APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a premises liability case. The plaintiff alleges he slipped and fell in a leaf-filled gutter maintained by defendant. Plaintiff filed suit against the defendant, alleging that the defendant failed to properly maintain and warn pedestrians of a dangerous condition. Because the trial court granted defendant summary judgment without making findings of fact or stating the legal basis for its decision before instructing defendant to prepare an order, we vacate the trial court’s order of summary judgment and remand.

Owner of back-to-back billboards filed a petition for review challenging the decision of the Tennessee Department of Transportation (“TDOT”) to revoke his billboard permits on the ground that the billboards were not in compliance with the TDOT spacing requirements. We find substantial and material evidence to support the decision of the TDOT Commissioner and, therefore, affirm the chancellor’s decision. 

A jury convicted the defendant, Dennis Haughton Webber, of driving with a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor; disorderly conduct, a Class C misdemeanor; failure to display his registration plates, a Class C misdemeanor; and failure to carry a registration, a Class C misdemeanor.  The defendant on appeal challenges the jurisdiction of the trial court.  We interpret his other issues to be challenges to the sufficiency of the convicting evidence.  We conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to impose its judgments on the defendant.  However, we reverse the defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct because the evidence was not sufficient to support it as it was charged in the indictment.  We affirm the remaining judgments of the trial court.

Frederick L. Moore (“the Petitioner”) filed his second petition for writ of error coram nobis, presenting “newly discovered evidence” in the form of expert testimony regarding cell phone towers accessed by the Petitioner's cell phone at the time of the offense. The coram nobis court denied relief without a hearing, finding that the Petitioner's claim was time-barred, that the evidence was not newly discovered, and that it was not the type of evidence which might have produced a different result at trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Defendant, Shasta Jackson, appeals after being convicted by a Knox County jury of two counts of reckless endangerment, one count of second degree murder, one count of attempted second degree murder, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-five years. In this appeal, Defendant challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the trial court's refusal to allow an expert witness testify about eyewitness identification; (3) introduction of evidence relating to Defendant's membership in the “Westside 111 Neighborhood Crips”; (4) introduction of pictures from Defendant's Facebook page; (5) the decision by the trial court to strike the testimony of a defense witness after he refused to answer a question on cross-examination; and (6) the length of her sentence. After a review of the record, we determine that Defendant is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Defendant, Jordan Thomas Peters, was convicted of one count of delivery of psilocin, a Schedule I controlled substance, and one count of delivery of psilocin within 1000 feet of a school. Defendant received a total effective sentence of fifteen years to serve at 100%. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether a retrial for delivery of a controlled substance violated the constitutional protection against double jeopardy after Defendant was originally acquitted of sale of a controlled substance; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to compel discovery of the case names and files of other cases in which the confidential informant had been involved; (3) whether the trial court erred by giving acquittal-first jury instructions, precluding the jury from considering the inference of casual exchange; (4) whether the trial court erred in not giving a specific instruction with regard to the defense of entrapment by luring into a school zone; (5) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; and (6) whether his sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime committed and therefore unconstitutional. Upon our thorough review of the arguments, record, and authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Given the clear and apparently controlling case law concerning convictions enhanced pursuant to the Drug Free School Zone Act (the Act), I must reluctantly concur. However, I write separately to set forth my ever increasing concern regarding enhancement of convictions under the Act.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant, Roy Seagraves, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant.  He properly reserved a certified question of law for appeal.  The question of law is dispositive of the case.  Having reviewed the record in this case, we hold that the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that the police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the charges with prejudice.

We granted permission to appeal to address whether exhaustion of administrative remedies is required in this lawsuit brought by a hospital against a TennCare managed care organization (MCO). The hospital alleged in its complaint that the MCO had not paid the hospital all of the monies due for emergency services provided to the MCO’s TennCare enrollees. In its answer, the MCO asserted that it had paid the hospital in accordance with TennCare regulations; the MCO also filed a counterclaim regarding overpayments made pursuant to the TennCare regulations. The MCO filed a motion for partial summary judgment. It argued that the hospital’s allegations implicitly challenged the applicability and/or validity of the TennCare regulations, so the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) required the hospital to exhaust its administrative remedies by bringing those issues to TennCare prior to filing suit. Absent exhaustion of administrative remedies, the MCO argued, the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. The trial court agreed; it dismissed the hospital’s lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the MCO’s counterclaim as well. The Court of Appeals reversed; it concluded that the hospital’s lawsuit was simply a dispute regarding the interpretation of statutes and regulations, over which the trial court had jurisdiction. The MCO appeals. Looking at the substance of the parties’ dispute rather than simply the face of the hospital’s complaint, we hold that the UAPA requires exhaustion of administrative remedies in this matter to the extent that resolution of the parties’ claims would necessarily require the trial court to render a declaratory judgment concerning the validity or applicability of TennCare regulations. While the UAPA prohibits the trial court from rendering such declaratory relief absent exhaustion of administrative remedies, it does not address claims for damages. In this case, both parties have asserted damage claims that hinge on the issues to be addressed in the administrative proceedings. Under these circumstances, we reverse the dismissal of the complaint and the counterclaim and remand the case to the trial court with directions to hold the parties’ damage claims in abeyance pending resolution of administrative proceedings regarding the validity or applicability of the TennCare regulations at issue.   

The Defendant, Shelby Lesean Harris, was indicted for one count of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine and one count of delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine.  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417.  Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and facilitation of the delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine.  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-403.  The trial court merged the Defendant’s conviction for facilitation of the delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine into his conviction for facilitation of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine.  The trial court then sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years and six months.  On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the in-court identification of the Defendant by two confidential informants; and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions.  Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Ray Neil Thompson, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Davidson County.  He was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated robbery and later entered a guilty plea to two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of evading arrest.  For these offenses, he received an effective sentence of fifty years at 100 percent in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from an action for divorce wherein the trial court ordered the parties’ marital debt to be divided in a nearly equal fashion. The trial court awarded child support to the wife, who was designated primary residential parent and who received a greater share of co-parenting time with the children. The court also awarded child support retroactive to the date of the filing of the divorce complaint. In addition, the court allocated both federal tax exemptions for the children to the wife. The husband has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment with a slight modification in the amount of the child support arrearage award.

This is an appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission involving a contract dispute. The Claims Commissioner concluded that the Appellants were not entitled to damages other than for services rendered because their services contract with the State was terminated for cause. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Appellant appeals the trial court‘s order enforcing a settlement agreement, arguing that the agreement was the product of coercion on the part of her attorney. We affirm.

A Knox County jury found Curtis Scott Harper (“the Defendant”) guilty of three counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication, three counts of vehicular homicide by creating a substantial risk of death and serious bodily injury, one count of reckless endangerment, one count of tampering with evidence, one count of leaving the scene of an accident, one count of driving under the influence, and, in a subsequent deliberation, one count of driving under the influence (second offense). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective thirty years' incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant claims that: (1) the introduction of fifty crime scene and autopsy photographs, many of which were gruesome, graphic, or horrifying, deprived the Defendant of a fair trial by inflaming the passions of the jury; (2) the State presented false expert testimony concerning the speed of the Defendant's vehicle, thereby depriving the Defendant of due process; (3) the State violated Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to provide to the Defendant a copy of the article the forensic pathologist relied upon during his testimony; (4) the prosecutor engaged in improper argument, including personal attacks on defense counsel, that violated the Defendant's right to a fair trial; (5) the trial court erred in imposing partial consecutive sentences; and (6) the cumulative effect of the error requires a new trial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting numerous graphic and gruesome crime scene and autopsy photographs, the prejudicial effect of which far outweighed their probative value, and such error was not harmless. We, therefore, reverse the judgments of the criminal court and remand the case for a new trial.

This post-divorce appeal concerns the trial court's denial of the husband's motion to terminate his spousal support obligation and to add his current wife as a beneficiary to his life insurance policy. We affirm the court's denial of the termination of the support obligation but reverse the court's denial of the request to amend the life insurance policy.

Appellant TennCare enrollee has been receiving 24/7 care from a private duty nurse in the home of his grandparents in Martin, Tennessee. TennCare determined that he could receive adequate care for less cost in a special respiratory care unit in St. Francis Hospital in Memphis. Enrollee, through his grandparents as his co-conservators, filed an administrative appeal. The administrative law judge agreed with TennCare. Appellants appealed that decision to chancery court, which reversed the administrative law judge’s decision as being arbitrary and capricious. TennCare appealed. We reverse the decision of the chancery court and affirm the administrative law judge’s opinion.

On August 13, 2010, following a violation of his probation, Donald Nichols began serving a sentence at the Knox County Detention Facility (KCDF). He was assigned to a second floor cell. The only bed available there was a top bunk. On August 20, 2010, Nichols was subjected to a physical examination by KCDF's medical staff. The staff detailed his medical history as pain in his lower back and extremities, as well as surgeries on his knee, foot, and ankle. On August 27, 2010, while he was asleep, Nichols rolled off his bed and hit the floor. As a result, his head was bloody, and he had intense pain in his neck and back. The on-duty nurse examined him and gave him ibuprofen for pain. In the weeks that followed, Nichols continued to have ongoing pain. He made multiple requests for medical assistance. He had an x-ray on November 5, 2010. That x-ray and a subsequent CT Scan and MRI revealed that he had several cervical fractures as a result of his fall. Through the efforts of his criminal attorney, Nichols was released from KCDF on November 10, 2010. Thereafter, in January 2011, he had surgery and incurred medical expenses of approximately $240,000. He filed a complaint against Knox County, alleging common law negligence. Nichols filed a motion for partial summary judgment. Knox County filed a motion for summary judgment.

The petitioner, Richard Anthony, filed a post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his 1990 convictions for aggravated robbery and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, and resulting concurrent sentences of twelve years and six years, respectively. As we understand, the petitioner claims that, although he has had no contact with trial counsel in the last twenty-five years, he was unaware that counsel was not pursuing a second-tier appeal of the convictions. As relief, he asks that his convictions be vacated or, in the alternative, that he have counsel appointed to pursue a second-tier direct appeal of his convictions. The post-conviction court determined both that his petition was untimely and without merit, even if considered as a motion to reopen a similar 1997 petition. Following our review, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, James Smith, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which challenged his 2000 conviction of first degree murder, claiming that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the indictment was void. Discerning no error, we affirm the order of summary dismissal.

In 2013, the Defendant pleaded guilty in case number F-13761 to two counts of theft of property valued over $1,000, one count of theft of property valued between $500 and $1,000, and one count of simple possession of a controlled substance.  The Defendant also pleaded guilty in case number F-14140 to one count of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine.  For these convictions, the trial court imposed a six-year sentence in case number F-13761 and a two-year consecutive sentence in case number F-14140, for a total effective sentence of eight years, to be served on supervised probation.  In 2014, the trial court issued a probation violation warrant and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a revocation of his probation.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This products liability case arises out of an accident which resulted from the failure of a tire purchased less than three months before the accident. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff’s vehicle was totaled. Subsequently, the entire vehicle, including the tire, was destroyed. This case presents the following issues for review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to dismiss this case as a sanction for spoliation of evidence; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying summary judgment to the Defendants on the issues of causation and whether the tire was defective or unreasonably dangerous; and (3) whether the trial court erred in denying summary judgment on the issue of the application of the apparent manufacturer doctrine. Upon a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court did not err with respect to any of these issues. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.