APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Leslie Lamont Coleman, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to twenty years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to his sentence in a prior felony murder case. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because the only proof connecting him to the crime was the uncorroborated testimony of his alleged accomplice; (2) the trial court committed plain error by ruling the State could question the defendant about his prior felony murder conviction under Tennessee Rules of Evidence 608 and 609 if he chose to testify; and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing by imposing the maximum Range II sentence of twenty years. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal invoves a claim for adverse possession. Gilbert Lopez and his wife Wendy Lopez claimed ownership of a 1.25 acre parcel of land (“Lot 39”) adjacent to their property under the theory of common law adverse possession. Deidra Sharp, owner of a tract also adjacent to Lot 39, presented evidence of her unencumbered title to Lot 39. Ms. Sharp established that she and her predecessors in title had paid taxes on Lot 39 and argued that the Lopezes did not prove their possession was uninterrupted, continuous, exclusive, or adverse for the requisite twenty year period. After a bench trial, the trial court found that the Lopezes did not “indicate ownership of [Lot 39] nor did [they] do anything that would rise to the level of more than a trespass.” The trial court resolved the conflicting testimony by making explicit credibility determinations in favor of Ms. Sharp and her witnesses. The trial court also held that Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-110(a), which generally bars a claim to real estate when the claimant has failed to pay taxes on the claimed property, applies to bar the adverse possession claim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant city residents sued the City of Memphis for breach of contract, breach of implied
contract, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel related to inadequate garbage
collection services provided by the City. Residents also sought a constructive trust and a
declaratory judgment. The trial court dismissed the breach of contract action upon its
conclusion that the provision of garbage collection services was a government function that
did not create an enforceable contract between the city and its residents. The trial court
dismissed the residents’ other contractual claims on the basis that they were barred by
sovereign immunity. Finally, the trial court dismissed the claims for constructive trust and
declaratory judgment upon its conclusion that they did not state a claim for relief under the
circumstances. We affirm.

The Defendant, Vincent John Elliott, Jr., pled guilty to second degree murder and reserved a certified question of law concerning whether his right to a speedy trial was violated. Also on appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to eighteen years instead of the minimum sentence of fifteen years. Upon review, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review the Defendant’s certified question and respectfully dismiss that portion of the appeal. We further conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in sentencing the Defendant. Accordingly, we respectfully affirm the Defendant’s conviction and sentence in all respects.

Following his conviction for first degree murder, the Petitioner, Jose Lemanuel Hall, filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to meet with him adequately and failed to object to the State’s opening statement. He also argues that the requirement to show actual prejudice in post-conviction proceedings is overly burdensome and conflicts with constitutional protections. We respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiffs filed suit against the purchaser of real property, alleging that the purchase was a fraudulent conveyance. On a motion for summary judgment, the trial court determined on the undisputed facts that the purchase was in good faith and without notice of Plaintiffs’ claims and for reasonably equivalent value. We conclude that the undisputed facts show that the purchaser was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We also discern no abuse of discretion in a separate decision by the court to set aside the dismissal of the purchaser’s counterclaim against Plaintiffs. So we affirm.

Defendant, Johnny DeWayne Boyd, was convicted by a jury of rape of a child and incest. The trial court imposed an effective thirty-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant contends (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss due to the State’s failure to file a bill of particulars, and (2) that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to continue trial after a court security officer tested positive for COVID-19 and by failing to comply with the Tennessee Supreme Court’s Order on COVID-19 protocol. Following a review of the record, the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an employment discrimination case. The plaintiff, a female secretary at a high
school, sued the county school board for discrimination alleging that she was terminated
because of her sex in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act. Following a bench
trial, the trial court held in favor of the plaintiff and awarded damages. The school board
appeals, asserting that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination.
We have determined that the plaintiff failed to identify a “similarly situated” employee and
therefore failed to make out a prima facie case of sex discrimination. We reverse the
judgment of the trial court.

Tabila Aida Tekle was charged in the Monroe County Criminal Court with two counts of
harassment and one count of retaliation for past action for statements she made on
Facebook about employees of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The
Defendant filed motions to dismiss the indictment, asserting that her statements were
protected by the right to free speech, and the trial court dismissed the charges. The State
appeals the trial court’s dismissal of the harassment charges, arguing that the court made a
pretrial factual determination about an element of the offense, which was a determination
for the jury. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we reverse
the judgments of the trial court, reinstate the charges for harassment, and remand the case
to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, Curtis Morris, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his Shelby County convictions for first degree murder during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse, first degree murder during the perpetration of aggravated child neglect, aggravated child abuse of a child eight years of age or less, and aggravated child neglect of a child eight years of age or less, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon counsel’s: (1) failure to call an expert witness to rebut the State’s experts and bolster Petitioner’s testimony that the victim’s death was accidental; (2) making “material misstatements” regarding the evidence in counsel’s opening statement; (3) failure to adequately prepare to cross-examine one of the State’s experts and failure to request a McDaniel hearing to challenge the expert’s testimony; (4) failure to file any pretrial motions; (5) failure to object, during the prosecutor’s cross-examination of Petitioner, to the prosecutor’s repeated use of the word “stomping” to characterize Petitioner’s direct examination testimony; (6) failure to request proper jury instructions regarding the mens rea required for a conviction for aggravated child abuse; and (7) failure to present evidence of child custody proceedings in which Petitioner sought and won custody of his children. Petitioner also contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief based on cumulative error. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to one of her children. The trial court found that Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) established four grounds for terminating the mother’s parental rights and that termination of her rights was in the best interest of the child. The mother appeals. We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

This appeal arises from a divorce case. The husband filed a petition for divorce, and the
wife filed a counter-petition. The trial court entered a final decree of divorce dividing the
marital estate and granting the divorce in the wife’s favor on the grounds of adultery and
inappropriate marital conduct. The husband appeals. We affirm as modified.

Defendant, Juan Lasean Perry, appeals the denial of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct an illegal sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this case, prospective adoptive parents Whayne D., Lauren D., James K., and Heather K.1 (“Petitioners”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Miya M. (“Mother”) to two of her minor children. They alleged these grounds: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by failure to financially support the children; (3) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (4) persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal; and (5) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children. The trial court found that Petitioners established four of the five alleged grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence and that termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We reverse the trial court’s holding that Petitioners established the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, and affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects, including its ultimate ruling terminating Mother’s parental rights.

The Petitioner, Cody Ricky Cofer, was convicted in the Cumberland County Criminal
Court of two counts of first degree felony murder and one count of attempted especially
aggravated robbery and received an effective sentence of two consecutive life terms. The
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis based on newly discovered evidence,
and the coram nobis court denied the petition without a hearing because the petition was
untimely. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that the coram nobis court erred by summarily
denying the petition without first considering whether the statute of limitations should be
tolled on due process grounds. The State argues that we should dismiss the appeal because
the Petitioner’s notice of appeal also was untimely. Based upon the oral arguments, the
record, and the parties’ briefs, we agree with the State and conclude that the appeal should
be dismissed.

Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider
this appeal.

A mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights to two children. The trial court concluded that the petitioner proved five statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. The court also concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children’s best interest. After a thorough review, we agree that clear and convincing evidence supports three grounds for termination and that termination was in the children’s best interest. So we affirm.

In this case involving a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights to her child and
to allow the petitioners to adopt the child, the trial court determined that one statutory
ground for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. However, the
trial court further determined that the petitioners had failed to establish clear and
convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s
best interest. The trial court accordingly dismissed the petition and remanded to the
juvenile court’s protective jurisdiction. The petitioners have appealed the best interest
determination, and the mother has raised an issue regarding the statutory ground. We
affirm the trial court’s finding as to the statutory ground of failure to support. However,
having determined that under the facts of this case the trial court erred in applying the
statutory best interest factors applicable to the initial termination petition rather than
those applicable to the amended petition, we reverse the trial court’s best interest finding
and remand for reconsideration applying the amended best interest factors contained in
Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i) (Supp. 2022).

This appeal arises from a suit to rescind a contract for the sale of a home due to fraud. The
trial court found clear and convincing evidence of fraud justifying rescission. It ordered
the buyer to convey the property back to the sellers, with the sellers returning the purchase
price, minus the fair rental value of the property, with a credit to the buyer for various
expenses he had incurred. However, the trial court declined to award any offset to the
buyer for improvements he had made to the property. It also declined to award punitive
damages but did award the buyer attorney fees. Taken together, the parties present twentyfive issues for review on appeal. We vacate in part, reverse in part, and remand for further
proceedings.

Plaintiff alleges she was injured from a fall at a skilled nursing facility while using a defective shower chair with a broken lock and torn netting. The circuit court concluded the Plaintiff did not need to file a certificate of good faith under the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act because the common knowledge exception is applicable and the complaint’s negligence allegations do not require expert testimony. The nursing facility appeals, arguing expert testimony is required to establish both the standard of care and proximate causation; therefore, a certificate of good faith must be filed. Because the allegations set forth in the complaint do not require expert testimony to maintain the Plaintiff’s claim, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Antwain Tapaige Sales, appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s order dismissing his claim that his judgments of conviction for second degree murder and attempted second degree murder are fraudulent and void. After review, we conclude that the appeal should be dismissed.

A Madison County jury found the Defendant, Montreal Portis Robinson, guilty of felony
murder in the perpetration of a theft, especially aggravated kidnapping, robbery, and theft
of property. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain
his convictions. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s
convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and robbery. However, we also conclude
that the evidence is insufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions for theft and felony
murder in the perpetration of a theft. Accordingly, we dismiss the theft charge, and we
modify the Defendant’s conviction for felony murder to that of second degree murder as a
lesser-included offense. We respectfully remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion, including the entry of a modified judgment and a sentencing
hearing on the conviction for second degree murder.

Defendant, Lester Tolliver, appeals as of right from his jury conviction for aggravated rape,
for which he received a sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, Defendant contends that
the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by (1)
admitting hearsay statements, specifically the victim’s reporting the rape to a friend and
the victim’s statement to a police officer; (2) admitting the victim’s testimony that she had
been sexually assaulted previously; (3) admitting testimony from an expert witness
regarding why a victim might lie about having had sexual activity in the days preceding a
sexual assault; and (4) denying Defendant’s request for a special jury instruction.
Following our review, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Tyler D. Bolton, appeals the Washington County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded convictions for possession of twenty-six grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell, unlawful possession of a firearm, and two counts of aggravated burglary.  On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred by denying his motion in limine to exclude jail call recordings from the post-conviction hearing.  The Petitioner also argues that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his claims alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel by trial counsel’s failing to adequately investigate the Petitioner’s mental health history and request a mental health evaluation prior to advising him to accept a plea offer.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Frank M. Green, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of rape in Counts 1 and 3 and assault by extremely offensive or provocative physical contact in Counts 2 and 4 and was acquitted of the charge of aggravated kidnapping in Count 5. The Defendant filed a post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal as to the rape conviction in Count 3 and the assault conviction in Count 4. The trial court denied this motion but merged Count 3 with Count 1 and merged Count 4 with Count 2. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of ten years for each of the rape convictions and a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the assault convictions and ordered the rape and assault convictions served concurrently, for an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the State’s faulty election of offenses led the trial court to provide erroneous and misleading jury instructions, which undermined the integrity of the jury’s verdict; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions in count 3 for rape and count 4 for assault; and (3) the convictions in Counts 2 and 4 reflect the incorrect offense class and sentence. Because the State failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that errors regarding the election, the charge, and the supplemental jury instructions were harmless, we reverse the Defendant’s convictions and remand the case for a new trial on the offenses of rape in Counts 1 and 3 and the offenses of assault by extremely offensive or provocative physical contact in Counts 2 and 4.