APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant and Appellee were involved in a romantic relationship during which time
Appellee adopted her biological grandson. After Appellee ended the relationship with
Appellant, Appellant filed a petition to adopt Appellee’s grandson. The trial court
dismissed Appellant’s petition with prejudice on its conclusion that Appellant did not have
standing to file an adoption petition. Discerning no error, we affirm. We grant Appellee’s
motion to declare Appellant’s appeal frivolous and award her damages.

The defendant appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion seeking resentencing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432(h). Upon our review of the applicable law and the briefs of the parties, we conclude the defendant does not have an appeal as of right and the instant appeal should be dismissed.

Frank Delmar Raines, Jr., Defendant, was indicted for rape, aggravated kidnapping, and
violating the sex offender registry. The third count of the indictment, charging Defendant
for violating the sex offender registry was severed prior to trial. After a jury trial,
Defendant was convicted of attempted rape and attempted aggravated kidnapping. The
trial court sentenced Defendant to 15 years on each offense and ordered the sentences to
be served consecutively. Defendant’s motion for new trial was denied and this appeal
followed. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and his
sentence. Because we determine that the evidence was sufficient and the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to an effective sentence of 30 years, we affirm
the judgments of the trial court. However, because there is no judgment form in the record
for the charge for violation of the sex offender registry, we remand to the trial court for
entry of the same.

The petitioner, Jonathan Michael Atha, appeals the denial of his motion for a hearing on
his petition for relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 ("the
Act"). Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Petitioner, DeMorris Sanchez McKenzie, sought relief from his convictions and effective
life sentence for first degree premeditated murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm,
and driving on a revoked license. Petitioner alleged that he received the ineffective
assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs
of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Cody Lynn Wyrick, Alias, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury
convictions of rape of a child, rape, and aggravated sexual battery, arguing that the
evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises out of a settlement agreement between the parties that resolved the
distribution of the decedent’s estate’s assets. Under the settlement agreement, Appellant
agreed to receive $1,800,000.00 from a joint brokerage account in his name and the
decedent’s name. Appellant alleged that he was entitled to $1,800,000.00 outright and was
not required to pay the capital gains taxes associated with the disbursement of such funds.
Appellant also alleged that he was entitled to post-judgment interest on the $1,800,000.00.
The trial court concluded that Appellant was responsible for the capital gains taxes
associated with the disbursement and that Appellant was not entitled to post-judgment
interest on the same. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The State appeals the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence recovered during the search of the car in which the defendant was a passenger. The State asserts that the trial court erred because the scent of marijuana provided probable cause for the search regardless of the possibility that legal hemp was the source of the odor. After review, we conclude the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion for suppression, reinstate the indictments against the defendant, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Russell Davis, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary
dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of
Criminal Procedure 36.1. Specifically, the Defendant argues that his sentence is illegal
because the State failed to file timely and proper notices of enhanced punishment and
because he was improperly classified as a Range II offender. After review, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns a claim of retaliatory discharge. Heather Smith (“Smith”), then an
at-will employee of BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc. (“BlueCross”), declined to
take a Covid-19 vaccine. Smith emailed members of the Tennessee General Assembly
expressing her concerns and grievances about vaccine mandates. BlueCross fired Smith
after it found out about her emails. Smith sued BlueCross for common law retaliatory
discharge in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). For its part,
BlueCross filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. After a hearing, the Trial
Court granted BlueCross’s motion to dismiss. Smith appeals. We hold that Article I,
Section 23 of the Tennessee Constitution, which guarantees the right of citizens to petition
the government, is a clear and unambiguous statement of public policy representing an
exception to the doctrine of employment-at-will. Smith has alleged enough at this stage to
withstand BlueCross’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. We reverse the Trial
Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

In April 2018, Petitioner, Adarion C. Morris, pleaded guilty in three separate cases and received an effective sentence of six years to be served on community corrections. However, after two community corrections violation warrants were filed, one in June 2018 and another in August 2018, the trial court held a hearing, revoked Petitioner’s community corrections sentence, and re-sentenced Petitioner to forty-eight years in the Department of Correction. This court affirmed the trial court’s revocation and sentence imposed on appeal. See State v. Adarion C. Morris, No. M2018-02034-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2019), no perm. app. filed. Petitioner subsequently filed a post-conviction petition alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when entering his guilty pleas, which rendered his pleas unknowing and involuntary. He also alleged counsel was ineffective at the revocation hearing and re-sentencing for not challenging the legality of the original community corrections sentence. After a hearing, the post-conviction court concluded Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims regarding the guilty pleas were untimely and that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim relative to the revocation and re-sentencing was without merit. Petitioner appeals, arguing that he is entitled to due process tolling of the limitations period for his claims regarding his guilty pleas. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Douglas Wayne Woods, was convicted by a Sullivan County Criminal
Court jury of two counts of perjury, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-16-
702(a)(1) (2018) (subsequently amended). The trial court imposed an effective sentence
of eleven months and twenty-nine days on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends
that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of
the trial court.

A decedent’s estate sued his girlfriend for the proceeds of his life insurance policy, items from his home that were missing or damaged, and money withdrawn from his credit union account. The trial court found for the estate on the basis of fraud, conversion, and undue influence. The girlfriend appealed. We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand.

After a jury trial, the Defendant, Jerry Rommell Gray, was convicted of felony murder,
attempted especially aggravated robbery, and attempted aggravated robbery. The
Defendant received a total effective sentence of life plus fifteen years. In this delayed
appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by (1) ordering that additional
fingerprints could be taken from the Defendant on the first day of trial; and (2) allowing an
expert to testify regarding the conclusions of a non-testifying expert. Upon review, we
respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A trial court ordered a defendant to pay a set amount of criminal restitution but did not
state payment terms or consider the defendant’s ability to pay. The Court of Criminal
Appeals dismissed the appeal, ruling the restitution order was not a final order because it
did not include payment terms. We hold the restitution order was a final order even though
it did not include payment terms. See State v. Cavin, No. E2020-01333-SC-R11-CD, ___
S.W.3d ____, 2023 WL _________ (Tenn. ______, 2023). The date for payment of the
restitution was, by default, the expiration of the defendant’s sentence based on Tennessee
Code Annotated section 40-35-304(g). The trial court erred by failing to consider the
defendant’s financial resources and ability to pay when setting the amount of restitution as
required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-304(d). We reverse the judgment of
the Court of Criminal Appeals, vacate the trial court’s restitution order, and remand to the
trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Jasmin Lawan Towles, was convicted by a Fayette County Circuit Court
jury of theft of property valued at $1000 or less and sentenced by the trial court to 11
months, twenty-nine days at 75% in the county jail, with the sentence suspended after
service of 100 days and the Defendant placed on probation supervised by community
corrections. The sole issue he raises in this appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to
sustain his conviction. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the Court’s judgment reversing the Court of Criminal Appeals, and I agree with much of the majority opinion’s analysis, including its determination that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider Joseph Gevedon’s ability to pay when setting the amount of restitution.1 I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that the restitution order here was final and appealable, but I reach that conclusion by way of a slightly different analysis. I write separately to explain how my reasoning differs from that of the majority. While the majority asks whether the trial court’s judgment satisfied the statutory requirements for restitution orders, I would focus instead on whether the record shows that the trial court thought it was finished with the case. In my view, the restitution order here was final because nothing in the record or on the face of the order suggests that the trial court had any intention of setting the time for payment, not because the trial court did everything it was supposed to do.

This is a criminal contempt case. Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s finding that he is guilty of four counts of criminal contempt for violating the trial court’s orders regarding medical treatment for the minor child. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Marcus Johnson, Petitioner, sought habeas corpus relief for the third time after his convictions for one count of felony murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated assault.  See State v. Marcus Johnson, No. W2002-00987-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22080778, at *14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 4, 2003), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 26, 2004); Marcus Johnson v. State, No. W2007-02664-CCA-R3-PC, 2008 WL 4866817, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2008), no perm. app. filed.  The petition was dismissed without a hearing after the habeas corpus court determined that Petitioner was merely raising issues that had previously been litigated.  We determine that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition and affirm the judgment of that court. 

Appellants, purchasers of several unimproved lots, filed suit against Appellee title company. Appellants asserted five counts against Appellee based on Appellee’s alleged failure to disclose the existence of a lien lis pendens on the lots. The trial court dismissed all but one of the counts against Appellee and certified its orders of partial dismissal as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. We conclude that the trial court improvidently certified its orders as final and dismiss the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The primary issue presented is whether a criminal restitution order is a final and appealable
order under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 when the order directs a defendant
to pay a set amount of restitution without payment terms. A trial court ordered the
defendant who had pleaded guilty to burglary and theft to pay $5,500 in restitution during
his probationary period. The Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that
the restitution order was not a final and appealable order because it lacked payment terms.
We hold that the restitution order was a final order. Tennessee’s criminal restitution statute,
Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-304, allows—but does not require—trial courts
to specify payment terms. Here, the trial court’s restitution order resolved all issues, was
reasonable, and appropriately considered the victim’s pecuniary loss and the defendant’s
ability to pay.

I concur in the Court’s judgment reversing the Court of Criminal Appeals, and I agree with much of the majority opinion’s analysis, including its determination that the trial court did not err in ordering Johnny Cavin to pay restitution. I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that the restitution order here was final and appealable, but I reach that conclusion by way of a slightly different analysis. I write separately to explain how my reasoning differs from that of the majority. While the majority asks whether the trial court’s judgment satisfied the statutory requirements for restitution orders, I would focus instead on whether the record shows that the trial court thought it was finished with the case. In my view, the restitution order here was final because nothing in the record or on the face of the order suggests that the trial court believed there was more to be done, not because it did everything it was supposed to do.

Defendant, Billy W. Locke, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his two
motions to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Following our review of the briefs of the parties, the record, and
the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court pursuant to Court of
Criminal Appeals Rule 20.

Defendant, William Rimmel, III, was indicted by the Marion County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated assault, two counts of reckless endangerment, one count of false imprisonment, one count of vandalism over $2,500, and one count of burglary of an automobile. The charge of false imprisonment was dismissed prior to trial. A jury found Defendant guilty of attempted aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, attempted reckless endangerment, vandalism under $1,000, and attempted burglary of an automobile. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s request for judicial diversion and imposed an effective sentence of two years on probation following service of 11 months and 29 days in confinement. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s request for an alternative sentence and in ordering consecutive sentencing, that his convictions should be vacated due to the State’s failure to preserve evidence, and that the trial court gave confusing jury instructions. Based on the record, the briefs, and oral arguments, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a judgment in Count 4 and amended judgment in Count 3, reflecting that those counts were dismissed, and for entry of corrected judgments in Counts 5 and 6.

This case involves a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the plaintiff, then a member of the Clarksville City Council, was entitled to a declaration of rights concerning alleged communications between the Clarksville City Attorney and the local District Attorney General potentially pertaining to plaintiff. The trial court dismissed the action, concluding that the plaintiff was seeking an impermissible advisory opinion because there was no justiciable controversy. Having reviewed the record, we affirm.