APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Stacey Philander Baldon, appeals the summary denial of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence. Because the petitioner stated a colorable claim for relief under Rule 36.1, which the State concedes, the trial court erred by summarily denying the motion. In consequence, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff and his former wife purchased a house together in 2002. The former wife moved out of the house with all of her belongings in 2009, and the house suffered damage from a fire in 2010. The former wife was a named insured on the house, and each of the insurance checks issued to cover property loss and living expenses was made payable to both Plaintiff and his former wife. The president of the bank that held a mortgage on the house had a separate business relationship with the former wife. According to Plaintiff, the bank president informed him that he could not have any of the insurance proceeds unless one-half was given to the former wife, which proceeds were used to pay down the former wife’s separate and unrelated loan. The bank ultimately foreclosed on the house because the loan became delinquent. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the bank and president asserting conversion, wrongful foreclosure, and other related causes of action. The bank and the president filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff did not file his opposition within the time prescribed by the procedural rules, and the trial court granted the bank and the president’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in some respects and reverse the judgment in other respects. Plaintiff’s deposition transcript that the trial court considered in ruling on the motion for summary judgment raised genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment on several of the causes of action alleged.  

The appellant, Casey Dupra Drennon, pled guilty in the Rutherford County Circuit Court to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and received a seven-year sentence with credit for 149 days already served and the remainder on supervised probation.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation and ordering that he serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur with the results of the majority, but from a somewhat different view. I agree the arrival of Rule 36.1 has produced an anathema. I further agree that the trial court misapprehended Defendant’s claim as one that would result in permissive sentence alignment.

The Appellant, Scott Edward Robins, pled guilty in the Marshall County Circuit Court to the initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced the Appellant to eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a divorce case. Wife/Appellant appeals the trial court’s award of transitional alimony in the amount of $1,625.00 per month for three years. Because the record contains neither a transcript of the proceedings, nor a Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 statement of evidence, we have no basis on which to review the ruling of the trial court. Affirmed and remanded.

The petitioner, Junior P. Samuel, appeals pro se from the summary dismissal of his 2015 petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 2009 convictions of rape and sexual battery by an authority figure.  Because the petition was filed beyond the applicable statute of limitations, because this is the petitioner’s second successive petition for post-conviction relief, and because the petitioner failed to prove a statutory exception to the timely filing or a due process tolling of the statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is the second appeal from a finding of criminal contempt. Appellant and his wife originally filed a petition to have the Appellees’ daughter adjudicated dependent and neglected. The trial court entered an order, in which the parties could not contact each other or each other’s families. Appellant made contact with Appellees’ daughters on multiple occasions via text message and once in person. The Appellees filed a petition for contempt against Appellant, and the trial court found the Appellant guilty of four counts of criminal contempt and sentenced Appellant to the maximum punishment allowed for each contempt conviction with the sentences to run consecutively. On the first appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions of criminal contempt but vacated the sentence and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to resentence the Appellant and explain its reasons for the sentence it imposed. On remand, the trial court found the Appellant guilty of twenty eight counts of criminal contempt. The trial court imposed twenty-four hour sentences for each count except one, for which the trial court imposed a five-day sentence. Appellant appeals from the convictions, the sentence, and the trial court’s denial of a motion to recuse. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

The Petitioner, Bruce Turner, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 conviction for rape of a child and his twenty-five-year sentence. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The pro se Petitioner, Christopher Michael Hooten, appeals as of right from the Maury County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his petition presented a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and, therefore, that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing the petition.  The State concedes that the Petitioner presented a colorable claim for relief.  Following our review, we agree with the parties and remand for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing.

Petitioner, Jason Charles Austin, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner was indicted for one count of first degree murder. Petitioner was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and sentenced by the trial court to 23 years incarceration. Petitioner's conviction and sentence were affirmed by this court on direct appeal. State v. Charles Austin, No. E2010-00796-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 2445058 (Tenn. Crim. App., June 28, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn., Nov. 21, 2012). Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Having reviewed the entire record before us and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the post-conviction court's findings and conclusions. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. After a thorough review of the record, we reverse as to the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, vacate as to the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and support by an incarcerated parent, and affirm as to the grounds of abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home and persistent conditions. We also affirm the trial court's finding that termination is in the child's best interest. Accordingly we affirm the termination of Father's parental rights

This appeal arises from a decision by the Tennessee Board of Parole (the “Board”) to deny an inmate parole after his initial parole review hearing. In 2009, the inmate pled guilty to two counts of attempted rape of a child and two counts of incest and was sentenced to 20 years in prison with parole eligibility after serving 30% of his sentence. Apparently because of his good behavior, the Board considered the inmate for release on parole after he had served only 20% of his sentence. Without further explanation, the Board denied the inmate parole based solely on its finding that “[t]he release from custody at this time would depreciate the seriousness of the crime of which the offender stands convicted or promote disrespect of the law,” and deferred review of his parole application for five years. The inmate filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari, arguing, among other things, that the Board acted arbitrarily in denying him parole based solely on the seriousness of the crime without providing any support or explanation for its decision. The trial court affirmed the Board’s decision and this appeal followed. On appeal, we conclude that the Board acted arbitrarily in deferring further review of the inmate’s parole application beyond the time when he would have otherwise been parole eligible—at 30% of his 20-year sentence. Because the inmate has already served more than 30% of his 20-year sentence, we hold that he should immediately be granted a new parole hearing. We therefore vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

The defendant, Michael Smith, was convicted of aggravated burglary and sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years, the sentence to be served consecutively to a sentence previously imposed in another matter. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by the following rulings: (1) instructing as to flight; (2) concluding that the defendant could be impeached with prior convictions for rape and attempted rape; (3) engaging in an ex parte communication with the jury; (4) refusing to grant a mistrial; (5) concluding the defendant could receive a fair trial even though the State had lost or destroyed recordings of telephone calls and jail visits; and (6) not allowing the defendant to present certain proof to impeach one of the State's witnesses. Following our review, we conclude that the issues raised on appeal are without merit and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mark Winslow brought suit against Charles Fleischmann and his campaign advertising consultant, John Saltsman, to recover for allegedly false and defamatory statements made in the course of Mr. Fleishman’s campaign for election to the United States Congress, and related contractual claims. Mr. Fleishman and Mr. Saltsman moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the statements were not false or capable of defamatory meaning or published with actual malice, and that they took no action to induce a breach of contract or otherwise interfere with the relationship between Mr. Winslow and the Tennessee Republican Party. Mr. Winslow did not contest the grant of summary judgment on the contract claims; the trial court granted the motion as to the defamation and false light claims, holding that there was no evidence from which to infer malice, that the statements were not defamatory or capable of a defamatory meaning, and that any statements upon which the action was based which related to Mr. Winslow were either true or substantially true and, therefore, not actionable. Mr. Winslow appeals. Because Mr. Fleishman and Mr. Saltsman demonstrated that the undisputed facts negate the element of actual malice which is essential to the defamation and false light claims, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. 

The defendant, Edward Sample, was convicted of one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his other crimes, that the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial, and that he was improperly fingerprinted during trial without counsel present. Following our review of the briefs of the parties, the record, and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence of other crimes, and we reverse the defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial.

Pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant, Jon Michael Johnson, who pleaded guilty to one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”), appeals two related certified questions of law relative to the validity of the instrument used to measure his blood alcohol level following his arrest.  Because neither of the certified questions presented is dispositive of the defendant’s case, the appeal is dismissed.

The petitioner, Mathew Dixon, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. The petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. He subsequently filed both a direct appeal and a petition for post-conviction relief in his case. He has now filed the instant petition to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging a later-arising claim. Specifically, he contends that he subsequently learned that a witness at trial against him had an agreement with the prosecution. He contends that the post-conviction court erred in not finding that the statute of limitations should be tolled. Following review of the record, we conclude we are without jurisdiction to review the challenged issue. Accordingly, the summary dismissal is affirmed.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the courts below erred in concluding that the mother must be afforded relief from a void default judgment terminating her parental rights even though she did not seek relief from the void judgment under Rule 60.02(3) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure until more than eight years after it was entered. We agree with the courts below that the default judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdiction and also conclude that the reasonable time filing requirement of Rule 60.02 does not apply to petitions seeking relief from void judgments under Rule 60.02(3). Nevertheless, we hold that relief from a void judgment should be denied if the following exceptional circumstances exist: “(1) [t]he party seeking relief, after having had actual notice of the judgment, manifested an intention to treat the judgment as valid; and (2) [g]ranting the relief would impair another person’s substantial interest of reliance on the judgment.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 66 (1982). We hold that the record has not been sufficiently developed to determine whether exceptional circumstances exist. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and remand for the trial court to determine, after a hearing, whether exceptional circumstances justify denying relief in this case.

The Oak Ridge City Court found the manager of three apartment buildings liable for several violations of the local building code. The manager appealed to the circuit court, and the City moved to amend the cause to add the purported owner of the properties as a defendant. The case proceeded to trial. After the City closed its proof, the trial court noticed that the purported owner of the property had not been properly made a party to the action. Accordingly, the trial court granted the City‟s motion to amend. Although the purported owner moved for a mistrial and/or a continuance, the trial court proceeded on to rule against the purported owner for several violations of the local building code. The purported owner appeals. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings to allow the purported owner of the properties an opportunity to meaningfully respond to the allegations against him in accordance with Rule 15.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

This is an appeal from an order designating a primary residential parent and setting visitation and child support. The juvenile court found that naming Father as primary residential parent was in the child’s best interest and set child support accordingly. Mother appealed both the designation of primary residential parent and the amount of child support owed to father. We affirm.     

Following a bench trial, the Defendant-Appellant, Carl C. Dotson, was convicted of driving on a revoked license, eighth offense, and driving under the influence (DUI), third offense, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 55-50-504 and 55-10-401, respectively.  For these offenses, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served consecutively to an unrelated matter.  In this appeal as of right, the Defendant-Appellant argues that the trial court erred by using a prior 1998 DUI conviction to enhance the instant DUI to a third offense and that the evidence was insufficient to support his DUI conviction.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jimmy W. Wilson, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which challenged the life sentence imposed based upon a Sullivan County Criminal Court jury's finding that he was a habitual criminal following his 1985 conviction of rape. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Plaintiff brought an action to pierce the corporate veil of defendant company and hold its sole shareholder personally liable for a debt. The trial court conducted a bench trial on the issue and found in favor of the defendant company and shareholder. The trial court initially declined to issue findings of fact in its final judgment. After both parties submitted their own proposed findings of fact, the trial court adopted the defendants‘ version nearly verbatim, incorporating two additional findings of fact of its own. However, because we find the trial court‘s findings of fact and conclusions of law insufficient to facilitate appellate review, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law.