APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Madison County Circuit Court jury found the Defendant, Halley OBrien Thompson,1
guilty of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to fourteen
years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that
the trial court erred by allowing an investigator to testify that it was common for child
victims to delay reporting allegations of sexual assault. He also argues that the State
presented improper prosecutorial argument during its rebuttal closing argument. Upon
review, we respectfully disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal concerns the criminal gang-enhancement statute, Tennessee Code Annotated
section 40-35-121, and specifically what is required in an indictment to sufficiently plead
and provide notice under the statute. Dashun Shackleford (“Defendant”) was arrested for
aggravated robbery as to four individuals in September 2016, along with his friend and
fellow gang member, Jalon Copeland. Defendant’s indictment contained twenty counts:
four alternative counts each of aggravated robbery against four victims and four
corresponding counts of criminal gang offense enhancement. The gang-enhancement
statute requires the State to give notice in separate counts of the indictment of the
enhancement applicable under the statute. The indictment also alleged that Defendant was
a “Crips” gang member and listed the convictions of fifteen alleged fellow Crips members
to prove Defendant’s gang had a “pattern of criminal gang activity,” as also required by
the gang-enhancement statute. A Knox County jury convicted Defendant as charged. The
trial court merged the aggravated robbery convictions into four counts and imposed a total
effective sentence of twenty years to be served at eighty-five percent. In this case, the
gang- enhancement conviction increased Defendant’s aggravated robbery convictions from Class
B felonies to Class A felonies. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the
evidence at trial was insufficient to support his gang-enhancement conviction. The Court
of Criminal Appeals agreed, taking particular issue with the allegation in the indictment
that Defendant and the other gang members listed therein were plain Crips. In the
gang-enhancement phase of trial, the proof established that the majority of the gang members
listed in the indictment, including Defendant, were members of several different subsets of
the Crips gang, with only one of the listed men identified as a plain Crip. The intermediate
court concluded that the State failed to prove that Defendant’s subset gang had engaged in
a pattern of criminal gang activity and failed to comply with the notice requirements of the
gang-enhancement statute. In doing so, the court also, sua sponte, determined that a fatal
variance existed between the indictment and proof at trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals,
therefore, reverted Defendant’s aggravated robbery convictions to a classification lower in
the absence of the gang enhancement. After review, we conclude that the Court of Criminal
Appeals erred in its decision. The gang-enhancement statute is worded broadly and does
not require the State to specify in the indictment a criminal defendant’s gang subset nor
that the defendant is in the same gang subset as the individuals whose criminal activity
establishes the gang’s “pattern of criminal gang activity.” Defendant waived all other issues
by failing to properly raise them before the trial court or on appeal. Therefore, the decision
of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and the trial court’s judgments are reinstated.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on January 17, 2023, in the Knox County
General Sessions Court (“Trial Court”). The Notice of Appeal filed by the appellant
incorrectly sought review in this Court instead of the circuit court. Furthermore, the Notice
of Appeal was not filed until May 12, 2023, more than ten days after entry of the Trial
Court’s judgment from which the appellant seeks to appeal. Because the Notice of Appeal
was untimely and was filed in the wrong court, we have no jurisdiction to consider this
appeal. We also determine that transferring the appeal to the correct court would be futile.

This case concerns claims of negligence against several people and entities for allegedly serving alcohol to and/or failing to protect a 20-year-old man who died in a car accident while intoxicated. John D. Benbow (“Plaintiff”), individually and as next of kin to his son, Jacob N. Benbow, deceased, filed a wrongful death action in the Sumner County Circuit Court (“the Trial Court”) against the defendants, L&S Family Entertainment, LLC d/b/a Strike & Spare (“L&S”); JPZ, LLC d/b/a Silverado Rivergate Sports Bar & Grill (“Silverado’s”); 1 Rancho Cantina, LLC (“Rancho Cantina”); Jody D. McCutchen; Brandi McCutchen; and Brenon D. McCutchen (“the McCutchens”). Certain of the defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted summary judgment for Rancho Cantina, L&S, Brandi, and Jody. 2 However, the Trial Court denied summary judgment for Brenon.3 Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment to Jody because Plaintiff failed to create any genuine issue of material fact that Jody took charge of Jacob. However, we reverse the Trial Court’s grants of summary judgment to Rancho Cantina, L&S, and Brandi, as genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to Plaintiff’s claims against those parties. We observe that the standard is comparative fault, not contributory negligence. Whether Jacob was at least 50% at fault for comparative fault purposes is a question not properly resolvable at this summary judgment stage under the facts of this case. We thus affirm, in part, and reverse, in part. We remand to the Trial Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The pro se Defendant, Ryan Monroe Allen, appeals his jury convictions for second degree
murder and abuse of a corpse, and his resulting effective forty-year sentence. On appeal,
the Defendant argues as follows: (1) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s
motion to continue or, in the alternative, to proceed pro se that was made at the start of
trial, thus, forcing the Defendant to proceed to trial with an attorney who had a conflict of
interest; (2) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the Defendant’s prior bad acts in
violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), and the prosecutor explicitly defied the
trial court’s pretrial 404(b) ruling during opening statements; (3) the trial court erred by
failing to address pretrial the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the abuse of a corpse charge
due to insufficient proof of venue or, in the alternative, to sever the two offenses; (4) the
evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions; (5) the trial court erred
by not excusing a juror who indicated that she might have known the spouse of someone
who assisted with the investigation; (6) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s
motion for a mistrial made because the State failed to disclose prior to trial that two
witnesses were going to testify to having seen certain evidence in the Defendant’s
residence; (7) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to recuse made on
the ground that the trial court was holding court proceedings without the Defendant present
and was biased against the Defendant; (8) the Defendant’s sentence was out-of-range and
illegal because he was not provided with the State’s notice of its intention to seek enhanced
punishment; (9) the State’s case was based on perjured and recanted testimony; and (10)
the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by suppressing certain pieces of evidence.
Following our review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of
the trial court.

Dan E. Durell, Petitioner, appeals from the summary dismissal of his habeas corpus
petition, in which he claimed his convictions were void because the State withheld
exculpatory evidence during sentencing; the State misrepresented facts to the trial court
that were relied upon in sentencing; and his convictions violate double jeopardy. After a
thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas
court.

Petitioner, Marshall G. Tate, appeals from the Franklin County Circuit Court’s order denying him post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel when he pleaded guilty to driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .08 percent or more (DUI per se). Petitioner also argues counsel’s ineffective assistance rendered his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Frederick D. DeBerry, appeals from the Fayette County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1.  Based on our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we conclude that the petitioner’s appeal is untimely, the interest of justice does not mandate waiver of the untimely notice, and therefore, the appeal should be dismissed.

A Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel found that a Shelby County
attorney’s law license should be suspended for four years based on multiple violations of
the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPCs), including RPC 5.5(a). The attorney appealed
part of the hearing panel’s decision, and the trial court affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and modified the sanction to one year. The Board appeals the trial court’s decision that the
attorney did not violate RPC 5.5(a) by practicing law while his license was suspended. We
find that the attorney violated RPC 5.5(a) by continuing to manage and market his law
practice; by directly or indirectly communicating with office staff, attorneys, and former
clients; and by recruiting and hiring attorneys while his law license was suspended. The
hearing panel’s decision that the attorney violated RPC 5.5(a) is supported by substantial
and material evidence. We hold that the attorney’s law license shall be suspended for two
years, with eighteen months served on active suspension. This sanction is based on the
RPC 5.5(a) violation, as well as the hearing panel’s findings that he violated additional
RPCs, which he did not appeal, the American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions (ABA Standards), five aggravating factors, and no mitigating factors.
The attorney shall also make appropriate restitution, obtain additional continuing education
as ordered by the trial court, and engage a practice monitor during his probated suspension.

Defendant, Luis Alexis Briceno, was convicted of alternative counts of driving under the
influence of an intoxicant (second offense), driving on a revoked license, and violation of
the financial responsibility law. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eleven
months, twenty-nine days, with seventy-five percent release eligibility, and service of fiftynine
days in confinement before release on probation. On appeal, Defendant argues that
the Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts erred by denying his request of funding
for expert assistance; Rule 13 of the Tennessee Supreme Court is unconstitutional both on
its face and as applied in his case; and the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress
the results of his breath test. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs and oral
arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff, Defendant’s former employee, filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act
alleging that he had suffered a loss of overtime wages. The trial court entered a judgment
denying Plaintiff any recovery. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that the trial
court’s findings are insufficient. Although under the specific circumstances presented here
we would generally remand the case to allow the trial court an opportunity to more clearly
state its findings, as well as offer specific findings and conclusions in reference to the
appropriate legal standards, the judge who tried this case is no longer on the bench.
Accordingly, we are compelled to vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial on the
question of whether Defendant improperly denied Plaintiff overtime pay.

This appeal concerns a complaint for health care liability. Although Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) provides for an extension of the applicable statutes of limitations in health care liability actions when pre-suit notice is given, it also specifies that “[i]n no event shall this section operate to shorten or otherwise extend the statutes of limitations or repose applicable to any action asserting a claim for health care liability, nor shall more than one (1) extension be applicable to any [health care] provider.” After a prior lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice, Plaintiff provided new pre-suit notice and refiled in reliance on the Tennessee saving statute and an extension under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c). The trial court dismissed the refiled complaint with prejudice, however, holding, among other things, that Plaintiff could not utilize the statutory extension in his refiled action because he had already utilized a statutory extension in the first lawsuit. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s lawsuit.

Although I ultimately agree with the majority’s conclusion, I write this separate concurrence to express my concerns with the result in this case.

Defendant, Rex Allen Moore, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation after
incurring new criminal charges related to his failing to report an email address to the sex
offender registry. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
finding that he knowingly violated the terms of his probation. Following a de novo review
of the record, we affirm.

The petitioner, Undray Luellen, appeals the denial of his Rule 36.1 motion to correct an
illegal sentence, asserting that his sentence is illegal because the trial court imposed
consecutive sentences without stating its reasons on the record. Upon our review of the
record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Benjamin Scott Brewer, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal
Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his
convictions for six counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication, four counts of reckless
aggravated assault, driving under the influence, violation of motor carrier regulations, and
speeding. Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based
upon counsel’s failure to object to witnesses’ descriptions of the crash scene as unfairly
prejudicial under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403. Upon review, we affirm the judgment
of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Marquez Travell Billingsley, pleaded guilty to conspiracy with intent to
sell over fifteen grams of heroin in a drug-free zone, a park. In exchange, the State
dismissed other charges pending against him. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial
court sentenced the Defendant to twelve years, to be served at 100%. Several years later,
the Defendant filed a motion to be resentenced pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated
section 39-17-432(h). After a hearing, the trial court denied relief. On appeal, we conclude
that an appeal as of right does not lie from a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for
discretionary resentencing pursuant to the Drug-Free School Zone Act. Accordingly, the
Defendant’s appeal is dismissed.

This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his child. Following a
bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the
following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment by wanton disregard; (2)
incarceration for a period of ten or more years; and (3) the persistence of conditions which
led to removal. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child.
We affirm the trial court’s ultimate termination decision.

In this case involving termination of the father’s parental rights to his children, the trial
court found by clear and convincing evidence three statutory grounds for termination of
the father’s parental rights to all three of his children, and the court found by clear and
convincing evidence additional putative father grounds for termination of his parental
rights to his youngest child only. The trial court further determined that clear and
convincing evidence established that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interest. The father has appealed. Having determined that the trial court
found two statutory grounds, abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure
to support, that were not included in the petitioners’ original or amended petitions, we
reverse the court’s findings on these two grounds. We must also reverse the four statutory
grounds applicable to a putative father inasmuch as the petitioners did not present evidence
to establish that the father qualified as a putative father. We affirm the trial court’s
judgment in all other respects, including termination of the father’s parental rights based
upon the remaining ground and best interest analysis.

The Petitioner, Ricky Campbell, Jr., pleaded guilty to theft of more than $10,000.
Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he
received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied after
a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

In this quiet title action, the pro se defendant appeals the trial court’s decision to permit
constructive service by publication in lieu of personal service, pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated section 21-1-203(a)(2). Because Plaintiff met the statutory requirements of
service by publication and because constructive service by publication was effective to
establish the trial court’s personal jurisdiction over Defendant, we affirm.

This appeal involves a capital post-conviction petitioner’s expert funding requests under
Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 13. A jury convicted the Petitioner, Jessie Dotson, of six
counts of premeditated first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. This Court
affirmed the jury’s verdict. The Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging several
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. He requested funds under Tennessee Supreme
Court Rule 13 to hire expert witnesses to assist in establishing his claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court authorized the funds, but the Director of
the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) and the Chief Justice denied approval for
some of the Petitioner’s requested experts. After an evidentiary hearing, the
post-conviction court denied relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the ruling
without deciding the Petitioner’s Rule 13 constitutional challenges. We granted review to
consider the Petitioner’s constitutional issues regarding Rule 13. We hold the provisions
of Rule 13 are constitutional as applied; the Petitioner was not unconstitutionally denied
appellate review of the denial of his request for expert funds; and the Petitioner was not
deprived of a full and fair post-conviction hearing due to the denial of expert funds.

This appeal arises from a petition to establish parentage and a parenting plan pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36–2–311 for a child born out of wedlock. In finding that the statutory best interest factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106(a) favored the father, the trial court designated the father as the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child and ruled that the child would live with the father in Tennessee during the school year and spend the majority of the summers and holidays with Mother in Texas. The mother appeals. We affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Martrice Thomas, of first degree premeditated murder.  The Petitioner appealed her conviction, and this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.  State v. Martrice Thomas, No. W2017-02489-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 6266277, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nov. 29, 2018), perm.  app. denied (Tenn. March 28, 2019).  On April 6, 2020, more than a year after the expiration of the statute of limitations, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that her trial counsel was ineffective.  After a hearing, the trial court denied relief, finding that the Petitioner had received the effective assistance of counsel.  The Petitioner appeals, maintaining that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce evidence of Battered Woman Syndrome at trial.  Because the post-conviction court treated the petition as timely from the outset of the hearing, thereby preempting any proof the Petitioner may have presented to show that due process considerations required tolling of the statute of limitations, we remand the case for a hearing on the sole issue of the statute of limitations.  

Paula Christine Hutcherson, Defendant, appeals after a jury found her guilty of eight counts of unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B).  The trial court subsequently sentenced her to ten years for each conviction, to be served concurrently, and ordered the sentences suspended to supervised probation.  On appeal, Defendant argues that her prior convictions for obtaining drugs by fraud are not “felony crimes of violence” or “felony drug offenses” within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1307(b)(1) and that her convictions must be reversed.  Because we determine that Defendant’s prior convictions for obtaining drugs by fraud are felony drug offenses for the purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B), we affirm Defendant’s convictions.  However, during our review of the record, we identified possible clerical errors on the judgment forms concerning the arrest date and pretrial jail credit dates.  On remand, the trial court should enter corrected judgment forms if necessary.