APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant-Appellant, Walter Francis Fitzpatrick, III, was indicted by the McMinn County Grand Jury for harassment, aggravated perjury, stalking, and extortion. The trial court granted the defense's motion for judgment of acquittal as to the stalking charge after the close of the State's proof at trial, and it was dismissed. The jury convicted Fitzpatrick of aggravated perjury and extortion, Class D felonies, but found Fitzpatrick not guilty of harassment, a Class A misdemeanor. T.C.A. §§ 39-16-703; 39-14-112; 39-17-308. The trial court sentenced Fitzpatrick to concurrent sentences of three years with a release eligibility of thirty percent for his aggravated perjury and extortion convictions and ordered these sentences to be served consecutively to his misdemeanor convictions in Monroe County for disrupting a meeting and resisting arrest in case number 10-213, resisting arrest in case number 11-018, and tampering with government records in case number 12-108.1 On appeal, Fitzpatrick argues: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction over his case because a grand jury member voting to indict him was disqualified by reason of interest, and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, David Leon Graves, was convicted by a Wilson County Criminal Court jury of two counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony; one count of assault, a Class B misdemeanor; and one count of reckless endangerment, a Class E felony.   He was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years and twenty years, respectively, for the attempted murder convictions, six months for the assault conviction, and two years for the reckless endangerment conviction.  The trial court ordered the twenty-year sentence served consecutively to the twenty-five-year sentence, for an effective term of forty-five years in the Department of Correction. The defendant raises six issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing evidence of statements the defendant made while hospitalized; (3) whether the trial court erred by admitting a photograph of the victim’s injuries; (4) whether the trial court erred by not allowing evidence about a prior frivolous 9-1-1 call made by the defendant’s girlfriend; (5) whether the defendant’s convictions and sentences violate principles of double jeopardy; and (6) whether the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing.  Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant employee appeals from the denial of her claim for unemployment compensation. Because there is substantial and material evidence in the record to establish that the employee was discharged for work-related misconduct, we affirm.

Following the execution of a search warrant for his property and residence, the Defendant-Appellant, Jerry Lewis Tuttle, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury in case number 21695 for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of not less than one-half ounce nor more than ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell, and being a felon in possession of a firearm.  He was also indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury in case number 22091 for conspiracy to possess marijuana in an amount over 300 pounds with intent to sell or deliver within 1000 feet of a school, conspiracy to commit money laundering, money laundering, possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, and acquiring or receiving property subject to judicial forfeiture pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-703.  The Defendant-Appellant filed motions to suppress the evidence seized and to dismiss the forfeiture count, which were denied by the trial court following a hearing. At trial, the Defendant-Appellant was convicted in case number 21695 of the lesser included offense of simple possession of cocaine and the charged offense of possession of marijuana with intent to sell; the count charging him with being a felon in possession of a firearm was dismissed.  In case number 22091, the Defendant-Appellant was convicted of the lesser included offense of conspiracy to possess marijuana in an amount over 300 pounds with intent to sell or deliver as well as the charged offenses of conspiracy to commit money laundering, money laundering, and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony.  Following a bench trial on the judicial forfeiture count, the trial court denied the forfeiture of several items seized but ordered the forfeiture of other items, including the $1,098,050 that is at issue on appeal.  After a sentencing hearing on the other counts, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifty years with a release eligibility of thirty-five percent.  On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant argues:  (1) that the search of his property violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures because the affidavit in support of the search warrant did not provide probable cause for the issuing judge to believe that evidence of a crime would be found on his property and in his home; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conspiracy convictions; and (3) he is entitled to the return of the $1,098,050 because the cash seized was obtained by him more than five years prior to the seizure and because the seizing agent failed to deliver a notice of seizure to him at the time the cash was seized.  Upon review, we reverse the Defendant-Appellant’s convictions.  However, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in regard to the forfeiture proceedings.

The employee alleged that he sustained a compensable injury to his lower back. His employer initially accepted the claim but later denied it. The trial court found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury. It further found that the testimony of Employee's evaluating physician overcame the presumption of correctness attached to a Medical Impairment Registry (“MIR”) evaluation by clear and convincing evidence. The employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennesssee Supreme Court Rule 51. We conclude that the trial court erred by finding that the MIR presumption had been overcome, and we modify the judgment accordingly. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

I concur with the majority’s opinion in its affirmation of the trial court’s forfeiture order.  I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the affidavit supporting the search warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause.  Instead, I would affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to suppress and would conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s convictions.

An employee alleged that he developed cubital tunnel syndrome and carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of his work activities. His employer provided medical treatment for the former condition but denied liability for both conditions at trial. The trial court found that the cubital tunnel syndrome was compensable but the carpal tunnel syndrome was not. It further found that Employee had a meaningful return to work, thus limiting his recovery to one and one-half times the anatomical impairment. The employee has appealed, asserting that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings regarding his carpal tunnel syndrome and return to work. The employer contends that the evidence preponderates against the finding that the cubital tunnel syndrome was compensable. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the judgment.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Vernon Elliott Lockhart, of one count of conspiracy to sell 300 pounds or more of marijuana within a drug-free school zone, a Class A felony; one count of possession of 300 pounds or more of marijuana with intent to deliver within a drug-free school zone, a Class A felony; ten counts of money laundering, a Class B felony; one count of possession of ten pounds or more of marijuana with intent to deliver within a drug-free school zone, a Class C felony; and one count of facilitation of possession of ten pounds or more of marijuana with intent to deliver, a Class E felony. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective ninety-four-year sentence. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress evidence obtained from the wiretaps of various cellular telephones; that the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress evidence based upon the unlawful attachment of GPS tracking devices on two vehicles and the unlawful GPS tracking of a co-defendant’s cellular telephone; that the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress evidence seized pursuant to an unlawful search warrant for his home; that the trial court incorrectly ruled that a detective could testify as an expert in the identification and interpretation of drug ledgers; that the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of a State witness; that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; that his effective sentence is excessive; and that cumulative error warrants a new trial. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the appellant’s money laundering convictions in counts 14, 16, and 31. Therefore, those convictions are reversed, and the charges are dismissed. We also conclude that the trial court mistakenly sentenced the appellant in count 36 to the charged offense of possession of ten pounds or more of marijuana with intent to deliver rather than the convicted offense of facilitation, modify the appellant’s sentence for the conviction from four to two years, and remand the case to the trial court for correction of the judgment. The appellant’s remaining convictions and effective ninety-four-year sentence are affirmed.

The petitioner, Adrian Wilkerson, appeals pro se from the summary dismissal of his 2014 petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 1996 convictions of first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000. Because the petition was filed more than a decade beyond the applicable statute of limitations, because this is the petitioner’s second successive petition for post-conviction relief, and because the petitioner failed to either allege or prove a statutory exception to the timely filing or a due process tolling of the statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Tracy Lynn Carman-Thacker, was convicted in a bench trial in the Coffee County Circuit Court of twelve counts of unlawful possession of a firearm while subject to an order of protection and twelve counts of violating an order of protection by possessing a firearm, all Class A misdemeanors. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-113 (2014) (violation of an order of protection or restraining order), 39-17-1307 (Supp. 2012) (amended 2014) (unlawful carrying or possession of a weapon). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the evidence found during a search of her house and that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions. We vacate the Defendant’s convictions and dismiss the charges.

This post-divorce appeal arises from the trial court's denial of Father's petition to modify custody. Following a one-day trial, the court found that Father failed to demonstrate a sufficient material change in circumstances and denied his petition. We affirm.

Patrick James O'Brien, Jr., (“the Appellant”) pleaded guilty to reckless homicide and possession of a schedule II drug. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Appellant was sentenced to concurrent, four-year sentences. The trial court denied alternative sentencing. The Appellant filed an appeal alleging that the trial court erred in denying him alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Anthony B. Whitaker (“the Defendant”) was convicted of aggravated statutory rape. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it did not give the jury a missing witness instruction. Additionally, the Defendant claims that the language in the presentment was deficient because the presentment did not include “recklessly” as a culpable mental state. After review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves post-divorce child support matters. Heather Russell Wilder (“Mother”) filed a petition in the Fourth Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) for modification of child support against Joseph Chamblee Wilder (“Father”). Mother later alleged that Father had fraudulently misstated his true income, and that he owed more in support towards the parties' three children (“the Children”) than had been ordered. The Trial Court adopted the Magistrate's findings and recommendations and held that Mother could not obtain Rule 60 relief on her fraud claim as time had expired. Mother appeals to this Court raising a number of issues. We affirm the Trial Court.

This is a negligence action. The plaintiff sustained injuries to her foot and heel while attempting to use a water slide on the defendants’ property. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendants exactly one year after her injury. The complaint, filed against “Robin Nichols and Willow Brook Lodge,” failed to include the proper name of the company, which is “Accommodations by Willow Brook Lodge, LLC.” Approximately fifteen days after filing the complaint, instead of serving Robin Nichols, the plaintiff served her son, Grant Nichols. The defendants’ answer made the errors known, but the plaintiff’s counsel was dilatory in filing a motion to amend. Upon the defendants filing a motion for summary judgment claiming that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations, the trial court granted the motion. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner, Howard Lavelle Tate, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Anesha McKinnon, filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Shelby County Criminal Court, alleging that her trial counsel was ineffective and that her guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Employee filed this workers’ compensation action alleging that he suffered two low back injuries while working as a truck driver for Employer. The trial court held that Employee was not a credible witness and that Employee’s alleged workplace injuries did not occur within the course and scope of his employment. Employee has appealed the trial court’s decision. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kevin Lewis, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s partial denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue to the jury that the State did not prove the element of “sexual contact” accompanying his conviction for aggravated sexual battery and for failing to impeach a witness. In response, the State asserts that the post-conviction court erred when it vacated and dismissed the Petitioner’s conviction for aggravated kidnapping after concluding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to mount a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal. The State also responds that the post-conviction court did not err when it denied the Petitioner’s remaining claims. Following our review, we reverse the post-conviction court’s ruling dismissing the aggravated kidnapping charge against the Petitioner because we conclude that the court should have vacated the judgment without dismissing the charge in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-111. In all other respects, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Roderick D. Tate, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Knox County. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner entered guilty pleas to six drug-related offenses, for which he received an effective twenty-one-year sentence. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to his guilty pleas because counsel misinformed him regarding the applicable range of punishment. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Conservator appealed the trial court’s order adopting the special master’s report. We find merit in the conservator’s argument that the trial court was required to hold a hearing before acting on the special master’s report. As we are unable to ascertain from the record whether a hearing was held, we vacate and remand for a determination of whether a hearing was held by the trial court. If no hearing was held, the trial court must hold a hearing on the special master’s report in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 53.04(2).

Anthony Phillip James, Sr. (“the Appellant”) was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of aggravated child abuse.  On appeal the Appellant alleges that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to prove that he knowingly injured the child.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Inmate at Wilson County jail, who fell from top bunk bed and injured his shoulder, sued the County under the Governmental Tort Liability Act for failing to assign him to a bottom bunk or provide him with a ladder to access the top bunk. Following a trial, the court held that the bunk assignment was a discretionary function, and consequently, the County was immune from suit; that the county owed no duty to provide a bottom bunk, and that the inmate was more than 50 percent at fault for his injuries. We reverse the trial court’s ruling that the County was immune and the court’s consideration of comparative fault; determining that the County was not negligent, we affirm the judgment in favor of the County.

The Petitioner, Michael George Medina, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Smith County.  He was convicted of first degree murder of his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.