APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

As part of a divorce proceeding, the trial court ordered a father to pay child support. Within two months thereafter, the father lost his job as a finance manager for an automotive dealership. The father filed a motion to modify his child support obligation and took a job in another field, making significantly less money. The father claimed that a more lucrative job was not available to him because he only had a high school education. And he did not wish to pursue another job as an automotive dealership finance manager due to the long hours, pressure, and deleterious effect of the job on his health. The mother opposed the motion to modify, claiming that the father was voluntarily underemployed. The trial court agreed. On appeal, the father challenges only the court’s determination that he was voluntarily underemployed. After a review of the record, we affirm. 

The Appellant, Andre Anthony, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this divorce action, the mother argues that, in making the father the primary residential parent, the trial court did not give adequate weight to the father’s relocation with the children against her wishes at the time of the parties’ separation. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Appellant, Miguel Saenz, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis seeking relief from his previously entered guilty plea. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, and upon application of the ruling of our Supreme Court in Frazier v. State, 495 S.W.3d 246 (Tenn. 2016), we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother appeals from the denial of her motion to recuse the trial court after the trial court, sua sponte, ordered Mother to undergo a mental examination pursuant to Rule 35.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the trial court’s actions in this case do not create the appearance of bias, we affirm. 

The Defendant, James Larry Williams, entered a guilty plea to driving under the influence (DUI), reserving a certified question of law challenging whether there existed sufficient probable cause that a violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-8-123(1) had occurred or reasonable suspicion based upon the totality of the circumstances to justify a traffic stop of the Defendant’s vehicle. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this parental termination case, maternal Grandparents sought termination of both Mother’s and Father’s rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by willful failure to support and (2) abandonment by willful failure to visit.  The trial court found no grounds for termination as to Mother and only one ground—failure to support—as to Father. The trial court however found that it was not in the child’s best interest to terminate Father’s rights.  We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. 

This appeal arises from a divorce. Wafa Badawi Hindiyeh (“Wife”) sued Waleed Fawzi Abed (“Husband”) for divorce in the Chancery Court for Rutherford County (“the Trial Court”). After a trial, the Trial Court, inter alia, granted Wife a divorce, entered a permanent parenting plan with respect to the parties’ minor son (“the Child”) awarding Wife 285 days to Husband’s 80, and awarded Wife a judgment for the value of a Cadillac less $2,500 Wife received on the sale of her original vehicle for a total judgment of $13,400. Husband appeals to this Court, arguing, among other things, that the Trial Court found no statutory factors applicable to justify such a paltry award of parenting time to him and that the Cadillac at issue was not even marital property subject to division. We vacate the Trial Court’s judgment with respect to the residential parenting schedule and remand for the Trial Court to award Husband significantly more time with the Child. Finding that the Cadillac was not marital property, we modify the Trial Court’s award of $13,400 to Wife to $2,000 to account for only the sale of Wife’s original vehicle. We otherwise affirm the Trial Court. We, therefore, affirm as modified, in part, and vacate, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court.

This is a divorce case between parties who amassed a great amount of wealth and lived an extravagant lifestyle for many years. There are no minor children involved, and this appeal is limited to the trial court’s identification, classification, valuation, and division of marital property, the trial court’s awards of alimony to Wife, and Husband’s convictions for several counts of criminal contempt. One of the most salient issues raised by Husband on appeal relates to the trial court’s decision to use a financial statement prepared by Husband in 2012 to value several properties in the marital estate rather than the certified appraisals that were prepared in the course of litigation for the purpose of valuing the marital estate. According to Husband, this resulted in the court grossly overvaluing the marital estate. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s identification and classification of marital property as well as the trial court’s findings and sentencing related to Husband’s criminal contempt. We vacate the trial court’s valuation and distribution of the parties’ marital property and awards of alimony. We remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The Petitioner, John Armstrong, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends (1) that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition for being untimely filed; and (2) that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case presents the issue of a seller’s liability for damages caused by an allegedly defective water heater. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant seller concerning the plaintiff’s claims of products liability, strict liability, breach of implied warranty, negligence, and unfair or deceptive trade practices, finding these claims to be barred by the expiration of the ten-year statute of repose applicable to products liability actions. The trial court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the seller regarding the plaintiff’s remaining claim of breach of express warranty. Determining that no material factual disputes existed, the court held that the seller was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the seller had demonstrated that it had fully complied with the warranty on the water heater at issue. The plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend, also requesting a more specific order. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend except that it provided a more definite statement of the basis for its grant of summary judgment in favor of the seller. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This appeal involves an incarcerated inmate’s filing of a petition for writ of certiorari. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the time for filing such a petition had passed. The trial court dismissed the petition as untimely. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Malik Jones-Smith, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. However, we remand the case to the post-conviction court for entry of a corrected judgment form with respect to one of the Petitioner’s convictions.

This is an appeal from an adjudicatory order of the circuit court in a dependency and neglect appeal. Because the order appealed is not a final, appealable judgment, we dismiss the appeal and remand for further proceedings.

The Appellant, Gerald Carter, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim of outrageous conduct/intentional infliction of emotional distress filed against his employer because the plaintiff had previously filed a workers’ compensation claim against the employer, seeking compensation for injuries arising out of the same incident. The plaintiff has appealed the dismissal of his claim. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of dismissal. We decline Appalachian’s request for an award of attorney’s fees, determining that Mr. Byrd’s appeal was not frivolous or taken solely for delay.

The Petitioner, Devaughn Edwards, filed for post-conviction relief from his convictions of facilitation of kidnapping, facilitation of robbery, and facilitation of aggravated burglary, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

This is a termination of parental rights case involving a two-year-old child, Kyle F. (“the Child”). In January 2016, the Sullivan County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) granted temporary legal custody of the Child to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The Child was immediately placed in foster care, where he has remained since that date. DCS subsequently filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the Child’s mother, Debra F. (“Mother”), on September 19, 2016.1 Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that DCS had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had abandoned the Child through conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the welfare of the Child prior to her incarceration. Determining that no statutory ground existed for termination of Mother’s parental rights, the trial court declined to address the best interest of the Child. The guardian ad litem timely filed a notice of appeal. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm

The defendant, Deandrey Peterson, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and possessing a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, claiming that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator. Because the trial court erred by admitting evidence that the defendant had committed crimes other than those for which he was on trial and because the error cannot be classified as harmless, we reverse the defendant’s convictions and remand the case for a new trial.

The Petitioner, Eric Bledsoe, appeals as of right from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he requested DNA analysis pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-303. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition for post-conviction DNA analysis because the evidence was already tested. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

A Carter County Criminal Court Jury found the Appellant, Robert Landon Webster, guilty of three counts of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine, one of which was within a school zone. The trial court sentenced the Appellant to a total effective sentence of fifteen years. On appeal, the Appellant contends that his right to confrontation was violated because the State failed to call a confidential informant as a witness at trial and that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Michael Presson, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends (1) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present an “economic motive” defense and failing to call witnesses at trial to support that defense; (2) that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request a severance for charges that involved two separate victims; (3) that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge certain jurors during voir dire; (4) that trial counsel was ineffective by failing “to call” the Petitioner as a witness at trial; (5) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State’s references to the term “pedophile” and to pornography during its closing argument; (6) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on certain lesser-included offenses and that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request such instructions; (7) that trial counsel “was ineffective for failing to request that the trial court require the State to make an election of offenses” and “by failing to object to the trial court judge’s election of offenses”; and (8) that post-conviction relief is warranted due to cumulative error. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Christopher Joel Hartwell, pleaded guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement in case number C22683 to conspiracy to commit money laundering, a Class C felony, maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances are used, a Class D felony, two counts of possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a Class D felony, two counts of possession with the intent to manufacture a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a Class D felony, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a non-dangerous felony, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-903 (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014), 53-11-401 (2008) (amended 2010), 39-17-417 (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014), 39-17-1307 (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014). The Defendant also pleaded guilty in case number C22684 to the sale or delivery of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a Class D felony. See id. § 39-17-417 (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014). The Defendant pleaded guilty in case number C22685 to the sale or delivery of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a Class D felony. See id. § 39-17-417 (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014). Finally, the Defendant pleaded guilty in case number C23659 to two counts of the delivery of a controlled substance in a drug-free school zone, a Class C felony. See id. § 39-17-417 (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014). After the appropriate merger of the offenses, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to an effective five-year sentence of which three years were to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying judicial diversion, (2) allowing confidential informants to testify at the sentencing hearing, and (3) not requiring the State to produce discovery materials related to the confidential informants. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Julie Christine Ottmer, pled nolo contendere to simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor, and received an agreed upon sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served on probation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-418. Thereafter, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw her nolo contendere plea. The trial court denied the motion, finding that there was no manifest injustice to support withdrawal of the plea. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion because she “misunderstood the terms of her plea.” Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellants, an estate and its co-executors, appeal from the trial court’s order disqualifying their counsel due to a purported conflict of interest. Because the appellants have appealed from a non-final order, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.