APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this health care liability action, the trial court granted the defendants’ motions to
compel the plaintiff to produce expert witness materials despite the plaintiff’s claim of
the work product doctrine. The trial court subsequently denied the plaintiff’s motion for
interlocutory appeal. Upon the plaintiff’s application, this Court granted leave for an
extraordinary appeal. Determining that the plaintiff has waived any privilege or
protection for specific materials requested by the defendants, including expert witnesses’
notes, draft reports, and communications with counsel, we affirm the trial court’s grant of
the defendants’ motions to compel, inclusive of the trial court’s proviso allowing the
plaintiff to present specific materials for review if she believes they contain mental
impressions of her counsel. However, also determining the trial court’s order to be
overly broad, we modify the language of the order to more closely track the language of
Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 26.02(4)(A)(i) and the defendants’ specific requests.

I concur in the decision to affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified. I do
so because Tennessee law requires the result reached in the Court’s opinion. However, I
write separately to state my view that the 2010 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(4), which protects draft reports and communications of expert witnesses
from discovery, is a better approach than that set out in Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure
26.02 as it is currently written. Tennessee does not offer the same sort of protection from
discovery of draft reports and communications of expert witnesses that is provided under
the federal rules. As a result, and certainly after this Court’s opinion, counsel for both
defendants and plaintiffs likely will decline to write down their communications with
experts and instead rely exclusively on oral communication. Even more concerning, the
experts will communicate with counsel only by oral means leaving counsel, likely not a
healthcare provider, not having the benefit of what she is told being in a more detailed
writing. Counsel for Dr. Akinlaja candidly acknowledged as much at oral arguments,
saying “that is the way that it’s done practically.”

The petitioner, Adolphus Lebron Hollingsworth, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his conviction of second degree murder, alleging that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to post-conviction relief, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. 

The Petitioner, Justus G. Onyiego, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of
two counts of aggravated rape based on alternative theories. The trial court sentenced the
Petitioner to seventeen years for each conviction and merged the convictions. This court
affirmed the convictions, and the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief,
claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. The
post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing, granted relief, and ordered a new trial
for both counts based on trial counsel’s failure to request jury instructions on any lesserincluded
offenses. The State appeals, claiming that the post-conviction court erred by
granting relief, and the Petitioner cross-appeals, claiming that the post-conviction court
erred by denying relief on his various other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, that
the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors warrants relief, and that the post-conviction
court erred by denying his requests for funding for an investigator and a DNA expert.
Based on the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the postconviction
court’s granting relief for the Petitioner’s conviction of aggravated rape causing
bodily injury and reinstate his conviction for that offense. The judgment of the postconviction
court is affirmed in all other respects, and the case is remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This matter is before this court on a Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 9 interlocutory appeal to determine “whether the trial court erred in determining that it cannot order a new trial on the issue of punitive damages only.” Under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.07, “[a] new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues in an action . . . .” Accordingly, this court concludes that trial courts may order new trials addressing the limited matter of punitive damages without need of retrying the entirety of the parties’ dispute.

After Mother filed a notice of appeal of the termination of her parental rights, her appointed
counsel filed what was characterized as a brief, but which contained no statement of facts,
no statement of the case, and no argument. The Tennessee Department of Children’s
Services argues that Mother’s appeal should be waived under these circumstances. Based
on the Tennessee Supreme Court’s opinion in In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507 (Tenn.
2016), we are not at liberty to waive consideration of either the grounds for termination or
the best interests of the child despite the deplorable state of Mother’s “brief.” Following
our review, we reverse the trial court’s finding of the ground of abandonment based on the
Tennessee Department of Children’s Services’ decision not to defend that ground. We
affirm the remaining grounds, as well as the trial court’s finding that termination was in
the child’s best interest.

In this appeal from a judgment enforcing a settlement agreement, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting her counsel leave to withdraw. She further contends that she lacked the capacity to agree to the settlement. We discern no error in granting counsel leave to withdraw. And because the appellant failed to file a transcript or statement of the evidence, we must presume that the trial court’s findings relating to the appellant’s capacity are supported by the evidence. So we affirm.

Defendant, Kevin Meadows, was convicted as charged by a Jackson County Criminal Court jury of felony murder, aggravated arson, theft of property valued between $1,000 and $2,500, and two counts of tampering with evidence. The trial court imposed an effective life sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting Facebook Messenger communications when the State failed to properly authenticate the messages by establishing that the account belonged to Defendant. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jimmie Elwood Shelton, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his
probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. While on
probation, the Defendant was again charged with multiple additional crimes. After a
hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the
remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial
court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and when it ordered him to
confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Because the notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed this Court lacks jurisdiction
to consider this appeal.

Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights to her minor child. The
trial court found clear and convincing evidence to support five grounds for termination: (1)
abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home; (2) substantial noncompliance with
the permanency plan; (3) persistence of conditions; (4) severe abuse; and (5) failure to
manifest the ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also found that
termination was in the best interests of the minor child. Mother appeals the trial court’s
order terminating her rights. The Department of Children’s Services concedes on appeal
one of the grounds, and we find three others to be unsupported by clear and convincing
evidence. We find, however, the termination ground of severe abuse to be supported and
the best interests of the child to favor termination. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
termination of Mother’s parental rights.

Upon a review of the notice of appeal and the motion to dismiss filed by the
appellees, Ashley T. and Hunter T., this Court determined that the notice of appeal was not
timely filed in accordance with Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The Trial Court’s judgment was entered on November 9, 2022.

The appellant in this case challenges the trial court’s entry of an order of protection against
her. She argues that an order of protection should not issue when the sole incident for
which the appellee sought the order of protection occurred more than a year and a half
before appellee filed the petition for an order of protection. Under the circumstances of
this case, we agree with the appellant and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

After a borrower defaulted on a note and deed of trust, the lender sent a cure notice and, later, a notice of foreclosure. But the borrower did not receive either notice. When the borrower failed to cure the default, the home was sold at foreclosure. The borrower then sued to set aside the sale, arguing that the lender breached the deed of trust and violated Tennessee law by failing to deliver proper notice. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the lender, concluding that the notices only needed to be sent to, not received by, the borrower. We agree and affirm.

This divorce action involves a marriage of twenty-one years’ duration wherein the
husband maintained a significantly greater earning capacity than that of the wife. The
trial court ordered the husband to pay transitional alimony to the wife during the time she
sought to obtain her Ph.D. and for two years thereafter, or for seven years from the time
of the divorce, whichever time period was shorter. The amount of the husband’s child
support obligation was reduced to zero because he had agreed to pay the minor children’s
private school tuition. Furthermore, the trial court’s net division of the parties’ marital
assets and liabilities was nearly equal, and the trial court awarded attorney’s fees to the
wife. The husband has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment in its entirety. We further determine that the wife is entitled to an
award of attorney’s fees incurred on appeal, and we remand this matter for the trial
court’s determination concerning the proper amount to be awarded.

This appeal involves a claim by a surviving spouse against the decedent’s estate. After a
bench trial, the trial court concluded that the surviving spouse’s petition for specific
property, year’s support allowance, and elective share filed more than nine months after
the date of the decedent’s death was time barred pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated
section 31-4-102. Further, the trial court held that the surviving spouse was not prevented
from timely filing for specific property, year’s support allowance, and elective share by
fraud of the personal representative. The surviving spouse appeals. We affirm the ruling
of the trial court.

The Defendant, William Riley Gaul, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury
of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, possession of a firearm
during the commission of a dangerous felony, reckless endangerment, stalking, tampering
with evidence, and theft of property valued over $500. After merging the felony murder
conviction into the premeditated murder conviction, the trial court sentenced the Defendant
to an effective term of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The
Defendant raises twelve issues on appeal, which we have condensed and reordered as
follows: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the
especially aggravated stalking count of the presentment; (2) whether the trial court erred
by not sequestering the jury and by allowing the trial to be livestreamed by the media outlet
Law and Crime; (3) whether the trial court erred by admitting a Snapchat message between
the Defendant and the victim; (4) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to
present character evidence in the form of testimony that the Defendant was controlling,
manipulative, and possessive in his relationship with the victim; (5) whether the Defendant
was denied his right to a fair trial by the State’s introduction of his use of the video game
“Call of Duty” and the related evidence that the game included “wall banging,” or killing
individuals by shooting through the walls of a building; (6) whether the trial court erred in
allowing Bobby Jones, Jr., to testify as an expert and to offer trajectory evidence; (7)
whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce evidence of the Defendant’s
uncharged criminal conduct relating to the theft charge; (8) whether the evidence is
sufficient to sustain the convictions for first degree murder, felony murder, stalking,
possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and theft of property
valued over $500; (9) whether the jury returned mutually exclusive and patchwork verdicts;
and (10) whether the cumulative effect of the various alleged errors deprived the Defendant
of his right to a fair trial. Based on our review, we conclude that the Defendant’s felony
theft conviction in count three must be modified to a Class A misdemeanor and a sentence
of eleven months, twenty-nine days pursuant to the savings statute. The Defendant’s
remaining convictions are affirmed and the case remanded to the trial court for an amended
judgment in count three.

Defendant, Kayla Nicole Pauze was convicted by a jury of reckless homicide and
aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective ten-year sentence
in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant challenges the length,
range, and manner of her sentences. Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs
and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The issues on appeal involve the assessment of state business taxes against a pharmaceutical company that stored and sold its products from a warehouse in Memphis, Tennessee. The trial court granted summary judgment to the taxpayer, Eisai, Inc. (“Eisai”), on the ground that its pharmaceutical sales were not subject to business tax because the pharmaceuticals did not constitute “tangible personal property” as the term is defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-4-702(a)(23), which exempts products that are “inserted or affixed to the human body” by physicians or “dispensed . . . in the treatment of patients by physicians.” The Department of Revenue (“the Department”) appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court, but also rule in favor of Eisai on a different ground raised in the trial court and on appeal. In order to prevail in this case, the Department must establish that Eisai made “wholesale sales” to “retailers,” as distinguished from “wholesaler-towholesaler” sales, the latter of which are exempt from business tax. The undisputed facts reveal that Eisai’s sales were “wholesaler-to-wholesaler” sales. Accordingly, Eisai’s sales were not subject to business tax. As such, Eisai need not establish that the exception in § 67-4-702(a)(23) applies. Nevertheless, if Eisai’s sales to its distributors are within the scope of the business tax, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that Eisai’s sales are exempt under Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-4-702(a)(23). For these reasons, we affirm.

In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court
found that three statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing
evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence established
that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother
has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, filed by Jeff A. Willis (“Petitioner”), seeking to recuse the judge in this suit to collect a judgment. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Petitioner, and finding no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves application of the Tennessee Public Participation Act (TPPA). Plaintiff filed multiple causes of action against the City of Shelbyville, the Bedford County Listening Project, and several individuals – one of whom is a member of the Shelbyville City Council. Defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 12.06, and two of the non-governmental Defendants also filed petitions for dismissal and relief under the TPPA. The non-governmental Defendants also moved the trial court to stay its discovery order with respect to Plaintiff’s action against the City. The trial court denied the motion. The non-governmental Defendants filed applications for permission for extraordinary appeal to this Court and to the Tennessee Supreme Court; those applications were denied. Upon remand to the trial court, Plaintiff voluntarily non-suited his action pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01. The non-governmental Defendants filed motions to hear their TPPA petitions notwithstanding Plaintiff’s nonsuit. The trial court determined that Defendants’ TPPA petitions to dismiss were not justiciable following Plaintiff’s nonsuit under Rule 41.01. The Bedford County Listening Project and one individual Defendant, who is also a member of the Shelbyville City Council, appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a breach of contract action brought by two tenured university professors for
wrongful termination in violation of their respective contracts of employment and the
university’s tenure policy. The university denied breaching the contracts or its tenure
policy. It insists the elimination of the tenured faculty appointments was based on two
permissible grounds, “financial distress” and the “bona fide reduction or discontinuance of
a program or department of instruction.” The trial court found the university proved both
grounds and dismissed the complaints. It also found the university complied with other
relevant provisions of the tenure policy. This appeal followed. We affirm.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Tennessee
Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for
Sullivan County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Andrea
A. (“Mother”) to her minor children Serenity M., Alfred M. (“Alfie”), Chloe M., and Zoey
M. (“the Children,” collectively).1 The Children’s father, A.M. (“Father”), surrendered his
parental rights and is not a party to this appeal. After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered
an order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children on four grounds. Mother
appeals. DCS concedes the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home.
We vacate that ground. However, we find, as did the Juvenile Court, that the other three
grounds found—substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent
conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody—were
proven against Mother by clear and convincing evidence. We further find by clear and
convincing evidence, as did the Juvenile Court, that termination of Mother’s parental rights
is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm as modified, resulting in affirmance of the
termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Children.

A judgment creditor petitioned to enroll and enforce a Missouri judgment under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. The judgment debtor opposed the petition claiming that the doctrine of laches prevented the judgment creditor from enforcing its judgment. Alternatively, the judgment debtor claimed that equitable estoppel prevented the judgment creditor from collecting the full amount remaining on the judgment. The trial court enrolled the judgment but agreed that equitable estoppel applied. We conclude that equitable estoppel does not apply. So we affirm the enrollment of the foreign judgment and vacate the trial court’s decision as to enforceability.