APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Christopher Wilson, filed a Rule 9 interlocutory appeal seeking our review of the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of his blood alcohol test based upon a violation of Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and found that a “good faith exception” to the Defendant’s forced blood draw existed and denied the Defendant’s motion. The Defendant filed an application for an interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted. On appeal, the Defendant contended that the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress based upon a “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule. After review, we concluded that the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress because, at that time, there was not a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. State v. Christopher Wilson, W2015-00699-CCA-R9-CD, 2016 WL 1627145, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, April 21, 2016). On November 22, 2016, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted Defendant’s application for permission to appeal and remanded the case to this court for reconsideration in light of the supreme court’s recent opinion in State v. Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d 283 (Tenn. 2016). Upon reconsideration in light of Reynolds, we conclude that the officer acted with reasonable good-faith reliance on binding precedent in effect at the time. Accordingly, we reinstate and affirm the trial court’s denial of the Defendant’s motion to suppress.

The Defendant, Rudy Vincent Dunn, appeals from the Marshall County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation for his conviction for felony drug possession and order that he serve the remainder of his one-year, three-month sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

My general disdain for the so-called “good faith exception” is fully set forth in my concurring opinion the first time that this case was before this panel. State v. Christopher Wilson, W2015-00699-CCA-R9-CD, 2016 WL 1627145, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, April 21, 2016) (Woodall, P.J., concurring opinion). In light of our supreme court’s embracing of the “good faith exception” in State v. Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d 283 (Tenn. 2016), there is no need to repeat my firm belief that the “good faith exception” should never be recognized in Tennessee. As a judge of an intermediate court, I am required to follow specific precedent of a higher court, in this case, the Tennessee Supreme Court. State v. Irick, 906 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tenn. 1995). I fully accept the principle of law that requires me to follow controlling legal authority even when I do not agree. With all due respect, I concur in results only.

This matter initially originated from a fee dispute between attorney Peter M. Napolitano (“Attorney”) and his client Gayle Connelly (“Client”). Client filed a complaint with the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility (“the Board”) regarding the fee dispute in 2008. The Board dismissed this complaint in 2010 without imposing any sanctions. Client sued Attorney over the fee dispute and, after Attorney was deposed in conjunction with the lawsuit, Client filed a second complaint with the Board in 2012. This second complaint alleged that Attorney had mishandled funds in his trust account and lied under oath. The Board prosecuted this second complaint, resulting in a hearing before a hearing panel (“the Panel”). The Panel determined that Attorney had committed ethical violations related to his trust account and by lying under oath. Accordingly, the Panel imposed sanctions against Attorney, including a five-year suspension of Attorney’s law license, with one year of active suspension. Attorney and the Board both sought review in circuit court. The circuit court modified the Panel’s sanctions in part but affirmed the five-year suspension. Both Attorney and the Board sought review by this Court, with Attorney seeking a lesser punishment and the Board seeking disbarment. Additionally, both parties disagree with the Panel’s order of $7,500 in restitution to Client. We hold that the five-year suspension is appropriate and that the Panel did not err in ordering $7,500 in restitution. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment but modify it by adding the requirement of a practice monitor during Attorney’s probationary period.

This appeal arises from the termination of Mother’s parental rights. The child was removed from Mother’s custody in November 2013, when the child was twelve months old, after Mother and the child tested positive for drugs. On the petition of the Department of Children’s Services, the juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected based on the finding that Mother committed severe child abuse as defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102. In September 2014, DCS placed the child in the custody of Petitioners. One year later, Petitioners filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse and the finding that termination of her rights was in the child’s best interest. Mother appealed. We affirm.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit and support, contending that her failure to visit and support was not willful. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A father appeals the denial of his petition to modify a permanent parenting plan. The juvenile court found no material change in circumstance had occurred sufficient to modify the primary residential parent designation. The court also denied the father’s subsequent motion to alter or amend the judgment. Because the father failed to file a transcript or a statement of the evidence, we presume that the evidence presented at trial supported the court’s determination that no material change in circumstance occurred. Therefore, we affirm both the judgment of the juvenile court and the denial of the father’s motion to alter or amend the judgment to conform to the evidence presented at trial. We also find that this appeal is frivolous.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the Court of Appeals may exercise discretion and decline to award appellate attorney’s fees when the marital dissolution agreement at issue contains a provision entitling the prevailing party to an award of such fees. In this case, Husband and Wife were parties to a marital dissolution agreement that was incorporated into their final divorce decree (“the Parties’ MDA”). The Parties’ MDA contained a provision for the award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in any subsequent legal proceedings. Following a post-divorce proceeding that resulted in the trial court granting relief and awarding attorney’s fees to Wife, Husband appealed. Wife also prevailed on appeal and sought an award of appellate attorney’s fees from the Court of Appeals under a statutory provision and under the Parties’ MDA. Exercising its discretion, the Court of Appeals declined to award the requested fees under the statute. The Court of Appeals erroneously failed to separately consider an award of the requested fees under the Parties’ MDA. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

This is a declaratory judgment case. Decedent, mother to the parties, died testate, leaving a holographic will that divided her real property between her two sons, David Alsup/Appellant and William Alsup/Appellee. The probate court admitted the will to probate. Following completion of the probate proceeding, William obtained a survey dividing the property as provided for in Decedent’s will. David refused to accept the survey procured by William, and William then filed this action to quiet title and for ejectment. David filed an answer but did not file a counterclaim or a countervailing survey. William moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Emmett Lamon Roseman, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2013 Marshall County Circuit Court convictions of possession of marijuana with intent to sell, sale of 0.5 grams or more of crack cocaine, delivery of 0.5 grams or more of crack cocaine, and three counts of failure to appear, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty years. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Petitioner’s convictions were affirmed by this court on direct appeal and no Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 application for permission to appeal was filed. The Petitioner filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and requesting that he be allowed to file a delayed Rule 11application. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing his petition because the statute of limitations should be tolled under due process. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm.

Defendant, Dewayne D. Fleming, was indicted for one count of aggravated burglary, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated rape, and two counts of aggravated robbery. Defendant was convicted by a jury as charged. The trial court sentenced Defendant to six years for the aggravated burglary conviction; 12 years for each aggravated robbery conviction; 25 years for the aggravated rape conviction; and 25 years for each of the two especially aggravated kidnapping convictions. The trial court found Defendant to be a dangerous offender and imposed partial consecutive sentencing. The court ordered Defendant’s aggravated robbery sentences to run concurrently with each other and his especially aggravated kidnapping sentences to run concurrently with each other. However, the court ordered that Defendant’s sentences for aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated rape run consecutively, for an effective sentence of 62 years. In this appeal as of right, Defendant asserts that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the accomplice testimony was uncorroborated; 2) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on theories of criminal liability that were not included in the indictment; 3) Defendant’s convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping violate due process because the State failed to establish that the confinement was greater than necessary to commit the other felonies; and 4) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In February 2015, a Maury County jury convicted Joshua D. Ketchum (“the Defendant”) of attempted robbery, for which he received a sentence of seven years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) his sentence is excessive; and (3) the trial court committed plain error by questioning the Defendant during his allocution. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Michael C. Bolden, appeals his Morgan County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated rape of a child, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on rape of a child as a lesser included offense. We affirm the conviction and sentence but remand for correction of a clerical error in the judgment.

This divorce case involves a marriage of eight years’ duration. Because the parties had reached an agreement with regard to the division of certain marital assets, the trial court was requested during a bench trial to divide the parties’ retirement and pension accounts, or the marital portion thereof, and other limited marital assets and liabilities. The trial court considered the relevant statutory factors and apportioned the remaining assets and liabilities 60% to the wife and 40% to the husband. The trial court also awarded the husband $1,000.00 in attorney’s fees and $180.42 in court reporter fees. The husband has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Defendant, Melvin King, was convicted by a Knox County jury of first degree murder, aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, reckless aggravated assault, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated animal cruelty. He was sentenced to an effective life sentence. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support dual convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and attempted especially aggravated robbery, that the trial court improperly allowed the State to admit autopsy photographs into evidence, and that the trial court improperly gave the jury an instruction on flight. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, because the trial court did not enter judgment forms disposing of each count of the indictment, we remand the matter to the trial court for entry of a separate judgment form for each count of the indictment.

Jose Ramon Gonzalez-Perez (“Father”) appeals the March 7, 2016 order of the Juvenile Court for Shelby County (“the Juvenile Court”) finding him in contempt for non-payment of child support. Father raises several issues including whether Father can be held guilty of contempt when benefits Father receives pursuant to 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq., the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, are exempt from “all claims of creditors and from levy, execution, and attachment or other remedy for recovery or collection of a debt . . . ” under § 916 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act; whether the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act preempts inclusion of Father’s benefits from the calculation of child support; and whether Father was guilty of contempt for non-payment of child support. We find and hold that although the benefits Father receives are exempt from levy, execution, attachment, etc., Father may be found guilty of contempt; that the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act does not preempt the inclusion of the benefits Father receives from the calculation of child support; and that Father had the present ability to pay child support and willfully failed to do so making Father guilty of contempt. We, therefore, affirm the March 7, 2016 order of the Juvenile Court finding Father in contempt for non-payment of child support.

Defendant, Bruce Wayne Sutton, pled guilty to attempted initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine and received a sentence of nine years and six months.  As part of his plea agreement, Defendant reserved two certified questions of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A) with regard to the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of a residence.  Upon our review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that based upon his disclaimer of interest in the property, Defendant was without standing to complain about the search.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Kevin Scott Burris’ (“the Defendant”) community corrections officer filed an affidavit, alleging that the Defendant had violated the conditions of community corrections. Following two hearings, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s community corrections supervision and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. After a review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, James Courtney Shane, was convicted by a Weakley County Circuit Court jury of facilitation of robbery, a Class D felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to five years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to his sentence in a federal case. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of his identity and argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kelvin Winn, was convicted of first degree felony murder and received a life sentence. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to: (1) obtain an enhanced version of the surveillance video of the gas station; (2) proffer actual evidence of the Petitioner’s height to the jury; (3) submit the Petitioner’s clothing to be tested for blood; and (4) investigate the State’s jailhouse informant for possible impeachment evidence. The Petitioner asserts that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficient performance because, absent these deficiencies, the jury would not have convicted the Petitioner. Discerning no error in the post-conviction court’s decision, we affirm.

The appellant, Lewis Bonding Company, appeals the denial of its “Petition to Allow Lewis Bonding Company to Use Real Property as Security Collateral,” arguing the trial court abused its discretion by denying the appellant’s request to pledge real property to underwrite bonds in lieu of a cash deposit with the clerk of court. The State contends the trial court’s denial of the petition was a proper use of its broad discretion to regulate bondsmen. Following our review of the record and pertinent authorities, we agree with the State and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Charles Steven Blocker (“Employee”) sustained a compensable injury to his cervical spine in November 2010.  Surgery was required to treat the injury.  He was able to return to work for Powell Valley Electric Cooperative (“Employer”) after that injury.  His claim for workers’ compensation benefits was settled.  Employee suffered a second, gradual injury to his cervical spine in January 2013.  He was unable to return to work after that injury.  He brought suit in the Chancery Court for Claiborne County against Employer and the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Second Injury Fund (“the Fund”).  The parties stipulated that Employee was permanently and totally disabled.  The only issue presented to the court was apportionment of the permanent total disability benefits between Employer and the Fund.  The trial court found that the second injury had caused a 9% permanent partial disability without reference to the prior injury.  Benefits were apportioned 9% to Employer and 91% to the Fund.  The Fund has appealed, contending that the trial court incorrectly apportioned the award.  The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51.  We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

A Shelby County jury found the defendant, Roy Robinson, guilty of aggravated assault and second degree murder. The trial court imposed an effective twenty-year sentence to be served at one hundred percent, and the defendant appealed. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his second degree murder conviction, arguing he shot his victim in self-defense. The State asserts sufficient evidence exists to support the second degree murder conviction. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Charis Lynn Jetton, pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-211, 39-17-1324(a). For her respective crimes, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of seven years and three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erroneously denied her request for alternative sentencing as to the voluntary manslaughter conviction. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s seven-year sentence to be served in confinement.