APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A jury convicted the Defendant, Dewayne Jones, of rape of a child, incest, and aggravated sexual battery for crimes committed against his daughter, and he was sentenced to an effective sentence of thirty-five years. The Defendant appeals, asserting (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions; (2) that the trial court committed error in questioning a witness; (3) that the trial court erred in failing to merge the convictions; (4) that the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentences; (5) that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; and (6) that he is entitled to relief under a theory of cumulative error. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for correction of a judgment form to reflect the proper statutory provision for the conviction offense.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Corey Jones, of aggravated kidnapping, robbery, aggravated burglary, and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more. The trial court imposed an effective nineteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in requiring that the Defendant wear physical restraints at trial and that the trial court made improper comments in the presence of the jury regarding the credibility of the State’s witnesses. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. We remand for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting a three-year sentence for the theft conviction.

The Petitioner, John Ashley Snider, pleaded guilty to six drug-related charges in exchange for an effective sentence of ten years of Community Corrections, after the service of eleven months and twenty-nine days. At the time of the plea, he reserved a certified question for appeal regarding law enforcement officers’ warrantless entry into his home and the seizure of his person. This court dismissed the appeal, holding that the certified question was not dispositive of the case. State v. John Ashley Snider, No. W2014-01848-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 5014605, at *3-4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Aug. 25, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2015). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court held a hearing, after which it denied the petition. On appeal, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Perry Lewis Sisco, the Defendant, was convicted by a jury of one count of rape of a child and four counts of rape and was sentenced to twenty-five years for rape of a child and to twelve years on each of the rape convictions. The four twelve-year sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to the twenty-five-year sentence, for a total effective sentence of thirty-seven years. On appeal, the Defendant claims that: (1) the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress his statement; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for the recusal of the 13th Judicial District Attorney General and his staff; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing; and (4) there was insufficient evidence to sustain the convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Trial counsel pursued an appeal following a guilty plea by Petitioner, wherein trial counsel’s work resulted in Petitioner’s appeal being dismissed for a procedural reason. The procedural reason for dismissal of the appeal was that the certified question of law was not dispositive of the case.

Defendant, Lesandru Deniesh Webster, was convicted of aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping. She received an effective sentence of thirty-five years and six months. On appeal, Defendant argues that she was denied her right to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community and that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. After review, we hold that Defendant is not entitled to relief. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Tipton County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Bryan Austin DeMeza, on charges of aggravated child neglect, first degree felony murder, and three counts of aggravated child abuse. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement, which the trial court denied. The jury convicted the Defendant as charged and sentenced him to life for the first degree murder conviction. At a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the Defendant’s convictions for three counts of aggravated child abuse into his conviction for aggravated child neglect and sentenced the Defendant to twenty years to be served concurrently with his life sentence.The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion for new trial. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements because he was subject to custodial interrogations without being informed of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); (2) the trial court erred in admitting extrinsic evidence of the Defendant’s prior false statements under Tennessee Rules of Evidence 401 and 608(b); and (3) the evidence was insufficient for a rational juror to have found the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The State argues that the trial court erred in merging the Defendant’s three aggravated child abuse convictions into his aggravated child neglect conviction. After a thorough review of the evidence and applicable case law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions for felony murder and three counts of aggravated child abuse. Because the evidence at trial was insufficient for a rational juror to have found the Defendant guilty of aggravated child neglect beyond a reasonable doubt but was sufficient for a finding of guilt of child neglect, we reduce the Defendant’s aggravated child neglect conviction to child neglect and remand for sentencing on the child neglect conviction. We also conclude that the trial court erred in merging the three aggravated child abuse convictions into the aggravated child neglect conviction and remand for sentencing on the Defendant’s three aggravated child abuse convictions.

This appeal concerns an effort to re-assert causes of action under the Savings Statute. In July 2006, David Jones (“Plaintiff”) filed an action in the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). On February 12, 2016, Plaintiff took a voluntary non-suit. On February 2, 2017, Plaintiff filed a purported complaint (“the February 2 Document”) attempting to re-assert his original claims, which featured his typewritten name rather than his handwritten signature. Victor Hazelwood and Advantage Title & Escrow, Inc. (“Defendants”) filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. Plaintiff appealed. We hold that Plaintiff’s typewritten name qualified as his signature and that his filing, while quite deficient as a piece of legal writing, was not so deficient as to render it not a complaint in the first place. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court.

James Harrison sustained a compensable injury to his right shoulder while employed by General Motors, LLC (“GM”). He filed a workers’ compensation claim contending he was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the injury. The Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims found he was not permanently and totally disabled and awarded permanent partial disability benefits in accordance with the statutory scheme. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(3)(A) & (B) (2014 & 2017 Supp.) Mr. Harrison appeals contending the evidence preponderates against the finding he is not totally disabled. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm.

Defendant, Antwuan Matias Gordon, entered an open guilty plea to one count of driving a motor vehicle after having been declared a habitual motor vehicle offender, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-616. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve four years in incarceration. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying an alternative sentence. After a review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, James Allen, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2013 Washington County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree murder and possession of a firearm with intent to employ it during the commission of first degree murder, for which he received a life sentence. In this appeal, the petitioner contends only that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Benjamin Tate Brown, was indicted for driving under the influence (DUI), driving while his blood alcohol concentration was .08% or more (DUI per se); and DUI, second offense. Following a bench trial, the Defendant was found guilty of DUI, second offense, and the remaining charges were dismissed. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in not suppressing the evidence because the officer lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle and in finding the offense was a second offense because his convictions were more than ten years apart. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

James Green (“Employee”) alleged that he sustained a compensable injury in the course of his employment with Kellogg Companies (“Employer”). After a compensation hearing, the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims found that Employee did not sustain his burden of proof and dismissed the claim. Employee has appealed from that decision. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.

In 2016, the Defendant, Timothy Mark Hartsfield, entered a best interest plea to possession of methamphetamine, possession of synthetic marijuana, and unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The Defendant reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) as to whether the search of the Defendant’s residence was valid based on statements made by the investigating officer in the search warrant application. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to ten years of incarceration. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

At issue in this personal injury action is whether the trial court erred by striking the defendant’s affirmative defense that an unknown “John Doe” driver of an Averitt Express truck was comparatively at fault for the plaintiff’s injuries. Relying on Brown v. Wal- Mart Discount Cities, 12 S.W.3d 785 (Tenn. 2000) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119, the trial court struck the affirmative defense as to John Doe and Averitt Express upon the finding that the defendant failed to sufficiently identify John Doe so that the plaintiff may serve process on John Doe. We have determined the trial court’s discretionary decision to strike the affirmative defense of comparative fault as to John Doe and Averitt Express was premature because the defendant was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to engage in pre-trial discovery to endeavor as to the identity of John Doe in sufficient detail for the plaintiff to serve process on John Doe. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Terry Sanders, the Movant, filed a “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence” pursuant Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure claiming that his sentence was illegal because the State failed to comply with the ten-day notice requirement of intent to seek enhanced punishment, the State intentionally filed an improper notice to interfere with the Movant’s due process rights, and the trial court erred in calculating his prior felony convictions and sentencing him as a career offender. The trial court found that the Movant failed to state a colorable claim and summarily dismissed the motion. We affirm.

The defendant, Christopher M. Mullins, appeals the revocation of the six-year probationary sentence imposed for his 2013 conviction of manufacturing .5 grams or more of methamphetamine, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Howard Melton, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction of sexual exploitation of a minor, claiming that the trial court erred by improperly admitting certain evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Roger Terry Johnson, is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

In this attorney disciplinary appeal, upon petition by the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility, this Court ordered the temporary suspension of the attorney from the practice of law based on the threat of substantial harm he posed to the public. For a time, the attorney was placed on disability status; later he was reinstated to suspended status. Subsequently, after an evidentiary hearing, a hearing panel found multiple acts of professional misconduct, including knowing conversion of client funds with substantial injury to clients, submitting false testimony and falsified documents in court proceedings, engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, violating Supreme Court orders, and defrauding clients. The hearing panel determined that the attorney should be disbarred. On appeal to the chancery court, the attorney argued inter alia that the disbarment should be made retroactive to the date of his temporary suspension. The chancery court affirmed the decision of the hearing panel. On appeal to this Court, the attorney does not question the disbarment but argues that it would be arbitrary and capricious not to make his disbarment retroactive to the date of his temporary suspension, in order to advance the date on which he may apply for reinstatement of his law license. We disagree. In contrast to suspension, which contemplates that the lawyer will return to law practice, disbarment is not a temporary status. Disbarment is a termination of the individual’s license to practice law in Tennessee. Therefore, we decline to make the effective date of the attorney’s disbarment retroactive to the date of his temporary suspension. Accordingly, we affirm.

This is an appeal from attorney disciplinary proceedings based on the attorney’s knowing conversion of client funds. In this case, disputed insurance funds were placed in the attorney’s trust account pending resolution of the dispute. Shortly after the disputed insurance funds were deposited, the attorney began to comingle funds in her trust account and use the insurance proceeds for her own purposes. At about the time the dispute over the insurance funds was resolved, the attorney moved out of state. In response to her client’s repeated inquiries about disbursement of the client’s share of the funds, the attorney stalled, made misrepresentations, and finally stopped communicating with the client altogether. After the client filed a complaint with the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility against the attorney, the hearing panel found violations of RPC 1.4, RPC 1.15(a) and (d) and RPC 8.4, which included the knowing conversion of client funds and the failure to communicate. The hearing panel found five aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances. It suspended the attorney’s Tennessee law license for eighteen months, two months of which were to be served on active suspension. After the Board appealed, the chancery court held that the hearing panel’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and that disbarment was the only appropriate sanction. The attorney now appeals to this Court, arguing that disbarment is not warranted. In the alternative, the attorney argues that the disbarment should be made retroactive to the date of her original temporary suspension. Under the circumstances of this case, we affirm the chancery court and disbar the attorney from the practice of law in Tennessee, and we decline to make the disbarment retroactive.

The Defendant, Matthew George Vogel, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s revocation of probation for his Range I, eight-year sentence for possession with the intent to sell methamphetamine, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2014). The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this appeal, a father challenges the trial court’s award of equal parenting time to the child’s mother. The father contends that he should be awarded more parenting time because the majority of the statutory best interest factors weigh in his favor and he provides the child more stability. We have reviewed the record and find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding equal parenting time to the parties. 

The Defendant, Duran Maszae Lee, was convicted by an Anderson County Criminal Court jury of possession with the intent to sell or to deliver more than 0.5 gram of cocaine, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417(a)(4) (2010) (amended 2012, 2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to sixteen years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) that the indictment is duplicitous, and (3) the trial court erred by failing to exclude his pretrial statements to the police. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the dismissal of a petition for writ of certiorari to challenge two administrative decisions by the Planning Commission of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee. The petition was dismissed pursuant to a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(1) motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The challenge to the first decision was dismissed because the statutory sixty-day period had run from the date the minutes approving the challenged decision had been entered. The challenge to the second decision, the Planning Commission’s decision to approve the final site plan, was deemed untimely because the challenge to a site plan must be filed within sixty days of the entry of the minutes approving the master development plan, not the final site plan, and the statutory period had run. Finding no error, we affirm.