APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Cory Shane Rollins, appeals from the denial of his petition for post conviction relief, wherein he challenged his jury convictions for aggravated robbery, evading arrest, and driving under the influence. On appeal, the Petitioner raises the following ineffective assistance of counsel claims: (1) whether trial counsel failed to convey a plea offer made by the State; and (2) whether trial counsel failed to adequately apprise him of his right to testify. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Michael Bailey (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated robbery in case number 09-02888. At a subsequent sentencing hearing for case number 09-02888 and six other case numbers, the Defendant was sentenced as a repeat, violent offender to seven sentences of life without the possibility of parole. The trial ordered the Defendant's life without parole sentence in 09-02888 to run consecutively to one of the other life without parole sentences. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction in case number 09-02888 and (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered partial consecutive sentences. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Joseph Meadows, was indicted for initiating the process of the manufacture of methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia.  The Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized during the warrantless search of his home.  The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion, and the Defendant pleaded guilty to initiating the process of the manufacture of methamphetamine, in return for the dismissal of the remaining counts and an eight-year sentence to be served on supervised probation.  The Defendant reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) as to whether the search of his home by law enforcement was lawful.  After review, we conclude that the search was lawful and thus, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Lincoln County jury convicted the Defendant, Charles Allen McKinney, of second-degree murder, child abuse, and child neglect.  The trial court merged the convictions for child abuse and child neglect and then sentenced the Defendant to serve twenty-four years for the second-degree murder conviction and a concurrent sentence of two years for the merged child abuse and child neglect conviction, for a total effective sentence of twenty-four years.  On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of a prior finding of “severe child abuse” and that there is insufficient evidence to support the child abuse and neglect convictions.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.         

The Petitioner, Paul E. Isaac, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty-pled convictions for two counts of aggravated assault, attempted aggravated robbery, and misdemeanor assault. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective because he was not adequately prepared for trial, and the Petitioner’s lack of confidence in trial counsel led him to plead guilty. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

At issue in this appeal is whether the attorney-in-fact for Nathleene Skinner, the decedent, had the authority to incur post-mortem legal fees to defend an action by the decedent’s step-children to recover the cremated remains of their father, Roy Skinner. After Mr. Skinner died, his body was cremated, and Mrs. Skinner retained possession of his remains until her death. When Mrs. Skinner died, her body was also cremated, and her attorney-in-fact took possession of both her remains and her husband’s remains. While Mrs. Skinner’s estate was being administered in the probate court, the stepchildren of the decedent, the children of Roy Skinner, commenced a separate civil action to recover their father’s remains from the decedent’s attorney-in-fact. The estate of Mrs. Skinner was not brought into the action. The attorney-in-fact hired the plaintiff to represent him in the action to recover Mr. Skinner’s remains. After the action to recover the remains of Mr. Skinner was dismissed, the plaintiff filed a motion in the probate court to require Mrs. Skinner’s estate to pay his attorney’s fees. The executor of Mrs. Skinner’s estate opposed the motion. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion because there was “an insufficient showing that such fees were reasonable, necessary or for the benefit of this Estate.” The plaintiff appealed. We affirm the probate court’s determination that the services rendered by the plaintiff did not inure to the benefit of the estate of Mrs. Skinner. We have also determined that Mrs. Skinner did not grant her attorney-in-fact any post-mortem authority pertaining to her husband’s remains; therefore, her attorney-in-fact did not have the legal right to incur legal fees on her behalf to defend a civil action regarding Mr. Skinner’s remains. Accordingly, we affirm.

Defendant, Kenyale Pirtle, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his two motions filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. One motion pertained to case numbers 5168 and 5277. Although appellant listed these case numbers in his notice of appeal, he has made no argument concerning the trial court’s summary dismissal of this motion. The other motion pertains to case numbers 4841, 4940, and 4996. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing this motion. All challenged sentences have expired. In light of State v Brown, ____ S.W.3d _____, No. E2014-00673-SC-R11-CD, (Tenn., filed Dec. 2, 2015) we affirm the judgments of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

The petitioner, Cody Holland, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2012 Rhea County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded conviction of rape, for which he received a sentence of 10 years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Kervin Jackson, was convicted of first degree murder for the shooting death of his brother-in-law. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction because the State failed to establish premeditation. After a review of the evidence and authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Joe Travis Northern, appeals the dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence. Because the defendant has failed to prepare an adequate record for review, we affirm.

This is an appeal by Amanda P. from an order terminating her parental rights to her two minor children, Aiden M. and Kaidence M. The order terminating the appellant's parental rights was entered on May 5, 2015. The Notice of Appeal was not filed until June 26, 2015, more than (30) days from the date of entry of the final order. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Michael Lebron Branham, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; coercion of a witness, a Class D felony; aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-102(a)(1)(A)(iii), -13-402(a)(1), -14-403, -16-507, -17-1324(b)(1). The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty-nine years. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that this case should be remanded for a new trial because one of the prosecutors had previously represented the Defendant in an unrelated matter; (2) that the indictments for aggravated burglary and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony should be dismissed due to alleged vindictive prosecution; (3) that the trial court erred in not severing the coercion of a witness charge from the other offenses; (4) that the Defendant's convictions for aggravated burglary and aggravated assault violate the constitutional protection against double jeopardy as those offenses “were incidental to the aggravated robbery”; (5) that the State failed to make a proper election of offenses with respect to the coercion of a witness charge; (6) that the trial court erred in setting the length of the Defendant's sentences; and (7) that the trial court erred in imposing partial consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jeffrey S. Whitaker, appeals the Roane County Criminal Court's dismissal of his second petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the one-year statute of limitations should be tolled based on the later-arising claims doctrine and the discovery rule of contract law, that his plea agreement was breached when his judgments were corrected to show a release eligibility of 100% and when the trial court imposed partially consecutive sentences, and that the post-conviction court erred in failing to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel against the State. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises out of a divorce case. The husband asserts that the trial court erred in classifying, valuing, and distributing the parties’ marital property. Because the husband failed to comply with Rule 7 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, we deem his issues regarding the marital property division to be waived. The trial court’s decision is accordingly affirmed.

An inmate sought a writ of certiorari challenging the decision of the prison disciplinary board, alleging both a violation of his due process rights and a violation of the Uniform Disciplinary Procedures. The trial court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings based upon the Tennessee Supreme Court's holding in Willis v. Tennessee Department of Correction, 113 S.W.3d 706 (Tenn. 2003). We affirm the dismissal of the inmate's due process claim but reverse the trial court's decision to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings of the inmate's claim related to the alleged failure to comply with the Uniform Disciplinary Procedures. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

The defendant, James Dickerson, appeals his Montgomery County Circuit Court jury convictions of aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence at trial.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Jacob R. Mowery, appeals the revocation of his probation, asserting that there was insufficient evidence to support the revocation.  After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court revoking the defendant’s probation and ordering him to serve his original sentence in confinement.

Defendant, June Curtis Loudermilk, appeals his sentence for driving under the influence (“DUI”), third offense, a Class A misdemeanor, which was imposed upon remand after this Court modified his original conviction for DUI, fourth offense, a Class E felony. He argues that the sentence is illegal because, during his first direct appeal, he completed a probationary period which exceeded the statutory maximum punishment for a Class A misdemeanor. We conclude that Defendant’s sentence is not illegal because he was not on probation pending the resolution of his direct appeal. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Rodney Stephens, was convicted by a Campbell County Criminal Court jury of aggravated stalking. T.C.A. § 39-17-315(c)(1)(E) (2010) (amended 2012). The court sentenced the Defendant to three years, with sixty day' confinement and the remainder to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in allowing the trial to proceed despite the absence of a police officer and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. We modify the judgment of conviction for aggravated stalking to one for misdemeanor stalking, and we remand the case for sentencing and entry of a judgment of conviction for misdemeanor stalking.

I respectfully dissent with the conclusions of the majority that a rational trier of fact could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant possessed the culpable mental state of knowingly violating an order of protection. On direct examination, Defendant acknowledged that he was served “with something” when he left the jail. On cross-examination, Defendant admitted that he knew that there was an order telling him not to have contact with his wife when he left the jail. He acknowledged that somebody had given him a copy of the order and he showed it to the officer who stopped him a few minutes later. Finally, he agreed with the State that he was not “trying to tell the folks of the jury that [he] didn’t know that [he was] not allowed to have contact with [Ms. Stephens]” and he knew that there was an order of protection

The defendant, Billy S. Watson, appeals his McMinn County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated burglary, attempted theft, and vandalism, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Police seized a vehicle and commenced forfeiture proceedings. The Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security mailed notices of the forfeiture proceedings to the driver and the owner of the vehicle, but the postal service returned the notices undelivered. When no petition was filed asserting a claim to the vehicle, the Department entered an order of forfeiture. After learning of the order of forfeiture, the owner of the vehicle filed a petition for judicial review, but because the petition was filed sixty-one days after the entry of the order of forfeiture, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.
 

In this case, we are called upon to determine whether an exception to a claim against an estate was timely filed. Sally Layton (the decedent) died intestate. On the day before the one-year anniversary of her death, Blounts Operator, LLC, dba Greystone Healthcare Center, the operator of a nursing home, petitioned the trial court for letters of administration on the decedent's estate. The court granted the petition the same day. Also on the same day, Blounts filed a claim against the estate. Elizabeth Layton, one of the decedent's children, later filed an exception to Blounts's claim. The exception was filed within five months of the first notice to creditors. The trial court held that the exception was timely filed. The court reduced the amount of the claim. Blounts appeals, arguing only that the exception was not timely filed. We affirm the trial court's judgment as to the timeliness of the filing of the exception.

This is an appeal from the entry of a five-year order of protection. The general sessions court entered an ex parte order of protection on behalf of the Appellee against the Appellant. After a hearing, the general sessions court entered a one-year order of protection. Appellant appealed this order to the Circuit Court for Smith County. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that Appellant had violated the previous order of protection and extended the order of protection to five years. Because the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusion that Appellant violated a previous order of protection, we conclude the trial court did not meet the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 52.01. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand.
 

Lorenza Zackery (“the Petitioner”) pleaded guilty to two counts of rape of a child.  Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis (“the Petition”) alleging “newly discovered evidence” in the form of an affidavit from the Petitioner stating that the victim testified in a 2009 juvenile court hearing that she had no sexual contact with the Petitioner until she was fifteen years old.  The coram nobis court denied relief.  On appeal, the Petitioner argues that (1) due process requires that the statute of limitations be tolled; (2) the coram nobis court should have held an evidentiary hearing because the newly discovered evidence shows that the Petitioner was “factually innocent” of the crime of rape of a child; and (3) the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) when it failed to provide the Petitioner with a record of the juvenile hearing.[1]  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.