APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Daniel Lee Mooneyhan, appeals his Bedford County convictions for Count 1: aggravated burglary, and Counts 2 and 4: theft of property between the value of $1,000 and $10,000, for which he received an effective sentence of five years with a 30% release eligibility, to serve in the Department of Correction. The Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions in Counts 1, 2, and 4 because the State offered no independent evidence to corroborate an accomplice’s testimony about the Defendant’s involvement in the offenses. The Defendant does not appeal his conviction in Count 3, felon in possession of a handgun. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the convictions, but remand for merger of Counts 2 and 4.

The Defendant, Andrew McMurray, Jr., appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence and the trial court’s order that he serve the remainder of his sentence in prison. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we discern no abuse of discretion, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Lewis County jury convicted the Defendant, Steven O. Summers, II, of theft of more than $1,000, and the trial court sentenced him to four years on probation and ordered him to pay restitution to the victim. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to excuse certain members of the jury pool for cause; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; and (3) the trial court ordered the Defendant to pay an incorrect amount of restitution and failed to follow the proper procedure when it determined restitution. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Former police officer appeals the denial of her petition for a writ of certiorari and the denial of her motion for relief from a final judgment related to the termination of her employment. Here, the evidence was undisputed that the former police officer neglected her duties, failed to follow the directive of a “superior” and was repeatedly informed about various instances of misconduct. As such, the city administrator’s decision to uphold Appellant’s dismissal was supported by material evidence and was neither arbitrary, illegal, nor capricious.

Fredrick Sledge (“Petitioner”) appeals the June 16, 2017 order of the Chancery Court for Nashville and Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) dismissing Petitioner’s October 2016 petition for declaratory judgment (“2016 Petition”) based upon the prior suit pending doctrine. We find and hold that the prior suit pending doctrine applies as Petitioner had a prior suit pending involving the same parties and the same subject matter in a court that had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s June 16, 2017 order dismissing Petitioner’s petition.

The Petitioner, Scott L. Bishop, was convicted of four counts of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to serve eleven years in prison. The Petitioner filed a postconviction petition asserting that his trial counsel did not provide effective assistance, and the post-conviction court denied the petition after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was deficient in failing to present character witnesses, failing to object to leading questions asked by the prosecutor, and preventing him from viewing the victim’s recorded forensic interview. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner is not entitled to relief, and we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Kenneth Ramsey (“Defendant”), pro se, appeals the April 18, 2017 order of the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Circuit Court”) granting Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Defendant’s appeal from General Sessions Court to the Circuit Court. Defendant’s brief on appeal severely fails to comply with Tenn. R. App. P. 27. We, therefore, find that Defendant has waived his issues on appeal. We affirm the Trial Court’s April 18, 2017 order.

The Defendant, Moses A. Ballard, Jr., was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm and first degree premeditated murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202, -17-1307. The unlawful possession of a firearm charge was ultimately dismissed upon the State’s request. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210. The trial court subsequently imposed a sentence of thirty-eight years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred in allowing an expert witness to testify beyond the scope of her expertise; (3) that the trial court erred by not allowing recorded jail phone calls between the Defendant and two of the State’s witnesses to be introduced at trial; (4) that the trial court erred by not allowing “evidence regarding the gang affiliation of various involved parties” to be introduced at trial; (5) that the State committed a discovery violation by withholding evidence; (6) that the withheld evidence “amount[ed] to newly discovered evidence” requiring a new trial; and (7) that the trial court was unable to perform its duty as the thirteenth juror “due to the withheld evidence.” Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Carlos Prather, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2015 Shelby County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of vandalism of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, for which he received an effective sentence of 10 years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Ronnie Bradfield, appeals from the summary dismissal of his pro se pleading, in which pleading the petitioner asked for relief via the writ of error coram nobis, the writ of habeas corpus, and Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Because the record supports the dismissal, we affirm.

On April 1, 2016, the Obion County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Alando Deshaun Brown, on two counts of rape. A jury convicted the Defendant of both counts at trial. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged Count 2 into Count 1 and sentenced the Defendant to eight years in the Department of Correction, with release eligibility after service of 100% of the sentence for Count 1. The Defendant filed a timely motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. The Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, claiming insufficient evidence to support the verdict. Based on the evidence in the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This appeal of a conviction for criminal contempt arises out of a civil suit brought by business owners against the owners and employees of a competing business for fraud in the use of the tax-sale and redemption process for real property. The trial court issued a temporary injunction, prohibiting defendants from, inter alia, recording deeds in real estate transactions without an authentic notary seal on the documents and requiring defendants to notify the court and opposing counsel of any documents they intended to record in the Register’s Office. Appellant, the owner of the business which was the subject of the injunction, subsequently formed a trust in which Appellant retained the right to direct the distribution of income and principal and to amend, revoke, or terminate the trust. The trustee of the trust was conveyed real property in trust and recorded the deed without the notice required by the injunction. The property was subsequently sold, and, at Appellant’s instruction, a portion of the proceeds of sale used to pay Appellant’s legal fees for a related proceeding; the trial court held that, in so doing, the Appellant willfully and for a bad purpose violated the injunction, and held him in contempt. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. We have reviewed the record and conclude that there is evidence to support the contempt conviction beyond a reasonable doubt and accordingly affirm the judgment.

This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his two children. The father suffers from paranoid schizophrenia. The trial court terminated his parental rights on the grounds of mental incompetence and abandonment by willful failure to visit and/or support. We reverse the trial court’s findings regarding abandonment but otherwise affirm the termination of parental rights.

The Petitioner, Anne Marie Kent, was convicted by a Lewis County jury of two counts of aggravated child neglect or endangerment and two counts of child abuse and received an effective sentence of twenty-two years. The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition alleging that she received ineffective assistance of counsel, which was subsequently denied by the post-conviction court. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective by (1) failing to file a motion to change venue; (2) advising the Petitioner not to testify at trial; (3) failing to call a witness; and (4) failing to properly crossexamine a witness. Upon thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this interlocutory appeal, the petitioner, Nikolaus Johnson, appeals the ruling of the post-conviction court ordering that he provide discovery materials to the State. The rules governing post-conviction proceedings impose upon the State an automatic and mandatory obligation to provide discovery materials to the petitioner as part of the postconviction proceeding even in the absence of a request for such materials. Although Rule 28 of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court does not include a similar provision requiring automatic and mandatory reciprocal discovery from the petitioner to the State, the Post-Conviction Procedure Act provides that Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 governs discovery in a post-conviction proceeding. Nothing in Rule 28 specifically exempts a post-conviction petitioner from complying with the discovery requirements of Rule 16. Accordingly, we reverse that part of the post-conviction court’s ruling that held that the filing of a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, without more, triggers in the post-conviction petitioner a duty to provide reciprocal discovery to the State. Instead, we hold that a post-conviction petitioner’s duty to provide reciprocal discovery to the State arises when the State has fully complied with its own mandatory discovery obligation and has requested reciprocal discovery under the terms of Rule 16. Because the State has not yet satisfied its duty to disclose in this post-conviction proceeding, the post-conviction court erred by ordering the petitioner to provide reciprocal discovery to the State. Regarding the post-conviction court’s order that the petitioner disclose prior to the evidentiary hearing the underlying facts and data for those expert witnesses the petitioner intended to present at the evidentiary hearing, we conclude that Tennessee Rule of Evidence 705 authorizes the court’s order and, therefore, affirm.

The defendant, Millard Ellis Spurgeon, appeals his Sevier County Circuit Court jury convictions of burglary, theft of property valued at $1,000 or more, vandalism of property valued at $1,000 or more, and possession of burglary tools, challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress certain evidence and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Jerry Reginald Burkes, appeals his convictions of money laundering, theft, and sales tax evasion and the accompanying 18-year effective sentence that included five years of confinement. The defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by permitting the State to introduce certain evidence in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (2) the trial court erred by concluding that certain of the defendant’s convictions would be admissible for purposes of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 609; (3) the trial court violated his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination; (4) the State failed to discover and disclose exculpatory evidence; (5) the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of money laundering; (6) the trial court erred by imposing a Range II sentence; and (7) the sentence imposed by the trial court is illegal. Because the fiveyear term of confinement imposed by the trial court is not authorized, we vacate the sentencing decision of the trial court and remand the case for resentencing. Additionally, because the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court cannot be satisfied under the terms ordered by the trial court, we vacate the restitution order and remand the case for the trial court to impose restitution in a manner that complies with Code section 40-35- 304. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

This is an appeal from the entry of an order dismissing an order of protection, which had already expired by its own terms. Because the order of protection has expired, we affirm the decision of the trial court and dismiss the appeal as moot.

This is an unlawful detainer case. U.S. Bank initiated an action against Letitia and Roderick Robertson in the general sessions court seeking possession of a residential property it had purchased at a foreclosure sale after the Robertsons defaulted on their home loan. The general sessions court issued U.S. Bank a writ of possession, and the Robertsons appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court granted U.S. Bank’s motion for summary judgment and writ of possession. The Robertsons appealed to this Court, arguing that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer claim. Because we have concluded that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction, we affirm.

The Defendant, Martin Ellison Hughes, was found guilty by a Hawkins County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to concurrent terms of fifteen and ten years, for an effective fifteen-year sentence at 45% service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves Appellant’s attempt to redeem property that was purchased by Appellee at a tax sale. Appellant executed a power of attorney in favor of his son, which vested his son with authority to file the motion to redeem the subject property. Appellee objected to the motion on the ground that son, who is not a licensed attorney, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by filing the motion to redeem; thus, Appellee argued that the motion was void. In response to the motion, Appellant filed an amended motion to redeem with the assistance of an attorney. The amended motion, however, was filed after the one year redemption period had expired. The trial court denied the amended motion to redeem, finding that the original motion to redeem was void and that the amended motion to redeem did not relate back to the date son filed the original motion. Thus, the trial court held that the amended motion was untimely. We hold that Appellant’s son was authorized, under the power of attorney, to file the original motion to redeem and that the filing of the form motion provided by the clerk’s office was not an unauthorized practice of law. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand.  

Appellants, home and community based service providers and their professional trade organization, appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee Tennessee Department of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities. The case, which was filed as a declaratory judgment action, involves financial sanctions levied against Appellant providers by Appellee for billing for day services in excess of the 243-day limit imposed by a federal waiver. Appellants assert, inter alia, that the imposition of these fines exceeded Appellee’s statutory and/or contractual authority. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment against Appellants on all counts of their petition.

A wife filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(3) to set aside a final decree of divorce granted on the ground of irreconcilable differences. The trial court denied the motion, finding that she failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the judgment was void. We affirm the trial court’s decision.

The defendant, Gabriel Dotson, was convicted of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, rape, and incest for which he received an effective sentence of thirty-five years. On appeal he challenges his convictions on the grounds there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdicts, the State made improper statements throughout trial which prejudiced the defendant, the trial court erred in instructing the jury, the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence, and the cumulative effect of the errors at trial prejudiced the verdict. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jerry Edward Lanier, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.