APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiffs brought suit alleging breach of contract and the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing against the mortgage servicer of their loan. The mortgage servicer sought summary
judgment on two grounds: (1) an absence of privity and (2) its actions did not violate any
provision of the contract. The Plaintiffs conceded that the mortgage servicer’s actions did
not violate any specific term of the contract and indicated their suit exclusively relied on a
claim predicated upon breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the mortgage servicer. The trial court
acknowledged but declined to rule upon the mortgage servicer’s privity argument and
instead granted summary judgment based on its conclusion that a breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing cannot occur in the absence of a breach of a specific term of
the contract. The Plaintiffs appealed. We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment on the ground that there is no privity of contract between the Plaintiffs and the
mortgage servicer.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of a petition for emergency custody and its
sua sponte entry of a joint mutual restraining order between the parents involved in a
custody dispute. We affirm.

This is a post-divorce dispute. Two primary issues are presented, whether the trial court
erred by (1) holding the mother in civil contempt for violating the Permanent Parenting
Plan and the Parental Rights Statute and (2) reversing the Shelby County Divorce Referee’s
ruling regarding the father’s child support obligations. For the reasons set forth below, we
reverse the findings of contempt as well as the ruling setting aside the Divorce Referee’s
ruling and remand with instructions to reinstate the Order Confirming the Divorce
Referee’s Ruling.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s judgment finding that she breached a contract and
ordering her to pay $3,343.10 in contractual damages. On appeal, Appellant has failed to
comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a) and Rule 6 of the Rules of the
Court of Appeals of Tennessee. Substantive review is also precluded by the lack of a
transcript or statement of the evidence as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate
Procedure 24. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.

This appeal concerns the enforcement of a restrictive covenant. A number of property owners (“Plaintiffs”) in the German Creek Cabin Site Subdivision sued fellow property owner Julia Cris Stevens (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Grainger County (“the Trial Court”) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs sought to prevent Defendant from completing a 400 square foot structure on her lot as it would constitute a second dwelling on the original lot in contravention of a restrictive covenant. The Trial Court ruled in Plaintiffs’ favor, ordering Defendant to remove the structure and granting permanent injunctive relief. Defendant appeals. She argues, among other things that it is inequitable to require her to remove the structure. She also contends that it is not a dwelling. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Purchaser of real property at a non-judicial foreclosure sale brought an unlawful detainer
action against the original homeowners when they refused to vacate the property after the
sale. The homeowners brought a separate action against their mortgage servicer and the
purchaser alleging, inter alia, wrongful foreclosure. The trial court dismissed the
homeowners’ complaint against the purchaser and granted the purchaser’s motion for
summary judgment with regard to the detainer action because there was no genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the purchaser was entitled to possession of the property.
Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on November 23, 2022. The Notice of Appeal
was not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until June 27, 2023, more than thirty days
from the date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because
the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Because “[t]here is absolutely no doubt that wrongful foreclosure can be raised as
an affirmative defense to an unlawful detainer action brought by the purchaser of property
in foreclosure[,]” Davis v. Williams, No. E2010-01139-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 335069, at
*3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2011), no appl. perm. appeal filed (citations omitted), I
respectfully dissent. The reasoning behind this defense is evident—to protect those who
are wrongfully foreclosed upon from losing their home. The Hances availed themselves
of the defense of wrongful foreclosure, just as Tennessee law provides. The Hances’
wrongful foreclosure lawsuit against Nationstar is still pending.1 While I cannot know the
future outcome of the wrongful foreclosure lawsuit, neither can the majority. Under the
majority’s holding, the decision in the wrongful foreclosure suit is immaterial. The Hances
could prevail in their wrongful foreclosure lawsuit against Nationstar and still be ejected
from their home by JCR leaving them with the hollow “victory” of attempting to collect
on a money judgment against Nationstar. Their home would be lost to them despite their
win. Such a result would be deeply unjust and contrary to longstanding Tennessee
precedent that wrongful foreclosure is a defense to a detainer action.

The Chester County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Jerry Ray Mullins, for the first-degree
murder of the victim, Samantha Melendez. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of the
lesser-included offense of second degree murder. The trial court imposed a twenty-twoyear
sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues
that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because he acted in self-defense
when he shot the victim twice in the head. Following our review of the entire record and
the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Elizabeth Christmas and John M. Kington were romantically involved for many years.
When the parties’ relationship ended, Dr. Kington reported to the Hamilton County
Sheriff’s Office (“the Sheriff’s Office”) the theft of several items of jewelry from his home.
At the conclusion of the Sheriff’s Office’s investigation, a grand jury indicted Ms.
Christmas for theft of property valued at more than $250,000. The State of Tennessee (“the
State”) later dismissed the charge of theft before the case proceeded to trial. Ms. Christmas
subsequently filed a complaint and an amended complaint against Dr. Kington in the
Hamilton County Circuit Court (“Trial Court”) alleging, inter alia, malicious prosecution
and abuse of process. Dr. Kington filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial
Court granted. Ms. Christmas appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the
judgment of the Trial Court.

The defendant, Benjamin Spencer Brown, appeals the trial court’s imposition of
consecutive sentences for his Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convictions of
criminally negligent homicide and reckless endangerment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Sean Longmire, of one count of first degree
murder and three counts of attempted first degree murder. On appeal, the Defendant asserts
that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review, we
affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this divorce action, Wife appeals the trial court’s classification and distribution of assets,
formation of a parenting plan, and calculation of Husband’s child support obligation. Wife
also appeals the denial of her petition for criminal contempt. As appellee, Husband raises
issues regarding the allocation of the parties’ equity in the marital property, the enrollment
of the child in private school, and the distribution between the parties of education expenses
for the child. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s decisions regarding the division of
the parties’ property after minor modification, vacate the trial court’s decisions regarding
child custody and child support, and remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings. Wife is barred from appealing the denial of her criminal contempt petition
and we decline to award Wife her attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress, the defendant, Rodney Paul Beech, pled guilty to driving under the influence (“DUI”) and DUI per se and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended to probation after service of forty-eight hours in jail. As a condition of his plea, the defendant reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress based on lack of reasonable suspicion for the stop of his vehicle. Upon our review, we conclude the defendant failed to properly certify the question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2). Accordingly, this Court is without jurisdiction, and the appeal is dismissed.

The petitioner, Erick Bailey, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for
fingerprint analysis under the Post-Conviction Fingerprint Analysis Act of 2021. After
review, we conclude the post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion in summarily
dismissing the petition and affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Mack Mandrell Loyde, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the Defendant, Derrick Johnson, of
conspiracy to possess with the intent to sell 150 grams or more of heroin in Count 1 and
conspiracy to possess with the intent to deliver 150 grams or more of heroin in Count 2,
and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eighteen years. On appeal, the
Defendant argues (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial
court abused its discretion in allowing the State to present evidence of the November 19,
2017 phone conversations on redirect examination; (3) the trial court abused its discretion
in failing to replay the October 25, 2017 phone recordings for the jury; (4) the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor, during its
rebuttal closing argument, improperly commented on the Defendant’s constitutional right
to remain silent; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing an effective
eighteen-year sentence. After review, we remand the case for entry of corrected judgment
forms in Counts 1 and 2 as specified in this opinion. In all other respects, the judgments of
the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner, Glenard Cortez Thorne, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis by the Davidson County Criminal Court, arguing the trial court erred in dismissing the petition because newly discovered evidence exists in his case. After our review, we conclude the petition is untimely and does not present a cognizable claim for coram nobis relief. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Defendant, James Stephen Carder, was indicted by the Marshall County Grand Jury for 36 counts of theft of property in amounts ranging from less than $1,000 to $60,000 and two counts of aggregate theft in an amount greater than $60,000 but less than $250,000. Five of the theft counts were dismissed after the close of the State’s proof, and a petit jury convicted Defendant of 24 theft counts and both aggregate theft counts. The trial court merged those individual theft convictions involving the same victim and also merged the two counts of aggregate theft, and the court sentenced Defendant as a Range II offender to an effective 20 years’ incarceration and ordered him to pay $134,990 in restitution. In this appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and that law enforcement improperly investigated the case and interfered with his contracts. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand this case to the trial court for entry of amended judgment forms to reflect the merger of the 24 individual theft convictions into count 37, the one aggregate theft conviction.

The pro se Defendant, Marquette Benson, aka Marquette Mukes, appeals the summary
denial of his September 6, 2022 Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to
correct an illegal sentence. Because it is clear that the Defendant’s September 6, 2022
filing is merely a request for the trial court to reconsider its denial of the Defendant’s first
Rule 36.1 motion, which was summarily denied on October 4, 2021 for failure to state a
colorable claim, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This is an appeal from a divorce decree that was initially entered in 2017, but the divorce action was not finalized until 2022. In this appeal, Wife argues that the trial court should not have divorced the parties because there were no valid grounds for divorce. Because the parties executed a valid marital dissolution agreement agreeing to be divorced on the ground of irreconcilable differences, we affirm the trial court’s decision to declare the parties divorced. We modify the divorce decree, however, to provide that Wife is awarded the divorce on that ground, consistent with the parties’ agreement. We further award Husband his attorney’s fees as required under the marital dissolution agreement.

Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, the defendant, Casey DeWayne
Hodge, appeals one certified question of law related to the trial court’s denial of his motion
to dismiss in which he alleged a speedy trial violation and two certified questions of law
related to the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress in which he challenged the
constitutionality of a traffic stop. Discerning no error, we affirm. We remand for entry of
judgments on Counts 2 and 3 reflecting that the charges were dismissed in accordance with
the plea agreement.

The plaintiffs, a prospective adoptive couple and six other Tennessee taxpayers, brought this declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147, which allows private child-placing agencies that receive state funding to deny services to prospective foster or adoptive parents based upon the agencies’ religious beliefs. A three-judge panel concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the statute. We have determined that the plaintiffs have standing and reverse the decision of the three-judge panel.

A husband and wife entered into a marital dissolution agreement in 2019. Part of the agreement provided that once the husband retired from the United States Army, he would pay the wife alimony in futuro in an amount equal to the amount of military retirement to which the wife was entitled under the agreement. In 2021, the wife filed a motion for contempt alleging, inter alia, that the husband was not complying with the alimony requirements. The husband argued that the parties’ agreement was unenforceable because it is pre-empted by federal law. Following a hearing, the trial court found that the husband had failed to comply with the agreement but that the contempt was not willful. The husband appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. We also grant the wife’s request for her appellate attorney’s fees.

The Defendant, Devon Allen Wall, pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated robbery and was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated kidnapping related to the same incident. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his aggravated kidnapping convictions and challenges the trial court’s refusal to deliver a special jury instruction. Relative to his sufficiency challenge, the Defendant contends that there was no significant confinement or removal of the victims and that the aggravated kidnappings were incidental to the underlying crime of aggravated robbery. Regarding his second challenge, the Defendant contends that the requested jury instruction concerning “relatively trivial restraints” provided crucial guidance for the jury on Tennessee’s aggravated kidnapping statute. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.