APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Melvin L. Horne, appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it relied on a note on the court file from the original guilty plea hearing.  The State responds that the note is not properly included in the record, that Defendant waived consideration of the issue by failing to object during the hearing, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  Upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Julia Sanford, was indicted for failure to maintain her lane, violation of the financial responsibility law, driving under the influence, and driving under the influence per se with a blood alcohol content of .20 or higher. The Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the traffic stop of her vehicle. The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion, and the Defendant pleaded guilty to driving under the influence and reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) as to whether the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle by law enforcement was lawful. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Jewell Wayne Smith, Jr., appeals from the Robertson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2013 best interest guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter, for which he is serving a thirteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that (1) his guilty plea was involuntary and (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Jeffrey Henry, pled guilty on January 12, 2015, to three counts of aggravated sexual battery and received an effective twenty-year sentence. Subsequently, on September 22, 2016, he filed an untimely petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging as newly discovered evidence that the victim was taking medication for oppositional defiant disorder, which, he believed, raised questions as to whether her responses were true or, simply, impulsive responses. Not knowing the victim was taking this medication meant that the Petitioner’s pleas of guilty were unknowing and involuntary, according to his argument. Additionally, he asserts that the decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Frazier v. State, 495 S.W.3d 246 (Tenn. 2016), violates his right to due process, which, in his view, tolls the one-year statute of limitations for filing his claim. The coram nobis court dismissed the petition, finding that, pursuant to the holding in Frazier, the relief the Petitioner sought was not available because he had entered pleas of guilty. Further, the coram nobis court determined that the Petitioner had been aware that the victim was undergoing “some possible mental health treatment.” Accordingly, the coram nobis court denied relief, and we affirm that determination pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Defendant, John David Smartt, was indicted for five counts of rape of a child, (Counts 1, 2, 3, 6, and 9); one count of rape (Count 12); three counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a child, (Counts 4, 7, and 10); and three counts of aggravated sexual exploitation of a child (Counts 5, 8, and 11). Following a second jury trial, after the first trial ended in a mistrial, Defendant was convicted as charged on all twelve counts. The trial court imposed and effective sentence of 153 years' incarceration. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that: 1) the trial court erred by allowing testimony regarding a recorded phone call by the victim to Defendant; 2) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence Defendant's wife's journal; 3) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant's convictions; 4) this court should overturn prior case law, so that the testimony of a victim regarding the content of sexually explicit material must be corroborated; and 5) his sentence is excessive. Having reviewed the entire record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Richard Crawford, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of especially aggravated robbery, attempted especially aggravated kidnapping, attempted second degree murder, and employing a firearm during the attempted commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by: (1) determining that alleged prior bad acts of the victim and another witness were inadmissible for impeachment purposes; and (2) preventing the Defendant from subpoenaing the victim to testify a second time about additional prior inconsistent statements. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of Appellants’ motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. In In re Estate of Morris, No. M2014-00874-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 557970, (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 15, 2015) (Morris I), this Court held that Decedent’s will was invalid for failing to comply with the statutory formalities for executing a will. Following the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, the parties entered into an agreed order declaring the will invalid and agreeing to administer the Decedent’s estate as an intestate estate. After our decision in Morris I and entry of the agreed order, the legislature amended Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-1-104 to validate wills executed in the manner of the will at issue here. Relying on this amendment, Proponents of the will filed a Rule 60.02 motion asserting that "it is no longer equitable that the [agreed final judgment] should have prospective effect and relief from the operation is justified.” The trial court denied Rule 60.02 relief and proponents of the will appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.  

The Defendant, Eric Dewayne Finley, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s revocation of his probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by reinstating a sentence of full confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se Petitioner, Quinton Albert Cage, appeals the denial of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief.  Following our review, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements to seek discretionary review of a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings.   

Petitioner, Jason Lee Holley, entered a guilty plea to one count of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell in exchange for the dismissal of other charges. Petitioner received a twelve-year sentence as a Range II offender and was ordered to serve one year of the sentence day-for-day prior to being released to community corrections for the balance of the sentence. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the basis that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing. Because Petitioner failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

We granted this appeal by the State of Tennessee to consider whether the trial court erred by allowing the jury in this case to deliberate late into the night and early morning on the last day of trial before convicting the defendant of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the defendant relief on this issue, reasoning that absent a showing of unusual circumstances, late-night trial proceedings should be avoided and that such circumstances were not presented in this case. We accepted this appeal to examine this issue and clarify the applicable standard of review on appeal. Following our review, we conclude that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in concluding that the trial court’s conducting late-night trial proceedings requires reversal of the defendant’s convictions. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.  

This is an appeal from an order granting a motion filed pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The order on appeal vacated and set aside the Final Decree of Divorce, Permanent Parenting Plan and Marital Dissolution Agreement previously entered by the Trial Court in the proceedings below. The appellee has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal arguing that the lack of a final judgment deprives this Court of jurisdiction. We agree and grant the motion to dismiss.

I concur only in the result in this case. The defendant is not entitled to a new trial based on waiver and the absence of plain error. The majority errs by proceeding further and establishing the appellate standard of review regarding late-night court proceedings. By addressing the appellate standard of review under the guise of a plain error analysis, the majority overreaches and violates longstanding, conservative prohibitions on issuing advisory opinions. 

The Defendant, Brandon Lee Clymer, was convicted of rape of a child by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury. He is serving a twenty-six-year, Range II sentence. On appeal, he contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the victim’s forensic interview, (3) the trial court erred in admitting the Defendant’s pretrial statement without redacting opinions expressed by police officers, (4) the trial court erred in overruling the Defendant’s objection to the State’s rebuttal closing argument, (5) he is entitled to a new trial due to cumulative trial error, and (6) the trial court imposed an unconstitutional and excessive sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the trial court’s order of disclosure of certain public records over the objection of the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance and the corresponding denial of attorney fees for failure to disclose the said records. We affirm.  

The Defendant, Charles Timothy Krauss, alias, pled guilty to two counts of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000 and received a total effective sentence of ten years as a Range III, persistent offender. He applied for but was denied probation. Additionally, the trial court denied his request for pretrial jail credits for the time he had spent in confinement in Mississippi. He filed a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 motion requesting jail credits for the period from January 9, 2013, to February 9, 2016. According to the Defendant, he was entitled to the credits because he had requested, pursuant to the Interstate Compact on Detainers, that he be transferred to Tennessee to answer to the Knox County charges. The trial court denied the motion, and we affirm that denial.

The Petitioner, Lavely L. Brown, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court denying the petition.

This is a divorce case. Appellant/Husband appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment, his motion to vacate the pendente lite award, the division of marital property, and the award of alimony. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

This appeal concerns an employment-related restrictive covenant. Eric Manchir (“Manchir”) worked as a sales manager for ADP, LLC (“ADP”), a company that deals in human resources and business outsourcing matters. As a prerequisite to obtaining restricted stock options from ADP, Manchir consented to a restrictive covenant agreement (“the Agreement”). The Agreement contained, among other things, a non-competition clause extending to twelve months after Manchir left ADP. New Jersey law governs the Agreement. Manchir later resigned from ADP and went to work for an ADP competitor, Paycor, Inc. (“Paycor”). ADP sued Manchir in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) for breach of contract and sought specific enforcement of the Agreement. ADP filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. The Trial Court also awarded ADP, pursuant to a provision in the Agreement, attorney’s fees and costs. Manchir appeals. We hold, inter alia, that the Agreement is reasonable and enforceable under New Jersey law, that Manchir breached the Agreement, and that specific performance is an appropriate remedy. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This appeal is before the court on remand from the Supreme Court for our consideration of two issues that were not resolved by the Supreme Court in Beard v. Branson, No. M2014-01770-SC-R11-CV, __ S.W.3d __, 2017 WL 3725519 (Tenn. Aug. 30, 2017). This is a medical malpractice, wrongful death action in which Plaintiff seeks to hold Trinity Hospital, LLC (“Trinity”) and James William Branson, M.D. (“Dr. Branson”), liable for the wrongful death of Ruth Hartley on September 29, 2004. Plaintiff alleged that Mrs. Hartley died because of delay in treatment of a bowel perforation she developed as a complication of colon surgery performed by Dr. Branson. In a partial summary judgment ruling, the trial court determined that a non-party, Stanley Anderson, M.D. (“Dr. Anderson”), the radiologist with whom Trinity contracted to provide services to its patients, was an apparent agent of Trinity and that Trinity was vicariously liable for any negligent acts or omissions of Dr. Anderson. Following a trial, the jury found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded damages in the amount of $750,000.00, allocating 50% of the fault for Mrs. Hartley’s death to Trinity, 10% to Dr. Anderson, and 40% to Dr. Branson. The two issues we must consider are: (1) whether the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment to Plaintiff by finding that Dr. Anderson was the apparent agent of Trinity; and (2) whether the trial court erred in assessing discretionary costs in the amount of $68,945.85 against Trinity. Finding no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Taris C. Frazier, was convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, Class A felonies; three counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies; resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor; and criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor. He was sentenced to an effective term of seventy-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to his sentence in another case. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence convicting him of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a dependent and neglect action in which the mother of three minor children appeals the circuit court’s finding that her children were subjected to severe abuse and that she “either committed the severe abuse herself, or knowingly failed to protect her four month old infant from the severe abuse that led to his death.” Mother contends the circuit court erred by allowing three grandparents who intervened in the juvenile court proceedings to fully participate as parties in the circuit court proceedings. She further contends the circuit court failed to conduct a true de novo hearing following her appeal from the juvenile court, and that the circuit court erred by admitting the transcripts from the juvenile court hearings into evidence. We affirm the trial court in all respects but one. We find the evidence insufficient to clearly and convincingly establish that Mother committed the severe abuse herself; however, we affirm the circuit court’s ruling that Mother committed severe child abuse by knowingly failing to protect Hunter from the severe abuse that led to his death.

The Petitioner, Charles D. Belk, appeals the Obion County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of introducing a controlled substance into a penal institution, a Class C felony; Class C felony unlawful possession of a weapon; Class D felony unlawful possession of a weapon; possessing marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, a Class E felony; and simple possession, a Class A misdemeanor, and resulting effective sentence of twelve years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The partial guardian of the child appeals the trial court’s order assessing the totality of the guardian ad litem’s fees to it following the denial of the partial guardian’s termination of parental rights petition. Because guardian ad litem’s fees may be assessed against parties pursuant to Rules 17.03 and 54.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure in parental termination proceedings, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Ray W. Buck (“Plaintiff”) appeals the January 4, 2017 order of the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) granting summary judgment to Accurate C & S Services, Inc. (“Accurate”) and R&R Properties of Tennessee, LLC (“R&R”) in this suit for premises liability. We find and hold that the defendants made properly supported motions for summary judgment and that Plaintiff failed to respond with genuine disputed issues of material fact showing that a rational trier of fact could find in his favor. We, therefore, affirm the grant of summary judgment.