APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Edward Sample, was convicted of one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his other crimes, that the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial, and that he was improperly fingerprinted during trial without counsel present. Following our review of the briefs of the parties, the record, and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence of other crimes, and we reverse the defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial.

Pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant, Jon Michael Johnson, who pleaded guilty to one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”), appeals two related certified questions of law relative to the validity of the instrument used to measure his blood alcohol level following his arrest.  Because neither of the certified questions presented is dispositive of the defendant’s case, the appeal is dismissed.

The petitioner, Mathew Dixon, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. The petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. He subsequently filed both a direct appeal and a petition for post-conviction relief in his case. He has now filed the instant petition to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging a later-arising claim. Specifically, he contends that he subsequently learned that a witness at trial against him had an agreement with the prosecution. He contends that the post-conviction court erred in not finding that the statute of limitations should be tolled. Following review of the record, we conclude we are without jurisdiction to review the challenged issue. Accordingly, the summary dismissal is affirmed.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the courts below erred in concluding that the mother must be afforded relief from a void default judgment terminating her parental rights even though she did not seek relief from the void judgment under Rule 60.02(3) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure until more than eight years after it was entered. We agree with the courts below that the default judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdiction and also conclude that the reasonable time filing requirement of Rule 60.02 does not apply to petitions seeking relief from void judgments under Rule 60.02(3). Nevertheless, we hold that relief from a void judgment should be denied if the following exceptional circumstances exist: “(1) [t]he party seeking relief, after having had actual notice of the judgment, manifested an intention to treat the judgment as valid; and (2) [g]ranting the relief would impair another person’s substantial interest of reliance on the judgment.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 66 (1982). We hold that the record has not been sufficiently developed to determine whether exceptional circumstances exist. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and remand for the trial court to determine, after a hearing, whether exceptional circumstances justify denying relief in this case.

The Oak Ridge City Court found the manager of three apartment buildings liable for several violations of the local building code. The manager appealed to the circuit court, and the City moved to amend the cause to add the purported owner of the properties as a defendant. The case proceeded to trial. After the City closed its proof, the trial court noticed that the purported owner of the property had not been properly made a party to the action. Accordingly, the trial court granted the City‟s motion to amend. Although the purported owner moved for a mistrial and/or a continuance, the trial court proceeded on to rule against the purported owner for several violations of the local building code. The purported owner appeals. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings to allow the purported owner of the properties an opportunity to meaningfully respond to the allegations against him in accordance with Rule 15.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

This is an appeal from an order designating a primary residential parent and setting visitation and child support. The juvenile court found that naming Father as primary residential parent was in the child’s best interest and set child support accordingly. Mother appealed both the designation of primary residential parent and the amount of child support owed to father. We affirm.     

Following a bench trial, the Defendant-Appellant, Carl C. Dotson, was convicted of driving on a revoked license, eighth offense, and driving under the influence (DUI), third offense, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 55-50-504 and 55-10-401, respectively.  For these offenses, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served consecutively to an unrelated matter.  In this appeal as of right, the Defendant-Appellant argues that the trial court erred by using a prior 1998 DUI conviction to enhance the instant DUI to a third offense and that the evidence was insufficient to support his DUI conviction.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jimmy W. Wilson, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which challenged the life sentence imposed based upon a Sullivan County Criminal Court jury's finding that he was a habitual criminal following his 1985 conviction of rape. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Plaintiff brought an action to pierce the corporate veil of defendant company and hold its sole shareholder personally liable for a debt. The trial court conducted a bench trial on the issue and found in favor of the defendant company and shareholder. The trial court initially declined to issue findings of fact in its final judgment. After both parties submitted their own proposed findings of fact, the trial court adopted the defendants‘ version nearly verbatim, incorporating two additional findings of fact of its own. However, because we find the trial court‘s findings of fact and conclusions of law insufficient to facilitate appellate review, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law.

This appeal concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Greg S. (“Father”) to his minor child Greg S., Jr. (“the Child”). The Juvenile Court terminated Father’s parental rights to the Child on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. Father appeals to this Court arguing only that it is not in the Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court.

An individual who sought records from a county sheriff’s department was provided the records outside the seven business day period required by the Tennessee Public Records Act. The individual, who was acting pro se, requested an award of attorney’s fees and discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(g). The trial court denied the request because the individual plaintiff did not incur attorney’s fees and did not incur the types of costs contemplated by Rule 54 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The individual appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal concerns the termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Bridgetta M. (“Mother”) to her minor children Greg S. and Kaedince M. (“the Children”). The Juvenile Court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Children on the grounds of wanton disregard and severe abuse. Mother appeals to this Court arguing only that it is not in the Children’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court.

The defendant, Gregory Dale, was convicted by a Williamson County Circuit Court jury of two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies, and simple assault, a Class A misdemeanor.  He was sentenced to four years, suspended to supervised probation after serving one year in the county jail.  On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim’s prior violent mood swings to corroborate his claim that the victim was the first aggressor and he acted in self-defense.  After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Cyrus Randy Whitson, of first degree murder.  The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the conviction.  State of Tennessee v. Cyrus Randy Whitson, No. M2007-02197-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 3787457, at *1-3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 12, 2009) perm. app. denied (Tenn. April 23, 2010).  Thereafter, the Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court issued an order denying the petition.  On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel.  After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that Employee’s bilateral knee replacements related to a work-related injury she suffered on March 20, 2004, and that any claim for compensation related to an injury she sustained on February 6, 2011 was barred by the doctrines of judicial and equitable estoppel. Employee has appealed. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Aaron Dean Lawson, was convicted of two counts of first degree premeditated murder and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, for which he was sentenced, respectively, to two life sentences and a consecutive two-year sentence. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by (1) disallowing expert proof of mental problems which were not such that they prevented his premeditating the murders; (2) admitting evidence of a jail telephone call which he made; (3) allowing proof of prior arrests, some of which resulted in his acquittal; (4) without a hearing, placing the Defendant in a stun-belt during the trial; (5) allowing evidence regarding pistol shells as proof of premeditation; and (6) excluding evidence of a prior consistent statement of the Defendant's father after he had been impeached with an allegedly inconsistent statement. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Brian Allen Cathey, pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and one count of theft of property of $1000.00 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, in exchange for concurrent sentences of three and two years. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied an alternative sentence and ordered the defendant to serve his sentences in confinement. The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by denying him an alternative sentence. Following our review of the briefs of the parties, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Richardson, was indicted for one count of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402, -502. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of aggravated rape. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the aggravated robbery charge, a mistrial was declared with respect to that charge, and it was ultimately dismissed. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-two years for the aggravated rape conviction to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred “in ruling that if consent [was] raised as a defense,” then evidence of two other rapes committed by the Defendant “would be relevant to rebut the issue of consent.” Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Justin Terrell Knox, was convicted following a jury trial of aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-506(c). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years as a Range II, multiple offender. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) that the State knowingly presented false testimony at trial; (3) that the trial court erred in admitting testimony from two of the witnesses at trial; (4) that the State failed to file a timely notice of its intent to seek enhanced punishment; and (5) that the trial court erred by ordering his sentence in this case be served consecutively to his sentence for a prior felony conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a transfer from juvenile court, the Madison County Grand Jury indicted Abraham Medina, Jr. (“the Defendant”), along with five other co-defendants, with three counts of aggravated robbery and one count of evading arrest. The Defendant was tried separately from his co-defendants and convicted as charged. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective twelve years' incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant's convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it failed to include a lesser included jury instruction as to facilitation; and (3) the trial court erroneously imposed the maximum sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a divorce action in a marriage of a long duration. The trial court granted the parties a divorce and divided the marital property. The wife appeals the trial court’s classification of the parties’ separate property, the valuation of their pensions, and the division of the marital property. We affirm

Petitioner, Chad Richard Dietz, sought post-conviction relief on the basis of an involuntary guilty plea and ineffective assistance of counsel.  After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief.  Because Petitioner has failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that his plea was involuntary, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Willis Holloway, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated burglary. He was sentenced to 135 years, and this court affirmed the judgments against him on direct appeal. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied by the post-conviction court after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, petitioner has abandoned his original claims for post-conviction relief and now argues that he should be granted a new trial because his trial counsel passed away prior to his post-conviction hearing. He also contends that his constitutional rights were violated by the trial court's assignment to hear the post-conviction proceeding. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a jury trial, Jennifer Lopez (“Defendant Lopez”) was convicted of one count of aggravated child neglect, and her ex-boyfriend, Sergio H. Gonzalez (“Defendant Gonzalez”) was convicted of two counts of aggravated child neglect in connection with severe abdominal injuries received by Defendant Lopez’s two-year-old son, N.L, in September 2011. On appeal, Defendant Gonzalez argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his September 27, 2011 interview with lead investigator, Detective Pilarski; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of N.L.’s bruises; (3) the trial court erred in preventing Defendant Gonzalez from impeaching Detective Pilarski with evidence from the detective’s personnel file; (4) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (5) the trial court erred when it sentenced Defendant Gonzalez to twenty years for one of his aggravated child neglect convictions.  Defendant Lopez argues that: (1) the trial court erred in failing to strike “improper statements made by the State’s attorney in closing arguments”; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction; and (3) the trial court erred when it sentenced her to seventeen years.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.