APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Joseph Dejuan Webster, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison.  The Petitioner appealed, arguing that there was newly discovered evidence.  This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction.  State v. Joseph Dejuan Webster, No M2007-00050-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2229208, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 29, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2008).  In May 2014, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that one of the key witnesses against him at trial had recanted her trial testimony in a sworn statement.  The coram nobis court held a hearing, and, after expressing doubt as to the witness’s testimony, dismissed the petition for writ of error coram nobis.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the coram nobis court erred and asserts that he is entitled to coram nobis relief on the basis of the witness’s recanted testimony.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable authority, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is the second appeal from a 2008 petition filed by Mother to set Father’s child support obligation for the parties’ five-year-old child, to make an upward deviation to pay for private school, and to determine the amount of retroactive support owed. Father responded, contending that an upward deviation for private school was not appropriate. He also contended that he should be credited for voluntary payments he made throughout the retroactive period. The trial court established Father’s current support obligation, which included an upward deviation for private school; however, the court made no findings to justify the deviation as required by Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-2-4-.07(2)(a)(1). Father appealed the upward deviation. We reversed and remanded with instructions for the trial court to “make the requisite findings of fact to determine, inter alia, whether private schooling for the child is appropriate based upon the facts of this case.” In re Andrea A.R., No. M2011-00574-COA-R3-JV, 2012 WL 397475, at *7-8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2012). On remand, Mother sought to introduce additional evidence about the appropriateness of private school. The trial court declined to accept additional evidence, relied on the evidence introduced in the first trial, and, based on its written findings of fact, concluded that deviating from the child support guidelines was not appropriate because the parties could not afford private school. The trial court also established Father’s child support obligation for each of the six years preceding the filing of the petition to set support, calculated Father’s total obligation for the retroactive period, determined that Father’s voluntary payments exceeded that obligation, and held that no arrearage was owed. Because Mother filed a new petition to modify the current support obligation, which was consolidated with the above petition, the trial court allowed each party to introduce evidence of their current income. Based on that evidence, the court imputed income to Mother because she failed to provide reliable evidence of her income and modified Father’s child support obligation, which was established pursuant to the guidelines without a deviation. Mother appealed, raising several issues. We affirm in all respects.

Petitioner, Douglas Zweig, was convicted in 1981 of attempt to commit a felony: to wit, third degree burglary.  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-603 (1975).  He was sentenced to serve eleven months, twenty-nine days in the Shelby County Correctional Center, but the trial court suspended his sentence to two years of probation after service of thirty days in confinement.  In 2014, he filed a motion under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36, requesting that the trial court correct the judgment to reflect that he was convicted of a misdemeanor rather than a felony.  The trial court denied his petition.  Upon review, we conclude that petitioner’s conviction was a felony and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

This appeal involves a challenge to a local rule of the criminal court in Shelby County. The lawsuit was filed in the chancery court. After a hearing, the chancery court concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the matter and entered a temporary injunction prohibiting the criminal court and its ten judges from enforcing a section of the local rule. We granted an application for an extraordinary appeal filed by the criminal court and its judges. We reverse the chancery court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction, vacate the temporary injunction and remand for dismissal of the complaint.

Defendant, Blake Edward Childress, was convicted by a Hamblen County Jury of incest. He was sentenced to six years in incarceration. On appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court improperly denied a motion to suppress; (2) the trial court improperly allowed introduction of evidence of prior bad acts; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. After a review, we determine Defendant properly invoked his right to counsel and, thereafter, was improperly subjected to continued discussion by a detective that produced an incriminating response. Consequently, the subsequent confession by Defendant was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, and the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress. We determine the subsequent introduction of the confession at trial was not harmless error, and the judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded for new trial.

This is a consolidated appeal from two separate actions arising from numerous competing petitions filed by the parents of two minor children. Due to the fact that the parents represented themselves during much of the trial court proceedings and at all times on appeal, the procedural history is muddled, the record is incomplete, and the briefs are of little assistance. The salient facts and procedural history are that a petition for divorce was filed in 2011 at which time both parties were represented by counsel. In December 2012, the trial court entered a final judgment whereby it declared the parties divorced, awarded Mother custody, and set child support. Father appealed, but soon thereafter he filed several petitions to modify custody and support. Mother answered and filed a petition for civil contempt against Father. The trial court found Father in civil contempt for failing to pay child support; he was incarcerated but released when the arrearage was paid. The court also entered a permanent injunction prohibiting Father from having contact with Mother. Father appealed several decisions in the second case. Based on post-judgment facts we agreed to consider, we are advised that Father filed an emergency petition in May 2015 to be granted custody due to Mother’s drug problems. After a hearing, the trial court awarded Father temporary custody, and the children remain in Father’s exclusive custody. Because Father has custody of the children, we are unable to provide Father meaningful relief with respect to this issue. The issues that are currently justiciable include: (1) whether the trial court is biased against Father; (2) the initial award of child support; (3) finding Father in civil contempt; (4) the injunction against Father; and (5) attorney’s fees awarded Mother. We affirm the trial court in all other respects.
 

This is negligence case. Appellees rented a storage unit from Appellant. The storage unit flooded, and the flooding destroyed Appellees’ personal property. Appellees filed suit against Appellant in general sessions court, claiming negligence and gross negligence. Appellees prevailed in general sessions court, and Appellant appealed the case to the trial court. After a bench trial, the trial court found the exculpatory clause in the parties’ rental agreement was void. The trial court also found that the Appellant’s rental of the unit to the Appellees, despite its knowledge of the obvious condition of flooding and advertising its units as dry, constituted gross negligence. We affirm.

The employee successfully pursued a Request for Assistance (“RFA”) through the Department of Labor and Workforce Development (“DOL”) for treatment of deep vein thrombosis resulting from a fall at work in February 2006. In January 2013, she filed a second RFA alleging that she required knee replacement surgery as a result of the same incident. DOL denied her request, and she filed this action in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County. The trial court dismissed her claim based on the expiration of the statute of limitations, laches, waiver, and estoppel. She has appealed that decision. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Upon review, we find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s granting of the motion for summary judgment on the statute of limitations and reverse the judgment on that issue. Additionally, there are genuine issues of fact as to the equitable defenses. Therefore, we remand the case for further consideration consistent with this ruling.

In this divorce case, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce based upon the sole statutory ground of irreconcilable differences, adopting and approving the parties‟ signed and notarized marital dissolution agreement and signed temporary parenting plan. The trial court subsequently entered two different parenting plans, designating the second plan as the permanent parenting plan. The mother has appealed the entry of the subsequent parenting plans. Determining that the trial court lacked authority to enter a temporary parenting plan concomitant with a final decree of divorce, we vacate the later plans and reinstate the original temporary parenting plan, designating it to be the controlling permanent parenting plan in this action.

A Dickson County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, James Denver Case, of first degree felony murder, aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and the trial court immediately sentenced him to life in prison for the murder conviction.  After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to eight years for aggravated robbery and three years for aggravated burglary with all of the sentences to be served concurrently.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, that the trial court erred by instructing the grand jury in the presence of the jury venire, and that the trial court erred by allowing the deliberating jury to view a video in the courtroom without the appellant’s being present. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Andre De'Lane Ross, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court's denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion for correction of a clerical error on the face of his possession of cocaine judgment. In this appeal, the Appellant submits that the trial court erred in denying his motion because, at the guilty plea hearing, the court found that his plea to this charge lacked a sufficient factual basis but a guilty judgment was, thereafter, erroneously entered. Based on our review, we dismiss the appeal.

This appeal arises from a divorce and the entry of a permanent parenting plan. Pamela Rose Beeler (“Mother”) filed for divorce from her husband Barry Allen Beeler (“Father”) in the Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Trial Court”). After a prolonged and contentious legal battle, the Trial Court granted the parties a divorce. The parties ultimately reached a settlement regarding the custody of their three minor children, which was announced in open court. Father appeals, arguing that, despite his agreeing to the settlement, he actually opposes the settlement and that the final judgment should be overturned. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. We further find this appeal frivolous and remand to the Trial Court for a determination of reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded to Mother.

The Defendant-Appellant, Thomas Mitchell, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of burglary of a building, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-402(a)(1). As a Range III, persistent offender, he was sentenced to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court abused its discretion in applying certain enhancement factors. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff has appealed from a final order entered on September 25, 2015, dismissing her Petition for Judicial Review. Because the plaintiff did not file her notice of appeal within the thirty day time period required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.
 

Taxpayer appealed the Shelby County Assessor of Property's tax assessment regarding unreported tangible personal property and raw materials to the Tennessee State Board of Equalization. The administrative judge ruled partially in favor of taxpayer but against taxpayer regarding the raw materials. Taxpayer appealed to the State Board's Assessment Appeals Commission, and the administrative judge's ruling was upheld. Taxpayer then challenged the Appeals Commission's ruling in the chancery court. The chancery court reversed the Appeals Commission's ruling, finding that taxpayer was not a manufacturer and that its inventory should not have been assessed as raw materials. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Tyrone Musgrave, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief arising from his guilty plea to one count of burglary, a Class D felony, and one count of retaliation for past action, a Class E felony. On appeal, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to his guilty pleas because counsel did not spend adequate time meeting with him and failed to fully explain the consequences of his plea agreement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an appeal from a juvenile court order assessing a portion of the mother’s attorney’s fees against the father’s counsel. Because the father’s counsel did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the judgment as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.

Defendant, John Traion Davis, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s summary dismissal for failure of Defendant to state a colorable claim.

The Defendant, Corey Antuan Gray, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of four counts of attempted first degree murder; four counts of aggravated assault; four counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; and one count of evading arrest. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the attempted murder and aggravated assault convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to consecutive sentences of twenty years for each count of attempted murder, six years for each count of employing a firearm during a dangerous felony, and one year and six months for evading arrest. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support all four of the convictions for attempted first degree murder and that his sentence is excessive. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Hamblen County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Luis M. (“Father”) to the minor child Analilia R. (“the Child”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court found that clear and convincing evidence established the ground of persistent conditions against Father, and that the evidence was clear and convincing that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Father appeals, arguing DCS failed to meet its burden of proof on the ground of persistent conditions. DCS raises its own issue of whether the Juvenile Court erred in failing to find the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court in its entirety.

Reluctantly and respectfully, I dissent from the majority opinion in this case. The Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 movant in this case stated a colorable claim to relief, and based upon the current wording of the rule, that is all that is required. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(b).

Deangelo Jackson (“the Defendant”) was indicted with one count each of especially aggravated robbery, attempted second-degree murder, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After a jury trial, the trial court entered judgments of conviction for especially aggravated robbery and facilitation of attempted second-degree murder and imposed an effective thirty-two-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant raises two issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions and (2) whether the trial court erred when it held that the State would be allowed to impeach the Defendant’s testimony with evidence of his prior convictions for theft and felon in possession of a handgun. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Ronnie L. Johnson, appeals as of right from the Wilson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis.  The Petitioner contends that the coram nobis court abused its discretion in dismissing his petition.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Petitioner, Daniel Wade Wilson, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner alleges that his conviction for felony murder is void because the trial court violated the law of the case doctrine by merging the conviction for second degree murder into the conviction for felony murder in direct contravention of this Court’s directions upon remand of Petitioner’s direct appeal. Petitioner also alleges that his conviction for felony murder violates the constitutional protection against double jeopardy because he was already serving a sentence for the second degree murder conviction before he was retried for felony murder. Upon our review of the record, we find that the trial court did not violate the law of the case doctrine and that Petitioner has failed to provide an adequate record for review of his double jeopardy claim. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The defendant, William Earl Starks, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.