherwise affirm.

A Cheatham County jury convicted the Petitioner, Demario Quintez Driver, of rape and coercion of a witness. On appeal, this court affirmed the trial court’s judgments. State v. Driver, No. M2021-00538-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 1284978, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. April 29, 2022), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 29, 2022). The Petitioner filed a timely post-conviction petition, and after a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that the cumulative errors of his trial counsel warrant relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant, Demarcus Montay Montgomery, entered guilty pleas for aggravated assault against a first responder and evading arrest involving the risk of death or injury in exchange for a three-year sentence, with the trial court to determine the manner of service. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of three years’ confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to full confinement rather than probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State employee received proton beam radiation therapy for prostate cancer. Insurance company denied authorization of the treatment as “investigational” and not “medically necessary” pursuant to the insurance plan and its medical policy. After exhausting administrative remedies, the employee submitted an appeal to the Tennessee Claims Commission, alleging breach of contract. The Claims Commission found that the treatment was not a covered expense, granting summary judgment in favor of the State. We now affirm.

Petitioner, King Allah James, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his guilty pleaded convictions for assault, vandalism, and two counts of aggravated assault and his effective six-year sentence. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he failed to establish a colorable claim for relief. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Justin Rivers, was convicted of aggravated child neglect and received a sentence of fifteen years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) his motion for judgment of acquittal should be treated as a prematurely filed motion for new trial; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; and (3) the aggravated child neglect statute is unconstitutionally vague. After review, we dismiss the appeal due to its untimeliness.

Antwon William Santos, Defendant, claims that the trial court erred in finding that he violated the terms of his probation and in ordering him to serve the balance of the sentence in confinement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant filed an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of a recusal motion pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. However, the trial judge has presented this case to the presiding judge of his district, pursuant to local rule, for another judge to hear the matter by interchange. Thus, we determine that the appellant’s Rule 10B appeal is moot and dismiss the appeal.

This is a healthcare liability action against a surgeon and the hospital where the surgeon practiced. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants. We affirm.

John W. McClarty, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. Michael Swiney, C.J., and Kristi M. Davis, J., joined.

Ira M. Long, Jr., Chattanooga, Tennessee, and William Cameron, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Susan Oakes and Randy Oakes.

Rachel Park Hurt, Devin P. Lyon, and Raymond Grant Lewallen, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Mark A. Fox, M.D. and Covenant Medical Group, Inc.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Timothy McKinney, of one count of attempted second degree murder, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. State v. McKinney, No. W2016-00834-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 1055719, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 23, 2019), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 19, 2018). The Petitioner also pleaded guilty to three counts of being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a repeat violent offender to life without the possibility of parole. The Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed his convictions and sentence. Id. The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, amended by appointed counsel, in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective in multiple ways. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal ensued. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Koalis Peete, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns individual liability in the context of a limited liability company. John Olderman (“Olderman”) and Christopher Smith (“Smith”) are manager members of CCD Oldsmith Henry, LLC, and Oldsmith Group, LLC (“Oldsmith,” collectively). Oldsmith asked the Town of Nolensville (“the Town”) to rezone certain property so it could develop residential units on the property. This development would increase traffic at a nearby intersection. At a hearing before the Nolensville Board of Mayor and Aldermen (“the BOMA”), Smith said that Oldsmith could help pay to improve the intersection. The Town subsequently rezoned the property. Oldsmith later declined to pay what the Town said it owed, asserting it never agreed to pay so much. In response, the Town refused to issue building permits. Oldsmith sued the Town in the Circuit Court for Williamson County (“the Trial Court”). The Town filed a counterclaim and a motion to join Smith and Olderman. The Town alleged that Smith and Olderman fraudulently and negligently misrepresented what Oldsmith was willing to pay. The Trial Court denied the motion, ruling that the Town could obtain complete relief without Smith and Olderman. The Trial Court also ruled that Smith and Olderman could not be held individually liable based on these allegations. The Town appeals. We hold that the Town alleged nothing actionable against Olderman; that the Town sufficiently alleged promissory fraud against Smith; that Smith’s status as manager member of an LLC does not insulate him from liability for his own acts or omissions; and that the Trial Court’s denial of joinder as to Smith was an abuse of discretion. We affirm the denial of joinder as to Olderman. Otherwise, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Dalton Bryce Patterson, filed a motion through counsel seeking review of the Blount County Criminal Court’s June 4, 2025, order revoking his release on his own recognizance bond and imposing a monetary bond in the amount of $100,000. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-144; Tenn. R. App. P. 8. He contends that the trial court’s use of “hold without bond” warrants for violations of pretrial release supervision violated his due process rights, see State v. Burgins, 464 S.W.3d 298, 306 (Tenn. 2015), and that the court improperly modified his bond based on alleged violations of his release conditions. The State opposes the motion, asserting that the trial court’s actions were consistent with due process. Upon our review, we respectfully deny the Defendant’s motion.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has remanded this case for consideration of the Defendant’s appeal from the Smith County Criminal Court’s probation revocation of her two consecutive eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentences for her guilty-pleaded misdemeanor convictions for marijuana possession and possession of drug paraphernalia. See State v. Shenessa L. Sokolosky, --- S.W.3d. ---, No. M2022-00873-SC-R11-CD, 2025 WL 2016420 (Tenn. July 18, 2025) (reversing State v. Shenessa L. Sokolosky, No. M2022-00873-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 1780085 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2024)). This court concluded in its previous opinion that the Defendant’s appeal was moot because she had fully served her sentence and was no longer constrained by confinement or probation supervision. The Tennessee Supreme Court disagreed and concluded that the mootness doctrine does not apply because a probation revocation may result in future adverse consequences, even after completion of a sentence. Upon further review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further findings of fact pursuant to State v. Wade, 863 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Tenn. 1993). We, likewise, remand for the entry of a corrected judgment form in Count 6 to reflect consecutive service with Count 5 and for the entry of judgment forms, if necessary, reflecting a dismissal of the charges in Counts 2, 3, 4, and 7.

I respectfully dissent. This case comes to us on a probation revocation where, even taking the State’s evidence at face value, the proof does not establish a violation. The trial court found absconsion and failure to pay fines and costs, but the record supports neither finding. And because the probation warrant was already admitted and considered, a remand to supply a “good cause” hearsay finding cannot cure the problem. Whether the hearsay is excluded or admitted again, the result is the same: the State’s proof remains insufficient to sustain the revocation.