APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this termination of parental rights case, the Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of B.B. (mother) and J.T. (father) with respect to J.T., Jr. and H.T. (the children). The trial court determined that clear and convincing evidence supported two grounds for termination: (1) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; and (2) persistence of conditions. By the same quantum of proof, the court determined that termination is in the best interest of the children. We vacate the trial court’s judgment with respect to the ground of persistence of conditions. As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating the parental rights of the parents because termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence of substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan and is in the best interest of the children. 

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Justus Onyiego, of two counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the convictions and sentenced him to seventeen years in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court denied his right to due process by failing to dismiss the indictment due to the State’s ten-year preindictment delay, that the trial court erred by failing to strike the testimony of two police officers, that the trial court erred by refusing to admit evidence of the victim’s prior sexual behavior under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412, and that a prosecutor’s failure to correct false statements during closing arguments violated Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), and constituted prosecutorial misconduct. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Gabriel Dotson, was convicted of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, rape, and incest for which he received an effective sentence of thirty-five years. On appeal he challenges his convictions on the grounds there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdicts, the State made improper statements throughout trial which prejudiced the defendant, the trial court erred in instructing the jury, the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence, and the cumulative effect of the errors at trial prejudiced the verdict. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jerry Edward Lanier, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Tarrants Yvelt Chandler, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief due to (1) numerous instances of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel; and (2) the State’s failure to disclose “exculpatory evidence prior to trial.” Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Miguel Gomez, was convicted of three counts of aggravated assault. The trial court merged Counts Two and Three into Count One and sentenced Defendant to eleven years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his convictions and that his sentence was excessive. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Charles Lee Warner, appeals his jury conviction for first degree murder, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. In this direct appeal, the Defendant alleges the following errors: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, challenging the evidence establishing his identity and premeditation, and alleging that his jailhouse confession was not sufficiently corroborated; (2) that the trial court erred by declaring Robert Strange to be an unavailable witness and admitting his preliminary hearing testimony; and (3) relying on the rules of evidentiary relevance, that the trial court erred (a) by permitting a law enforcement officer to testify “regarding the [D]efendant’s propensity to carry weapons in the past”; (b) by allowing a former employer to testify about murderous threats made by the Defendant to the victim over a year prior to the victim’s death; and (c) by prohibiting defense counsel from eliciting testimony “regarding the potentially violent propensities of others known to the witness in the homeless community.” Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to two children on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support and persistence of conditions. Upon our review, we conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence that the conditions which led to the children’s removal from Mother’s home persisted and that termination of her rights is in the children’s best interest; however, the evidence of abandonment by failure to support is not clear and convincing. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment in part and affirm the termination of her rights.  

This is a divorce case in which the trial court designated the mother as the primary residential parent, awarded her child support and a portion of her attorney’s fees as alimony, and awarded her retroactive child support. The father appealed, arguing the trial court erred in numerous ways. We decline to address the father’s arguments, however, and affirm the trial court’s judgment because the father’s brief does not comply with the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a) or Court of Appeals Rule 6. We grant the mother’s request for frivolous appeal damages pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122.  

The petitioner, Tobias Johnson, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The petitioner contends his sentence for life with parole eligibility at thirty percent is illegal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-501(i)(1), (i)(2)(A). The petitioner bargained for and received a life sentence pursuant to his plea agreement. The judgment of conviction contains a clerical error because “standard 30%” rather than “violent 100%” was checked for “release eligibility.” The petitioner’s concurrent sentences for rape and incest have expired. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court summarily dismissing the motion for failure to state a colorable claim, but remand for correction of the clerical error pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.

Defendant, Michael Shane McCullough, was indicted in February of 2016 by an Obion County grand jury for disorderly conduct, criminal littering, initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine, and promotion of methamphetamine manufacture. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of criminal littering, initiation of process to manufacture methamphetamine, and promotion of methamphetamine manufacture. Defendant appeals from his convictions, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for the methamphetamine-related convictions. Because we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Deon Lamont Cartmell, was convicted of second degree murder for the killing of his wife and sentenced to eighteen years. On direct appeal, his conviction and sentence were affirmed. State v. Deon Lamont Cartmell, No. M2012-01925-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 3056164, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 7, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2014). He then filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, followed by three amended petitions, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and cumulative error. Following a bifurcated hearing, the post-conviction court found that the Petitioner’s claims were without merit, and we agree. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court denying relief.

The pro se Petitioner, Edward Hood, II, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that a letter that he received from his daughter, K.P., constitutes newly discovered evidence of his innocence and that the coram nobis court erred in dismissing his petition without the appointment of counsel or an evidentiary hearing. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

A plaintiff filed a health care liability complaint in 2015 against several physicians and entities that he later non-suited in order to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a). The plaintiff then filed a second complaint against the same defendants, relying on the saving statutes of Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1- 105 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c) to extend his statute of limitations. The plaintiff’s wife joined him as a plaintiff in the second complaint. The defendants filed motions to dismiss, alleging non-compliance with the pre-suit notice requirements and the statute of limitations. The trial court granted all of the defendants’ motions and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint against the physicians. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint against all three of the physicians on statute of limitations grounds. We also affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the wife’s claims against all of the defendants.

The defendant, James Wolford, appeals the order of the trial court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original four-year sentence in confinement. Following our review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defendant violated the terms of his probation and the imposed sentence is proper. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a legal malpractice case. Appellant filed suit against Appellee, who had previously served as Appellant’s attorney in a divorce matter. Appellant alleged that she suffered monetary damages and was convicted of criminal contempt as a result of the negligent legal representation she received from Appellee in her divorce case. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that Appellant’s claims were, among other things, barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel as a result of the sworn statements Appellant made in conjunction with her divorce settlement. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee. We affirm.      

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on grounds of (1) abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; (2) persistence of conditions; (3) substantial noncompliance with permanency plans; and (4) failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody of the child. We reverse the trial court’s ruling with regard to substantial noncompliance with permanency plans, but affirm the remaining grounds, as well as the trial court’s determination that termination is in the child’s best interest. The termination of Mother’s parental rights is therefore affirmed.

The issue on appeal is whether the commencement of a dependency and neglect action in the juvenile court deprived the chancery court of subject matter jurisdiction to rule on a pending motion to modify a parenting plan. Shortly after Father filed his petition to modify the parenting plan in the chancery court, the Department of Children’s Services filed a dependency and neglect petition in the juvenile court. After the juvenile court held a preliminary hearing on the dependency and neglect petition and assumed jurisdiction, the chancery court modified the parents’ child support obligations and awarded the father the federal income tax exemption for the child. Months later, the mother filed a motion to vacate the chancery court’s judgment on the basis it was void ab initio for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The chancery court denied the motion, and this appeal followed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-103 vests juvenile courts with exclusive original jurisdiction over dependency and neglect proceedings and, once a juvenile court has exercised jurisdiction in a dependency and neglect proceeding, its exclusive jurisdiction continues until the case has been dismissed, the custody determination is transferred to another court exercising domestic relations jurisdiction, or a petition for adoption is filed. Because none of the jurisdiction exceptions had occurred prior to the chancery court modifying the parenting plan, the chancery court’s order was void ab initio for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the chancery court’s order modifying the parenting plan is hereby vacated.

Petitioner, Terry Lea Bunch, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief for being filed untimely. Petitioner alleged in his petition that defects in the affidavit of complaint rendered his conviction void. Having reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Douglas McArthur Wilson, was indicted for attempted first degree murder in 2012. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to ten years in incarceration. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant presents a multitude of issues on appeal. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal follows prior appeals in this litigation that has spanned a decade. In this latest appeal, the trial court determined that the motions filed by the administrator ad litem for the estate of the third-party plaintiff should be denied. We affirm.

The Defendant, Patrick Jayson Reeners, pleaded guilty to public intoxication and disorderly conduct and received concurrent thirty day sentences. In a separate case, he pleaded guilty to telephone harassment and received a probation sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. After the entry of his guilty pleas and sentencing, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas “made under life threatening needed medical attention.” The trial court denied the motion after a hearing. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it did not find a “fair and just reason” to allow the Defendant to withdraw his pleas. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In this negligence action that arose from a tractor-trailer accident, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims following the court’s determination that a critical piece of evidence had been destroyed by the plaintiffs, resulting in severe prejudice to the defendant. The court further determined that dismissal was the only equitable remedy for the plaintiffs’ spoliation of evidence. The plaintiffs timely appealed the dismissal of their claims. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Antonio L. Freeman, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of possessing contraband in a penal facility and resulting sentence of ten years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal of his conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A husband and wife were divorced in 2016, and the divorce decree permitted the husband to purchase the parties’ real property, which was in the wife’s name. The parenting plan provided the parties the opportunity to travel domestically or abroad with their minor son. The husband filed a contempt petition against the wife based on her refusal (1) to provide information to his lender that was necessary for him to close on the purchase of the property and (2) to cooperate with him to renew their child’s passport when the husband wanted to travel with the child to Europe. The trial court found the wife in contempt on both grounds and awarded the husband damages. The wife appealed, arguing that she was not willful in refusing to cooperate with the husband’s lender. The evidence showed that the wife believed the husband was trying to refinance her loan and add his name to her deed rather than purchase the property outright. We hold that the trial court erred in finding the wife willfully disobeyed the court’s order that she cooperate with the husband’s lender. We affirm the trial court’s order holding the wife in contempt for failing to cooperate with the husband in renewing the child’s passport.