APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, Shira Jean Stafford, was indicted by the Jackson County Grand Jury for preventing or obstructing a law enforcement officer from effecting a stop, frisk, halt, or arrest in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-602.  She was convicted by a jury and sentenced to six months, to be served on probation.  After the denial of a motion for new trial, she appealed.  Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence; the trial court’s decision to allow evidence regarding a civil case during the criminal trial; and the trial court’s failure to issue a curative instruction to the jury.  After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Oscar Berry, was convicted of first degree murder in 1991 and was sentenced to life imprisonment.  He filed a direct appeal of his conviction, which was dismissed by this Court in 1992.  State v. Oscar Thomas Berry, No. 01-C01-9201-CR-00033, 1992 WL 275402 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oct. 8, 1992).  His petition for post-conviction relief, filed in 1997, was dismissed by the trial court as untimely.  In 2013, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen the post-conviction proceedings.  He contended that several recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court established constitutional rights in post-conviction proceedings that did not exist at the time of his conviction, thereby allowing his case to be re-opened under the authority of Tennessee Code Annotated §  40-30-117(a)(1).  The trial court rejected his theory and dismissed his motion.  After careful review of the controlling law, we affirm.

Homeowners association brought declaratory judgment action against homeowners to enforce the development’s restrictive covenants. The trial court determined that the homeowners association’s architectural review committee (“ARC”) acted within its discretion in ordering homeowners to remove improvements the ARC found to be inconsistent with other homes in the neighborhood. We affirm.

Appellant, Kenneth Krasovic, was charged with one count of vehicular homicide by reckless conduct and five counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon stemming from an automobile crash that occurred in Grundy County.  The jury found Appellant guilty on all counts and the trial court sentenced Appellant to a total effective sentence of twelve years and six months.  Appellant filed a motion for a new trial which was denied after a hearing.  Appellant then filed this appeal, arguing (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, and (2) that the trial court improperly limited counsel’s closing argument as to the defense of “sudden emergency.”  Upon review of the record, we find that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the convictions and that there was no improper limitation of defense counsel’s closing argument.  We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a bench trial in a suit over the sale of a used vehicle. The trial court originally ruled in favor of the seller-defendants, finding that the plaintiff-buyer failed to meet his burden of proving fraud or misrepresentation in the sale of the vehicle. The court found that defendant-sellers had violated one subsection of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, but that plaintiff-buyer had failed to prove any actual damages, so the trial court dismissed the complaint. Upon considering the plaintiff-buyer’s motion to alter or amend, the trial court changed its original decision and found that the defendant-sellers had engaged in fraud, and the court rescinded the sale of the vehicle. Upon considering plaintiffbuyer’s second motion to alter or amend, the trial court clarified its ruling and awarded attorney’s fees to the plaintiff-buyer. Both parties appeal. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s decision, reinstate its original ruling, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The jury found that Defendants were liable for damages arising from breach of contract and that Plaintiff was liable for damages arising from negligence. It also found that Defendants were entitled to treble damages under Tennessee Code Annotated § 62-2-503. Plaintiff appeals. Finding material evidence to support the jury verdict, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Michael Daniels, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves a claim for workers’ compensation benefits filed by a nurse employed
at the Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute. The nurse filed a claim with the Tennessee
Claims Commission because she believed that she had contracted tuberculosis when her hand came into contact with a patient’s blood. The claims commissioner dismissed the nurse’s claim on the basis that she failed to produce expert medical evidence that she had
tuberculosis, and the nurse sought judicial review under Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 51. We affirm the
judgment of the Claims Commission.

A Davidson County jury convicted Defendant Brian Dunkley of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The jury convicted Defendant William Miller of one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, one count of attempted aggravated burglary, and one count of attempted first degree murder. The trial court sentenced both defendants to effective sentences of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant Dunkley asserts that: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted text messages into evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (2) the trial erred when it denied his motion for new trial because the trial court failed to function as the thirteenth juror and because newly discovered evidence warranted a new trial; (3) there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction; and (4) the trial court improperly applied enhancement factors when it sentenced him. Defendant Miller asserts that: (1) there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for new trial because the trial court failed to function as the thirteenth juror; and (3) the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.
 

The Defendant, Jan Michelle Ell, was convicted by a Blount County Circuit Court jury of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-403, 39-12-103 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of twenty-two years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction and twelve years for the conspiracy conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Dennis Wade Suttles, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition in which he sought relief from his death sentence, claiming that he was intellectually disabled. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the trial court erred in denying (1) his petition for writ of error coram nobis, (2) his motion for a declaratory judgment, and (3) his stand-alone claim under the intellectual disability provisions in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jessica C. (“Mother”) and Jesse W. (“Father”) appeal the termination of their parental rights to the minor child Alexis C. (“the Child”). We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence was shown that grounds existed to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child for abandonment by wanton disregard pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), and for severe abuse pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102, and that clear and convincing evidence was shown that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court for Greene County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child.

Ashley K. Moyers (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of sale or delivery of a Schedule II drug in a drug-free zone. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to four years’ incarceration and imposed the $40,000 fine assessed by the jury. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction. She also contends that her $40,000 fine is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction but decrease the Defendant’s fine from $40,000 to $2,000.

In this case, the plaintiffs alleged that their easement rights had been interfered with by the defendant property owners. The trial court determined, inter alia, that the defendants, subject to the provisions in the deed at issue, could exclude all others from their property. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the determination of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Montrel Gilliam, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Shelby County. He was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and three counts of attempted first degree murder and received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus sixty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, John Westin Massey, pled guilty to vehicular homicide and to driving while under the influence (“DUI”), which was merged with the vehicular homicide. The sentence was eight years with the trial court to determine the manner of service of his sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant asserts that the sentence is excessive and that the trial court’s denial of an alternative sentence was improper based upon the facts of the case. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In this appeal from a final divorce decree, Wife takes issue with a number of the trial court’s financial decisions. Specifically, Wife contends the trial court erred in the assessment of spousal support, in classifying marital property as Husband’s separate property, in valuing Husband’s woodworking business, in dividing the marital estate, in finding she dissipated the marital estate, in declining to find that Husband dissipated the estate, in failing to sanction Husband for non-production of documents, and by sanctioning her $100,000 under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37.02 for abuse of discovery. Finally, Wife alleges error in failing to grant the divorce to both parties and contends the trial court should not have verbatim adopted portions of Husband’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as its final judgment. We affirm the trial court’s rulings on these issues. Husband also seeks his attorney’s fees incurred on appeal which we respectfully deny.

The petitioner, Antonio Santial Jones, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and is currently serving a sentence of twenty-two years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to supply the petitioner with discovery, only beginning preparation for trial the day before, failing to convey a plea offer to the petitioner, and ignoring the self-defense claim asserted by the petitioner. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Defendant, Daniel Muhammad, and his co-defendant Michael Taylor were indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for aggravated arson. Defendant filed a motion to have his case severed from that of his co-defendant. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of facilitation of aggravated arson. The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to co-defendant Taylor, and the trial court declared a mistrial. Defendant was sentenced as a Range II multiple offender to 12 years of incarceration. Defendant appeals his conviction and raises the following issues for our review: 1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to sever; 2) whether the trial court erred by not granting Defendant’s motion for a mistrial; and 3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction. After a careful review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Lloyd Daniel Thompson, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to three years in the Department of Correction, suspended to supervised probation. The trial court also ordered that the defendant pay $40,000 in restitution to the victim. In a timely appeal to this court, the defendant argues that the evidence at the restitution hearing did not support the trial court’s determination of the victim’s losses and that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay $40,000 in restitution without considering his resources and future ability to pay. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s finding that the victim suffered $40,000 in losses but remand for the trial court to determine the defendant’s current financial resources and future ability to pay restitution.

The Defendant, Jennifer Leigh Salyers, pled guilty to two counts of reckless aggravated assault. The trial court denied the Defendant’s application for judicial diversion and sentenced her to serve sixty days in jail, followed by two years of supervised probation. The Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied her application for judicial diversion and a sentence of full probation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Petitioner, Albert Wayne Franchek, Jr., appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to selling one-half gram or more of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class B felony, and resulting eight-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that he did not plead guilty knowingly and voluntarily. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Elmus Travis Gaylor (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the length of his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Joshua Allen Felts, on count one of theft of property valued less than $500, a Class A misdemeanor; on count two of attempted theft of property valued more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class E felony; on count three of attempted theft of property valued more than $500 but less than $1,000, a Class A misdemeanor; and on counts four and five of theft of property valued more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his convictions, the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, and the State’s failure to preserve the chain of custody of the stolen items. Upon review, we affirm the appellant’s conviction in count five. However, the State concedes, and we agree, that the State failed to establish the value of the stolen items in the remaining counts; therefore, we remand to the trial court for amendment of the judgments of conviction in counts one and four to theft of property valued less than $500, a Class A misdemeanor, and to reflect the reduction in the sentence on each of those convictions to eleven months and twenty-nine days. Additionally, we remand to the trial court for amendment of the judgments of conviction in counts two and three to attempted theft of property valued less than $500, a Class B misdemeanor, and to reflect the reduction in the sentence on each of those convictions to six months.
 

In this post-divorce proceeding, Mother filed a petition seeking a modification of Father’s parenting time, recovery of medical expenses incurred on behalf of the parties’ child, and an increase in child support. The trial court modified Father’s parenting time, ordered an upward deviation to Father’s support obligation, and awarded Wife judgment for one-half of the medical expenses and one-half of the attorney fees she incurred in prosecuting the petition;the court issued an order that the judgment for medical expenses, back child support, and attorney fees be enforced by wage assignment. Father appeals the upward deviation, the award forone-half of the child’s medical expenses,and the wage assignment; Mother appeals the award for one-half of her attorney fees. We modify the wage assignment order to exclude the amount of the judgment for attorney fees; in all other respects we affirm the judgment.