APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Joshua Bishop, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

In this action to collect on a promissory note, the trial court granted summary judgment to the bank. Appellants appeal the trial court’s decisions regarding whether the bank was properly doing business in the State of Tennessee and whether the Appellants’ two contract-based counter-claims fail as a matter of law. Discerning no error regarding the trial court’s finding that the bank was properly doing business in the State, we affirm the trial court’s ruling in that regard. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that the bank was entitled to summary judgment on the contract-based counterclaims.

The defendant, Devin Rogers, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I agree with the result reached by the majority Opinion with regard to whether Cadence was properly authorized to bring this suit. I also concur in the majority’s conclusion that the Appellants cannot survive summary judgment on their claims arising from the parties’ written contract. I must respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s holding that summary judgment was proper with regard to Appellants’ breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims concerning the alleged oral contract. My disagreement with the majority’s Opinion is two-fold. First, a genuine dispute of fact exists over whether the parties entered into a binding oral contract. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tenn. 1993). Second, contrary to the majority’s conclusion that no contract existed between the parties based on the omission of material terms, Tennessee law will uphold a contract’s formation even though one party has discretion to choose between material terms. Gurley v. King, 183 S.W.3d 30, 41 (Tenn. 2005). Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Cadence Bank on Appellants’ claims under the alleged oral contract.

This is a medical malpractice action. Plaintiff filed a complaint after sending pre-suit notices to Defendants. After voluntarily dismissing the complaint, Plaintiff filed a second set of pre-suit notices before re-filing the complaint. The pre-suit notices were filed within one year of the voluntary dismissal. Defendants moved for summary judgment, alleging that the re-filed complaint was untimely because it was not filed within one year of the dismissal pursuant to the saving statute. Plaintiff responded that the re-filed complaint was timely because the pre-suit notices entitled her to a 120-day extension of the saving statute pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c). The trial court dismissed the action. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court.

A jury convicted the defendant, Willard V. Fleming, of facilitation of the sale of cocaine, a Class D felony; facilitation of keeping or maintaining a dwelling used for keeping or selling controlled substances, a Class E felony; and assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and denial of his motion to acquit, asserting that the co-defendant’s testimony regarding the defendant’s involvement was insufficiently corroborated; that there was no proof that drugs were present because only lay testimony supported the conclusion that the substance sold was cocaine; that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant maintained the dwelling; and that the confidential informant’s testimony did not establish the elements of assault. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts, and we accordingly affirm.

In the first appeal of this action to quiet title to real property, which was the former home of the parties’ common ancestor, Plaintiff was declared the owner of the real estate. Thereafter, the same two parties disputed who owned the personal property in the home. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and determined that Plaintiff owned some of the personal property, and Defendant owned the remaining personal property. Being dissatisfied with that determination, Defendant filed a motion for new trial contending Plaintiff made false statements under oath, which was denied. In this appeal, Defendant contends the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s ruling concerning the ownership of the personal property. He also appeals the denial of his motion for a new trial. Because Defendant has not provided a verbatim transcript of the evidence or a statement of the evidence pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 24, we have no evidence to review. Lacking any evidence to review, we presume the evidence presented supports the trial court’s decisions. Defendant’s contention that he is entitled to a new trial must also fail because his motion was not supported by any evidence, and he offered nothing more than bare assertions that Plaintiff made false statements at trial. We find no merit to either contention and affirm the trial court in all respects. We have also determined that this appeal was devoid of merit; thus, it constitutes a frivolous appeal under Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses she incurred on appeal. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court in all respects and remand with instructions for the trial court to award Plaintiff her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses.

In this appeal, the owner of a bar sought review of a citation he received for failure to display a beer permit. We affirm.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Desmond Sykes, of two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective nine years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statement to police and evidence obtained pursuant to his arrest because the police lacked probable cause for the arrest. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

First American Title Insurance Company (“First American”) sued Citizens Bank seeking a declaratory judgment holding that First American had no liability to Citizens Bank for two specific transactions involving loan closings on real property located in Sevierville, Tennessee. First American filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Chancery Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”) granted First American summary judgment and dismissed Citizens Bank’s counterclaim. Citizens Bank appeals to this Court raising issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in finding that by assigning the mortgages and deeds of trust Citizens Bank also had assigned the two closing protection letters related to these specific transactions, and also that Citizens Bank’s counterclaim was barred because Citizens Bank failed to give First American timely notice of the settlement between Citizens Bank and the assignee of the mortgages.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant of the aggravated assault of Jack Austin. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Joshua Paul Lewis, was convicted of two counts of rape of a child, Class A felonies, and one count of attempted rape of a child, a Class B felony. He received twentyfive year sentences for the convictions for rape of a child and a ten-year sentence for attempted rape of a child, all to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of twentyfive years. On this delayed appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal; and (3) the cumulative effect of the errors at trial deprived him of his right to a fair trial. After reviewing the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Joseph Sanford McNair, Jr., was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of possession with the intent to sell more than 0.5 grams of cocaine in a drug-free zone, a Class B felony, possession with the intent to deliver more than 0.5 grams of cocaine in a drug-free zone, a Class B felony, and possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a)(4) (2010) (amended 2012, 2014) (possession with intent to sell and to deliver), 39-17-432 (2014) (drug-free school zone), 39-17-418 (2010) (amended 2014) (possession of marijuana). The trial court merged the possession with the intent to deliver cocaine conviction with the possession with the intent to sell cocaine conviction and sentenced the Defendant to twelve years’ confinement. The court ordered concurrent service of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the marijuana possession conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for possession with the intent to sell more than 0.5 grams of cocaine and (2) the court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Nazario Araguz, was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone and possession with intent to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone.  He received concurrent seventeen-year sentences.  Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief.  On appeal, petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel did not properly advise him regarding his right to testify. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. 

Appellant, Mark A. Crites, was convicted of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”), second offense.  The trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days in confinement.  On appeal, appellant argues that the assistant district attorney general committed prosecutorial misconduct in her closing argument and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Mother and Father were divorced when their child was not quite two years old. Mother was named the primary residential parent. She remarried when the child was three years old and sought to relocate to Virginia when her husband was required to move there for his job. Father objected and sought to be named the primary residential parent. The evidence was undisputed that Mother’s stepson (the child’s stepbrother) committed an act of sexual abuse on the child when he was four and the stepson was ten. Counselors were retained to work with each child. Both counselors testified the situation was under control and Mother was taking proper precautions to protect the child. The trial court permitted Mother to relocate with the child, but it limited the number of days the stepbrother could spend with the child in Virginia. Mother appealed, claiming the trial court’s ruling was arbitrary. She also appealed the trial court’s ruling requiring her to pay the transportation costs of the child’s flights to Tennessee to visit Father, its credit to Father for childcare expenses on the child support worksheet, and its denial of her request for attorney’s fees. We vacate the court’s $250 childcare credit to Father because no evidence of this expense was offered at trial. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

Defendant, Jeffrey Gallaher, was indicted by the Lewis County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, one count of introduction of contraband into a penal institution, and one count of possession of a schedule IV drug.  After a jury trial, Defendant was found not guilty of aggravated assault.  He was convicted of introduction of contraband into a penal institution and simple possession.   The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of six years in incarceration as a Range II, multiple offender.  On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the conviction for introduction of contraband into a penal institution.  He does not challenge the conviction for simple possession.  We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for introduction of contraband into a penal institution.  Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. 

Father who filed petition to establish visitation with his child appeals the award of parenting time, contending that the parenting plan does not maximize his participation in the child’s life. Finding that the evidence preponderates against the parenting schedule ordered by the Court, we reverse the judgment and remand for the adoption of a plan that increases Father’s residential parenting time.

This appeal arises from a claim of fraud in a post-divorce context. Lisa Denise Church (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint for fraud in the Circuit Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”) against her ex-husband, Shannon Wayne Brown (“Defendant”), alleging that he had misled her during their divorce regarding the valuation of his business interest. This suit followed an earlier, unsuccessful action on the issue of fraud filed by Plaintiff under TRCP 60 in the divorce action which had yielded a final judgment after appeal. The Trial Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding, inter alia, that Plaintiff’s fraud claim was barred by res judicata. Plaintiff appealed to this Court. We hold that Plaintiff’s current lawsuit for fraud is a distinct cause of action, namely, common law fraud, and is not barred by res judicata. However, as the issue of fraud already had been decided in the earlier post-divorce Rule 60 proceedings, the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents Plaintiff from re-litigating the issue of fraud. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court as modified.

This appeal involves claims arising from a settlement agreement allegedly entered by two of the parties to settle previous lawsuits. Appellant filed a complaint against Appellees alleging four causes of action: (1) tortious interference with a contractual obligation; (2) abuse of judicial process; (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (4) conspiracy to deny Appellant her rights under the settlement agreement. Appellees responded by filing a joint motion to dismiss. The trial court found that three of Appellant’s causes of action for tortious interference, breach of good faith, and conspiracy each required the existence of a contract and dismissed those claims based on a finding that the settlement agreement was void and unenforceable. The trial court also dismissed Appellant’s abuse of judicial process claim after finding “no evidence whatsoever that [Appellees] or their counsel of record did anything improper that would support a cause of action for abuse of process.” On appeal, we reverse the trial court’s finding that the settlement agreement was void and therefore reverse the dismissal of Appellant’s claims requiring a contract. Additionally, we hold that because the trial court did not consider any extraneous evidence in dismissing the abuse of judicial process claim, the trial court erred in applying a summary judgment standard with regard to that claim. Because we find that the complaint sufficiently alleged abuse of judicial process, we also reverse the trial court’s dismissal of that claim.

The Appellant, Robert B. Ledford, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Appellant contends that the trial court erred in summarily denying his motion because the motion stated a colorable claim for relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The court-appointed Guardian ad Litem (“the Guardian”) for the minor child Jonathan F. (“the Child”) filed a petition 1 in the Juvenile Court for Sevier County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Amy F. (“Mother”) and Uriah F. (“Father”) to the Child. The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a response joining in the Guardian’s petition. After a trial, the Juvenile Court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights on a host of grounds. We vacate certain of the grounds as relates to Father. Otherwise, we affirm the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court as modified.

This post-divorce parenting dispute arose when the father filed a petition to modify the parties’ permanent parenting plan as to their two minor children. Concomitantly with entry of the final judgment for divorce, the trial court had entered a permanent parenting plan order on January 19, 2007, designating the mother as the primary residential parent and granting the father residential co-parenting time on alternating weekends and Wednesday evenings. This parenting plan was later modified by agreement in an order entered June 17, 2008. Nearly five years later on July 27, 2012, the father filed the instant petition to modify the permanent parenting plan. He alleged that a dangerous situation existed at the mother’s home and requested an emergency ex parte order naming him the primary residential parent, which the trial court immediately granted. Upon a hearing, the trial court entered an order, inter alia, confirming the father as the primary residential parent, pending further proceedings, on August 13, 2012. Following a final hearing conducted approximately one year later, the trial court found that a material change in circumstance had occurred since entry of the June 2008 permanent parenting plan and that it was in the children’s best interest for the father to be declared their primary residential parent with sole decision-making authority. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Appellant, Martinez Dennis, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of felony murder during the perpetration of a robbery and was sentenced by the trial court to life in prison. In this appeal, he raises two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his custodial statement to law enforcement officers; and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1994, a jury found the Petitioner, Charles Edward Meeks, guilty of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to serve a life sentence in prison.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction and sentence.  See State v. Charles Edward Meeks, No. 01C01-9506-CC-00170, 1995 WL 687695, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 21, 1995), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 6, 1996).  In March 1997, the Petitioner filed a post conviction petition, and this Court affirmed the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.  Charles Edward Meeks v. State, No. 01C01-9807-CC-00295, 1999 WL 173972, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, March 30, 1999), perm. app denied (Tenn. Oct. 11, 1999).  On January 10, 2005, the Petitioner filed for a writ of error coram nobis alleging that he had discovered new evidence.  The State filed a response to the petition requesting that the trial court dismiss the petition as untimely.  The trial court agreed, and  dismissed the petition on that basis.  We affirm the trial court’s judgment.