APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Caleb Wayne DeHoog, was convicted by a Madison County Criminal Court jury of attempted aggravated burglary, a Class D felony; two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies; and one count of aggravated criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to three years for the attempted aggravated burglary, five years for each count of aggravated assault, and eleven months and twenty nine days for the aggravated criminal trespass. The court ordered that the sentences for the two aggravated assault convictions be served consecutively to each other but concurrently with the sentences on the other convictions, for an effective term of ten years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Tamekia Shantell Jones, was charged with Class A misdemeanor theft from Macy’s store in an indictment returned by the Madison County Grand Jury. Following a jury trial, she was found guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced her to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Madison County jail, to be served consecutively to a sentence for convictions in Hardeman County. In this appeal, Defendant’s sole issue is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

The defendant was indicted for seven counts of rape of a child. Prior to trial, the State sought permission to offer as evidence a video-recorded statement made by the child victim to a forensic interviewer. At the conclusion of a pre-trial hearing, the trial court refused to allow the video-recorded statement as proof at trial. We granted the State an interlocutory appeal to determine whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-123 (Supp. 2014) violates the separation of powers,whether the video-recorded statement qualifies as inadmissible hear say evidence, and whether the use of the statement at trial would violate the defendant’s right to confront witnesses. Because section 24-7-123 does not unconstitutionally infringe upon the powers of the judiciary and is a valid legislative exception to the general rule against the admission of hearsay evidence, the ruling of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for trial. The State will be permitted to offer the video-recorded statement as evidence at trial, provided that the evidence is relevant and otherwise comports with the requirements of section 24-7-123 and the Tennessee Rules of Evidence.

In this divorce action involving the dissolution of a thirty-six year marriage, the wife appeals the trial court’s distribution of the marital estate and the amount of alimony in futuro she was awarded by the court. She also contends that the trial court judge erred by denying multiple motions for his recusal. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The primary issue in this divorce case is whether the trial court erred in failing to find that Sherry Juanita Carter Berkshire (Wife) was entitled to long-term alimony in futuro from Edwin Carl Berkshire, III (Husband). Instead, the court awarded four months of transitional alimony. Wife, who was sixty at the time of the divorce, has numerous health problems and is totally and permanently disabled. Husband, who is twenty years her junior, is able-bodied and works as an automobile mechanic, with an earning capacity of at least $62,000 per year. Taking into account the relevant statutory factors and the totality of the circumstances, we modify the trial court’s alimony judgment to make it an alimony in futuro award in the amount of $150 per week. We decline Wife’s request to increase the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to her, but we do award Wife a reasonable attorney’s fee for professional services rendered, plus expenses, in connection with this appeal, in an amount to be determined by the trial court on remand. Further, we modify the trial court’s decree requiring Wife to refinance the mortgage on the marital residence. As modified in the ways indicated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

S.R. (Mother) and D.M.S. (Father) challenge the order (1) terminating their parental rights with respect to their minor son, E.L.R. (the Child) and (2) approving the adoption of the Child by his legal custodian and maternal grandmother, E.W. (Grandmother) and her husband, T.C.W. Jr. (T.W.) (collectively, Grandparents). After a trial, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) grounds for termination exist as to both Mother and Father and (2) termination is in the best interest of the Child. The court further found, also by clear and convincing evidence, that the adoption of the Child by Grandparents is in the Child’s best interest. Mother and Father appeal. They contest the finding of grounds for termination as well as the trial court’s best interest determination. We affirm.

Phyllis Louise Bige, a former police officer with the City of Etowah, brought this retaliatory discharge action against the City, alleging that she was fired because of her failure to meet a quota for citations. Her claim was predicated on Tenn. Code Ann § 39-16-516 (2014). The trial court granted defendant summary judgment, finding that an earlier judgment of the United States District Court dismissing plaintiff’s federal claims – including a claim that her substantive due process rights were violated because defendant required her to commit an illegal act – collaterally estopped plaintiff from proceeding with her retaliatory discharge claim under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (2014). We affirm the summary judgment of the trial court, but on different grounds. We hold that defendant demonstrated plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to two essential elements of her claim – (1) that she refused to participate in an illegal activity, and (2) that defendant fired her solely because of her refusal to participate in an illegal activity. We affirm the grant of summary judgment.

Defendant, Billy D. Rapier, and two co-defendants, Cassandra Haynes and Leveris Keller, were charged with aggravated robbery. Mr. Keller was also charged with felony evading arrest, and Defendant was charged with evading arrest. Pursuant to a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the charges and received concurrent sentences of eight years for aggravated robbery and eleven months, twenty-nine days for evading arrest. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the defense of duress barred his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves the interpretation of a marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”). Wife filed suit to clarify the terms of the MDA regarding the apportionment of Husband’s future military retirement.  The trial court held that the MDA granted Wife twenty-five percent of Husband’s retirement benefits at the rank of captain, his rank at the time of divorce, including cost-of-living adjustments that will be in effect when he elects to retire. Husband appeals and argues that the award of retirement benefits was intended to be alimony in solido and was ascertainable at the time of divorce rather than at the time he elects to retire. We agree with the trial court’s interpretation and affirm the trial court in all respects.

This appeal arises from a divorce. Sheila Christine Jones Calloway (“Wife”) sued Willard Randall Calloway (“Husband”) for divorce in the Chancery Court for Roane County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court granted Wife a divorce on the ground of adultery by Husband. The Trial Court equally divided the parties’ marital residence but awarded Husband’s onehalf interest in the marital residence to Wife as alimony in solido. The Trial Court also awarded Wife alimony in futuro and attorney’s fees. Husband appeals. Given the parties’ relative earning capabilities and other relevant circumstances of this case, we affirm the Trial Court’s award to Wife of Husband’s one-half interest in the marital residence as alimony in solido. However, once Wife was awarded Husband’s one-half interest in the marital residence, she no longer was financially disadvantaged relative to Husband, and, therefore, the Trial Court erred in awarding Wife alimony in futuro and attorney’s fees. We affirm, in part, and, reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court.

John Wayne McDonald (“Father”) and Jamie Rhea McDonald Bunnell (“Mother”) had two children during their marriage before divorcing in 2012. The permanent parenting plan entered with the divorce named Mother the primary residential parent. After Mother remarried and relocated with the children, Father filed a petition to modify the existing parenting plan and asked the court to designate him the children’s primary residential parent. Father argued that the behavior of Mother’s new husband (“Stepfather”) around the children constituted a material change in circumstance and that the modification would be in the children’s best interest. At a hearing, Father presented evidence that Stepfather used foul language around the children and had, in jest, referred to them using a racial slur.  The trial courtfound thatStepfather’sbehavior,though “distastefuland ill-advised,”did not constitute a material change in circumstance. Father appealed. After careful consideration, we conclude that the evidence in the record does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted Desmond Obrian Anderson of aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. The jury convicted Camillia Harrison of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery. The trial court ordered the defendants to serve effective sentences of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant Anderson asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court improperly denied his motion to sever after his codefendant had testified; and (3) the trial court erred when it failed to sentence him as an Especially Mitigated Offender. Defendant Harrison asserts that: (1) the trial court should have admitted the transcript of the preliminary hearing into evidence; and (2) the trial court should have severed the defendants’ charges in this case. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This matter arises from post-divorce proceedings regarding the parties’ minor child. Mother filed an application for extraordinary appeal after the trial court designated Father as Temporary Primary Residential Parent and ordered that Father could enroll the parties’ child in a school in his school district. Mother’s application submitted three issues for review, but we grant extraordinary review only as to the issue regarding the trial court’s order designating Father as Temporary Primary Residential Parent and ordering that Father could enroll the parties’ child in a school in his school district. We vacate and remand.

A Madison County jury found the Petitioner, Timothy A. Baxter, guilty of aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced him to a twelve-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the conviction in State v. Timothy A. Baxter, No. W2012-00361-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 1197867 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, March 25, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 13, 2013). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, pro se, which he later amended with the assistance of counsel. The Petitioner subsequently filed a motion requesting that the post-conviction judge recuse himself. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to recuse and the petition for post-conviction relief, after which it denied both. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his post-conviction petition because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, and he further contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his motion to recuse because there was a reasonable basis for questioning the post-conviction judge’s impartiality. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgments.

In this delayed direct appeal, the defendant, James Tremelle Hunt, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 2011 Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of one count of aggravated rape, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of aggravated assault.  Because the defendant failed to file a timely petition for post-conviction relief, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the delayed appeal in this case.  As a result, the appeal must be dismissed.

The petitioner, Carl Renee Brown, appeals pro se from the summary dismissal of his 2013 petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 1987 convictions of criminal attempt to sell cocaine pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-6-417 (1982) (repealed 1989). Because the petition was filed decades beyond the applicable statute of limitations and because the petitioner failed to either allege or prove a statutory exception to the timely filing or a due process tolling of the statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Joann P.F. (“Mother”) and Gary A.M. (“Father”) to the minor children, Paige A.F., Tristan J.A.M., and Gaige D.W.M. (“the Children”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court for Anderson County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Children after finding that clear and convincing evidence was proven of grounds to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights for substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2) and for persistent conditions pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3), and that clear and convincing evidence was proven that it was in the Children’s best interest for Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to be terminated. Mother and Father appeal the termination of their parental rights to this Court. We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s findings made by clear and convincing evidence, and we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Robert Echols, of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and theft of property valued over $1,000. The trial court merged the theft of property conviction and the aggravated robbery conviction, and it ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the admission of the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony violated his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine itnesses against him; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence an unsigned statement of the Defendant; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (4) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Plaintiffs filed suit against their property insurer for breach of their homeowner’s insurance policy to recover for damages sustained to their home as a result of a tornado; Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendant violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). A jury found that Defendant’s actions violated the TCPA and awarded damages to Plaintiffs. Finding Defendant’s conduct to be willful, the trial court doubled the jury’s award; the court also awarded Plaintiffs attorneys fees and costs. Defendant appeals. We modify the award of costs to Plaintiffs; in all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Brandon Jones, was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to sell, a Class E felony, and possession of a deadly weapon with intent to employ it in the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony. He was sentenced to mandatory consecutive sentences of two years and four years for the respective convictions. On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred by allowing evidence regarding the defendant’s custodial statements; (2) the trial court erred by allowing hearsay testimony regarding statements made by the passenger in the defendant’s car; (3) the trial court erred in allowing a police officer to testify as an expert and offer opinion testimony; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to support the two convictions. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on the grounds of abandonment, contending that any failure to support or visit her children was not willful.Mother argues that her failure to support her children was a result of poverty and that her failure to visit was caused by obstruction on the part of the children’s grandmother/guardian. We find that the children’s grandmother/guardian failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of at least one of the statutory grounds for termination. We therefore reverse the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

In 2009, the Petitioner, Jeremy Shane Grooms, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued over $1,000 and aggravated burglary, and he was sentenced to eight years. One year of his sentence was to be served in jail, with the remainder to be served on community corrections. In December of 2009, a warrant was issued for the Petitioner’s arrest, alleging that he had violated his community corrections sentence by driving under the influence (“DUI”) and by attempting to break into and enter a vehicle. The warrant stated that the Petitioner had been sentenced to twelve years of community corrections for his original convictions. In 2014, the Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, contending that his sentence had expired. The trial court dismissed the Petitioner’s petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed his petition because “it met the qualifications for relief under the statute.” The State counters that the appeal is untimely and further that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of the Petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus relief.

In this termination of parental rights case, Father appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interests. Father was convicted of murdering the child’s mother and is imprisoned on a life sentence. We have reviewed the evidence and affirm the trial court in all respects.

This is a divorce case. After the trial court entered the final decree of divorce and awarded Wife/Appellee attorney’s fees associated with a motion to compel, Husband/Appellant filed this appeal. Although Husband did not formally file a motion to recuse either trial judge involved in this case, his appeal centers on alleged judicial and opposing counsel misconduct. Husband also seeks a new trial. We affirm.

The Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, and we therefore have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Consequently, this appeal is dismissed.