APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves an allegedly unsafe building in the City of Jackson. After a hearing, the City of Jackson’s environmental court ordered the property owner to demolish the building. The property owner appealed to circuit court. After another hearing, the circuit court declared the property a public nuisance and also ordered it demolished. The property owner appeals. He argues that the City of Jackson failed to follow the correct procedures under the city code, and therefore, he should not be required to demolish the structure. Discerning no merit in this assertion, we affirm.

The appellant, Katarina R. Long, pled guilty in the Dickson County Circuit Court to theft of property valued $10,000 or more but less than $60,000 and was granted judicial diversion with the requirement that she complete three years of probation and pay $20,000 restitution.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the amount of restitution when it was clear that she did not have the ability to pay it.  Because we lack jurisdiction to consider her appeal, we must dismiss it.

Post-divorce, a guardian was appointed for two minor children while their mother received treatment for substance abuse. The guardian, the half-brother of the minors, sought child support from both parents. The guardian alleges, inter alia, the trial court abused its discretion by adjusting for tax deductions before calculating the mother's gross income for child support due and by allowing her credit for support in kind and purchases of necessities. We affirm the trial court's findings.

The plaintiff filed the instant action regarding injuries he allegedly received while in the custody of the Robertson County Detention Center. The trial court dismissed the action sua sponte based on multiple grounds, including untimeliness pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations. The plaintiff filed a motion seeking alteration of the order of dismissal. The trial court denied the request by a handwritten notation supplied on the face of the motion. The plaintiff appealed. Having determined that there is no valid, final order in this matter, we conclude that the appeal must be dismissed due to this Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Defendant, Stacey Green, appeals from his convictions for aggravated robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, and three counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery.  The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence relating to a victim’s pretrial identification of the Defendant in a photographic lineup and that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions.  Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

An employee sustained a compensable injury to her shoulder. She was able to return to work in a transitional modified job and settled her claim within the one and one-half times impairment cap. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). Her employer offered her a permanent job with accommodations for her medical restrictions. The employee did not accept the position and was terminated. She sought reconsideration of her settlement. The trial court found that the employer had acted reasonably and that the employee had a meaningful return to work. The trial court, therefore, declined to award additional benefits. The employee has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.

The Petitioner, Frederick D. Deberry, appeals as of right from the Fayette County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the statute of limitations should be tolled (1) because he was in federal custody until 2014 and lacked access to Tennessee legal materials and (2) because his trial counsel and the trial court clerk failed to advise him about post-conviciton procedures after he inquired about such information. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The trial court entered a final judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of the appellee. Appellants appealed. Due to deficiencies in the appellants' brief to this Court, we conclude that they have waived their issues on appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

At issue is the ownership of real property. Plaintiff and Defendant divorced in 2001. In February 2005, they purchased a home as “tenants in common with right of survivorship.” Seven months later, in September 2005, Defendant transferred his interest in the property to Plaintiff by quitclaim deed. In March 2009, Plaintiff quitclaimed her interest in the property to Defendant. Neither quitclaim deed was recorded until a dispute arose in September 2014 following which Plaintiff commenced this action to set aside the 2009 quitclaim deed based on fraud. Plaintiff contends Defendant fraudulently induced her into conveying the property by assuring her that he would refinance the property and give Plaintiff her share of the equity within one year. Defendant insists he purchased the property outright for $9,000, a payment Plaintiff admits receiving. At trial, Defendant objected to evidence of a purported oral agreement based on the statute of frauds. The trial court ruled the defense had been waived and that evidence of an oral agreement was admissible based on equitable estoppel, an exception to the statute of frauds. At the conclusion of the trial, the court ordered that Plaintiff’s name be put back on the deed so that “both of you . . . own the property together.” Both parties appeal. The trial court summarized the testimony of the witnesses and discussed some relevant legal principles; however, it made few findings of fact, and the findings of fact and conclusions of law identified by the trial court fail to disclose the steps by which the trial court reached its decision. Although, we do not have a clear understanding of the basis for the trial court’s decision, it appears that the trial court’s ruling was based on equitable estoppel, which is significant because equitable estoppel is not a basis for affirmative relief. Because equitable estoppel is not a basis for the relief granted and the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01, we vacate the judgment and remand for the trial court to make findings of fact that include as much of the subsidiary facts as is necessary to disclose the steps by which the trial court reached its ultimate conclusion on each factual issue.

This action concerns a petition for custody filed by the maternal grandmother of three minor children. The juvenile court denied the petition, and the circuit court affirmed the denial on appeal following a de novo hearing. The maternal grandmother now appeals to this court. We dismiss the appeal in light of the adoption of the children during the pendency of this appeal.

This appeal concerns a post-divorce modification of alimony. During the underlying divorce proceedings, the parties executed a marital dissolution agreement providing that the husband would make payments to the wife of $8,000 per month in transitional alimony for a period of five years followed by payments of $7,500 per month in alimony in futuro for a period of five years. The agreement provided that the alimony in futuro payments could be modified by either party ―upon a showing of a material, unanticipated change in circumstances.‖ The agreement was incorporated into the trial court‘s final decree of divorce entered in January 2005. In April 2014, the wife filed a petition seeking to increase and extend the husband‘s alimony in futuro obligation. After a trial, the Shelby County Circuit Court found a change in circumstances warranting a modification of alimony and ordered that the husband continue to pay alimony in futuro of $6,200 per month beginning in January 2015 and continuing for a period of six years or until his retirement, whichever occurred later. The trial court also awarded the wife $30,000 as alimony in solido for attorney‘s fees. On appeal, we conclude that the record does not support the trial court‘s finding of a substantial and material change in circumstances. We therefore reverse the trial court‘s modification of the husband‘s alimony in futuro obligation. Additionally, we reverse the trial court‘s award of alimony in solido for attorney‘s fees. This matter is remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary and are consistent with this Opinion.

We granted review in this case to decide (1) whether an indigent parent’s right to appointed counsel in a parental termination proceeding includes the right to challenge an order terminating parental rights based on ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals must review any ground the trial court relied on to terminate parental rights when a parent fails to raise all grounds for termination on appeal. We hold that parents are constitutionally entitled to fundamentally fair procedures in parental termination proceedings. Nevertheless, this constitutional mandate does not require us to adopt a procedure by which parents may collaterally attack orders terminating parental rights based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Additionally, we hold that appellate courts must review a trial court’s findings regarding all grounds for termination and whether termination is in a child’s best interests, even if a parent fails to challenge these findings on appeal. Having reviewed the record on appeal in accordance with these holdings, we affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating the mother’s parental rights.

In this divorce case, the wife proceeding pro se appeals the division of marital property and the trial court’s denial of her request for alimony. She also appeals the trial court’s award of court costs. She elected not to file a transcript or a statement of the evidence. Because the wife’s first two issues are factual in nature, the lack of transcript or statement of evidence prevents us from reaching the substance of the issues raised by the wife. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in assessing court costs. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. We also find that the appeal is frivolous.

This action concerns a petition to set aside a tax sale as void for lack of notice to the original property owner. The purchaser of the property filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the original owner was not entitled to notice, that the petitioner received actual notice as the current owner, and that the petition was untimely. The petitioner countered with a motion for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition, finding that the petitioner received actual notice of the sale and that the time for filing such actions had passed. The petitioner appeals. We affirm.

The Court has decided that an indigent parent has the right to assistance of counsel—but not the right to effective assistance of counsel—in a parental termination proceeding. I believe that the vast majority of lawyers provide competent representation as required by our Rules of Professional Conduct. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPCs 1.1 & 1.3. But in those rare situations where a lawyer makes a mistake or fails to do his or her duty to such an extent that the termination proceeding is not fundamentally fair, I favor providing the parent with an opportunity to seek relief. In my view, providing counsel for an indigent parent but not requiring counsel to render effective representation is an empty gesture.  

Defendants in a federal civil conspiracy case that was voluntarily dismissed filed a malicious prosecution case in state court against the plaintiff and his attorney. The plaintiff and his attorney filed motions for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The defendants appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. When a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a lawsuit, the dismissal does not constitute a “favorable termination” for purposes of satisfying the third element of a malicious prosecution lawsuit.

In September 24, 2014, the Marshall County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Johnthan Tyler Ryan Tyree, for two counts of aggravated assault involving the use of a deadly weapon.  The Defendant entered a best interest guilty plea to the charged offenses with sentencing reserved.  Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I standard offender to four years and nine months in the Department of Correction for each count.  The trial court merged Count 2 into Count 1, finding the two offenses arose from a single incident.The sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to a Rutherford County sentence arising from criminal offenses committed while the Defendant was released on bail in this case.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that his sentence is excessive and contrary to law.  Following our review, we find no error in sentencing and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Cornelius Banks, appeals his Shelby County convictions for one count of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one merged count of aggravated rape, one merged count of aggravated sexual battery, three counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed a sentence of 240 years. Defendant argues (1) that the indictment for one of the counts of aggravated rape was fatally defective and should be dismissed; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that his kidnapping convictions violated double jeopardy; (3) that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could consider one of the witnesses as an accomplice whose testimony must be corroborated; and (4) that the trial court erred in ordering Defendant's sentences to be served consecutively. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this health care liability action, the plaintiffs disagree with a number of the trial court’s rulings upon which it based its decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The trial court excluded the plaintiffs’ life care planner due to their failure to provide a complete disclosure of the life care planner’s opinions in a timely manner. The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs’ sole standard of care expert, a neurosurgeon, was not competent to testify as to the standard of care of the defendant nurse practitioner. Furthermore, the trial court precluded the plaintiffs’ standard of care expert from testifying at all due to the plaintiffs’ repeated failure to comply with the court’s orders regarding discovery. We find no abuse of discretion with respect to the trial court’s decisions and affirm the judgment.  

This is a termination of parental rights case. The Department of Children's Services (DCS) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of A.C.P. (Mother) with respect to her three minor children, ages twenty-two months to six years at the time of trial. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of grounds. The court found the same quantum of evidence supporting the conclusion that termination of Mother‟s rights is in the children's best interest. Mother appeals. As modified, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Appellant, Phillip Serpas, entered guilty pleas to two counts of unlawfully obtaining a prescription for controlled substances by fraud, Class D felonies, and one count of conspiracy to obtain or attempt to obtain a controlled substance by fraud, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of two years each for the Class D felonies and one year for the Class E felony. The trial court held a hearing on the issue of alternative sentencing and ordered appellant to serve his effective two-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant appeals the denial of alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The former administrator of an assisted living facility appeals the summary dismissal of his claim for retaliatory discharge under the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304, and common law. Plaintiff contends he was fired in retaliation for initiating an internal investigation and submitting an internal report to his supervisors concerning an incident that arose when the son of an elderly resident observed an old bandage stuck to the bottom of his mother’s foot, which was revealed when her sock was removed in order to check the dressing for a wound on her ankle. Defendants contend Plaintiff’s claims are legally deficient because there was no neglect or illegal activity to report, and that Plaintiff grossly overreacted after being informed that an old bandage was found on the ball of a resident’s foot in a sock when the resident’s wound, which was on her ankle, was properly dressed and bandaged. Defendants also rely on the fact that Plaintiff did not file a qualifying internal or external report of neglect until after he was fired. The trial court summarily dismissed the TPPA claim stating “leaving a bandage in a sock, where a patient’s wound is in fact otherwise sufficiently bandaged, is not illegal activity as defined by the statute. Leaving the bandage in the sock is not ‘abuse and neglect’ as defined in the statute.” The court dismissed the common law whistleblower claim because Plaintiff did not show that Defendants engaged “in illegal conduct or in any way . . . posed a threat to an important public policy of the State when all that was done was to leave an old bandage in a patient’s sock.” Plaintiff appeals the summary dismissal of his claims under the TPPA and common law. We affirm.

Defendant, Daetrus Pilate, appeals his convictions for rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, sexual battery by an authority figure, and incest and also appeals his effective sentence of forty-nine years. Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred by permitting the State to present evidence that violated the rules of discovery; (2) the trial court erred by admitting a prior consistent statement of the victim; (3) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of Defendant's arrest and giving a jury instruction on flight; (4) cumulative error requires reversal of the convictions; (5) there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions; and (6) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court denied a personal representative's fee request after concluding that the request did not comply with a local rule setting a personal representative's fee as a percentage of the value of the estate. We reverse and remand for the trial court to reconsider Appellant's fee request “in light of all the relevant circumstances.” In re Estate of Schorn, No. E2013-02245-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 1778292, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2015).

The majority Opinion concludes that a reasonable juror (1) could not find that Mr. Richmond had reasonable cause to believe the presence of the soiled bandage was connected to “illegal activity,” as required by the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), and (2) could not find that Mr. Richmond could demonstrate that his termination for reporting the incident violated any clear public policy under his common law claim. Because I conclude that a reasonable juror could conclude that Mr. Richmond had reasonable cause to believe that the presence of the soiled bandage stemmed from neglect of the patient, I must respectfully dissent.