APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a breach of contract action in which the plaintiff employer filed suit against its employee, claiming that he was liable for balances on his commission and sales accounts and for breach of loyalty pursuant to the terms of the employment agreement. Following a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the employee and ordered the employer to direct the redemption of his stock held in the parent company. We reverse, in part, and hold that the parent company is not obligated to redeem the stock and that the employer is entitled to $15,000 in damages for unearned compensation as a result of the employee’s breach of loyalty. The court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects. We remand for the collection of attorney fees and costs.   

The Defendant, Andrew Young Kim, pled guilty to six counts of burglary, seven counts of theft of property in varying amounts, and one count of vandalism. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of fourteen years’ incarceration. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court improperly sentenced him to continuous confinement for a non-violent property offense and erred in setting the length of his sentences, in denying all forms of alternative sentencing, and in imposing partially consecutive sentences. Upon a thorough review of the record below and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s order as to the length of the Defendant’s sentences, the denial of any alternative sentence, and the partial consecutive sentence alignment, but reverse the trial court’s order of continuous confinement for the Defendant’s Class E felony conviction for theft of property (Count 14), an enumerated non-violent property offense in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-122(c)(11). Upon our de novo review of Count 14, we order that the Defendant’s two-year sentence on that count be served on supervised probation with the imposition of $1000 fine. Moreover, for reasons stated herein, Counts 7 through 10 are remanded for correction of clerical errors in the judgment forms. In all other respects, the judgments are affirmed.

After Appellant’s son violated an order of protection entered against him, Appellant sought relief from the trial court. Although the trial court ruled on some of the issues raised by Appellant, not all of her claims were adjudicated. We therefore dismiss the appeal due to the absence of a final judgment.

This appeal involves a request for access to examine records under Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-505, in which the plaintiff sought the release of civil forfeiture documents from the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security. The trial court held that the plaintiff did not show sufficient cause for release of the sought-after documents in a non-redacted format. Upon our previous review, we found the issue to be moot owing to the legislative enactment of 2016 Tenn. Pub. Acts, chapter 722, § 5. Upon the plaintiff’s appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case for our reconsideration in light of the legislative enactment of 2017 Tenn. Pub. Acts, chapter 113, § 1, which amended the Tennessee Public Records Act. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of trial court.

Defendants, Marcus K. Williams and Corey Zimberlist Rutland, Jr., were indicted for aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery and aggravated assault. Defendant Williams was also indicted for aggravated burglary. After a jury trial, Defendants Williams and Rutland were convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault, and Defendant Williams was convicted of aggravated burglary. At a sentencing hearing, Defendants Williams and Rutland received identical sentences of eleven years for aggravated robbery and five years for aggravated assault. Defendant Williams received a five year sentence for aggravated burglary. On appeal, Defendant Williams challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his aggravated robbery charge. Defendant Rutland argues that the trial court improperly excluded the content of a phone call between Defendant Rutland and Defendant Williams, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions under a theory of criminal responsibility, and that his sentence is disproportionate and excessive. Finding that the only error by the trial court was harmless, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Leroy Collins, pled guilty to three counts of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and one count of Class C felony reckless endangerment, all committed during one criminal episode. The offenses involved Defendant shooting three people and shooting into a house occupied by two other people. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement with the State, the sentence for each conviction of reckless aggravated assault is the minimum sentence of two years, and the sentence for the reckless endangerment conviction is the minimum sentence of three years. The State further agreed that the sentences would be served concurrently with each other, for an effective sentence of three years for four felony convictions committed with a handgun involving three victims being shot. However, the State opposed Defendant’s request for judicial diversion or probation for the effective three-year sentence. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied both requests for alternative sentencing and ordered Defendant to serve the entire sentence by incarceration. Defendant appeals from the trial court’s ruling. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Wendell Guinn, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends (1) that his constitutional rights were violated by prosecutorial misconduct during the jury voir dire and the State’s closing arguments; (2) that the trial court committed several errors in the jury instructions; and (3) that he received ineffective assistance from his trial and appellate counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this divorce action initiated by Father, the chancery court adjudicated the divorce and entered a parenting plan proposed by Father, naming him as primary residential parent and establishing a residential parenting schedule for the parties’ child; Mother had previously initiated a custody proceeding in Scotland. Mother moved to dismiss the Tennessee proceeding, contending that the Tennessee court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the divorce because the parties we not domiciled in Tennessee and did not have jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act to adjudicate the child custody matters. Upon Mother’s appeal, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over the divorce but, due to the pendency of the proceeding in Scotland, did not have jurisdiction over the custody matters. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of divorce to Father, vacate the parenting plan and child support provisions of the final decree, and remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.  

The Defendant, Michael Edward Roberts, was indicted on one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; one count of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; seven counts of rape, a Class B felony; and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-102, -13-304, -13-503, -14-403. The State ultimately dismissed five of the rape charges. Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted the Defendant of aggravated assault and the lesser-included offenses of aggravated criminal trespass of a habitation, a Class A misdemeanor, and two counts of assault, a Class B misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-301(a)(3), -14-406. The trial court acquitted the Defendant of the aggravated kidnapping charge. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of three years to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and (2) that the trial court erred in admitting fresh complaint evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, James Williams, was convicted by a jury of one count of driving under the influence (DUI) per se, one count of DUI, and one count of reckless driving. The trial court merged the DUI per se conviction with the DUI conviction and imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served in the county workhouse. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, which challenged “the legality of the traffic stop” resulting in the Defendant’s arrest. Following our review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A bookkeeper for two companies was terminated after his employers learned that he had a conviction for money laundering and mail fraud arising out of his previous employment. The employee filed suit, alleging that he was terminated because of his age, in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act, and his disability, in violation of the Tennessee Disability Act. The employers moved for summary judgment, asserting that the employee was terminated for poor performance and for not disclosing the prior conviction, that these grounds constituted legitimate, nondiscriminatory grounds for termination, and that the employee could not demonstrate that these grounds were a pretext for unlawful discrimination. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employers, and the employee appeals. Finding that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the asserted reasons for Plaintiff’s termination are pretextual, we reverse the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

In this garnishment case, a judgment creditor garnished funds from the joint bank account of a non-debtor depositor and a debtor. The trial court allowed the garnished funds to be tendered to the judgment creditor because the account agreement showed that the joint account was held with rights of survivorship. Tennessee Code Annotated section 45-2- 703(a), however, allows the non-debtor depositor to prove his rights in the funds held in the joint account. Because the non-debtor depositor provided sufficient evidence to prove his rights to the funds in the joint account, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.

Marcus T. Johnson, the Petitioner, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“the Petition”) claiming that he was being illegally restrained of his liberty because the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole (“the Parole Board”) violated his due process rights by failing to timely serve him with a parole violation warrant and failing to conduct a preliminary hearing within fourteen days of the service of the warrant. The State moved to dismiss the Petition for failure to state a cognizable claim. The habeas corpus court granted the State’s motion and summarily dismissed the Petition. We affirm.

Mother appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights to two children on the grounds of (1) persistence of conditions, (2) substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan, and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the children. She further challenges the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

The Petitioner, Jay Dee Garrity, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of three counts of aggravated sexual battery and resulting effective forty-eight-year sentence to be served at 100%. On appeal, he contends that he is entitled to a new trial because trial counsel was presumptively ineffective under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). In the alternative, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel under the usual Strickland standard. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel under Strickland. Therefore, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed, the judgments of conviction are vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Former county employee appeals the dismissal of his claims against the county and the county mayor related to the termination of his employment. In his complaint, the employee raised claims of violations of due process, indemnification, restitution, negligence, invasion of privacy, workplace harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and misrepresentation. After the county and county mayor filed a motion to dismiss, the trial court ruled that it would decide the motion without the benefit of a hearing. The trial court eventually dismissed all the claims; some claims, however, were dismissed on the basis of summary judgment after the trial court considered a county personnel manual. We conclude that the trial court was entitled to consider the personnel manual as part of the pleadings for purposes of the motion to dismiss under Rule 10.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Consequently, we affirm the dismissal of all claims raised by the employee under the motion to dismiss standard, with the exception of the employee’s claim against the county mayor for false light invasion of privacy. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

This appeal arises from a divorce; the primary issues on appeal pertain to the permanent parenting plan. During the pendency of the divorce and following a successful mediation, the parties entered into a Marital Dissolution Agreement and a Permanent Parenting Plan. Six weeks later, Father filed a notice of withdrawal of his consent to the mediated parenting plan. Subsequently, an order was entered approving the Marital Dissolution Agreement and declaring the parties divorced, reserving the issue of a permanent parenting plan for trial. Following the trial, the court established a permanent parenting plan similar to the mediated plan with four modifications. When Mother’s counsel submitted the final order for the court’s approval, it contained three alternatives for the “right-of-first-refusal” provision, which was one of the four modifications. The trial court approved one of the “right-of-first-refusal” alternatives and entered the final order. Father appeals, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in its formulation of the parenting plan and in awarding Mother her attorney’s fees. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. We also award Mother the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees she incurred on appeal.

This appeal involves a suit filed in the Tennessee Claims Commission against the State of Tennessee. The claimant alleged that he was seized without a warrant or probable cause, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. The State sought dismissal, alleging that the Claims Commission did not have the requisite jurisdiction to hear such a claim. The Claims Commissioner agreed and dismissed the claim. The claimant appeals. We affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on the minor child, Authur R. (“the Child”), of Lola R. (“Mother”) and Authur D. (“Father”). The Child was placed in protective custody on June 13, 2013, after Mother was discovered to be under the influence of illegal drugs while the Child was in her custody. The Hamilton County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) adjudicated the Child dependent and neglected on November 26, 2013. On November 25, 2015, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both Mother and Father. An amended petition to terminate was subsequently filed on May 6, 2016. DCS alleged as a basis for termination against both parents the statutory grounds of (1) abandonment by willful failure to visit, (2) abandonment by willful failure to support, (3) abandonment by an incarcerated parent, and (4) substantial noncompliance with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plans. Concerning Mother only, DCS also alleged the additional statutory grounds of (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and (2) persistence of the conditions leading to removal of the Child. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition upon its determination by clear and convincing evidence that DCS had proven as to both parents the statutory grounds of abandonment by an incarcerated parent and substantial noncompliance with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plan. With regard to Mother only, the trial court determined that DCS had also proven by clear and convincing evidence the ground of persistence of the conditions leading to the Child’s removal. The trial court further determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Mother and Father have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Following a trial, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Ugenio Dejesus Ruby-Ruiz, of three counts of sexual exploitation of a minor; five counts of aggravated sexual battery; nine counts of rape of a child; one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor; and two counts of rape, for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of 121 years in the Department of Correction. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied following a hearing. Upon review, we conclude that the pro se petition was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations applicable to post-conviction proceedings. However, because we are unable to determine from the record whether due process requires the tolling of the statute of limitations, we vacate the post-conviction court’s order and remand the case to the post-conviction court for a determination of whether due process tolling applies.

The defendant, Lee Alan Sprague, appeals his Roane County Criminal Court jury convictions of reckless driving and driving on a suspended license, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new preliminary hearing. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, Samuel Huffine, pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication, reckless aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, driving under the influence of an intoxicant, driving under the influence of an intoxicant per se, driving left of center, and speeding, for an effective sentence of nine years, with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentence. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied an alternative sentence. We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This appeal involves the attempt of Converging Capital, LLC, to collect an alleged credit card debt of Michael Matthews. Converging Capital alleged that it owned the debt as a result of a sale of certain accounts receivable from Pilot Receivables Management, LLC, which had earlier bought the debt from Citibank, the issuer of Matthews’s alleged MasterCard account. During the trial, Converging Capital presented the testimony of its records administrator. Matthews objected to the introduction of the bills of sale and assignment, and several credit card statements, on hearsay grounds. He also argued that Converging Capital failed to establish that his debt, if any, was included in the sales of the accounts receivable. The trial court overruled these objections and entered judgment against Matthews in the amount of the alleged debt, $55,684.88. We find that Converging Capital failed to meet its burden of proving that it owned the debt. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss Converging Capital’s complaint with prejudice. Costs are assessed against Converging Capital. 

The Petitioner, Tracy Lebron Vick, pleaded guilty to second degree murder and received a forty-year sentence. Nineteen years after his sentencing, he filed a petition for postconviction DNA analysis. The post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. 

Pro se Petitioner, Ladarius L. Reffegee, appeals from the Trousdale County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that his judgments of conviction and sentences are void because an arrest warrant was not issued prior to his arrest, divesting the court of jurisdiction to sentence and convict him. The State asserts that the Petitioner failed to show that his judgments were void. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.