APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Douglas Wayne Young, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2009 Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, especially aggravated kidnapping, and four counts of aggravated rape, claiming that the post-convction court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a continuance and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Deanty Montgomery, appeals as of right from his jury convictions for aggravated assault, unlawful possession of a weapon, and misdemeanor reckless endangerment, which resulted in an effective five-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court properly permitted the State‘s argument that the Defendant was engaged in unlawful activity and was, therefore, not excused from the duty to retreat under a theory of self-defense; (2) whether the trial court committed error during jury deliberations in its response to a question from the jury about a person‘s duty to retreat when engaged in an unlawful activity; and (3) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the trial court‘s judgments.

Appellant, Antonio Williams a.k.a. Antwoin Williams, pleaded guilty to selling a controlled substance and received a suspended three-year sentence with eighteen months on probation. Appellant’s probation officer issued a probation violation warrant before appellant had completed his eighteen months on probation. While the warrant was pending, appellant received four additional charges and subsequently pleaded guilty to the violation of probation and the four additional charges, receiving concurrent sentencing. Appellant later filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court summarily dismissed. On appeal, appellant argues he stated a colorable claim in his motion because the trial court erroneously imposed concurrent sentencing and the trial court failed to make proper findings during sentencing. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A corporate officer responsible for paying over the sales taxes collected by a corporation pled guilty to attempted tax evasion under Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-1-1440. As part of his plea agreement, the criminal court ordered the corporate officer to pay restitution in the amount of $17,500. After completing probation, the Department of Revenue notified the corporate officer of an individual sales tax assessment of $137,493.76 arising from the corporation’s operations. The corporate officer filed a complaint in the Davidson County Chancery Court challenging the assessment. The corporate officer argued that the amount of the criminal restitution, which he had already paid, was the full amount of his individual liability to the Department. The Department filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. Concluding that criminal restitution and civil tax liability are separate and distinct, we affirm the dismissal.

Appellant, George Robert Hamby, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony.  The trial court sentenced appellant as a Range II offender to twelve years in confinement.  On appeal, appellant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in not accepting a negotiated guilty plea; (2) the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing.  Following our review of the evidence and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case concerns the applicability of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 20-12-119(c). When the trial court grants a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12 for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Section 20-12-119(c) requires the trial court to award the dismissed party his or her reasonable attorney’s fees. In this case, Appellant was dismissed from the lawsuit, but the trial court denied an award of attorney’s fees. Because the trial court’s orders do not specify on what grounds it dismissed Appellant, we cannot determine whether Section 20-12-119(c) was triggered in this case. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for entry of an order specifying the grounds for dismissal. 

A Dyer County jury convicted the Defendant, Jerry Edward Lanier, of two counts of selling more than .5 gram of cocaine in a drug-free zone. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve concurrent thirty-year sentences for his convictions. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against him. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This case involves a petition for grandparent visitation filed by the paternal grandparents of the child at issue. The trial court granted the petition for visitation pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-306. Because the trial court did not make appropriate written findings in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01, we do not reach the merits of this appeal. We vacate and remand for appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Petitioner, James Roskam, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner was convicted of aggravated robbery and was sentenced to twenty years in confinement as a Range II multiple offender. Petitioner challenged his conviction on appeal, and a panel of this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. State v. James Randall Roskam, No. M2011-02071-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 3611749 (Tenn. Crim. App., Aug. 20, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn., Nov. 26, 2012). On appeal, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a mistrial, failing to investigate whether exculpatory video evidence existed, failing to acquire 911 recordings, and failing to communicate with Petitioner during voir dire. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, James Harrell Driver, of violating the Sexual Offender Registry residency restriction. The trial court sentenced the Defendant, as a Range II offender, to four-years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court improperly imposed a four-year sentence; and (3) Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-211(c) is unconstitutional as applied in this case. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s complaint in a negligence case. After Appellant’s case was dismissed, he filed a notice of appeal pro se. Significant procedural shortcomings in Appellant’s brief on appeal prevent this Court from reaching any substantive issues. We therefore affirm.

Petitioner, Evan Kenyon Knox, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for first degree premeditated murder and for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Petitioner pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of second degree murder, and the trial court dismissed the firearm charge. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Petitioner received an out-of-range sentence of 30 years to be served at 100 percent. Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance and that Petitioner’s guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appeals. Following a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Tipton County jury convicted the Petitioner, Justin DeWayne Rogers, of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed and this Court affirmed the conviction. State v. Justin DeWayne Rogers, No. W2009-00982-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 4812776, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 19, 2010). Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and after a hearing, the post-conviction court issued an order dismissing the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Plaintiff was terminated from his employment as a City of Clarksville police officer in August 2010. The trial court affirmed, and Plaintiff appealed. We determined that the City had failed to follow its disciplinary procedures when it terminated Plaintiff’s employment, vacated the termination, and remanded the matter. Upon remand, the City upheld termination of Plaintiff, and the trial court again affirmed. We affirm.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Willie L. Taylor, was convicted of aggravated burglary and aggravated assault, both Class C felonies.  He was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to fourteen years for each conviction, to be served concurrently.  On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated burglary conviction and that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by arguing facts not in evidence.  Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellee commenced a lawsuit in the Shelby County Chancery Court seeking to invalidate a writ of possession that previously had been filed pursuant to an order of the Shelby County Circuit Court. After conducting a hearing on the matter, the Chancery Court entered an order granting Appellee her request for relief. Because we conclude that Appellee’s lawsuit constituted a collateral attack of the Circuit Court judgment, and there is nothing in the record indicating that the Circuit Court was without jurisdiction, the Chancery Court’s order is hereby vacated. We remand the case to the trial court for the entry of an order dismissing Appellee’s case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Sebastian Pegues, of two counts of first degree felony murder, one count of aggravated child abuse and one count of aggravated child neglect. The trial court merged the two first degree felony murder convictions and sentenced the Defendant to life. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent twenty-year sentences for the aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect convictions. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and sentences. We remand this case to the trial court for the entry of a corrected judgment in Count 3, indicating that the convicted offense is aggravated child neglect.

In this divorce case, Robert Allan Inman, Jr. (Husband) appeals the trial court's decision awarding Glenna Randolph Inman (Wife) alimony in futuro of $1,900 per month. We hold that the court's decision is supported by a number of relevant statutory factors, including the twenty-nine year duration of the marriage, Wife's age, sixty-three at the time of trial, her poor physical condition, Husband's good physical condition, his higher earning capacity, Wife's demonstrated need, and Husband's ability to pay. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this termination of parental rights case, J.L.B., Jr. (Father), appeals the order terminating his rights to his minor daughter, T.L.G. (the Child). The Department of Children's Services (DCS) removed the Child from the home of her mother, G.M.G. (Mother) after Mother was arrested for domestic violence. DCS took temporary custody and placed the Child in foster care. The Child was subsequently adjudicated dependent and neglected. Some eight months later, DCS filed a petition to terminate each of the parents' rights. After a trial, the court granted the petition.1 The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) multiple grounds for termination exist, and (2) termination is in the Child's best interest. Father challenges the finding of grounds for termination, but does not question the court's decision that termination is in the Child's best interest. We affirm.

Borla Performance Industries, Inc. (Borla) entered into two contracts with Universal Tool and Engineering, Inc. (UTE), by the terms of which UTE was to repair and refurbish six of Borla's pipe bending machines, which machines are used in Borla's business of designing and manufacturing automobile exhaust systems. Borla later sued UTE for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). Borla alleged that as a result of UTE's failure to timely repair and deliver the machines, which are also known as “benders,” Borla incurred lost profits in the amount of $486,166. After a four-day bench trial, the court dismissed Borla's negligent misrepresentation and TCPA claims; the court did grant Borla a judgment for $11,839.98 on its breach of contract claim. The trial court held that Borla failed to prove that it incurred lost profits as a result of a breach of contract by UTE. Borla appeals the trial court's judgment denying its claims for lost profits. Borla also appeals the court's judgment dismissing the TCPA claim. UTE appeals the judgment against it for breach of contract. We affirm.

Dontavis K.W. (“Defendant”) appeals the order of the Criminal Court for Hamilton County (“the Criminal Court”) committing him to the custody of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) for an indefinite term based upon findings of delinquency and violation of probation. We find and hold that pursuant to Tenn. R. Juv. P. 35 and Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 37-1-131(a)(4) and 37-1-137(a)(1)(A) the Criminal Court did not err in the probation revocation proceeding when it ordered a disposition which would have been permissible in the original delinquency proceeding. We, therefore, affirm.

Appellant, Orlando E. Bourrage, pleaded guilty to simple possession of marijuana and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days, suspended to probation.  In pleading guilty, he reserved a certified question of law challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of an allegedly illegal detention.  On appeal, he argues that the arresting officer unreasonably prolonged the initial traffic stop and that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kenneth L. Williams, pursuant to a plea agreement, pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual battery with a sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed, pro se, a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and a petition for post-conviction relief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court issued an order denying the motion and dismissing the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that his guilty plea was not knowingly entered and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgments.

An employee of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (“Goodyear”) fell while at work and suffered injuries; pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Law, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-101, et seq., she began receiving medical treatment. She subsequently relocated to Minnesota and made a request to Goodyear that she be provided a second panel of physicians in order to continue her treatment; Goodyear denied the request. At the employee’s request a workers’ compensation specialist from the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development ordered Goodyear to provide a second panel of physicians. Goodyear requested and received an administrative review of the specialist’s order; the Department affirmed the order. Thereafter, Goodyear filed a petition for writ of certiorari in Chancery Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-101 asserting that the Department exceeded its authority by ordering Goodyear to provide a second panel of physicians and a physician outside of Tennessee. The Department moved to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the court denied the motion and considered the merits of the petition. The court held that the Department did not exceed its authority in ordering the panel of physicians; Goodyear appeals. The Department of Labor also appeals the holding that the court had subject matter jurisdiction to review its decision. Concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we reverse the judgment of the court and dismiss the petition.  

This is a post-divorce case concerning the enforcement of a marital dissolution agreement, which the trial court incorporated into the divorce decree. The marital dissolution agreement required Appellant to pay Appellee’s monthly rent. Appellant made two or three payments, then stopped. The Appellee filed several petitions and complaints seeking to enforce the marital dissolution agreement. Because the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure rule 52.01, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand the case with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing and to issue sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law.