APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Owner of a sexually oriented nightclub filed a writ of certiorari challenging the Respondent Board’s decision to sanction the nightclub for the inappropriate behavior of an entertainer. The trial court affirmed the decision of the Board. The nightclub raises several errors on appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

I agree with Judge Farmer’s conclusion that the claims arising from HB600’s
reordering of the political process, which strips Appellants of the ability to seek antidiscrimination
protections at the local level, should be dismissed. However, because I find
the United States Supreme Court precedent in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), difficult
to distinguish by reference to the structural barrier it imposes, I write separately. I would
instead distinguish Romer because, unlike the amendment at issue there, the burden HB600
imposes applies equally to any group seeking protected status. Therefore, Appellants have
not suffered a particularized injury sufficient to confer standing.

In concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the claims arising from HB600’s reordering of the political process. I also join Judge McBrayer in his determination that the claim of the Gay Straight Alliance of Hume Fogg Academic Magnet High School survives dismissal on standing grounds, as the State’s Answer to the original Complaint is insufficient to determine the applicability of HB600.

The Appellant, Ronnie Lee Johnson, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis.  The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is a pro se appeal from a denial of parole. Inmate/Appellant avers several problems
surrounding his parole hearing that he claims violate his due process and equal protection
rights, and violate the ex post facto constitutional prohibition. Because a prisoner has no
liberty interest in release on parole before the expiration of his sentence, due process
protections do not attach to parole determinations. Because, at the time of Appellant’s crime
and conviction, the law regarding parole gave total discretion to the Board and authorized
denial if the Board found that parole would depreciate the seriousness of the crime
committed, application of this ground for denial of parole does not violate ex post facto
prohibitions. Because Appellant has failed to prove that race was an issue in the Board’s
decision to deny him parole, no equal protection violation was shown. Consequently, we
affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the petition upon grant of summary judgment. Affirmed
and Remanded.

Petitioner, Ivan Charles Graves, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Petitioner was convicted by a Knox County jury of first degree premeditated murder and felony murder in the perpetration of a kidnapping. The trial court merged Petitioner’s convictions and sentenced Petitioner to life in prison. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

I write separately to emphasize two troubling procedural issues with the majority Opinion. First, I am troubled by this Court’s analysis with regard to the timeliness of the filing of Mr. Braden’s petition for a writ of certiorari. Second, I disagree that this case is appropriate for summary disposition. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

Following Appellant’s involvement in an automobile accident and the subsequent denial of coverage by her insurance company (the Appellee herein), Appellant brought the instant action against Appellee, alleging breach of contract, bad faith refusal to pay, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and intentional misconduct. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellee. Appellant appeals. We conclude that there is a dispute of material fact as to the ownership of the subject vehicle; this dispute of material fact precludes summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand for a hearing on the merits. Reversed and Remanded.

Plaintiffs allege that a 2011 act of the General Assembly adding a definition of “sex” to the
Tennessee Human Rights Act and creating the Equal Access to Intrastate Commerce Act,
now codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 7-51-1801(1) & (2), violates the Equal
Protection guarantees of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. The trial court
dismissed the action for lack of standing. We dismiss the claims of Plaintiffs Wesley Roberts
and the Gay/Straight Alliance of Hume-Fogg Academic Magnet High School as moot where
the Defendant Governor concedes that the Equal Access to Intrastate Commerce Act does
not apply to Local Education Agencies or Tennessee schools. We affirm dismissal of the
remaining Plaintiffs for lack of standing where they have failed to allege a discrete, palpable,
cognizable injury in fact.

I fully concur with the majority that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment should be reversed in light of the factual dispute over ownership of the automobile operated by Ms. Gipson at the time of the accident.

Michael Kizer (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. Following a sentencing hearing, the Defendant received a total effective sentence of forty-five years’ incarceration. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court improperly severed his case from that of his co-defendant and that the trial court erred in allowing the State to reopen its proof in order to introduce the testimony of his co-defendant. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted Defendant, Carl Miller, Jr., for aggravated sexual battery, sexual battery by an authority figure, and rape. Defendant was tried before a jury. Over the objection of Defendant, the trial judge declared a mistrial based on manifest necessity. Thereafter, Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment based on double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant entered a plea of guilty to rape, reserving a certified question related to the trial court’s denial of the motion. Following our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment.

Defendant, Ernest H. Pyle, was charged by presentment with two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of resisting arrest. The trial court dismissed at the request of the State the two counts of aggravated kidnapping. A petit jury convicted Defendant of the remaining counts. The trial court properly merged Defendant’s two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and sentenced Defendant to 25 years’ incarceration. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that trial court erred by not granting a mistrial after allowing evidence of a prior bad act. Having carefully reviewed the record before us and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The issue presented on this appeal is whether a plaintiff who brings a health care liability action against a governmental entity under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“the GTLA”) is entitled to the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations provided by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c)(Supp. 2014) under the current version of the Health Care Liability Act (“the HCLA”). This inquiry focuses on the effect of the 2011 amendment to the HCLA that expressly includes “claims against the state or a political subdivision thereof” within the definition of “health care liability action.” Applying the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Cunningham v. Williamson Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 405 S.W.3d 41 (Tenn. 2013), we hold that the 2011 amendment demonstrates a clear intent on the part of the General Assembly to allow the GTLA’s one-year statute of limitations to be extended by 120 days in cases where a plaintiff satisfies the requirements of the HCLA. We affirm the judgment of the trial court denying defendant Bradley County’s motion to dismiss.

This direct appeal presents a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure.  After the trial court denied her motion to suppress, Defendant, Laquite Monique Hogan, entered a guilty plea in the Maury County Circuit Court to facilitation of possession of a schedule II drug for sale and was sentenced to three years to be suspended and served on probation.  Defendant properly reserved the following certified question of law: “whether there was a sufficient nexus that continued to persist at the time the search warrant was executed due to the fact that the location of the alleged sales was away from the residence and the affidavit does not include facts that Jason Coleman was seen coming and returning to his home from the sale which was to have occurred 96 hours ago; whether the alleged facts that Mr. Coleman was monitored leaving from his home and returning within 30 days of the execution of the warrant was stale information and whether the record supports the finding that both prongs of Aguil[]ar-Spinelli have been satisfied.” After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that Defendant is not entitled to relief in this appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress, and we affirm Defendant’s judgment of conviction.

Mother and Father were divorced in 2009 and Mother was named the primary residential parent of their two children. Father later filed a petition to modify the parenting plan, and the court changed the primary residential parent designation to Father. Mother filed one petition to modify in 2012 and another petition in 2014 in an effort to become the primary residential parent again. The court entered orders denying each petition, and Mother appealed both orders. We affirm the trial court’s judgments in all respects.

The Petitioner, William L. Green, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 conviction for second degree murder and his twenty-three-year sentence.  The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the post-conviction court erred by denying him relief.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from the termination of Robert Koscinski (“Koscinski”) from his employment as a corrections officer with the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office. Koscinski had been found to be unfit for duty based upon a psychological evaluation. Koscinski appealed his termination to the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Civil Service Board “the Board”). The Board upheld Koscinski’s termination. Koscinski filed an application for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). After hearing arguments, the Trial Court entered an order denying Koscinski’s writ of certiorari. Koscinski timely appealed to this Court. We find and hold that the Board applied the correct legal standard, and that the Board’s factual findings were supported by substantial and material evidence. We affirm the Trial Court.

On July 26, 2012, this court affirmed judgments regarding the petitioner, Kevin Womack, for possession of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, possession of a firearm with intent to employ in the commission of a dangerous felony, possession of drug paraphernalia, theft of property over $500, and tampering with evidence, reducing the theft conviction from a Class E felony to a Class A misdemeanor. State v. Kevin Womack, No. W2011-01827-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 3055773, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 26, 2012). No application for permission to appeal was filed. On August 8, 2013, he filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he did not file a Rule 11 application because his trial counsel had filed a motion to withdraw, “informing the petitioner his application [for permission to appeal] must [be] filed by September 24, 2012.” He argued that his post-conviction petition was timely because it was filed within one year of this date. The State responded that the petition was untimely, and the post-conviction court agreed, dismissing the petition for this reason. On October 15, 2013, the petitioner filed his notice of appeal regarding that dismissal. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal pursuant to the de novo standard as required under Rule 10B, § 2.06, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.

The Petitioner, Terry D. Sanders, appeals the Houston County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of the sale of less than 0.5 gram of cocaine and his effective thirty-year sentence.  The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in denying a mistrial when the State’s confidential informant testified that the Petitioner was on community corrections, that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, and that he was denied a fair trial due to cumulative errors in the conviction proceedings.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Dandarius Woods, was charged with one count of aggravated rape and one count of rape.  He filed a motion to suppress a statement that he made to police, alleging that his statements were coerced by implied promises of leniency.  After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion, finding that Defendant’s statements were not voluntary.  The State sought an interlocutory appeal.  Upon thorough review of the record, we find that the detective did not imply that Defendant would be released or that Defendant would receive treatment in lieu of a jail sentence if he confessed to rape.  Therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.

The father and step-mother of the child at issue commenced this action to terminate the parental rights of the child’s mother and for step-parent adoption. The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support and by willful failure to visit the child, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i), and upon the determination that termination of Mother’s rights was in the best interest of the child, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(c)(2) and (i). The trial court further determined that step-parent adoption was in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals. We affirm the determination that Mother abandoned her child pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1113(g)(1) by willfully failing to visit her child and by willfully failing to support her child during the four-month period preceding the filing of this petition. However, because the trial court failed to provide written findings of fact as mandated by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k), we reverse the trial court’s determination that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Accordingly, we remand the issue of the child’s best interest to the trial court with instructions to provide written findings of fact on the issue of the child’s best interest and to enter judgment consistent with its findings.

Calvin Reid Quarles, Defendant, was convicted by a Williamson County Jury for theft of property valued over $500.  After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant perfected this appeal.  The following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in giving the jury charge partially before and partially after closing arguments; and (2) whether the trial court erred by issuing a supplemental jury instruction.  After a review of the applicable authorities and the record, we conclude that Defendant waived any challenge to the trial court’s completing the jury instructions after closing argument by acquiescing and by failing to raise the issue in a motion for new trial.  Further, we conclude that the trial court did not commit error in answering a question posed by the jury during deliberations.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Plaintiffs presented Defendants with an offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Prior to Defendants’ acceptance, Plaintiffs attempted to rescind the offer. Defendants nevertheless accepted the offer within the time allowed by Rule 68 and attempted to enforce the offer of judgment. The trial court concluded that Plaintiffs were not entitled to revoke the offer of judgment and entered an order granting the motion to enforce the judgment. We affirm and remand.