APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Kristy L. Poland (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at over $500 and was sentenced to one year suspended to supervised probation with restitution to be set by the trial court. After a hearing on the issue of restitution, the trial court ordered the Defendant to pay $8,100 in monthly installments of $75. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court failed to consider her current financial resources and future ability to pay restitution. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we modify the trial court‟s restitution order and remand the case for entry of a new restitution order.

Petitioner, James Mitchell Smith, is seeking post-conviction relief from his convictions for driving under the influence (“DUI”), driving on a suspended or canceled license, reckless endangerment, and two counts of leaving the scene of an accident. The post-conviction court denied relief, and petitioner now appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I respectfully dissent from the conclusion reached by the majority in this case. When establishing the proper amount in restitution owed, the trial court should base the figure on the victim’s pecuniary loss as well as the defendant’s financial resources and future ability to pay or perform. T.C.A. § 40-35-304(b), (d)-(e) (2010); State v. Smith, 898 S.W.2d 742, 747 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Furthermore, the payment schedule is not to exceed the term of the sentence imposed. T.C.A. § 40-35-304(c), (g)(2); see also State v. Daniel Lee Cook, No. M2004-02099-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 1931401, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 10, 2005) (concluding that there was no way the appellant could pay $9,000 in restitution at a rate of $150 per month during a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days). Finally, the Tennessee Supreme Court has previously stated that the trial court “simply should [] set the restitution at an amount it believe[s] [the defendant] can pay” rather than attempting to “facilitate payment of its order of restitution.” See State v. Mathes, 115 S.W.3d 915, 919 (2003).

The Appellant, Bertin DeJesus Jimenez, pled guilty to stalking and received a sentence of ninety days in the workhouse. Thereafter, the Appellant filed a motion to vacate the judgment, contending that the arrest warrant was void ab initio because it failed to allege all of the elements of the offense. The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellant appealed. Upon review, we conclude that the appeal should be dismissed.

Five groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed complaints in the Tennessee Claims Commission seeking a refund of retaliatory taxes paid under protest. The Commissioner entered judgments denying the requested refunds, and the insurance companies appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments. We granted permission to appeal to consider whether certain Pennsylvania workers’ compensation assessments result in a financial burden on Tennessee insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania, thereby triggering the imposition of retaliatory taxes against the Pennsylvania insurance companies doing business in Tennessee. Because the workers’ compensation assessments must be paid by employer–policyholders in conjunction with their premium payments, the administrative task of collecting and remitting those payments does not qualify as a burden on the insurance companies for purposes of the retaliatory tax. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are, therefore, reversed.

Five groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed complaints in the Tennessee Claims Commission seeking a refund of retaliatory taxes paid under protest. The Commissioner entered judgments denying the requested refunds, and the insurance companies appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments. We granted permission to appeal to consider whether certain Pennsylvania workers’ compensation assessments result in a financial burden on Tennessee insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania, thereby triggering the imposition of retaliatory taxes against the Pennsylvania insurance companies doing business in Tennessee. Because the workers’ compensation assessments must be paid by employer–policyholders in conjunction with their premium payments, the administrative task of collecting and remitting those payments does not qualify as a burden on the insurance companies for purposes of the retaliatory tax. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are, therefore, reversed.

Five groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed complaints in the Tennessee Claims Commission seeking a refund of retaliatory taxes paid under protest. The Commissioner entered judgments denying the requested refunds, and the insurance companies appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments. We granted permission to appeal to consider whether certain Pennsylvania workers’ compensation assessments result in a financial burden on Tennessee insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania, thereby triggering the imposition of retaliatory taxes against the Pennsylvania insurance companies doing business in Tennessee. Because the workers’ compensation assessments must be paid by employer–policyholders in conjunction with their premium payments, the administrative task of collecting and remitting those payments does not qualify as a burden on the insurance companies for purposes of the retaliatory tax. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are, therefore, reversed.

Five groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed complaints in the Tennessee Claims Commission seeking a refund of retaliatory taxes paid under protest. The Commissioner entered judgments denying the requested refunds, and the insurance companies appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments. We granted permission to appeal to consider whether certain Pennsylvania workers’ compensation assessments result in a financial burden on Tennessee insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania, thereby triggering the imposition of retaliatory taxes against the Pennsylvania insurance companies doing business in Tennessee. Because the workers’ compensation assessments must be paid by employer–policyholders in conjunction with their premium payments, the administrative task of collecting and remitting those payments does not qualify as a burden on the insurance companies for purposes of the retaliatory tax. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are, therefore, reversed.

In 1998, the Petitioner, Deshaun Fly Smith, was convicted along with three co-defendants of one count of first degree premeditated murder and two counts of attempted first degree murder. The trial court imposed upon the Petitioner an effective life sentence plus twenty-five years. This court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions on appeal. State v. Smith, No. M1997-00087-CCA-R3-CD, 1999 WL 1210813, at *14-20 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec. 17, 1999), Tenn. R. App. P. 11 denied (Tenn. Oct. 9, 2000). In 2001, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was dismissed. This court affirmed the dismissal of the petition on appeal. Deshaun Fly Smith v. State, No. M2004-00719-CCA-R3-PC, 2005 WL 468308, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec. 15, 2004), Tenn. R. App. P. 11 denied (Tenn. Nov. 7, 2005). In 2014, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, in which he presented multiple claims, including that the prosecutor intentionally withheld evidence in the form of the State’s primary witness’s criminal history. The coram nobis court dismissed the petition as untimely and held that the Petitioner had not established that his grounds for relief arose after the limitations period. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that the coram nobis court erred when it dismissed his petition, contending that the newly discovered evidence warrants a waiver of the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the coram nobis court’s judgment.

This is a breach of contract case. In 2012, the parties entered into a contract to resolve an issue of past-due child support owed by Appellant to Appellee. The contract provided that Appellant would grant a remainder interest in his home to Appellee, reserving a life estate interest for himself. In exchange, Appellee agreed to forgive the past-due child support owed to her by Appellant. The contract provided, among other things, that Appellant would pay the taxes on the property during his lifetime and would make monthly payments to Appellee's attorney to repay Appellee's attorney's fees. In 2014, Appellee filed a petition alleging that Appellant breached the contract by, among other things, failing to pay the taxes on the property. After a hearing, the trial court found that Appellant breached the contract and that forfeiture of his life estate in his home was the appropriate remedy. On appeal, Appellant admits that he breached the contract but argues that the trial court erred in holding that forfeiture was an appropriate remedy. Because the trial court failed to provide any reasoning for its decision, we are unable to perform a meaningful review of this issue on appeal. We affirm in part but vacate the trial court's revocation of Appellant's life estate and remand for further findings and conclusions on that issue.

Jason Lee Fisher (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of four counts of burglary, four counts of theft of property, and three counts of vandalism. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging, among other things, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel and co-counsel failed to file a motion to suppress evidence found during the inventory search of the Petitioner’s vehicle. Following a hearing where only the Petitioner, trial counsel, and co-counsel testified, the post-conviction court found that the Petitioner failed to show that he was prejudiced by counsels’ alleged deficiencies. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the State failed to prove that impounding the Petitioner’s car was necessary and, therefore, the inventory search was invalid. Accordingly, he contends that, had trial counsel and co-counsel filed a motion to suppress, it would have been successful, and all the evidence against the Petitioner would have been excluded. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Five groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed complaints in the Tennessee Claims Commission seeking a refund of retaliatory taxes paid under protest. The Commissioner entered judgments denying the requested refunds, and the insurance companies appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments. We granted permission to appeal to consider whether certain Pennsylvania workers’ compensation assessments result in a financial burden on Tennessee insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania, thereby triggering the imposition of retaliatory taxes against the Pennsylvania insurance companies doing business in Tennessee. Because the workers’ compensation assessments must be paid by employer–policyholders in conjunction with their premium payments, the administrative task of collecting and remitting those payments does not qualify as a burden on the insurance companies for purposes of the retaliatory tax. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are, therefore, reversed.

Five groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed complaints in the Tennessee Claims Commission seeking a refund of retaliatory taxes paid under protest. The Commissioner entered judgments denying the requested refunds, and the insurance companies appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments. We granted permission to appeal to consider whether certain Pennsylvania workers’ compensation assessments result in a financial burden on Tennessee insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania, thereby triggering the imposition of retaliatory taxes against the Pennsylvania insurance companies doing business in Tennessee. Because the workers’ compensation assessments must be paid by employer–policyholders in conjunction with their premium payments, the administrative task of collecting and remitting those payments does not qualify as a burden on the insurance companies for purposes of the retaliatory tax. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are, therefore, reversed.

The Appellant, Terry Lynn Priest, pled guilty to theft in an amount more than $1,000 and less than $10,000. He was sentenced as a Range II offender to five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother's parental rights to her severely disabled son. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that several grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the child's best interest. On appeal, the mother challenges only the best interest finding. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant, Danny Santarone, was convicted of possession of dihydrocodeinone, oxycodone, cocaine, and heroin within 1000 feet of a school with the intent to sell or deliver. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that application of the school zone enhancement violates public policy. Based upon a thorough review of the record, authorities, and arguments, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions and that his argument regarding the public policy behind the school zone enhancement is without merit. We therefore affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Donald Biggs, alias, appeals as of right from his guilty-pleaded convictions for four counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of theft by shoplifting, and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-402, -14-103, -14-105, -14-146. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-two years each on two aggravated robbery convictions. The trial court ordered that the Defendant serve these two sentences consecutively. The Defendant’s remaining sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, resulting in a total effective sentence of forty-four years. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred when it imposed partial consecutive sentences. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed partial consecutive sentences, and the judgments of the trial court are, therefore, reversed.

The defendant appealed from a judgment entered on May 12, 2014, and a post-judgment order entered on October 2, 2014. Because the defendant did not file her notice of appeal within the thirty day time period required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.  

This appeal arises from the dismissal of suit for unpaid fees. An expert and an attorney entered into a services agreement in March 2005. The expert first invoiced for his services in January 2006. Additional services were rendered after that date, and the expert sent additional invoices. Despite repeated requests from the expert and promises from the attorney, invoices went unpaid except for a small partial payment. On September 19, 2013, the expert filed suit against the attorney in general sessions court and obtained a default judgment. Attorney then appealed to circuit court. On a motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that suit was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. We reverse. 

I would affirm the judgment of the trial court in this case, and therefore I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I want to make it clear that I do not dissent for the reason the sentence imposed by the trial court is the most appropriate sentence for the Defendant. In fact, had I been the trial judge, I would have been persuaded by the logic set forth in Judge Thomas' opinion to sentence the Defendant to an effective sentence of 22 years.

The matters in dispute pertain to a retroactive child support judgment for a period of time prior to the filing of the child support petition. The trial court assessed a retroactive judgment that included a period of time prior to the filing of the petition, holding that the petition filed by the State on behalf of Mother was to “set” child support not to “modify” support. Father contends a prior support order was in effect when the petition was filed; thus, the trial court violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(f)(1) by awarding a judgment based on an increase in child support for several months prior to the filing of the petition. In the trial court the State insisted that the petition was to set support; however, on appeal, it concedes that a child support order was in effect when this petition was filed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(f)(1) directs that a judgment for child support shall not be subject to modification as to any time period or amounts prior to the date a petition for modification is filed. Therefore, we vacate the retroactive child support judgment and remand for the trial court to calculate the judgment from the date the petition to modify support was filed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant of aggravated sexual battery and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty-one years, to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it required that he be represented by counsel at trial; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (3) the trial court erred when it ordered consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that there exists no error in the judgments of the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

In this procedurally complex case, a Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Terry Norris, of second degree murder in 1999, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-one years of incarceration. After several proceedings and filings, discussed in detail below, the U.S. Sixth Circuit granted the Defendant habeas corpus relief unless the State allowed the Defendant to reopen his original direct appeal and raise an issue regarding whether his confession should have been suppressed pursuant to County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). The State allowed the Defendant to reopen his appeal. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his confession to police because he gave his confession after being held for more than forty-eight hours without a probable cause hearing. This Court addressed the issue pursuant to plain error review. State v. Terry Norris, No. W2000-00707-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 6482823 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 18, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 22, 2015). The Defendant filed a Rule 11 application, pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Our Supreme Court granted the application and remanded the case to this Court for plenary review. The State filed a petition to rehear, which the Tennessee Supreme Court denied on May 15, 2015. After our plenary review, we conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to relief.

The Petitioner, Richard Herrera, appeals the Obion County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 convictions for sexual battery and attempted sexual battery and his effective one-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A former church member brought suit against the pastor and other defendants not involved in this appeal. The trial court dismissed all of the plaintiff’s claims against the pastor with the exception of the causes of action for defamation and outrageous conduct. We have concluded that the plaintiff’s complaint does not make out claims for defamation or outrageous conduct. The decision of the trial court is, therefore, reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint in in its entirety.