APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Geoffrey Cale Vermilyea (“Husband”) sued Jessica Lynn Vermilyea (“Wife”) for divorce. After trial, the Chancery Court for Dickson County (“Trial Court”) entered its Final Decree of Divorce on June 13, 2017 (“Final Decree”) declaring the parties divorced, distributing the marital assets, denying Wife’s request to relocate to Canada with the parties’ minor child (“Cale”), denying Wife alimony, and entering a Permanent Parenting Plan with regard to Cale. Wife appeals the Final Decree raising issues regarding the Trial Court’s order denying Wife’s request to relocate to Canada with Cale and denying her an award of alimony. We find and hold that the Trial Court did not err in finding that it was not in Cale’s best interest to relocate to Canada and, therefore, denying Wife’s request to relocate. We further find and hold that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wife alimony. We, therefore, affirm the Final Decree.

A mother’s parental rights were terminated on the ground of abandonment by willfully failing to visit her daughter. Mother appeals, arguing that the petition initiating the proceeding did not include the notice required by Rule 9A of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure; that the record did not contain clear and convincing evidence that she abandoned her child; and that termination was not in the child’s best interest. Upon our review, we conclude that the proof does not clearly and convincingly establish the ground of abandonment by failure to visit. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the petition.

This case stems from an employee benefit board’s decision to change a former employee’s disability pension from “in-line-of-duty” to “medical.” The former employee appealed the board’s decision to the trial court. The trial court reversed the board’s determination on the ground that the board had misapplied the applicable legal standard. Determining that the board relied on the appropriate legal standard and based its decision on substantial and material medical evidence, we reverse the trial court’s decision

This appeal concerns the Tennessee Violence in the Workplace Act. After a citizen was disruptive at several city council meetings, the city filed a petition under the Act, seeking to enjoin the citizen from attending city council meetings and from contacting city officials. The trial court granted an ex parte temporary restraining order and, following an evidentiary hearing, granted an injunction for three years. On its own motion, the court also issued a three-year injunction “separate and apart” from the Act. Because the city failed to meet its burden of proof under the Act and there was no other basis on which to grant injunctive relief, we reverse. 

The Petitioner, Melvin Braison, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and his guilty pleas were therefore unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a personal injury action in which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages incurred in an automobile accident. Although several issues are raised, the principal issues on appeal are whether the trial court erred by ordering the plaintiff to submit to an independent medical examination, and whether the court erred by sanctioning the plaintiff for refusing to submit to the examination by prohibiting her from offering any evidence at trial regarding medical bills or medical records related to future pain and suffering, future loss of enjoyment of life, and/or permanent impairment. The case was tried before a jury with the sanctions in place, and the plaintiff was awarded damages in the amount of $500.00 for her past pain and suffering. This appeal followed. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

The pro se Petitioner, Demond Hughes Gunn, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The Petitioner, Jeffrey Scott, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he challenged his conviction for second degree murder and resulting twenty-five-year sentence. The Petitioner maintains that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Michael James Amble, was indicted by the Loudon County Grand Jury on one count each of DUI; DUI, multiple offenses; refusal of implied consent; driving while license cancelled, suspended, or revoked; possession of drug paraphernalia; speeding; and registration violation. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of DUI and driving on a suspended license, and the jury found him not guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia. Following a bifurcated hearing, the jury found Defendant guilty of second offense DUI. The trial court found that Defendant violated the implied consent law, and the remaining offenses were dismissed on motion of the State. Following a sentencing hearing, Defendant was sentenced to 11 months and 29 days with all but 45 days suspended. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that: 1) the trial court erred by not granting his motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia; and 2) that the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction for DUI. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Norma Barnett, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Madison County Circuit Court. In this appeal, she argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel and that her guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s recusal motion. Following a review of the record and the trial court’s ruling, we apply the de novo standard of review mandated by Supreme Court Rule 10B and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Over eighteen years ago, Defendant, Donald Clark, shot and robbed a man in Shelby County. After conviction, he received a 27-year sentence, as a violent offender. He now appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After careful consideration, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Jonathan Davis, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, and the Maury County Circuit Court summarily denied the motion. On appeal, the Appellant contends that his sentences for his first degree felony murder convictions are illegal because the trial court ordered consecutive sentencing after the judgments of conviction became final and that the sentences for all of his convictions are illegal because the trial court failed to award pretrial jail credits. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of the motion.

The Defendant, Michael John Stitts, was convicted by a Madison County jury of attempted first degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and he received an effective sentence of sixty-one years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements made to police; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the indictment to reflect the proper offense date; (4) he is entitled to reversal based on juror bias; (5) the trial court erred in placing the Defendant in restraints immediately before the jury verdict was read, and (6) the trial court erred in sentencing him as a Range III offender and in imposing partial consecutive sentences. After review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment to reflect the proper sentencing range for the attempted first degree murder conviction.

The Defendant, William Lewis Reynolds, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 in which he challenged his guilty-pled conviction for the sale of cocaine and resulting sentence of twelve years as a Range III, persistent offender, at 60%. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, we remand the judgment to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the convicted offense of sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because we find no evidence of any bias that would require recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiffs accepted an offer of judgment from the defendant company, which included payment of the plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses in an amount to be determined by the trial court. The trial court awarded attorney’s fees and expenses to the plaintiffs in the amount of $56,423.24, expressly determining such amount to be reasonable. The defendant company has appealed. Inasmuch as the trial court failed to consider the factors listed in Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 (“RPC 1.5”) when making its determination regarding a reasonable award of attorney’s fees, we vacate the trial court’s fee award and remand this matter for further proceedings concerning this issue. We accordingly decline to award fees to the plaintiffs on appeal.

In this divorce action, the mother argues that, in making the father the primary residential parent, the trial court did not give adequate weight to the father’s relocation with the children against her wishes at the time of the parties’ separation. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Appellant, Miguel Saenz, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis seeking relief from his previously entered guilty plea. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, and upon application of the ruling of our Supreme Court in Frazier v. State, 495 S.W.3d 246 (Tenn. 2016), we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother appeals from the denial of her motion to recuse the trial court after the trial court, sua sponte, ordered Mother to undergo a mental examination pursuant to Rule 35.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the trial court’s actions in this case do not create the appearance of bias, we affirm. 

The Defendant, James Larry Williams, entered a guilty plea to driving under the influence (DUI), reserving a certified question of law challenging whether there existed sufficient probable cause that a violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-8-123(1) had occurred or reasonable suspicion based upon the totality of the circumstances to justify a traffic stop of the Defendant’s vehicle. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this parental termination case, maternal Grandparents sought termination of both Mother’s and Father’s rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by willful failure to support and (2) abandonment by willful failure to visit.  The trial court found no grounds for termination as to Mother and only one ground—failure to support—as to Father. The trial court however found that it was not in the child’s best interest to terminate Father’s rights.  We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. 

This action involves a claim for compensatory damages for personal injury caused by a police dog. The defendant sought summary judgment, arguing that the victim, an officer acting in the course and scope of his employment, was a participant in the act or conduct that prompted the need for the dog’s services, thereby removing liability pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 44-8-413(b)(1). The court agreed and granted summary judgment. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Kedrick Carwell, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. Within the context of his post-conviction claims, the petitioner attempts to challenge the jury instructions recited at trial, claiming the instructions led to a nonunanimous verdict. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition and conclude the petitioner has waived any challenge to the jury instructions or verdict.

After the Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals granted a special exception permit for a nearby property, Appellant filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Davidson County Circuit Court. The trial court ultimately concluded that the permit was properly issued. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we affirm the decision of the trial court.