APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant-Appellant, Lesergio Duran Wilson, was charged with first degree premeditated murder, and the State filed its notice of intent to seek the death penalty.  Wilson then filed a notice of intent to introduce expert testimony regarding his mental diseases, defects, and other mental conditions bearing on his guilt for the charged offense, and the State filed a motion to exclude this expert testimony.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the State’s motion.  In this interlocutory appeal, Wilson argues that the trial court erred in ruling that he could not present expert testimony during the guilt/innocence phase of trial regarding his incapacity to form the requisite culpable mental states for the offense.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Joseph R. Vibbert, was indicted for two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class C felony.  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-527.  The Defendant pled guilty to one count of sexual battery, a Class E felony, and the second count was dismissed.  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-505.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years to be served in confinement.  In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion; and (2) that the trial court erred by denying his request for an alternative sentence.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The notice of appeal was not timely filed and therefore, this appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Defendant, Billy Jeremy Jones, entered an open guilty plea to felony failure to appear.  The trial court, thereafter, sentenced him to four years, as a Range II, persistent offender, and ordered that sentence to run consecutively to the eight-year sentence on the underlying conviction for which the Defendant failed to appear.  The sole issue presented for our review is whether the effective twelve-year sentence is excessive.  Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm the sentencing decision of the Bedford County Circuit Court.

Petitioner, Termaine Roberson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel’s failure to adequately prepare for trial, including failing to call two witnesses at trial and failing to obtain DNA testing of a ski mask worn by one of the perpetrators. Having reviewed the record before us and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s findings. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Appellant did not timely file the Notice of Appeal and thus, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Consequently, the appeal must be dismissed.

This is an estate case involving the division of two properties used as collateral to secure a commercial note. When the decedent‟s beneficiaries sought to partition the properties, her former husband objected, asserting that he assumed sole ownership of the properties by fulfilling the note with proceeds from the decedent's life insurance policies. Following a hearing, the trial court found that the beneficiaries were entitled to a 70 percent share of the properties. The former husband appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court as modified.

The Defendant, Dennis Lee Arnold, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, Class B felonies, and solicitation of a minor, a Class C felony.  See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-504, 39-13-522, 39-12-102 (2014).  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to consecutive terms of eleven years for the aggravated sexual battery convictions at 100% service and five years for the solicitation conviction, for an effective twenty-seven-year sentence.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously admitted prior bad act evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b).  We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I write separately to highlight the trial court's copious references to “completing the story of the crime” as a basis for allowing testimony that was challenged pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b).

The petitioner, Billy Drew Massengill, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2013 Cocke County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded convictions of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, the sale and delivery of Oxymorphone, driving on a revoked license, theft of $500 or less, and failure to appear, for which he received an effective sentence of eight years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Purchaser of insurance agency sued Seller, alleging breach of contract and misrepresentation. Seller filed a counterclaim seeking amount due on Purchaser’s promissory note.  The trial court found Purchaser failed to prove either breach of contract or misrepresentation, and it awarded Seller the balance due on the promissory note.  Purchaser appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

J.S.H. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, L.J., Jr. (the Child). Mother contends that the trial court erred in its finding – said to be made by clear and convincing evidence – that she abandoned the Child by willfully (1) failing to pay support and (2) failing to visit the Child in the four months immediately preceding the filing of the termination petition. She also challenges the trial court's holding that she failed to provide the Child a suitable home. Mother argues that the trial court erred when it held that termination is in the Child's best interest. Mother has three other children, B.H., J.T., and A.T. The Department of Children's Services (DCS) was awarded temporary legal custody of all of the four children on September 20, 2012, due to the trial court's finding that each was dependent and neglected. Mother's other three children now live with their paternal grandmother. Only Mother's parental rights with respect to L.J., Jr. are at issue on this appeal. We modify the trial court's judgment. As modified, the judgment terminating Mother's rights is affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Daetrus Pilate, of aggravated assault by use of a deadly weapon and evading arrest in a motor vehicle creating a high risk of death or injury, and the trial court sentenced him to a total effective sentence of nine years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it excluded photographs of him taken during his hospitalization after being shot during this incident; and (3) his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Petitioner, George Hardin, appeals the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s denial of his third petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1988 conviction for first degree murder and his life sentence. He contends that (1) although he has filed two previous petitions for habeas corpus relief, the arguments contained in the petitions were not considered and (2) the 1990 judgment and a 1996 order are void because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter them. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This appeal involves a dispute between a prisoner and the Tennessee Department of Correction regarding the Department’s classification of the prisoner as a member of a security threat group. The trial court dismissed the prisoner’s petition for writ of certiorari because it was not timely filed, and therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the petition. We affirm.

Jimmy L. Hensley brought this action to enforce his agreement with a former employer, Cocke Farmer’s Cooperative (the co-op), providing for the payment of severance pay to him in the event his employment was terminated without cause. Each side moved for summary judgment. The trial court held the agreement to be valid and enforceable. Accordingly, it granted Hensley summary judgment, awarding him the severance pay set forth in the agreement. The co-op appeals. We affirm.

Defendant, Jarrod Reese Spicer, was convicted by an Obion County jury of second degree murder and aggravated robbery and sentenced to serve concurrent sentences of twenty-five and twelve years, respectively, as a standard offender. On appeal, Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions and that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to the maximum sentence for each conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this interlocutory appeal, the defendants appeal the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss a product liability lawsuit on the ground of forum non conveniens. Discerning no abuse of discretion by the trial court, we affirm.

In 2007, Tim E. Shaw contacted FSGBank, N.A. (FSG) regarding the refinancing of multiple loans. FSG initiated the processing of his request for refinancing; in the meantime, it extended to him a new loan for $60,000 to enable him to purchase another piece of property for investment purposes. The new loan was secured by a trust deed on property he owned at 430 Highland Avenue in Cleveland, Tennessee. In 2010, after an apparent default by Mr. Shaw on the $60,000 loan, FSG sought foreclosure proceedings on the Highland Avenue property and advertised a trustee sale. As a result, Mr. Shaw filed a complaint against FSG in 2010. He alleged a number of claims, specifically (1) breach of an agreement for future loans; (2) breach of contract; (3) conversion; (4) fraud; and (5) misrepresentation. FSG subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, contending that Mr. Shaw’s complaint failed to state an actionable claim as there was not in existence a written agreement by FSG to make additional loans. Further, FSG claimed that Mr. Shaw’s misrepresentation claim was barred by the statute of limitations and because it was based upon FSG’s alleged failure to make loans it never agreed to make.

This appeal involves the assignment of a deed of trust. Plaintiff/Appellant purchased a home in Memphis in 2004 and later defaulted on her mortgage. Appellees advised of their intent to foreclose on the home, which prompted Plaintiff to file suit and obtain a temporary restraining order preventing foreclosure. Plaintiff asserted several legal theories, which were all dismissed by the trial court. Plaintiff appealed, and this Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal on all but one fraud claim. Upon remand, the trial court then granted Appellees' motion for summary judgment on the remaining fraud claim. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The defendant, Eddie James Bright, pled guilty to initiation of the process to manufacture methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and, following a sentencing hearing, was sentenced to ten years and one day incarceration.  On appeal, he argues that the State breached its contractual obligations to him by mentioning his pending charges at the sentencing hearing, contrary to the plea agreement’s preclusion of the mention of such charges at sentencing.  After review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

The employee, a police officer, was diagnosed with coronary artery disease after a routine stress test in February 2011. He sought workers’ compensation benefits, asserting he was entitled to the presumption of causation created by Tennessee Code Annotated section 7-51-201(a)(1). His employer denied the claim. At trial, both sides presented expert medical testimony from board-certified cardiologists. The trial court found that the employer did not rebut the statutory presumption and awarded benefits. The employer has appealed. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Upon review, we conclude that the employer rebutted the statutory presumption and the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding of causation. Therefore, we reverse the judgment.

The petitioner, Thomas Paul Gagne, Jr., appeals the denial of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The trial court found that Employee, a utility technician, suffered a work-related injury to his left hand and awarded thirty percent vocational disability. Employer has appealed, contending the trial court erred in awarding benefits for an injury to Employee's left hand rather than to his left index finger. This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Because there is no evidence suggesting unusual and extraordinary hand conditions stemming from the finger injury, we reverse the trial court's judgment. 

This case involves a mother’s request for a change in the primary residential parent designation for her children. Following a one-day hearing, the trial court found that the mother failed to prove a material change in circumstance as necessary to change the primary residential parent designation. On appeal, the mother argues that the court’s order did not comply with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01 and that the proof showed a material change in circumstance. After reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision.